FIRST DIVISION
MARCH 31, 2003

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendants, Melvin and Collette Tolliver (the Tollivers), and Maurice K. Robertson,Bennie A. Robertson, III, the Estates of Bennie Robertson, Jr. and Essie Bell Robertson(collectively, the Robertson defendants), appeal from the trial court's grant of judgment on thepleadings in favor of plaintiff, Scottsdale Insurance Company (Scottsdale) in a declaratoryjudgment action. The court found that a commercial general liability issued by Scottsdale to theTollivers unambiguously establishes the limits for any one occurrence to be $1 million,regardless of the number of people who sustain injuries thereby. For the reasons that follow, weaffirm.

BACKGROUND

The Robertson defendants were tenants in an apartment building located at 2114 E. 69thStreet in Chicago. The building was owned by a land trust, the beneficial interest of which washeld by the Tollivers. Sometime between December 23, 2000, and January 3, 2001, Bennie Jr.and Essie Robertson died and Maurice Robertson and Bennie Robertson III were injured as aresult of carbon monoxide poisoning in the apartment building.

The Robertson defendants subsequently filed suit against the Tollivers, alleging that theirinjuries (and deaths) were proximately caused by the Tolliver's acts and omissions pertaining tothe maintenance and configuration of the property's heating system, or other negligent acts inmaintaining the property.

Scottsdale acknowledged that the policy it issued to the Tollivers applies to the accidentthat gave rise to the Robertson defendants' claims, and offered to settle the lawsuit for $1 million,the amount Scottsdale claims is the policy's limit for any one occurrence. The Robertsondefendants rejected that offer, and asked instead for $2 million, the amount they claim they aredue under the policy, since its provisions with respect to bodily injury coverage are ambiguous.⁽¹⁾

The instant declaratory action ensued. In its complaint, Scottsdale sought a declarationfrom the trial court that the policy's provisions are unambiguous, and that its per occurrence limitis Scottsdale's maximum liability under the circumstances presented by the Robertson defendants'lawsuit. Cross motions for judgment on the pleadings were filed (735 ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West1998)), and the trial court entered judgment in Scottsdale's favor.

ANALYSIS

The Robertson defendants argue that because the policy is, at the very least, ambiguous asto whether the occurrence limits apply, in aggregate, to all bodily injuries suffered by allindividuals as a result of the accident, this court should reverse the decision of the trial courtwhich found in Scottsdale's favor.

We note first that the entry of judgment on the pleadings is reviewed de novo. M.A.K. v.Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 198 Ill. 2d 249, 255, 764 N.E.2d 1 (2001).

Contracts of insurance are subject to the same rules of construction as are applicable toother types of contracts. When construing an insurance contract, the primary objective is to giveeffect to the intent of the parties as expressed by the terms of the agreement. De Los Reyes v.Travelers Insurance Co., 135 Ill. 2d 353, 358, 553 N.E.2d 301 (1990). If the language isambiguous, or is susceptible of at least two reasonable interpretations, it is to be construed infavor of the insured and against the insurer, as the drafter of the document; however, if thelanguage of the policy is clear and unambiguous, it will be applied as written. United States FireInsurance Co. v. Schnackenberg, 88 Ill. 2d 1, 5, 429 N.E.2d 1203 (1981); United States Fidelity& Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 144 Ill. 2d 64, 73 (578 N.E.2d 926 (1991). Courts willnot strain to find an ambiguity in an insurance policy where none exists. McKinney v. AllstateInsurance Co., 188 Ill. 2d 493, 497, 722 N.E.2d 1125 (1999). Finally, the construction of aninsurance policy is a question of law subject to de novo review. State Farm Mutual AutomobileInsurance Co. v. Villicana, 181 Ill. 2d 436, 441, 692 N.E.2d 1196 (1998).

Relevant portions of the declarations page in the policy under examination provide thatthe aggregate limits of liability for products/completed operations is $1 million, and that thegeneral aggregate (other than products/completed operations) is $ 2 million. Beneath thislanguage appears "Coverage A," entitled bodily injury and property damage liability. Thissection provides that the limit for any one occurrence, subject to the products/completedoperations and general aggregate limits of liability, is $1 million.

