1-99-3836 & 1-99-4356 (consolidated) 

FIRST DIVISION
March 30, 2001

JUSTICE COHEN delivered the opinion of the court:

In June 1998, the plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against thedefendants for their alleged failure to honor a reservation he had made for amonth-long stay at their facility in Dubuque, Iowa. On November 18, 1998, thetrial court dismissed the complaint.

The defendant filed a second pro se complaint on May 10, 1999. On July16, 1999, the defendant Bass Hotels and Resorts, as successor in interest toHoliday Hospitality Franchising, filed a motion to dismiss and a motion forsanctions in the amount of fees and costs. On July 26, 1999, the trial courtgranted the motion to dismiss the plaintiff's second complaint. The motion forsanctions was noticed for hearing on August 16, 1999. However, no hearingoccurred on that date.

On August 27, 1999, the defendants filed a new motion for sanctions. Thetrial court entered an order for sanctions in the amount of $691.97 on September3, 1999. The plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the order of sanctions, whichthe trial court denied on October 20, 1999.

On November 1, 1999, the plaintiff filed what was apparently a second motionto vacate. In response, the trial court entered an order that sanctioned theplaintiff for $1,000 and prohibited him from filing any more motions in thecase.

The plaintiff filed pro se appeals of both the September 3, 1999,sanction order awarding defendant $691.97 in attorney fees and costs and theNovember 1, 1999, order requiring plaintiff to pay an additional $1,000. Theseappeals have been consolidated for review. We now vacate both orders ofsanctions.

ANALYSIS

Initially, we note that the plaintiff's brief fails to adhere to the supremecourt rules governing appellate review. The brief does not contain a propersummary statement, introductory paragraph or statement of the issue presentedfor review as required by Supreme Court Rule 341(e) (177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)). Thebrief does not contain an appendix with the order appealed from and an index tothe record as required by Supreme Court Rule 342 (155 Ill. 2d R. 342). However,while the insufficiency of the plaintiff's brief in this case hinders review,meaningful review is not precluded. The merits of the present case can bereadily ascertained from the record on appeal and, accordingly, we choose toreach the merits.

Admittedly, plaintiff's pro se status does not relieve him of theburden of complying with the format for appeals as mandated by the supreme courtrules. Bielecki v. Painting Plus, Inc., 264 Ill. App. 3d 344, 354 (1994).It is well established that this court is not required to search the record todetermine what legal issues are involved in an appeal. Bielecki, 264 Ill.App. 3d at 354, citing Biggs v. Spader, 411 Ill. 42 (1951). Rather, areviewing court is entitled to have briefs submitted that present an organizedand cohesive legal argument in accordance with the Supreme Court Rules. In reMarriage of Souleles, 111 Ill. App. 3d 865, 869 (1982). However, along withthese general rules, this court has held that "our jurisdiction toentertain the appeal of a pro se plaintiff is unaffected by theinsufficiency of his brief," so long as we understand the issue plaintiffintends to raise and especially where the court has the benefit of a cogentbrief of the other party. Bielecki, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 354, citingTannenbaum v. Lincoln National Bank, 143 Ill. App. 3d 572, 575 (1986). Cf.Harvey v. Carponelli, 117 Ill. App. 3d 448, 451 (1983), cert. denied(1984), 466 U.S. 951, 80 L. Ed. 2d 539, 104 S. Ct. 2153 (court chose toentertain the pro se plaintiff's appeal despite its finding thatplaintiff's brief was flagrantly deficient in many respects and violative ofSupreme Court Rule 341).

Here, as in Bielecki and Harvey, plaintiff's pro sebriefs fail to clearly articulate the errors relied upon for reversal or presentan organized and cohesive argument in compliance with the supreme court rules.However, it is clear from plaintiff's briefs that he seeks to challenge both thetrial court's September 3, 1999, sanction order and its November 1, 1999,contempt order. Irrespective of plaintiff's inarticulate briefs, even a cursoryreview of the record on appeal reveals that both of these orders are void.Courts have a duty to vacate and expunge void orders from court records and thusmay sua sponte declare an order void. Gilchrist v. Human Rights Comm'n,312 Ill. App. 3d 597, 601 (2000), citing Siddens v. Industrial Comm'n,304 Ill. App. 3d 506, 511 (1999).

