Uldrych v. VHS of Illinois

SUPREME COURT CASES

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State: Illinois

Court: 1st District Appellate

Docket No: 1-08-3278 Rel

Case Date: 03/02/2010

Preview:SECOND DIVISION FILED: March 2, 2010

No. 1-08-3278 HELEN ULDRYCH, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of RUDOLPH ULDRYCH, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. VHS OF ILLINOIS, INC., d/b/a MACNEAL HOSPITAL, Defendant and CounterplaintiffAppellant, and CHRISTOPHER D. JOYCE, M.D., JEFFERY C. ZAWACKI, M.D., and SUBURBAN SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, LTD., a corporation, Defendants and CounterdefendantsAppellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY.

No. 05 L 1597

THE HONORABLE SHELDON A. HARRIS, JUDGE PRESIDING.

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court: VHS of Illinois, Inc., d/b/a MacNeal Hospital (MacNeal

Hospital) appeals from an order of the circuit court dismissing its amended counterclaim for implied indemnity as time-barred pursuant to section 13-212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 2002)). follow, we affirm. For the reasons which

No. 1-08-3278 On February 10, 2003, Rudolph Uldrych underwent gastric

bypass surgery at MacNeal Hospital.

In February of 2005, Rudolph

and his wife, Helen Uldrych, filed a medical malpractice action alleging that Rudolph suffered severe and permanent injuries as a result of the creation of a misconstructed bowel segment during the February 10, 2003, surgery. Uldrychs were the physicians Christopher Joyce and Among the defendants sued by the who performed the surgery, Drs. Zawacki, and the physicians'

Jeffrey

alleged employers, Suburban Surgical Associates, Ltd. (Suburban Surgical) and MacNeal Hospital. Following the initiation of this lawsuit, Rudolph died and Helen was appointed special administrator of his estate. On

August 26, 2005, Helen Uldrych filed a four-count, second-amended complaint, setting forth claims for survival and wrongful death. Counts I and III alleged that Dr. Joyce and Dr. Zawacki were negligent in creating and/or failing to diagnose the

misconstructed bowel segment. Suburban Surgical was one of

These counts further alleged that the physicians' employers and,

therefore, vicariously liable.

Counts II and IV, on the other

hand, alleged that Drs. Joyce and Zawacki were MacNeal Hospital's actual or apparent liable agents for the and that MacNeal Hospital acts was and

vicariously omissions.

physicians'

negligent

On August 27, 2008, MacNeal Hospital filed a counterclaim against Dr. Joyce, Dr. Zawacki, and Suburban Surgical. In its

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No. 1-08-3278 counterclaim, MacNeal Hospital alleged that it had agreed to pay $1,000,000 to settle the underlying malpractice action and sought indemnification. On September 19, 2008, the circuit court entered an order that dismissed the underlying medical malpractice action pursuant to a settlement, but specifically stated that MacNeal Hospital's counterclaim remained pending. On that same day, MacNeal

Hospital filed an amended counterclaim, alleging that Drs. Joyce and Zawacki were the actual employees or agents of Suburban

Surgical at the time the gastric bypass surgery was performed. Nevertheless, the amended counterclaim further alleged that Dr. Joyce, Dr. Zawacki, and Suburban Surgical owed MacNeal Hospital an implied quasi-contractual obligation for indemnification based on the assertions contained in the second-amended complaint that Drs. Joyce and Zawacki were the actual or apparent agents of MacNeal Hospital. for The the amended $1,000,000 counterclaim that MacNeal again sought had

indemnification

Hospital

agreed to pay to settle the underlying action. Thereafter, Dr. Joyce, Dr. Zawacki, and Suburban Surgical filed motions to dismiss MacNeal Hospital's amended counterclaim pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-

619(a)(5) (West 2002)). MacNeal Hospital did

These motions alleged, inter alia, that not file its counterclaim for implied

indemnification within the four-year statute of repose contained in section 13-212(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West

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No. 1-08-3278 2002)), commonly referred to as the medical malpractice statute of repose. On November 7, 2008, the circuit court granted the

motions and dismissed MacNeal Hospital's amended counterclaim as time-barred. In This timely appeal followed. reversal of the dismissal of its the amended four-year

urging

counterclaim,

MacNeal

Hospital

contends

that

medical malpractice statute of repose set forth in section 13212(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 2002)) does not bar its counterclaim for implied indemnity. MacNeal Hospital

argues that section 13-212 is inapplicable as its counterclaim is grounded in the quasi-contractual implied duty to indemnify, not medical malpractice. MacNeal Hospital's amended counterclaim was dismissed

pursuant to 2-619(a)(5) of the Code, which allows for involuntary dismissal when "the action was not commenced within the time limited by law." 2-619 motion complaint and to 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2002). dismiss admits the legal or A section of the

sufficiency other

raises

defects,

defenses,

affirmative

matters that defeat the claim.

