SECOND DIVISION
March 30, 2004

JUSTICE CAHILL delivered the opinion of the court:

The dispute in this case arose from a news article published in the Chicago Sun-Times onMarch 7, 2001, headlined Mob links hurt Rosemont casino bid. Plaintiff Joseph Salamone, whowas referred to in the article as a "reputed organized crime figure," filed a defamation and falselight invasion of privacy action against Chris Fusco, Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., and HollingerInternational, Inc. The trial court dismissed the action under section 2-615 of the Code of CivilProcedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)). We affirm.

Here, in full, is the article on which the complaint is based:

"Mob links hurt Rosemont casino bid

The Illinois Gaming Board Tuesday released more than a dozen pages ofreasons for revoking Emerald Casino's state gambling license and denying itsrequest to open a Rosemont gambling barge.

Mob ties, lies by company executives and a decision to begin building theRosemont casino without gaming-board approval all were cited in two legal ordersfrom the board.

Their release set off what could be a long battle in the northwest suburb. Emerald is denying the board's allegations and plans to file an appeal, which it mustdo by the end of business Tuesday.

'The company disagrees with the preliminary findings and intends to file itsresponse,' Emerald [p]resident Kevin Larson said in a news release. Emeraldofficials declined to comment further.

The company, the board said, failed to conduct a proper investigationbefore allowing a trust held by Sherri Boscarino, wife of reputed mobster, NickBoscarino, to get a stake in the planned casino. Joseph Salamone, anotherreputed organized crime figure, was another investor.

Gaming Board investors also learned that one of the subcontractorsworking on the casino site was D&P Construction. The owner of that company,Josephine DiFronzo, is married to Peter DiFronzo and is the sister-in-law of JohnDiFronzo, both of whom have been connected to the mob, according to thegaming board.

Emerald's decision to hammer out an agreement with Rosemont to beginconstruction compromised its financial integrity and business practices, the boardruled. Emerald already has spent $25 million on the project.

The board also cited misleading statements by principal owners KevinFlynn and his father, Donald, regarding the selection of Rosemont as a site." (Emphasis added.) Chris Fusco, Mob links hurt Rosemont casino bid, ChicagoSun-Times, March 7, 2001, at NP 27.

Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on January 11, 2002, alleging defamation per se,defamation per quod and false light invasion of privacy against all three defendants. Defendantsmoved to dismiss the complaint under section 2-615 of the Code for failure to state a claim onwhich relief can be granted. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the phrase "reputedorganized crime figure" was vague and capable of an innocent construction.

A dismissal under section 2-615 of the Code is reviewed de novo. Brandt v. BostonScientific Corp., 204 Ill. 2d 640, 644-45, 792 N.E.2d 296 (2003). When ruling on a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled facts in the complaint andreasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d77, 86, 672 N.E.2d 1207 (1996). If, after viewing the allegations in the light most favorable tothe plaintiff, the complaint fails to state a cause of action on which relief can be granted, themotion should be granted. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 86.

A statement is defamatory if it tends to cause such harm to the reputation of another thatit lowers that person in the eyes of the community or deters third persons from associating withthat person. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 87. A statement may be either defamatory on its face orproven defamatory through extrinsic facts that demonstrate the statement has a defamatorymeaning. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 87. A statement may be actionable per se if it is defamatory onits face and fits in one of the limited categories outlined by our supreme court. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2dat 87. Included in these categories are: (1) words that impute the commission of a crime; and (2)words that prejudice a party or impute lack of ability in his trade, profession or business. Bryson,174 Ill. 2d at 88. If the defamatory statement is actionable per se, the plaintiff need not plead orprove actual damages. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 87. These statements "are thought to be soobviously and materially harmful to the plaintiff that injury to [the plaintiff's] reputation may bepresumed." Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 87.

The innocent construction rule is an exception to the actionable per se categories: where astatement falls within one of the recognized categories of words that are actionable per se, but isreasonably capable of an innocent construction, the statement will not be found actionable per se. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 90. The innocent construction rule requires consideration of the statementin context, giving the words, and their implications, their natural and obvious meaning. Bryson,174 Ill. 2d at 90. "If, so construed, a statement 'may reasonably be innocently interpreted orreasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff, it cannot be actionableper se.' " Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 90, quoting Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 352, 442N.E.2d 195 (1982). Whether a statement is reasonably capable of an innocent construction is aquestion of law. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 90.

Plaintiff first contends he stated a cause of action for defamation per se. He argues theheadline Mob links hurt Rosemont casino bid and characterization of plaintiff in the article as a"reputed organized crime figure" impute the commission of a crime and plaintiff's inability to"adequately serve[] as an investor in the casino." Plaintiff also argues these characterizations arenot subject to the innocent construction rule.

