FOURTH DIVISION
March 20, 2003

PRESIDING JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul) appeals an order of thetrial court granting the motion of defendants Allen Smith, Marjorie Ocasek, as specialadministrator of the estate of William Smith, deceased, Elizabeth Ing, as special administrator ofthe estate of Audrey Hardwidge, deceased, and independent administrator of the estate ofWilliam Hardwidge, deceased (collectively, defendants), for summary judgment declaring thatthe named driver exclusion contained in St. Paul's automobile liability insurance policy was voidas against public policy. On appeal, St. Paul contends that the named driver exclusion does notviolate the mandatory insurance laws of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (625 ILCS 5/1-100et seq. (West 1996)). St. Paul also argues that the named driver exclusion applies to bar coveragefor the underlying wrongful death lawsuit because the exclusion was part of the St. Paul policyand was not ambiguous, and contends that the negligent entrustment claim against Allen Smithfalls within the scope of the exclusion.

The main issue before this court is one of first impression in Illinois, whether a nameddriver exclusion in an automobile liability insurance policy violates Illinois public policy. Wefind that it does not and reverse and remand for further proceedings.

On June 3, 1996, William Smith (William), while driving a vehicle owned by his father,Allen, collided with an automobile carrying William and Audrey Hardwidge. All threeindividuals died as a result of their injuries. At the time of the accident, William had anautomobile liability insurance policy issued by Valor Insurance Company (Valor). The car wasinsured by St. Paul, under a personal insurance package policy including homeowners andautomobile liability insurance procured by William's parents, Allen and June Smith. The St. Paulpolicy initially listed Allen and June as insureds and drivers covered under the policy. OnJanuary 2, 1996, William was added as a covered driver to Allen and June's policy. St. Paul thenreceived William's driving record, which revealed that his license had previously been suspendedand revoked because he had been convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol twice anddriving with a revoked license. St. Paul removed William as a covered driver from Allen andJune's policy on January 22, 1996, and required Allen and June to sign a named driver exclusion,which excluded liability for any accidents or losses incurred while the car was driven by William.

In July 1997, the administrators of the estates of William and Audrey Hardwidge filed alawsuit against the estate of William Smith and Allen (the underlying suit). The complaintincluded several wrongful death counts against William's estate and a negligent entrustmentcount against Allen, alleging that Allen allowed William to use his car even though he knew thatWilliam had been abusing alcohol for a substantial period of time, William had previously beenconvicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and William was not covered by Allen'sautomobile insurance policy. Both Allen and William's estate tendered their defenses to Valor,which provided their defenses. Neither Allen nor William's estate tendered their defenses to St.Paul. In January 2000, a verdict of $5 million was entered against Allen and William's estate. Valor then paid its policy limits of $20,000 to each of the Hardwidge estates.

In April 1998, St. Paul filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking a declarationthat it did not owe a duty to defend and/or indemnify Allen or William's estate in the underlyingsuit because the named driver exclusion in Allen's insurance policy barred coverage for anyaccident involving a vehicle driven by William. Several months after paying its policy limits inthe underlying suit, Valor was granted leave to intervene in St. Paul's declaratory judgment actionand filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment. St. Paul filed a motion for summaryjudgment, arguing that the named driver exclusion operated to bar any coverage obligation toAllen and William's estate. Valor and defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment,contending that the named driver exclusion violated Illinois public policy as contained in themandatory insurance requirements of the Code. Defendants also argued that the exclusion wasambiguous, was not attached to the insurance policy and did not apply to bar claims of negligententrustment.

The trial court granted Valor's and defendants' summary judgment motions and denied St.Paul's motion on July 27, 2001. On December 12, 2001, the trial court clarified that order andheld that the sole basis of its ruling was that the named driver exclusion was void because itviolated public policy. On January 7, 2001, the trial court made an express written findingpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), that there was no just reason todelay enforcement or appeal of the July 27, 2001 and December 12, 2001 orders. St. Paul thenfiled this timely appeal.⁽¹⁾

Summary judgment is appropriate only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions andaffidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitledto judgment as a matter of law. Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill. 2d 304, 308, 780 N.E.2d 660,662 (2001), citing 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998). We review an appeal from the grant ofsummary judgment de novo. Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 308, 780 N.E.2d at 662. This case involvesa question of statutory interpretation, which we also review de novo. Land v. Board of Educationof the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 421, 781 N.E.2d 249, 254 (2002). In interpreting astatute, the court must ascertain the legislature's intent, which is found in the plain and ordinarymeaning of the language used in the statute. Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 421, 781 N.E.2d at 254.

Courts apply terms in an insurance policy as written unless those terms contravene publicpolicy. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d 369, 372, 757 N.E.2d881, 883 (2001). Statutes are an expression of public policy. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d at 372, 757N.E.2d at 883. "Statutes in force at the time an insurance policy was issued are controlling, and astatute's underlying purpose cannot be circumvented by a restriction or exclusion written into aninsurance policy. [Citation.] Accordingly, insurance policy provisions that conflict with a statuteare void." Smith, 197 Ill. 2d at 372, 757 N.E.2d at 883.

