Seitz-Partridge v. Loyola University of Chicago

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State: Illinois

Court: 1st District Appellate

Docket No: 1-09-3550 Rel

Case Date: 03/31/2011

Preview:SECOND DIVISION MARCH 31, 2011

1-09-3550 JEANINE SEITZ-PARTRIDGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, ALAN WOLFE, ADAM DRIKS, ALLEN FRANKFATER, GAYATRI VEDANTAM and DAVID KEATING, Defendants-Appellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 03 L12349 Honorable Allen S. Goldberg and Daniel J. Pierce, Judges Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Karnezis and Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION The plaintiff, Jeanine Seitz-Partridge, initiated this lawsuit in 2003 in the circuit court of Cook County seeking injunctive relief and damages against the defendant, Loyola University of Chicago1 (Loyola) and individual faculty members of the school. The plaintiff alleged she was wrongfully denied advancement into Loyola's molecular biology Ph.D. program. In February 2006, the trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss counts III and IV of the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code). 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2004). Count III alleged tortious interference by the individual defendants with the contract between the plaintiff and Loyola; and count IV alleged defamation per se against the plaintiff by the individual defendants.

The plaintiff's original complaint named Stritch School of Medicine as a defendant. In 2005, the trial court granted the defendants' uncontested motion to dismiss the school from the lawsuit.

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1-09-3550 At that time, the trial court also granted the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. The dismissal of those two counts, as well as the denial of injunctive relief, remained in effect for the duration of the pendency of the case. On December 8, 2009, the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the following: count I, which alleged breach of an express contract between the plaintiff and Loyola; count II, which alleged breach of an implied contract between the plaintiff and Loyola; and count V, which alleged defamation per quod by the individual defendants. The trial court denied, as moot, the plaintiff's motion to reconsider the trial court's order dismissing her request for injunctive relief. The court further denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to file a sixth amended complaint. This action disposed of the plaintiff's case in its entirety. On December 21, 2009, the plaintiff filed a timely appeal of the December 8, 2009, order and all prior orders striking or dismissing all counts of her fifth amended complaint. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. May 30, 2008). On appeal, the plaintiff raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the action for breach of contract; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to file a sixth amended complaint; (3) whether the trial court improperly denied the motion to reconsider its dismissal of the request for injunctive relief; and (4) whether the trial court erred in dismissing the count which alleged defamation per se. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand the case to the circuit court of Cook County.

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1-09-3550 BACKGROUND The record contains the following facts and allegations. The plaintiff enrolled in Loyola's highly selective molecular biology program in July 2000. She was awarded a graduate tuition fellowship and a position as a graduate assistant for which she was paid a stipend. The graduate assistant position was part of a class entitled "Thesis Research." The plaintiff was a member of Dr. Alan Wolfe's research staff, and Wolfe was her mentor and advisor in the program. In order to continue in the program as a Ph.D. candidate, the plaintiff needed to pass a preliminary examination by the end of her second year in the program. This examination required the plaintiff to write a grant proposal and present an oral defense of her proposal to a committee made up of the defendants Drs. Wolfe, Adam Driks, David Keating, Gayatri Vedantam and the committee chair, Allen Frankfater (known collectively as the Preliminary Examination Committee, or PEC). According to Loyola's written guidelines for the program, a student should take a course entitled "Research Ethics" by the end of the student's second spring semester. Relying on Wolfe's advice, the plaintiff deferred taking this class and had not taken it prior to her work on her grant proposal. On or about May 28, 2002, the plaintiff was given a topic for her preliminary examination by the PEC. She prepared an abstract and specific aims of her grant proposal which the PEC approved on July 18, 2002. The plaintiff submitted her written grant proposal in August 2002 and gave her oral defense of the proposal on September 9, 2002. At the conclusion of the oral defense, the members of the PEC privately deliberated. Professor Frankfater then verbally told the plaintiff, in the presence of the full PEC, that she passed the oral examination; that she passed the first part, or "Aim 1" of her written examination; and that she conditionally passed "Aim 2" but she needed to revise that part of 3

1-09-3550 the proposal. The plaintiff alleged that, contrary to the requirements in Loyola's guidelines, she never received a written evaluation of her grant proposal at the time of her oral defense, nor a written summary of the PEC's meeting held after her oral defense. The plaintiff subsequently revised the "Aim 2" section of her grant proposal with Wolfe's aid and submitted it to the PEC. Wolfe's later deposition statements indicated that four out of the five PEC members told him verbally that they would vote affirmatively to pass the plaintiff. Before the vote to pass the plaintiff was official, Professor Vedantam, a member of the PEC, accused the plaintiff of plagiarism, and the other members of the PEC reversed their opinions about passing the plaintiff. A written critique of the plaintiff's preliminary examination was prepared by the PEC and given to the program's steering committee in charge of student discipline. The PEC did not determine whether the plaintiff's plagiarism conduct was intentional. In her complaint filed in the circuit court of Cook County, the plaintiff alleged that the PEC's critique contained fabricated statements which misled the steering committee into believing that the plaintiff's work was subpar and that she would have failed her preliminary examination even without the plagiarism charge. The plaintiff alleged that the reason the PEC sent the critique to the steering committee was to make a permanent record of the allegations of plagiarism. The steering committee had the authority to overrule the PEC and could have given the plaintiff a passing grade or directed that she rewrite the portions of her work that were allegedly plagiarized. However, the steering committee agreed with the PEC that the plaintiff had committed plagiarism according to Loyola's definition. No determination was made by the steering committee as to whether the plaintiff plagiarized with the intent to deceive. The steering committee also agreed 4