On July 26, 1999, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's cause of action.However, the defendants' characterization of the trial court's July 26, 1999,dismissal order as a "dismissal for want of prosecution" is misguided.The July 26 order was submitted to the court by the attorney for defendants. Infilling out this form order, defendants' attorney checked the box next to thecategory "Case Dismissed for Want of Prosecution" and handwrote thewords "WITH PREJUDICE" immediately following the preprinted language.Section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West1992)), which governs dismissals for want of prosecution, does not allow adismissal for want of prosecution to be with prejudice. Walton v. Throgmorton,273 Ill. App. 3d 353, 357 (1995). Thus, the July 26 order is ambiguous on itsface.

Generally, the intention of the court is determined by the language in theorder entered, but where the language of the order is ambiguous, it is subjectto construction. Purcell & Wardrope, Chartered v. Hertz Corp., 279Ill. App. 3d 16, 21 (1996). In cases of ambiguity, the orders appealed fromshould be interpreted in the context of the record and the situation thatexisted at the time of their rendition. Purcell, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 21,citing People v. Cooper, 132 Ill. 2d 347 (1989). The notice of motion inthe record indicates that the July 26, 1999 hearing date was scheduled fordefendants to obtain a ruling on their motion to dismiss. Defendants' motionsought to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code onthe grounds that it was barred by principles of res judicata.Accordingly, the trial court's July 26 order should be construed as a"dismissal with prejudice." In fact, defendants concede thisinterpretation in their brief, arguing that the July 26 order was a dismissalwith prejudice on res judicata grounds.

It is well established that a trial court loses jurisdiction to vacate ormodify its judgment 30 days after entry of judgment unless a timely postjudgmentmotion is filed. Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill. 2d 232, 238 (1991). In thepresent case, defendants had until August 26, 1999, to file a timely motion forsanctions pursuant to Rule 137 (134 Ill. 2d R. 137). Defendants would likelyargue that their motion for sanctions was timely because it was filed on July16, 1999, and was pending on July 26, 1999, when the dismissal order wasentered. However, the motion for sanctions filed prior to judgment was scheduledfor hearing on August 16, 1999, but was not heard.

Defendants' pleadings before the trial court indicate that a docketing errorwas the reason that their original motion for sanctions was not heard on August16, 1999. However, the party filing a motion has the responsibility to bring itto the trial court's attention. Prather v. McGrady, 261 Ill. App. 3d 880,885 (1994), citing Gordon v. Bauer, 177 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1085 (1988).Unless circumstances indicate otherwise, where no ruling appears to have beenmade on a motion, the presumption is that the motion was waived or abandoned. Prather,261 Ill. App. 3d at 885, citing City National Bank v. Langley, 161 Ill.App. 3d 266, 274 (1987); Majewski v. Von Bergan, 266 Ill. App. 3d 140,144 (1994).

Significantly, after the August 16, 1999, hearing, defendants did notre-notice their motion for sanctions or request that the trial judge enter andcontinue the motion for hearing at a later date. To the contrary, on August 27,1999, defendants filed a new motion for sanctions. The defendants' action infiling a second motion supports the presumption that the original motion forsanctions was abandoned. It was this second motion for sanctions that defendantsnoticed for hearing on September 3, 1999. Accordingly, the trial court'sSeptember 3 order was entered pursuant to a motion for sanctions filed more than30 days after entry of the July 26 order which dismissed plaintiff's case withprejudice. As the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain this secondmotion for sanctions because it was not timely filed, the September 3 sanctionorder is void and should be vacated. See In re Marriage of Barmak, 276Ill. App. 3d 83, 85-86 (1995); F.H. Prince & Co. v. Towers Financial Corp.,266 Ill. App. 3d 977, 991-92 (1994). In light of this determination, allsubsequent orders entered by the trial court are also void. It should be noted,however, that even if the trial court had jurisdiction over this matter when theSeptember 3, 1999, and the November 1, 1999, orders were entered, we wouldreverse these judgments.

