Sherman West Court v. Arnold

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Illinois » 1st District Appellate » 2011 » Sherman West Court v. Arnold

State: Illinois

Court: 1st District Appellate

Docket No: 1-10-1081 Rel

Case Date: 02/22/2011

Preview:SECOND DIVISION FEB. 22, 2011 No. 1-10-1081 SHERMAN WEST COURT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAMON T. ARNOLD, THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, WILLIAM A.BELL, and ROSELLA D. FESSENDEN, Defendants-Appellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 09 L 50978 Honorable Mary K. Rochford, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Cunningham and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION Plaintiff Sherman West Court seeks judicial review of an administrative decision by defendant Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH). The circuit court affirmed the decision of IDPH. We find that IDPH's decision is not subject to judicial review because it was not a final order under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2008)). We vacate the circuit court's judgment and remand with directions to dismiss the complaint. BACKGROUND Defendant Rosella Fessenden's father was a resident at a nursing home operated by plaintiff Sherman West Court when he allegedly suffered a stroke. Fessenden filed a complaint against plaintiff with IDPH under the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/3-701 et seq. (West 2008)), alleging that plaintiff's employees did not adequately recognize the signs of the stroke or give her father adequate emergency care. IDPH investigated the complaint but determined that it 1

No. 1-10-1081 was unfounded. Fessenden was dissatisfied with IDPH's initial determination, so she filed a request for an administrative hearing. Plaintiff entered an appearance in front of the designated hearing officer, as is its right in such a situation. See 210 ILCS 45/3-702(g) (West 2008). Before the hearing occurred, however, plaintiff learned that IDPH and Fessenden had entered into a settlement agreement under which IDPH agreed to reinvestigate Fessenden's complaint against plaintiff and Fessenden agreed to withdraw her request for a hearing. Plaintiff noticed that the face of the order adopting the settlement agreement contained a material scrivener's error in the number identifying the complaint, so it filed a motion to vacate the order with the hearing officer. The order was duly vacated, and at the following status conference, plaintiff objected to the settlement agreement. However, it was unclear whether plaintiff had standing to object to the agreement because it was not the complainant, so the hearing officer set a briefing schedule on the issue. Following full briefing and oral arguments, the hearing officer found that plaintiff did not have standing to object to the settlement agreement and recommended to the Director of IDPH that a new order be issued adopting the agreement. Defendant Bell, the acting Deputy Director of IDPH, accepted the hearing officer's recommendation and issued an order that stated in pertinent part: "[IDPH], by agreement, is to reinvestigat[e] Complaint #0773998[] and reconsider the determination in this case." The rest of the order contained boilerplate language reciting that the Director of IDPH had adopted the hearing officer's findings. Importantly, the order purported to be a "final administrative decision" within the meaning of the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/3-713 (West 2008)) and the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-

2

No. 1-10-1081 101 (West 2008)). In response, plaintiff filed a complaint with the circuit court of Cook County, seeking judicial review of IDPH's order adopting the settlement agreement and ordering reinvestigation of Fessenden's complaint. The circuit court affirmed the order, finding among other things that plaintiff did not have a right to object to the settlement agreement. Plaintiff timely filed a notice of appeal, and this case is now before us. ANALYSIS The primary question presented in this case is whether plaintiff has standing to object to the settlement agreement between Fessenden and IDPH, which required IDPH to reinvestigate Fessenden's complaint against plaintiff. Because this is an administrative order, however, we must first consider the threshold question of whether the order is subject to judicial review. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,

Download Sherman West Court v. Arnold.pdf