1-09-3550 with the PEC's conclusion that because of the plagiarism, it was impossible to determine whether the plaintiff understood the material. It was explained to the plaintiff that according to the guidelines of the program, she had the opportunity to take a second preliminary examination on a different question to determine her eligibility to continue in the Ph.D. program. If she failed the second examination, she would be dismissed from the Ph.D. program. The plaintiff then took a second preliminary examination. After review, the PEC determined that plaintiff failed both the written and the oral portions of her second preliminary examination. The members of the PEC sent their individual critiques of the plaintiff's examination to the steering committee. The steering committee independently reviewed the materials and unanimously agreed with the conclusions of the PEC. The associate dean of the graduate school reviewed the steering committee's recommendation and conducted his own independent review. On March 27, 2003, the associate dean informed the plaintiff that she was dismissed from the Ph.D. program. The plaintiff does not allege any wrongful conduct on the part of the defendants regarding the results of her second failed preliminary examination. The plaintiff appealed to the school's hearing board pursuant to Loyola's academic grievance procedure. The hearing board consisted of two Loyola professors and one Loyola Ph.D. student whom the plaintiff did not know. The board heard testimony from the plaintiff and several of the professors involved in the plaintiff's review. On May 28, 2003, the board upheld the decision to dismiss the plaintiff from the program. The plaintiff appealed the hearing board's decision to the associate vice president for research, who was also the dean of the graduate school. The plaintiff submitted documents prepared with the 5

1-09-3550 aid of her legal counsel. The dean confirmed the hearing board's decision. The plaintiff then pursued the third level of review conducted by Loyola's vice president for health services. Again, she submitted documents prepared by her legal counsel. On August 19, 2003, the vice president upheld the decision to dismiss the plaintiff from the program. In October 2003, the plaintiff brought this lawsuit in the circuit court of Cook County. The plaintiff filed a fourth amended complaint in May 2005. The defendants filed a motion pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code to strike the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. On September 13, 2005, the trial court dismissed, without prejudice, count III of the fourth amended complaint which alleged tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and count IV which alleged defamation per se. In that same ruling, the trial court denied the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. However, the trial court also denied the defendants' motion to strike count V, which alleged defamation per quod. The plaintiff subsequently filed a fifth amended complaint on October 5, 2005, in which she alleged the following five causes of action: (I) breach of express contract; (II) breach of implied-infact contract; (III) tortious interference with contractual relationship by the individual professor defendants; (IV) defamation per se by the individual professor defendants; and (V) defamation per quod by the individual professor defendants. In her prayer for relief in the fifth amended complaint, the plaintiff asked: that the university expunge her record of failure on the preliminary examination and all allegations of plagiarism; that her student record be amended to reflect a passing grade on her

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1-09-3550 first preliminary examination; that the university confer a master's degree in molecular biology2 upon her; that she be reinstated in the Ph.D. program; that she be awarded monetary compensation for all consequential damages which she sustained as a result of the alleged contractual breaches; that she be awarded prejudgment interest and costs; and any other equitable relief that the court deemed just. The plaintiff requested compensatory damages for pain, suffering, humiliation, lost academic and professional opportunities and lost past and future income resulting from her alleged defamation claims. On February 10, 2006, the trial court granted the defendants' section 2-615 motion to dismiss, with prejudice, the plaintiff's count for tortious interference with contractual relationship, (count III), and the count for defamation per se (count IV) of the plaintiff's fifth amended complaint. At that time, the trial court also granted the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. The trial court stated in striking the request for injunctive relief that the plaintiff "can preserve those rights for appeal." The plaintiff then retained different counsel, who conducted further depositions of various Loyola professors. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for partial summary judgment on her request for injunctive relief, a motion to reconsider the trial court's prior order striking her request for injunctive relief and a motion for leave to file a sixth amended complaint. On December 8, 2009, six years after the plaintiff's initial complaint was filed, a newly

As of May 2005, the plaintiff had received a master of science degree from Loyola's biology program. Beginning in the fall of 2004, she was employed by Loyola in numerous positions, such as biology teaching assistant, biology instructor and nursing tutor. 7