The policy itself provides:

SECTION I -- COVERAGES

COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY

1.  Insuring Agreement

b.  This insurance applies to "bodily injury" ... only if:

     (1) The "bodily injury" ... is caused by an occurrence" ...

SECTION III - LIMITS OF INSURANCE

     a. Insureds;

     b. Claims made or "suits" brought; or

     c.  Persons or organizations making claims or bringing "suits."

     ***

    b.  Damages under coverage A ...

     a.  Damages under Coverage A ...

because of all "bodily injury" and "property damage" arising out of any one "occurrence."

The policy defines "Bodily Injury" as:

bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, including death resulting from any of these at anytime.

The policy defines "Occurrence" as:

an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.

According to the Robertson defendants, the ambiguity in the policy arises out of itsdefinition of "bodily injury," which they claim makes bodily injury specific to a single individual("sickness or disease sustained by a person ..."). [Emphasis supplied]. By linking the occurrencelimits to the bodily injury of a person, the Robertson defendants argue, the policy implies that"each" or "any one" persons who sustain bodily injury has his or her own occurrence limits. TheRobertson defendants insist that the ambiguity becomes "starkly apparent" when one engages inthe "simple exercise" of substituting the policy definitions of "bodily injury" and "accident,"along with the dictionary definition of "a," for the terms they define.⁽²⁾ This yields the followingpolicy construction:

[T]he Each Occurrence Limit [i.e., the $1 million limit stated in the declarations] is the most we will pay for the sum of: ... Damages because of all bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by one or each or any one person ... arising out of ... any one accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.

The Robertson defendants claim that if, as this exercise shows, the occurrence limitapplies to all bodily injury sustained by "one person or "each person," or "any one person," thenby implication, multiple occurrence limits must apply to all bodily injury sustained by multiplepersons. We are not so persuaded.

Preliminarily, as Scottsdale points out, the Robertson defendants' assertions with respectto policy construction fly in the face of well settled Illinois law that the number of occurrencesunder liability policies is determined by the number of causes, and not the number of effects. Illinois Central Railroad v. Accident and Casualty Company of Winterthur, 317 Ill. App. 3d 737,756, 739 N.E.2d 1049 (2000); United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Insurance Co., 268 Ill. App.3d 598, 648, 643 N.E.2d 1226 (1994); Illinois National Insurance Co. v. Szczepkowicz, 185 Ill.App. 3d 1091, 1094-95, 542 N.E.2d 90 (1989) (number of occurrences determined by referenceto the number of causes of injury rather than by the number of individual claims or injuries). Although the Robertson defendants concede that the cause of injuries in this case (theleakage of carbon monoxide) constituted one occurrence, they insist that this is not fatal to theirsuggested policy construction, in light of the ambiguity within the policy as to whether the claimsof all persons suffering bodily injury are subject to a single occurrence limit.

We are aware of no Illinois decision directly on point, however, the Robertson defendantsfind purported support for their position in Lyon v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, 207Ill. App. 3d 730, 566 N.E.2d 388 (1990), and Roth v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Company, 324Ill. App. 3d 293, 754 N.E.2d 439 (2001), petition for leave to appeal allowed, 197 Ill. 2d 584,763 N.E.2d 777 )(2001), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 202 Ill. 2d 490, 782 N.E.2d212 (2002).

Lyon involved eight separate McDonald's franchises, each of which paid its ownpremium for coverage under a single policy. 207 Ill. App. 3d at 731. The receipts from eachstore were placed in separate envelopes for deposit into separate accounts. Id. On November 23,1987, and again on January 16, 1988, the vehicle carrying those receipts was broken into whilethe driver was inside one of the restaurants collecting receipts. Id. The thief removed severalenvelopes of money the first time, representing receipts from seven different restaurants; thesecond time, proceeds from four of the restaurants were taken. Lyons, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 731.

Under the policy's Limits of Liability section, it was stated that:

... All loss incidental to an actual or attempted fraudulent, dishonest or criminal act or series of related acts at the premises, whether committed by one or more persons, shall be deemed to arise out of one occurrence.