Cohen v. McDonald's Corp., 347 Such a motion should supporting

Ill. App. 3d 627, 632, 808 N.E.2d 1 (2004).

be granted if, after construing the pleadings and

documents in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no set of facts can be proved upon which relief can be granted. Webb v. Damisch, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1037, This court does not give deference to the

842 N.E.2d 140 (2005).

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No. 1-08-3278 circuit court's ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619, but, rather, reviews the matter de novo. Fuller Family

Holdings, LLC v. Northern Trust Co., 371 Ill. App. 3d 605, 613, 863 N.E.2d 743 (2007). As it relates to this case, section 13-212(a) of the Code provides that: "[N]o action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist,

registered nurse or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or

otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have

known, or received notice in writing of the existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of such date occurs first, but in no event shall such action be brought more than 4

years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such injury or death." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/13-

212(a) (West 2002).

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No. 1-08-3278 In determining whether this section of the Code applies, courts do not focus on the actual labeling of the claims. Orlak v.

Loyola University Health System, 228 Ill. 2d 1, 14, 885 N.E.2d 999 (2007). Rather, the relevant question is whether the claims Orlak 228 Ill. 2d at 14. "Arising

arose out of patient care.

out of patient care" simply requires a causal connection between the patient's medical care and the injury. Brucker v. Mercola, This phrase has

227 Ill. 2d 502, 523, 886 N.E.2d 306 (2007).

been interpreted broadly to include "any injuries that have their origin in, or are incidental to, a patient's medical care and treatment." Brucker, 227 Ill. 2d at 523-24.

In Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 136 Ill. 2d 450, 557 N.E.2d 873 (1990), the Illinois Supreme Court held that third-party actions for contribution are subject to the four-year statute of repose set forth in section 13-212(a). Ill. 2d at 460-61. Hayes, 136

In reaching this conclusion, the Hayes court

rejected the third-party plaintiffs' argument that an action for contribution does not seek recovery for the damages sustained by the original plaintiff, but rather, seeks the enforcement of an equitable duty to share liability among the parties responsible for the original plaintiff's injury. "We believe of that the The court reasoned: the medical plaintiffs' malpractice

interpretation

statute of repose unduly limits its scope and misapprehends the purpose behind its

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No. 1-08-3278 enactment. It is true, as the plaintiffs

observe, that an action for contribution need not be predicated on the same theory of

recovery as that asserted by the plaintiff in the underlying action. [Citations.]

Nevertheless, 'the basis for a contributor's obligation rests on his liability in tort to the injured party' [citation.], even if the plaintiff in the direct action did not assert the theory of liability on which the thirdparty action relies. The action for

contribution apportions the damages among the parties responsible for the original

plaintiff's injury, and the contributor is obligated for the damages directly created by the contributor's negligent actions. The

third-party plaintiff, therefore, is seeking from the third-party defendant those damages proximately caused by the negligent acts of the third-party defendant which the thirdparty plaintiff may be obligated to pay in the underlying suit. This leads us to

conclude that an action for contribution is an 'action for damages' under the medical

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No. 1-08-3278 malpractice statute of repose." Ill. 2d at 456-57. The Hayes court further observed that section 13-212 was enacted in response to a perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis and that a definite period in which an action was required to be filed would enable and insurance companies to predict future Hayes, 136

liabilities premiums.

reduce

health-care

malpractice

insurance

Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 457-58.

The supreme court

determined that, "[b]ecause a suit for contribution against an insured for damages arising out of patient care exposes insurance companies to the same liability as if the patient were to have brought a direct action against the insured, we believe that the term 'or otherwise' in the medical malpractice statute of repose includes actions for contribution against a physician for

injuries arising out of patient care." 458.

Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at

In Ashley v. Evangelical Hospitals Corp., 230 Ill. App. 3d 513, 594 N.E.2d 1269 (1992), this court expanded the holding in Hayes to third-party actions for implied indemnity. Ashley, 230

Ill. App. 3d at 522; see also Roberson v. Belleville Anesthesia Associates, Ltd., 213 Ill. App. 3d 47, 51, 571 N.E.2d 1131 (1991) (reaching a similar result). The Ashley court observed that,

much like the relationship between a third-party plaintiff and a third-party indemnitee defendant in an in an action for claim contribution, seeks from the the

implied

indemnity

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No. 1-08-3278 indemnitor those damages caused by the indemnitor in the

underlying suit.

