FIFTH DIVISION
January 16, 2004

JUSTICE O'BRIEN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Aaron Thomas, a member of an orthodox Jewish community, filed a second amendedcomplaint against defendants Rabbi Shmuel Fuerst, Rabbi Yosef Wainkrantz, Rabbi Chaim Goldzweig(collectively referred to as the Rabbinic Court), and Danny Shabat, claiming the Rabbinic Court hadexcommunicated plaintiff from the Jewish community in order to punish him for initiating a civilaction against Shabat. Plaintiff alleged, by excommunicating him, the Rabbinic Court committed libel,violated his right to due process, intentionally inflicted emotional distress, and engaged in aconspiracy with Shabat. The circuit court dismissed plaintiff's second amended complaint pursuantto section 2-619.1 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 - 619.1 (West2000). Plaintiff appeals, claiming the circuit court erred in dismissing his second amended complaint,as each count in the complaint states a cause of action. We affirm.

In his second amended complaint, plaintiff pleaded that he lives "in a strict orthodox Jewishcommunity and culture wherein observance of Jewish law is universal, and wherein such observanceis a prerequisite for normal societal relations and normal economic activity." The Rabbinic Court,also referred to as a Beit Din, is responsible for administering proper law and order within theorthodox Jewish community.

Plaintiff pleaded that from 1998-2001, he prosecuted a civil complaint in the Cook Countycircuit court against Shabat and his wife for their "sexual exploitation" of plaintiff's minor son. During February 2001, Shabat asked Rabbi Fuerst to use his position as head of the Rabbinic Courtto "neutralize" plaintiff's lawsuit against the Shabats.

Plaintiff pleaded that in February, May, and July 2001, he received three summons to appearbefore the Rabbinic Court to "justify" his civil lawsuit against the Shabats. Each time, plaintiff agreedto appear before the Rabbinic Court, however, no hearing date was set.

Plaintiff pleaded that on October 30, 2001, Rabbi Fuerst telephoned him and demanded heimmediately drop his civil lawsuit against the Shabats. Plaintiff refused and stated he was willing toappear before the Rabbinic Court to justify his lawsuit against the Shabats.

Plaintiff pleaded that on December 4, 2001, the Shabats' attorney contacted plaintiff regardingthe settling of his case. Plaintiff refused to settle. Later that same day, plaintiff was served with anotice of excommunication, entitled a "Writ of Defiance" (the Writ) typed on Rabbi Fuerst's officialstationary and composed in Hebrew. Translated into English, the Writ states:

"To our great sorrow we are enjoined to fulfill our duty under Torah law and publiclyproclaim our anguish, that there now is a man by the name of [plaintiff], on whom we haveserved three summonses, and to whom we have also telecommunicated, to appear before theRabbinic Court regarding the complaint of Mr. and Mrs. Daniel Shabat (they should beblessed with longevity); and he has defiantly refused to appear before the Rabbinic Court; andnot only this but he has additionally sinned in laying claim to them in the gentile civil court,Heaven forfend, and even after being warned, he remains defiant and maintains his suit in civilcourt.

Therefore, it is our duty to uphold our holy law and proclaim in the most publicfashion that [plaintiff] is a defiant scofflaw; both for his defiant refusal to appear before theRabbinic Court, and for his resorting to the gentile civil court, proscription for which is foundin Chosen Mishpat, Sections 11 and 26, and in Yoreh Deah, Section 334. And the severityfor which is explicit in Chosen Mishpat, Section 26, that whoever resorts to the gentile civilcourts is a blasphemous infidel who strikes out against Mosaic Law, and he deserves to beshunned and excommunicated.

And therefore we proclaim it befitting that all good Jews distant this man from theirhomes, and likewise do not let him participate as part of the worship quorum, or any religiousactivity until he fully repents. And we have also informed [plaintiff] that he must reimbursethe Shabat family (they should be blessed with longevity) for all monies they have paid to theirattorneys as a result of his civil court claim against them, as elucidated in the codes."

The Writ was signed by Rabbis Fuerst, Wainkrantz, and Goldzweig and "circulated andpublished *** to influential Rabbinic leaders and family members in the U.S.A. and Israel."

The Writ forced plaintiff to abandon his profession (designing customized sunrooms for members ofthe Orthodox Jewish community), and seek employment in his father's law office as a secretary.

Plaintiff pleaded that by excommunicating him via the Writ of Defiance, the Rabbinic Courtcommitted libel, violated his right to due process, intentionally inflicted emotional distress, andengaged in a conspiracy with Shabat. Defendants brought a combined motion to dismiss, relying onsections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code. See 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2000). Pursuant to section2-615, defendants argued that plaintiff's second amended complaint failed to state a cause of action. Pursuant to section 2-619, defendants argued the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction underthe first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The circuit court granted themotion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed this timely appeal.

A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading.Universal Scrap Metals, Inc. v. J. Sandman & Sons, Inc., 337 Ill. App. 3d 501, 504 (2003). Thecourt accepts as true all well-pleaded facts and the inferences that can reasonably be drawn fromthose facts. Universal Scrap Metals, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 504. The issue is whether, when viewed inthe light most favorable to plaintiff, the allegations are sufficient to state a cause upon which reliefcan be granted. Universal Scrap Metals, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 504.