In order to allow courts to conduct an informed and reasoned review of thesanction decision, Rule 137 requires that the trial court set forth the reasonsand basis for its decision. Bedoya v. Illinois Founders Insurance Co.,293 Ill. App. 3d 668, 681 (1997). Failure to make specific findings pursuant toRule 137 is grounds for reversal of the trial court's order. Mandziara v.Canulli, 299 Ill. App. 3d 593 (1998). In Bedoya, the trial court setforth no reasons for granting attorney fees under Rule 137 other than "[t]hey[plaintiffs] are entitled to it." Bedoya, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 681.Accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's grant of Rule 137 sanctionsand remanded the cause for further proceedings to allow the trial court to makespecific findings of fact or law supporting its decision. In the present case,the trial court's sanction order summarily states, "the motion forsanctions is granted" and further awards defendants $691.97. This languageis clearly insufficient under Rule 137.

Similarly, the language in the November 1, 1999, contempt order is so legallyinsufficient as to render it void. Although the trial court's order is devoid ofany reasoning or findings, the record on appeal and the parties' briefs suggestthat plaintiff was summarily found in direct criminal contempt for filingduplicate motions. Ostensibly, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the trialcourt's September 3, 1999, sanction order which was denied on October 20, 1999.This order included language that it was final and appealable. On November 1,1999, plaintiff presented a second motion which stated in part, "I file tovacate 9-3-99 timely within 30 days." In response to plaintiff's duplicatemotion to vacate, the trial court entered an order which stated, "[t]heplaintiff is sanctioned an additional $1000 for contempt of court." Thecontempt order also precluded plaintiff from filing any additional motions inthe case.

If the purpose of a contempt sanction is retrospective--to punish pastconduct--the nature of the contempt is criminal. People v. Minor, 281Ill. App. 3d 568, 572 (1996). The power to punish for criminal contempt is anextraordinary one, which can only be exercised by a court if a contemnor engagesin specific misconduct that is "'calculated to embarrass, hinder, orobstruct a court in its administration of justice or to derogate from itsauthority or dignity, or bring the administration of law into disrepute.'" Peoplev. Miller, 51 Ill. 2d 76, 78 (1972), quoting In re Estate of Melody,42 Ill. 2d 451, 452 (1969). Direct criminal contempt is characterized as conductthat takes place in the presence of the judge or within an integral part of thecourt. Minor, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 572-73 (court upheld sanction forfiling documents containing false statements with the clerk). Here, it isalleged that the purpose of the sanction was to punish plaintiff for filingduplicate motions on the same issue. Therefore, the nature of the sanction wouldbe direct criminal contempt.

In Miller, the court stated the principles regarding review of directcontempt orders:

"The general doctrine that a reviewing court will ordinarily sustain a proper ruling of a trial court even though the ground assigned for the ruling was erroneous does not apply in the review of direct contempt orders. *** [A]n order imposing punishment for direct contempt must state, or the record must show, the specific acts upon which it is based. Such an order must be sustained upon the ground on which it was imposed, or not at all ***." Miller, 51 Ill. 2d at 78.

After reviewing the record on appeal, the reasons for the trial court'sNovember 1 contempt sanction remain unclear. While defendants may surmise intheir brief that plaintiff was sanctioned for filing duplicate motions, and therecord on appeal indicates that duplicate motions were in fact filed, affirmingthe trial court's ruling on this basis would be pure speculation. Therefore, wehold that the November 1, 1999, contempt order's lack of specificity renders itvoid.

Further, an element essential to a finding of criminal contempt is that theconduct be willful. Minor, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 574. The requisitecontemptuous intent is established if the contemnor knew or reasonably shouldhave known that his act was wrongful. In re Marriage of Bartlett, 305Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1999). Under the facts of this case, it is unlikely that abarely literate pro se litigant understood his conduct to be offensive tothe court. In fact, the one thing plaintiff 's brief does manage to articulateis his belief that he was filing an appeal from the September 3, 1999, judgmentwhen he filed his second motion to vacate in the trial court. Accordingly, wereverse both of the trial court's contempt sanctions.

Reversed.

McNULTY, P.J., and TULLY, J., concur.