Defendants respond, arguing the headline, when read in conjunction with the text of thearticle, and in particular the phrase "reputed organized crime figure," is reasonably capable of aninnocent construction. Defendants cite Antonelli v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 115 Ill. App. 3d 432,450 N.E.2d 876 (1983). The plaintiff in Antonelli brought a defamation per se action stemmingfrom the defendant's publication of a news article entitled Mobster vs. Media, which referred tothe plaintiff as a "reputed mobster." Antonelli, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 434. The court cited thegeneral rule that a headline and news report to which it refers must be considered together whendeciding whether words contained therein are reasonably capable of an innocent construction. Antonelli, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 435, citing Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 78 Ill. App. 3d 67, 71-72, 397 N.E.2d 41 (1979); Reed v. Albanese, 78 Ill. App. 2d 53, 58, 223 N.E.2d 419 (1966). After considering the headline and text of the article, the court held the words "mobster" and"reputed mobster" were not actionable per se because they were reasonably capable of aninnocent construction. Antonelli, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 435. The court reasoned that the headlinereference to "mobster" was made in conjunction with the balance of the story in which the plaintiffwas referred to as a "reputed mobster." Antonelli, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 435. The court defined"reputed" to mean " 'supposed, thought, or reckoned.' " Antonelli, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 435,quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1929 (1976). The court then defined"supposed" as " 'believed to be or accepted as such usu. on slight grounds or in error: erroneouslyimputed or ascribed.' " Antonelli, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 435, quoting Webster's Third NewInternational Dictionary 2298 (1971). The court concluded that under the plain meaning of theword "reputed," the defendant "accurately depicted [the] plaintiff as one about whom the word'mobster' had been 'supposedly,' perhaps 'erroneously imputed,' as the balance of the articlereveals, thereby supporting the 'innocent' construction of the word 'mobster.' " Antonelli, 115 Ill.App. 3d at 435. The court went on to note in dicta that the word "mobster" was a truthfulcharacterization of the plaintiff, who was an admitted convict. Antonelli, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 435-36.

Plaintiff argues Antonelli is distinguishable because he does not have a criminal record thatwould support the veracity of defendant's characterization of plaintiff as a member of the mob and"reputed organized crime figure." But the court in Antonelli did not rely on the plaintiff's criminalhistory to support its holding that the word "mobster," when modified by the word "reputed," isreasonably capable of an innocent construction. Nor does plaintiff cite to authority for hisargument that the lack of a criminal record would turn an otherwise nonactionable statementunder the innocent construction rule into a statement that is actionable per se.

We conclude that Antonelli is close enough factually to control the case before us. Reading the headline in conjunction with the full text of the article, we believe that defendantscharacterized plaintiff not as a mobster, but as a person who is believed to be, possiblyerroneously, an organized crime figure. There is nothing in the remainder of the article that wouldsupport an opposite conclusion.

Since we conclude that the statements pass an innocent construction test, we need notreach the constitutional question of whether the statements were, as the defendants argue,expressions of opinion protected under the first amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. I. We note in passing that defendants do not argue the opinion is that of theIllinois Gaming Board, nor do they raise the "fair-reporting privilege." See Myers v. TheTelegraph, 332 Ill. App. 3d 917, 923, 773 N.E. 2d 192 (2002) (fair-reporting privilege protectsnews accounts based on the written and verbal statements of governmental agencies and officialsmade in their official capacities). The official report by the Illinois Gaming Board refers toplaintiff as someone "associated with persons who have been identified as members and associatesof organized crime."

In reaching our conclusion that the words at issue in this case are reasonably capable of aninnocent construction, we recognize that the analysis relies heavily on a benign reading of"reputed." While the modifier "reputed" is a slippery word to handle, we have not found a singlecase where its use has been held irrelevant to an analysis of the actionable words it modifies. Forbetter or worse, the use of "reputed" in front of derisive characterizations of people appears to bea safe harbor for the media. The obvious question: "Reputed by whom?" is easily deflected by thestatutory privilege that protects a journalist from revealing his sources. See 735 ILCS 5/8-901 etseq. (West 2002); People v. Slover, 323 Ill. App. 3d 620, 623, 753 N.E.2d 554 (2001) (reportershave a statutory, qualified privilege protecting their sources, whether confidential or not, fromcompelled disclosure).

Having concluded that plaintiff's defamation per se claims were properly dismissed, weturn to plaintiff's allegations of defamation per quod.

A defamatory statement that is not actionable per se must be accompanied by an allegationthat the plaintiff suffered special damages. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 87-88. Special damages in thiscontext are damages to the plaintiff's reputation and pecuniary losses resulting from thedefamatory statement. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 104. "[G]eneral allegations such as damage to one'shealth or reputation, economic loss, and emotional distress are insufficient to state a cause ofaction for defamation per quod." Kurczaba v. Pollock, 318 Ill. App. 3d 686, 694, 742 N.E.2d425 (2000).

Plaintiff alleged the following damages against each defendant in his counts for defamationper quod:

"As a direct and proximate result of [the] statement, [plaintiff] sufferedhumiliation, embarrassment and harm to his reputation in that members of hiscommunity who associated with him prior to the publication of the March 7, 2001article ceased associating with him after the publication of the article and, oninformation and belief, repeat customers of his independent grocery store ceasedpatronizing his store after the publication of the article.