The insurance company argued that since the receipts for the various restaurants weretogether in one location and were all taken at the same time, only one occurrence took place perburglary, so that its total liability was for two occurrences. Lyons, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 732. Theinsureds argued that, by its terms, the "at the premises" provision applied only to acts or series ofrelated acts which occur at a franchise. No such limit is imputed to a loss incidental to a series ofrelated acts that occur outside the premises, as was the case here. Id.

The court in Lyons observed that, if a thief ran past each of the McDonald locations, andgrabbed a bag of cash from each, then there would be no question that each theft represented aseparate occurrence. And, in contrast, if a thief committed several criminal acts within a singleMcDonald's, it would be treated as one occurrence under the policy, regardless of the number ofpeople affected. 207 Ill. App. 3d at 732. The court's analysis centered around the determinationof whether one or multiple occurrences could be said to have taken place under the circumstancespresented. The court focused on the fact that separate premiums were paid for each of thefranchises and that the funds in question were segregated and earmarked for separate accounts,and concluded that the "premises" language indeed created an ambiguity, to be resolved in favorof the reasonable interpretation advanced by the insured. Lyons, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 735.

Although we find the decision in Lyons to be well reasoned, we do not find the particularanalysis in which the court in Lyons engaged helpful to our resolution of the issue at bar. Here, itis already clear (and the Robertson defendants do not contest) that a single occurrence gave riseto all of the injuries. Our analysis must accordingly focus on whether the policy's definition of"bodily injury" creates an ambiguity such that the construction urged by the insureds oughtprevail. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 607 N.E.2d1204 (1993).

The Robertson defendants point to Roth as an example of a case where the court found anambiguity as to whether the per person or the per occurrence limits of an uninsured motoristprovision were triggered by the death of an insured. In Roth, a 17 year old was killed in anautomobile accident. Suit was brought on behalf of the minor's estate for personal injuries underthe Survival Act, and a separate claim was brought by the parents and siblings under theWrongful Death Act. 324 Ill. App. 3d at 296. The wording of the policy under considerationwas such that the per occurrence limit was not made subject to the per person limit, so that thecourt found an ambiguity as to whether the two separate claims fell under one or the other clause. In particular, neither clause indicated that the application of one demanded that the other beforfeited. Roth, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 298. Reading the clauses together, the court found that theinterpretations urged by both the insured and the insurer were reasonable, and therefore resolvedthe dispute against the drafter, the insurer. Roth, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 299.

The court in Roth emphasized the importance of reading provisions of an insurancepolicy not in isolation, but in light of each other, to determine whether an ambiguity exists. 324Ill. App. 3d at 298, citing Douglas v. Allied American Insurance, 312 Ill. App. 3d 535 (2000). Employing that approach in the present case, we note that unlike in Roth, the policy underexamination in the present case explicitly makes its per person limit of liability subject to its peroccurrence limit. Specifically, the policy provides that "the Each Occurrence Limit is the mostwe will pay for the sum of ... Damages under Coverage A ... because of all 'bodily injury' and'property damage' arising out of any one 'occurrence.'" See Mckinney, 188 Ill. 2d at 493 (whereinalmost identical "subject to" language was found to unambiguously limit an insurer's liabilitylimit).

Scottsdale directs our attention to Greaves v. State Farm Insurance Co., 984 F. Supp. 12(D.D.C. 1997) aff'd, 172 F.3d 919 (Table), 1998 WL 720667 (D.C.Cir.), 335 U.S. App. D.C. 318(Unpublished Disposition), and contends that it is on all fours with the instant case. We havecarefully reviewed the decision in Greaves, and, although we recognize it is not binding authorityon this court, we find its reasoning to be sound and instructive.

In Greaves, two people were injured and one person died as a result of an apartment fire. 984 F. Supp. at 13. The apartment owner's insurer provided coverage with limits of $1 millionfor each occurrence and $2 million in the aggregate. Greaves, 984 F. Supp. at 14. The insurancepolicy at issue defined "bodily injury" in a manner identical to the policy under examination subjudice, as "bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, including death from any ofthese at any time." 984 F. Supp. at 15. Like the Robertson defendants in this case, the plaintiffsin Greaves argued that the definitions of "bodily injury" and "occurrence," if read together,created an ambiguity. Specifically, that the phrase "by a person" in the definition of "bodilyinjury" could reasonably be interpreted as referring to only one person, so that injury to multiplepersons triggered multiple occurrence limits.