Ashley, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 518.

This court

also noted that, similar to a suit for contribution, a claim for indemnification exposes an insurance company to the same

liability as if the patient had brought a direct action against the insured. Ashley, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 521. Accordingly, the

Ashley court concluded that the inclusion of third-party actions for implied indemnity within the ambit of the medical malpractice period of repose furthers the statute's legislative intent of enabling insurance companies to better predict future liability by reducing the extended exposure of physicians and hospitals to medical malpractice liability. In its briefs before Ashley, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 521. this court, MacNeal Hospital

acknowledges this court's holding in Ashley that the four-year medical implied malpractice indemnity. statute See of repose 230 applies Ill. to claims 3d at for 522.

Ashley,

App.

Nevertheless, MacNeal Hospital contends that Ashley is no longer controlling in light of the Illinois Supreme Court's recent

decision in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bowman, 229 Ill. 2d 461, 893 N.E.2d 583 (2008) (Travelers). In Travelers, an insurer issued several performance bonds to a metalworking company. After the company breached its

underlying construction contracts and the payment of claims under the performance bonds resulted, the insurer filed suit against the company for indemnification based on a written indemnity

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No. 1-08-3278 agreement the company had signed when the bonds were issued. The

company moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the insurer's claims were barred by the four-year statute of limitations in section 13-214(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-214(a) (West 2002)), applicable to construction improvements to real property. insurer, however, asserted that the 10-year statute The of

limitations for written contracts in section 13-206 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-206 (West 2002)) should apply. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of the insurer, noting that it had long held that the nature of the plaintiff's injury rather than the facts from which the claim arises

determines what limitations period governs.

Travelers, 229 Ill.

2d at 466, citing Armstrong v. Guigler, 174 Ill. 2d 281, 286-87, 673 N.E.2d 290 (1996). Applying this analysis, the supreme court

determined that the company's liability did not emanate from a construction-related activity but from the breach of the written indemnity agreement, and, therefore, the four-year statute of limitations in section 13-214(a) was inapplicable. 229 Ill. 2d at 469-70. Travelers,

Instead, the Travelers court concluded

that the insurer's suit was governed by the 10-year statute of limitations for written contracts set forth in section 13-206. Travelers, 229 Ill. 2d at 478. Relying on the holding in Travelers that the nature of the plaintiff's injury rather than the facts from which the claim arises determines what limitations period applies, MacNeal

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No. 1-08-3278 Hospital maintains that, in determining whether its counterclaim for implied of indemnity repose, it was we owed is barred by the on medical malpractice

statute

should by in

focus

the and

quasi-contractual Zawacki, not the

liability

Drs. the

Joyce

physicians' action.

liability

underlying

medical

malpractice

See Allison v. Shell Oil Co., 113 Ill. 2d 26, 28-29, 495 a claim for quasi-contractual

N.E.2d 496 (1986) (noting that

implied indemnity arises from certain pre-tort relationships in which the indemnitor impliedly promised to indemnify the loss incurred by the indemnitee). Contrary to MacNeal Hospital's

argument, however, we find Travelers to be distinguishable. Unlike the statutes of limitations at issue in Travelers, the medical malpractice statute of repose expressly states that it applies to actions "arising out of patient care." Compare 735

ILCS 5/13-206, 13-214(a) (West 2002) with 735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 2002). interpreted As previously discussed, this phrase has been

broadly to include "any injuries that have their

origin in, or are incidental to, a patient's medical care and treatment." Brucker, 227 Ill. 2d at 523-24. Accordingly, the

medical malpractice statute of repose employs a much broader and different test than most statutes of limitations. We, therefore,

conclude that the language in Travelers setting forth what courts should generally consider when determining which limitations to determine to a

period governs is wholly inapplicable. whether an injury has its origin in or

Rather, is

incidental

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No. 1-08-3278 patient's medical care and treatment and, thus, falls within the scope of the medical malpractice statute of repose, courts must look past the nature of the injury itself and, instead, examine the facts from which the injury arose. Having rejected the arguments raised by MacNeal Hospital, we continue to adhere to this court's holding in Ashley that actions for implied indemnity are subject to the four-year period of repose contained in section 13-212(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13212(a) (West 2002)). As a consequence, MacNeal Hospital's

implied indemnity claim, which was filed more than one-and-a-half years after the expiration of the period of repose, was properly dismissed by the circuit court. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Affirmed. CUNNINGHAM, P.J., and THEIS, J., concur.

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