*** [Plaintiff] has also suffered humiliation and embarrassment in that hehas been subjected to repeated jokes and ridicule by members of his communitybased on his alleged status as an organized crime figure, e.g., suggestions madealoud before [plaintiff] and other members of his community that [plaintiff] wouldbreak a person's leg or otherwise cause them harm if they were to displease him.

*** As a further direct and proximate result of [defendants' ] statements,and the effect they have had on his treatment in his community, [plaintiff] hassuffered from sleeplessness, depression and weight loss."

There is no precise definition for what will constitute special damages sufficient to sustaina cause of action for defamation per quod. See Kurczaba, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 694. In Kurczaba,the plaintiffs alleged generally that as a result of defamatory statements made by the defendants,the plaintiffs suffered damage to their reputations, loss of business income, great embarrassment,public humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress. Kurczaba, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 692,695. The court concluded the allegations lacked sufficient specificity to support their claim fordefamation per quod. Kurczaba, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 695. The court relied on Anderson v.Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 416-17, 667 N.E.2d 1296 (1996) (allegations that the plaintiffwas damaged monetarily by losing gainful employment and wages and had suffered great mentalpain and anguish for which she underwent expensive treatment); Quinn v. Jewel Food Stores Inc.,276 Ill. App. 3d 861, 870, 658 N.E.2d 1225 (1995) (allegations that a franchiser refused to grantthe plaintiff a franchise); Barry Harlem Corp. v. Kraff, 273 Ill. App. 3d 388, 395, 652 N.E.2d1077 (1995) (allegation that upon information and belief, the plaintiff lost patients who wouldhave otherwise presented themselves for treatment); Taradash v. Adelet/Scott-Fetzer Co., 260 Ill.App. 3d 313, 318, 628 N.E.2d 884 (1993) (allegations that former customers refused to deal withthe plaintiff, rendering the plaintiff unable to sell his product, which resulted in lost commissionsand income); Schaffer v. Zekman, 196 Ill. App. 3d 727, 733, 554 N.E.2d 988 (1990) (allegationsthat the plaintiff had been disgraced and injured in his professional reputation); Heerey v. Berke,188 Ill. App. 3d 527, 532, 544 N.E.2d 1037 (1989) (allegations that the plaintiff suffered frommental anguish and distress, acute nervousness, bodily pain and the plaintiff's reputation forhonesty and integrity, business opportunities, as well as her professional standing had beenimpaired); Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Phillips, 154 Ill. App. 3d 574, 585-86, 506 N.E.2d1370 (1987) (allegations that the plaintiff was exposed to public hatred, contempt and ridiculethat injured the plaintiff's public confidence, business and reputation); von Solbrig MemorialHospital v. Licata, 15 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 1030-31, 305 N.E.2d 252 (1973) (allegations that theplaintiff suffered ill health, emotional distress and damage to reputation and medical practice). Kurczaba, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 694-95. The court also distinguished Becker v. Zellner, 292 Ill.App. 3d 116, 127, 684 N.E.2d 1378 (1997), because the plaintiffs there alleged a third party hadactually stopped doing business with the plaintiffs as a result of the defamatory statement. Kurczaba, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 694-95.

Plaintiff's allegations of special damages are no more specific than those contained inKurczaba or the cases relied on by Kurczaba. Plaintiff alleged he "suffered humiliation,embarrassment and harm to his reputation" because members of his community who associatedwith plaintiff before the article was published ceased associating with him after the publication ofthe article. Plaintiff also alleged that, on information and belief, repeat customers of his grocerystore ceased patronizing his store after the article was published. Plaintiff alleged humiliation andembarrassment from being the subject of repeated jokes and ridicule by members of hiscommunity. Finally, plaintiff alleged he has suffered from sleeplessness, depression and weightloss. Plaintiff failed to allege with particularity which members of the community have ceasedassociating with him and patronizing his store. Nor did plaintiff allege actual monetary loss froma lack of business. Plaintiff's allegations that he was ridiculed and suffered sleeplessness,depression and weight loss lack the same specificity.

Finally, we consider plaintiffs' false light invasion of privacy claims. To sustain a cause ofaction for false light invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must allege: (1) he was placed in a false lightbefore the public as a result of the defendant's actions; (2) the false light would be highly offensiveto a reasonable person; and (3) the defendant acted with actual malice. Kurczaba, 318 Ill. App.3d at 696. Plaintiff has failed to allege the most basic element of a false light cause of action: thatthe statement was false. See Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill. App. 3d 672, 683, 691 N.E.2d 107(1998) (most basic element to false light cause of action is false statement). The statementcharacterizes plaintiff as supposedly or known to be, perhaps erroneously, an organized crimefigure. While the statement may be construed as a strong criticism of plaintiff, it is not astatement that is capable of being verified as true or false. See Dubinski v. United Airlines MasterExecutive Council, 303 Ill. App. 3d 317, 332, 708 N.E.2d 441 (1999) (false light plaintiff mustallege false statement; strong language critical of the plaintiff is insufficient to support a false lightcause of action).

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

WOLFSON, P.J., and BURKE, J., concur.