Like the Robertson defendants, the plaintiffs in Greaves contended that, though a singlecause was responsible for all damages sustained, each person who suffers bodily injuryconstitutes a separate occurrence under the policy's definition. Id. Again like the Robertsondefendants, the plaintiffs in Greaves urged a construction whereby the discrete phrase "by aperson" acts as a limitation on quantity. Their conclusion was that, if bodily injury encompassesinjury to a single person, then each time a person sustains bodily injury, a separate accidentoccurs, triggering additional liability limits. Id.

In rejecting the plaintiff's argument, the court in Greaves initially condemned the "seriesof elaborate and novel feats of syntactical acrobatics" necessary to reach the conclusion that eachperson who suffers bodily injury constitutes a separate occurrence under the policy's language. 984 F. Supp. at 15. The court concluded that the only reasonable interpretation of the phrase "bya person" is that it functions as a qualitative limitation. That is to say, the policy employs thephrase "by a person" to clarify that it is human bodily injury to which the policy's protectionsextend. 984 F. Supp. at 16.

The interpretation by the court in Greaves that the limitation was qualitative and notquantitative was "buttressed" by other language of the policy in that case. Specifically, in theparagraph that set forth the per occurrence limit of coverage in that policy appeared the language"the most that we will pay for all medical expenses because of bodily injury sustained by any oneperson is [$5,000]." Id. It was significant to the court that the insurer clearly employedlanguage of a quantitative nature in that section of the policy, because to sanction the plaintiff's"awkward" interpretation of the phrase "a person" would create an internal tension within thepolicy by suggesting that its drafters used the imprecise "a person" and the specific "any oneperson" synonymously. Id.

Here, the policy under review contains a Medical Expense Limit to "any one person" thatis identical to the language of the policy considered by the court in Greaves. We agree that toassume limitation language in one section of a policy is used synonymously with less preciselanguage in another section represents a strained and unnatural interpretation. See, e.g., Yarbertv. Industrial Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., 56 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1036 (1978) (in order not tolead to unreasonable results, or to defeat the intention of the parties to a contract of insurance, theconstruction thereof must not be arbitrary, irrational or forced). We find that where the draftersmeant to employ a term of numerical limitation, they knew how to do so.

The Robertson defendants argue that, if the phrase "to a person" were understood as aqualitative limitation, it would be redundant and therefore impermissible, since cars and dogs(for example) cannot sue for bodily injuries. In light of the fact that insurance policiesconsistently define "bodily injury" as "bodily injury," we find the Robertson defendant'sargument as to the impropriety of this so-called redundancy to be unpersuasive. Moreover, ourresearch has revealed that the exact definition of bodily injury under examination in this case iswidely used in insurance contracts (see, e.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.George, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 762 N.E.2d 1163 (2002); Johnson v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co., 323 Ill. App. 3d 376, 752 N.E.2d 449 (2001); Creamer v. State FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Co., 161 Ill. App. 3d 223, 514 N.E.2d 214 (1987)), and has neverbeen challenged or criticized as being redundant. In contrast, we note that if every instance ofbodily injury indeed constitutes a separate occurrence, then the language "[t]he most we will payfor all damages because of bodily ... arising out of any one occurrence [is $1 million]" containedin the policy would be rendered mere surplusage. See International Minerals and ChemicalsCorp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 168 Ill. Ap. 3d 161, 178, 522 N.E.2d 758 (1988) (aconstruction of an insurance policy which results in surplusage is to be avoided).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the reading of the policy urged by theRobertson defendants is forced and unreasonable. Because the policy's language is notsusceptible of the interpretation the Robertson defendants advance (Schnackenberg, 88 Ill. 2d at5), we find no ambiguity and are obliged to apply the terms as they are written.

Affirmed.

MCNULTY and O'MALLEY, JJ., concur.

2. The Robertson defendants supply us with the definition of "a" found in Webster's newWorld Dictionary (3d College Ed. 1988): 1 a) one; one sort of [we planted a tree] b) each; anyone [a gun is dangerous] ... 2 [[orig. a prep. < OE an, on, at]] to each; in each; for each; per [oncea day] ... Webster's Dictionary (3d College Ed. 1988) at p. 1.