Robillard v. Berends

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State: Illinois

Court: 1st District Appellate

Docket No: 1-06-0407 Rel

Case Date: 01/16/2007

Preview:No. 1-06-0407

ALAN T. ROBILLARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT W. BERENDS, THOMAS E. PATTERSON, and the PATTERSON LAW FIRM, P.C., Defendants-Appellants.

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Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 05 MI 602137

Honorable Sanjay Tailor, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff, Alan T. Robillard (Robillard), is a resident of the State of Massachusetts, employed by Forensic Science Applications located in Vineyard Haven, Massachusetts, where he works as a questioned document examiner, including forensic consulting and providing expert advise and testimony in federal and state courts. The defendants Scott Berends and Thomas E. Patterson are attorneys licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois and employed by defendant, the Patterson Law Firm, P.C. (the Firm) located in Chicago, Illinois. The plaintiff was granted a default judgment in Massachusetts against the defendants. The plaintiff then registered the judgment here in Illinois under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (735 ILCS 5/12-650 et seq. (West 2004)), and subsequently served each defendant with a citation to discover assets. The defendants moved to quash the registration of the foreign judgment, claiming Massachusetts lacked personal jurisdiction over them. The circuit court denied the defendants' motion finding that jurisdiction in Massachusetts was proper. The defendants'

No. 1-06-0407 appeal, contending the circuit court erred in denying their motion to quash the registration of the foreign judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm. Defendants admit that on January 14, 2005, Berends initiated contact with plaintiff by telephoning him in Massachusetts requesting plaintiff<s assistance as an expert witness concerning an alleged forged contract in a lawsuit defendants were handling in Chicago. Plaintiff was ultimately accepted by the defendants' client pursuant to his rate schedule to serve as their expert witness. The defendants transmitted documents to plaintiff in Massachusetts. On January 18, 2005, defendants asked plaintiff to provide a preliminary report of his conclusions after reviewing the documents. Plaintiff prepared a two-page, unsigned draft report that he transmitted via e-mail on January 21, 2005, to Chicago Illinois, where he was to give live testimony in the pending case. There are minor areas of dispute between the parties in the facts of this case. Defendants assert that on January 21, 2005, plaintiff telephoned Berends to confirm that Berends had received the draft report, and plaintiff was reminded that he would need to make travel arrangements to testify in Chicago on January 24, 2005. Plaintiff contends that Berends called him on January 24, 2005, to request that he finalize his report and testify that day. Plaintiff further claims that Berends called him a second time on January 24, 2005, to inform him that his testimony would not be needed until January 25, 2005. On January 25, plaintiff called defendants from the airport and explained he could not be there at the designated time, and he was directed not to come. Apparently, defendants' client paid another expert who testified in the

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No. 1-06-0407 case. After the case was completed, plaintiff transmitted his signed report and invoice to defendants. Plaintiff claims that he received certain documentary evidence relating to the lawsuit from Berends, examined the evidence in his Massachusetts lab and reported his preliminary results to Berends by telephone from Massachusetts. He further claims he was instructed to prepare a written report of his findings. On January 21, 2005, Berends telephoned plaintiff in Massachusetts and requested plaintiff to make arrangements to travel from Massachusetts to Chicago to testify at a hearing on January 24, 2005. Plaintiff prepared a written "Examination of Questioned Documents" in Massachusetts and sent it to Berends via e-mail on January 21, 2005. Berends reviewed the report and discussed certain problems with the report. Plaintiff then revised the report in Massachusetts and sent the corrected report to Berends via e-mail on January 24, 2005. Plaintiff purchased an airline ticket for January 24, and on that date, Berends telephoned plaintiff in Massachusetts to advise that the hearing was postponed to January 25, 2005, and requested plaintiff to be there at that time. On January 25, 2005, while in line to board the plane, plaintiff telephoned Berends and was advised that his testimony was not necessary. On the evening of January 25, 2005, Berends contacted plaintiff in Massachusetts and discussed the hearing and directed plaintiff to telephone another expert, Jim Hayes, who was working with defendants concerning the testimony of the opposing expert. On January 27, 2005, plaintiff telephoned Hayes from Massachusetts and shortly thereafter Berends asked plaintiff if he would be interested in working with defendants on

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No. 1-06-0407 another matter. Plaintiff sent his bill and the defendants offered no explanation as to why they failed to pay the bill. The plaintiff ultimately filed suit against the defendants in Dukes County, Massachusetts. The defendants failed to appear in that suit. On August 3, 2005, a default judgment was entered by the Edgartown district court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the amount of $3,207.96. Plaintiff filed this action to enforce the Massachusetts default judgment. Defendants moved to quash the registration of the default judgment and the circuit court, municipal division, found that Massachusetts properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the defendants and, thus, denied the defendants' motion. On appeal, the defendants renew its argument that the Massachusetts judgment is void because the Massachusetts court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. Specifically, defendants maintain they did not transact business in Massachusetts and did not have sufficient contacts with the State. The plaintiff, however, contends that the defendants' contacts with him in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts constituted a transaction of business, and that these contacts were constitutionally sufficient for Massachusetts to assert personal jurisdiction over them. The standard of review that applies to questions of law involving the registration of foreign judgments is de novo. Thorson v. La Salle National Bank, 303 Ill. App. 3d 711, 714 (1999); Khan v. Van Remmen, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 3d 49 (2001). Defendants claim that plaintiff had the burden of proving that the trial court had jurisdiction over defendants and that they failed to meet that burden and as a result the

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No. 1-06-0407 Massachusetts court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. Plaintiff contends that the defendants' contacts with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts constituted a transaction of business and that these contacts were constitutionally sufficient for Massachusetts to assert personal jurisdiction over defendants. ANALYSIS Under the doctrine of full faith and credit, the forum court will not rehear a case on its merits because the judgment is res judicata. Sackett Enterprises, Inc. v. Staren, 211 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1001 (1991). However, the trial court may inquire into whether a sister state had subject matter and personal jurisdiction in the matter. Sackett, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 1001. In Sackett, this court stated: "If this inquiry reveals a jurisdictional defect which would either render the foreign judgment void according to the law of the foreign state, or deprive the foreign court of jurisdiction over the nonresident under the general constitutional standards of due process the foreign judgment has no constitutional claim to full faith and credit." Sackett, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 1001. Whether Massachusetts courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant starts with a two-part inquiry. Good Hope Industries, Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 378 Mass. 1, 5-6, 389 N.E.2d 76, 79 (1979). First, we must determine whether jurisdiction is authorized under Massachusetts' long-arm statute. Second, we consider whether exercising jurisdiction in this

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No. 1-06-0407 case comports with federal constitutional due process requirements. The focus of the court is whether there was some minimum contact with the Commonwealth that resulted from an affirmative, intentional act of the defendants, such that it is fair and reasonable to require the defendants to come into Massachusetts to defend the action. Good Hope, 378 Mass. at 7, 379 N.E.2d at 80. The Massachusetts long-arm statute provides in part: "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person<s (a) transacting any business in this Commonwealth; (b) contracting to supply services or things in this Commonwealth[.]" Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A,

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