In this case, the named driver exclusion in Allen's St. Paul automobile liability insurancepolicy provided:

"Driver Exclusion Policy Number: PK01200772

Named Insured: Smith, Allen & June

This endorsement changes the policy.

Please read it carefully.

We will not be liable for any accidents or losses while anyauto or motorhome is driven by: William R. Smith[.]"

The exclusion was signed by Allen, June and William in January 1996.

Section 7-601(a) of the mandatory insurance provision in the Code requires that allvehicles be insured through a liability insurance policy. 625 ILCS 5/7-601(a) (West 1996);Smith, 197 Ill. 2d at 373, 757 N.E.2d at 883. Section 7-317(b)(2) of the Code's safetyresponsibility law requires that a motor vehicle liability policy "insure the person named thereinand any other person using or responsible for the use of such motor vehicle or vehicles with theexpress or implied permission of the insured." 625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(2) (West 1996). Construingthese provisions together, our supreme court interpreted these statutes to mandate that "'a liabilityinsurance policy issued to the owner of a vehicle must cover the named insured and any otherperson using the vehicle with the named insured's permission.'" Smith, 197 Ill. 2d at 373, 757N.E.2d at 883, quoting State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal UnderwritersGroup, 182 Ill. 2d 240, 244, 695 N.E.2d 848, 850 (1998). In affirming the appellate court, oursupreme court in Smith noted that "'[t]he purpose of mandatory automobile liability insurance isnot only to protect the owner against liability or some other insurance company; rather, itsprincipal purpose is to protect the public by securing payment of their damages.'" Smith, 197 Ill.2d at 376, 757 N.E.2d at 885, quoting State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Fisher,315 Ill. App. 3d 1159, 1163, 735 N.E.2d 747, 751 (2000).

Defendants maintain that the trial court was correct in holding that the named driverexclusion in St. Paul's liability insurance policy violates Illinois public policy because it conflictswith the language of the Code. The Code requires that every insurance policy cover the namedinsured and "any other person" using the vehicle with the insured's express or impliedpermission. 625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(2) (West 1996). However, the named driver exclusion allowsthe insurer to exclude certain individuals from coverage. Defendants contend that the definitionof the term "any other person" necessarily includes the driver who was purportedly excludedfrom coverage by the named driver exclusion, assuming he had the insured's permission tooperate the vehicle. Thus, defendants argue, the exclusion conflicts with the statute and is void.

In response, St. Paul argues that the named driver exclusion does not violate publicpolicy. Citing section 7-602 of the Code, St. Paul contends that this section clearly creates alimited exception for named driver exclusions to the mandatory insurance laws. 625 ILCS 5/7-602 (West 1996). We agree.

Section 7-602 of the Code discusses the requirements for insurance cards and provides inrelevant part:

"If the insurance policy represented by the insurance card does not cover anydriver operating the motor vehicle with the owner's permission, or the ownerwhen operating a motor vehicle other than the vehicle for which the policy isissued, the insurance card shall contain a warning of such limitations in thecoverage provided by the policy." 625 ILCS 5/7-602 (West 1996).

The plain language of this statute appears to recognize that insurance policies may excludenamed drivers from coverage and conflicts with the mandatory insurance requirements ofsections 7-601 and 7-317(b)(2).

When there is an alleged conflict between two statutes, a court interprets those statutes toavoid inconsistency and give effect to both statutes where such an interpretation is reasonablypossible. Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 311-12, 780 N.E.2d at 664. Sections of the same statute shouldbe considered in pari materia and each section should be construed with every other part orsection of the statute to produce a harmonious whole. Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 422, 781 N.E.2d at254. We presume that when enacting the statute, the legislature did not intend absurdity,inconvenience or injustice. Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 422, 781 N.E.2d at 255.

In interpreting section 7-602, we note that this section is located in Article VI, entitled"Mandatory Insurance," of the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law of theCode. Further, section 7-602 is situated directly after section 7-601, which requires vehicles tobe covered by a liability insurance policy. Section 7-602 was added to the Code by the samepublic act that created section 7-601, and the mandatory insurance article and both sections sharethe same effective date. Although section 7-602 has been amended several times since itsenactment in 1989, the legislature has never removed or changed this language concerning policylimitations. Thus, after construing section 7-602 with section 7-601, we hold that by enactingsection 7-602, the legislature intended to create a limited exception for named driver exclusionsto the mandatory insurance laws.

We find additional support for our holding from the administrative regulationspromulgated by the Secretary of State. Section 7-602 specifically authorizes the Secretary ofState to prescribe rules and regulations concerning the form, content and manner of issuance ofinsurance cards. 625 ILCS 5/7-602 (West 1996). Properly promulgated administrativeregulations have the force and effect of law. Chandler v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 333 Ill. App.3d 463, 472, 776 N.E.2d 315, 322-23 (2002). The regulation concerning insurance cardrequirements provides that: "d) The insurance card shall contain the following insuranceinformation: * * * 7) a warning of excluded drivers or vehicles, when applicable." 50 Ill. Adm.Code