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1-09-3550 assigned judge3 granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2008)), on count I (breach of express contract), count II (breach of implied contract) and count V (defamation per quod) of the plaintiff's fifth amended complaint; denied, as moot, the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on three questions of law; denied, as moot, the plaintiff's motion to reconsider a previous order striking her request for injunctive relief; and denied the plaintiff's request for leave to file a sixth amended complaint. On December 21, 2009, the plaintiff filed an appeal from the trial court's order of December 8, 2009, in which she stated that she was appealing: "[a]ll orders striking or dismissing complaints filed by the plaintiff," including the "February 2, [sic] 2006," order (dismissing the tortious interference with a contractual relationship claim, the defamation per se claim and striking the request for injunctive relief in the plaintiff's fifth amended complaint); the "September 9, [sic] 2005," order (dismissing the tortious interference with a contractual relationship claim, the defamation per se claim and striking the request for injunctive relief in the plaintiff's fourth amended complaint); the "April 21, 2005," order (dismissing the breach of implied contract count, the tortious interference with a contractual relationship count, and the defamation per se count of the plaintiff's third amended complaint); and "[a]ll orders related to or deriving from the aforesaid orders." ANALYSIS The appeal before this court concerns the plaintiff's fifth amended complaint. We first consider the issue of whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Loyola

The trial judge who had presided in the case from its inception was Judge Goldberg, but Judge Pierce was then substituted at this point in the proceedings. 8

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1-09-3550 on the plaintiff's counts for breach of express or implied contracts (counts I and II). A reviewing court uses a de novo standard when examining a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Kajima Construction Services, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 227 Ill. 2d 102, 106, 879 N.E.2d 305, 308 (2007). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions and affidavits in the record, when viewed most favorably to the non-movant, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2008); Hall v. Henn, 208 Ill. 2d 325, 328, 802 N.E.2d 797, 798 (2003). The plaintiff contends that a university's written catalogs and handbooks create an enforceable contractual relationship with its students. Harris v. Adler School of Professional Psychology, 309 Ill. App. 3d 856, 859, 723 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1999). While the defendants agree that a student's relationship with a university has contractual components, they point out that our courts have traditionally treated students' contractual claims against schools differently than typical breach of contract claims. Bilut v. Northwestern University, 269 Ill. App. 3d 125, 133, 645 N.E.2d 536, 541 (1994). A court will not review a teacher's subjective academic decision, but will review "whether school authorities acted arbitrarily or capriciously in their treatment of a student, including dismissal." Harris, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 859, 723 N.E.2d at 720. A student has a valid cause of action against a school when it is alleged that an adverse decision against a student "supposedly for academic deficiencies, was made arbitrarily, capriciously, and in bad faith." Brody v. Finch University of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical School, 298 Ill. App. 3d 146, 156, 698 N.E.2d 257, 266 (1998). It has been held that in stating a cause of action for breach of contract against a school, the plaintiff has the heavy burden of showing that the plaintiff's dismissal was " `without any discernible 9

1-09-3550 rational basis.' " Frederick v. Northwestern University Dental School, 247 Ill. App. 3d 464, 472, 617 N.E.2d 382, 387 (1993) (quoting Holert v. University of Chicago, 751 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (N. D. Ill. 1990)). The plaintiff in the case before us argues that she sufficiently alleged a cause of action for breach of contract and presented sufficient evidence of the individual defendants' intentional wrongdoing. She alleges that the plagiarism accusation against her was false and resulted in the PEC giving her a failing grade on her first preliminary examination. She also argues that Professor Frankfater, of the PEC, falsely told the head of the steering committee, prior to the steering committee's decision, that the plaintiff would have failed the first preliminary examination independent of the plagiarism issue. Further, the plaintiff claims that the PEC's critique of her performance on the first examination was replete with misrepresentations, including criticisms of aspects of her first examination that the PEC had already found to be of passing quality. She claims that this false information was then relayed to the steering committee without mention that the PEC had concluded that she had a passing grade before they were informed of the plagiarism. According to the plaintiff, the steering committee upheld the decision to fail her because of the alleged misinformation provided to it. This resulted in requiring her to take a second preliminary

examination, which she acknowledged that she did not pass. The plaintiff argues that had her first examination been evaluated without the misrepresentations, she would never have been required to take a second preliminary examination and she would have advanced in the program as a Ph.D. candidate. The plaintiff alleges that the individual professor defendants did not follow Loyola's 10

1-09-3550 guidelines, which is further proof of their arbitrary and capricious conduct. The department guidelines state that students are "expected to complete" 25 hours of coursework, including a research ethics class, by the end of their second year in the program. The plaintiff states that the ethics course "formally taught plagiarism issues." The common practice, however, was that the students deferred this course until their third year of graduate study. The defendants contend that the university's guidelines do not create a contractual obligation to ensure that students complete courses by a particular time or receive feedback in a certain way. The plaintiff argues that she should have been given written feedback on her first preliminary examination. The defendants allege, however, that it was common practice that only oral feedback was given to students at that point in the review process. The plaintiff highlights the fact that Loyola's definition of the term "plagiarism" was listed in its handbook in the section entitled "Statement on Academic Honesty." The subheadings where the definition is found are labeled "Academic Honesty" and "Boundaries of Academic Honesty." The pertinent sections of Loyola's handbook states: "Papers. Plagiarism is the appropriation for gain of ideas, language or work of another without sufficient public

acknowledgment that the material is not one's own. The following acts are regarded as such violations:

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