FOURTH DIVISION
January 22, 2004

Plaintiff William Unterschuetz was discharged from his position at the City of Chicagodepartment of water (Department) for failing to maintain his residence within the City of Chicago,as required by a Chicago ordinance. He appealed to the personnel board (Board) of the City ofChicago which, after an evidentiary hearing, ordered him restored to his position with full back payand benefits. Thereafter, he sued the City of Chicago (City), claiming that five sections of the Cityordinance pertaining to the department of personnel constituted a breach of contract, and that theCity breached that contract. That breach, plaintiff averred, entitled him to be reimbursed forattorneys fees and any diminutions of his pension fund that occurred while he was appealing hisdischarge.

The trial court dismissed plaintiff's claims for failing to state a claim for breach of contractand additionally held that if plaintiff's assertions were construed to sound in tort, the City would beimmune pursuant to the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act(Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 2000)). On appeal, plaintiff does not contest theCity's immunity in tort, but appeals the dismissal of his breach of contract claim. Accordingly, theonly question raised is whether the plaintiff has alleged all the elements necessary for a breach ofcontract claim. We affirm.

During 1998 and 1999, the City's inspector general's office ran an investigation to determinewhether the plaintiff resided in Chicago as required by the City's personnel rules. As a result of thatinvestigation, on March 15, 2000, the plaintiff was placed on administrative leave. The next day, hewas informed of charges against him and was given notice of a predisciplinary meeting at which aunion representative would be present. On May 4, 2000, the plaintiff was discharged primarily forfailing to reside within the City limits as required by ordinance. Plaintiff then appealed the decisionto discharge with the City's personnel board, and the Board restored the plaintiff to his positionwith the department of water with full back pay and benefits.

Over a year later, plaintiff brought suit against the City, its department of water, and theDepartment's commissioner for violating the City's ordinances and rules by discharging him withoutjustification and for violating his rights to due process. The City removed the case to federal court,after which the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his due process claim. The federal district court ruledthat it was without jurisdiction to determine the remaining state law claims.

Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint in state court, alleging only a single count for"breach of contract" and naming the "City of Chicago, Department of Water" as the only defendant. In response, the City filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint arguing, inter alia, that theDepartment was not an entity that could be sued and that the plaintiff had failed to identify andattach the contract provisions that he claimed the City had violated. The trial court granted theCity's motion to dismiss, but granted the plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint.

Plaintiff's second amended complaint named the City as the only defendant and identifiedfive sections of the City ordinance concerning the responsibilities, authority, and policy of thepersonnel department as the sources of the contractual obligations allegedly violated by the City. The City filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint arguing, inter alia that the Cityordinances plaintiff cited do not create a contract, and that if the complaint were construed tosound in tort, the City would be immune under sections 2-109 and 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act(745 ILCS 10/2-109, 2-201 (West 2000)).

After briefing the matter, the trial court granted the City's motion and dismissed the casewith prejudice for failure to state a cause of action for breach of contract and because "the City isimmune pursuant to sections 2-201 and 2-209" of the Tort Immunity Act.⁽¹⁾ On appeal, plaintiffchallenges only the rejection of his contract claim and does not challenge the trial court's dismissalof any tort claims attendant to the facts he has pled.

Plaintiff's only argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in dismissing his secondamended complaint for failure to assert a cause of action for breach of contract, pursuant tosections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2000). Our review of a dismissal pursuant to both sections 2-615 and 2-619 is de novo, and we accept allwell-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts infavor of the nonmoving party. Hanna v. City of Chicago, 331 Ill. App. 3d 295, 303 (2002). Undereither section, dismissal is proper if the plaintiff fails to allege any set of facts to support a cause ofaction that would entitle him to relief. Stephen L. Winternitz, Inc. v. National Bank of Monmouth,289 Ill. App. 3d 753, 755 (1997). Further:

"A plaintiff cannot rely simply on mere conclusions of law or fact unsupported byspecific factual allegations, regardless of whether they generally inform thedefendant of the nature of the claim against him or her. Grund v. Donegan, 298 Ill.App. 3d 1034, 1039, 700 N.E.2d 157, 161 (1998); Hirsch [v. Feuer], 299 Ill. App.3d [1076,] 1081, 702 N.E.2d [265,] 270[ (1998)]. In other words, an actionablewrong cannot be made out merely by characterizing acts as having been wrongfullydone. Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 129 Ill. 2d 497, 520, 544N.E.2d 733, 744 (1989)." Weidner v. Midcon Corp., 328 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1059(2002).

In a claim for breach of contract, therefore, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a contract, theplaintiff's performance of all contractual conditions, defendant's breach of that contract, andconsequential damages. See Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. City of Chicago, 159 Ill. App.3d 98, 102 (1987).

Plaintiff first asserts that five sections of the City ordinance concerning the responsibilities,authority, and policy of the personnel department , as pled in his complaint, constitute the existenceof a contract between the City of Chicago and its employees. The first section, 2-74-010 of theChicago Municipal Code (Code), creates merit employment and states as follows:

"It is the general purpose of this ordinance, and it is necessary in the publicinterest, to establish a system of personnel administration that meets the social,economic, and program needs of the people of the city of Chicago, to provide for aprofessional and progressive merit system for employment, and to insure flexiblecareer service within the city of Chicago." Chicago Municipal Code