A section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint and raisesdefects, defenses, or other matters that act to defeat the claim. Krilich v. American National Bank& Trust Co. of Chicago, 334 Ill. App. 3d 563, 569-70 (2002). When ruling on a section 2-619motion, the trial court may consider the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits. Krilich, 334 Ill. App.3d at 570. The issue on appeal is whether the existence of a genuine issue of material fact shouldhave precluded the dismissal or, absent such an issue of fact, whether the dismissal is proper as amatter of law. Krilich, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 570. We review de novo the trial court's decision to granta section 2-619.1 combined motion to dismiss. Lawson v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. App. 3d 628, 634(1996).

First, plaintiff argues the trial court erred by dismissing his libel claims. Although thecommon law originally distinguished between spoken and written defamation (slander and libel,respectively), in Illinois the same standard applies whether an allegedly defamatory statement isspoken or written. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 89, (1996). Toestablish either slander or libel, plaintiff must show that: (1) defendant made a false statementconcerning plaintiff; (2) there was an unprivileged publication of the defamatory statement bydefendant to a third party; and (3) plaintiff was damaged. Stavros v. Marrese, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1052,1057 (2001).

Defamatory statements may be actionable per se or actionable per quod. Kolegas v. HeftelBroadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1992). A statement is defamatory per se if it is so obviouslyand materially harmful to the person to whom it refers that injury to his reputation may be presumed.Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 10. Illinois law recognizes five categories of statements that are considereddefamatory per se. Van Horne v. Muller, 185 Ill. 2d 299, 307 (1998). One of those categories is"words that prejudice a party, or impute lack of ability, in his or her trade, profession or business." Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 10.

Statements are defamatory per quod under two circumstances: (1) where the defamatorycharacter of the statement is not apparent on its face and resort to extrinsic circumstances is necessaryto demonstrate its injurious meaning; and (2) where the statement is defamatory on its face, but doesnot fall within one of the limited categories of statements that are actionable per se. Bryson v. NewsAmerica Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 103. Unlike a defamation per se action, plaintiff mustplead and prove special damages to recover for defamation per quod. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 103.

Plaintiff contends that the Rabbinic Court defamed him by proclaiming in their Writ ofDefiance that plaintiff is an "infidel" and "defiant scofflaw" deserving excommunication from Jewishsociety for failing to appear before the Rabbinic Court. Plaintiff contends that such languageconstitutes defamation per se, as it falsely imputes a lack of ability in his profession or business. Alternatively, plaintiff argues that the language contained in the Writ of Defiance constitutesdefamation per quod, as it specially damages his ability to earn a living within the Jewish community.

Defendants contend that the contents of the Writ of Defiance are true and, thus, notdefamatory. To determine the truth or falsity of the Writ's contents, this court would have to examineand interpret the Jewish law cited therein, specifically, sections 11 and 26 of the Chosen Mishpat, andsection 334 of the Yoreh Deah, which form the basis for the proclamation that plaintiff is a defiantscofflaw and infidel deserving excommunication. However, the first amendment to the Constitutionof the United States (U.S. Const. amend. I) bars any secular court from involving itself in theecclesiastical controversies that may arise in a religious body or organization: "it would be a vainconsent and would lead to the total subversion of *** religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by oneof their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed." Watson v. Jones, 80U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729, 20 L. Ed. 666, 676 (1872). Where resolution of ecclesiastical disputescannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, "the First andFourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highestecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as bindingon them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them." SerbianEastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151, 162, 96 S.Ct. 2372,2380 (1976).

The circuit court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's defamation counts, as resolution of thosecounts cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity.

Next, plaintiff contends the trial court erred by dismissing his due process claims. Plaintiffpleaded that the Rabbinic Court denied him due process by excommunicating him without firstaffording him a hearing. Plaintiff's contention is without merit, as no governmental body wasinvolved in the decision to excommunicate him. The due process clause protects individuals fromactions by the state, not actions by individuals. Rosewell v. Hanrahan, 168 Ill. App. 3d 329, 331(1988).

Plaintiff argues Treister v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 78 Ill. App. 3d 746(1979), compels a different result. Treister held that courts can review the application proceduresof a private association, such as a trade or professional association, when membership in theorganization is an economic necessity. Treister, 78 Ill. App. 3d at 755. Economic necessity may beshown where the organization or association has a monopoly over the field or profession. SeeFalcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A. 2d 791 (1961). Here, theRabbinic Court is not a trade or professional association, nor does it have a monopoly over plaintiff'ssunroom business. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff's due process counts.

Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his claims for intentional inflictionof emotional distress. To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,plaintiff must plead facts showing that: (1) defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2)defendants either intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that there was a highprobability that their conduct would do so; and (3) the defendants' conduct actually caused severeemotional distress. Welsh v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 306 Ill. App. 3d 148, 154 (1999); McGrathv. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 86 (1988). Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous is evaluated on anobjective standard based on all of the facts and circumstances. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d at 90. Liability doesnot extend to "mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or trivialities." PublicFinance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 89-90 (1976). Liability is attached only in circumstances wherethe defendant's conduct is "'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyondall possible bounds of decency.'" Public Finance Corp., 66 Ill. 2d at 90, quoting Restatement (Second)of Torts