The plaintiffs, Rickey A. Volpe and Kathleen Volpe, appeal from circuit court orders:granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, IKO Industries, Ltd. (Industries), ontheir complaint seeking recovery under a strict product liability theory; granting Industries'motion to strike the opinion testimony of their expert, William Cruice; and denying theirmotions for leave to file an amended complaint to allege an action in negligence. For thereasons which follow, we affirm.

Before analyzing the issues presented, we will set forth a brief recitation of the factualand procedural history of this case.

Industries is engaged in the business of manufacturing shingles and other roofingmaterials at a plant located in Brampton, Ontario. It is a privately held corporation owned bythe Koschitzky family. The Koschitzky family either owns or controls additional roofingmaterial manufacturing corporations in Canada and the United States, including IKO Chicago,Inc. (IKO Chicago), located in Bedford Park, Illinois.

The plaintiff, Rickey A. Volpe (Volpe), was employed as an oxidizer tank operator byIKO Chicago. On August 1, 1994, while at work, Volpe sustained severe burn injuries whenan oxidizer tank erupted and spewed hot asphalt down upon him. An oxidizer tank preparesasphalt for use in the manufacture of shingles. The process is as follows. A raw material called"flux" is pumped from a storage tank into an oxidizer tank. Once in the oxidizer tank, the fluxis heated to a high temperature by a super heater. Then, ferric chloride, a water based additive,is injected into the flux and air is blown from the bottom of the tank through the flux. Theintroduction of heat and air into the tank causes an exothermic chemical reaction, whereby theflux is transformed into asphalt, which is then applied to either dry felt or fiberglass to makeshingles.

Sometime prior to 1990, IKO Chicago's general manager, Art Friedson, and its plantmanager, Nelson Dunne, decided that the plant needed a second oxidizer tank. The secondoxidizer tank is at the center of this controversy. David Koschitzky, the president of IKOChicago, instructed his employees to consult John Evans, Industries' manager of corporateengineering, whenever new equipment or a modification of existing equipment was needed atthe IKO Chicago plant. Andrew Soward, Industries' controller, explained at his deposition thatIndustries became involved whenever IKO Chicago wanted to make a capital improvementbecause of the expertise of Industries' employees. He further stated that Industries' employeesassisted IKO Chicago with such projects because of the commonality of ownership among thecompanies. In accordance with this policy, IKO Chicago employees consulted Evans regardingthe purchase and installation of the second oxidizer tank for the plant. Evans visited the IKOChicago facility to inspect the oxidizing yard and the area where the second tank was to beconstructed. He subsequently ordered the second oxidizer tank from O'Connor Tanks, Ltd.(O'Connor Tanks), a custom fabricator of tanks located in Scarborough, Ontario. O'ConnorTanks had previously manufactured tanks for the various Koschitzky manufacturingcompanies.

Mitchell Moneta, an IKO Chicago plant engineer, testified at his deposition that Evansinformed him that the second tank would be the same as the existing one. He further testifiedthat Evans approved the specifications for the oxidizer tank. In contrast, Evans testified at hisdeposition that he only called O'Connor Tanks to obtain a price quote for an oxidizer tank. He stated that he did not provide the specifications for the tank; rather, O'Connor Tanksalready had a set of specifications from a prior purchase of an oxidizer tank by Industries. Hedid not know who sent those specifications. Isaac Shaposhnik, O'Connor Tank's operationmanager, testified at his deposition that O'Connor Tanks does not design tanks; rather, everytank is built to the customer's specifications. His testimony was corroborated by Don Malcolm,the general manager of O'Connor Tanks. Malcolm testified at his deposition that Industrieswould send O'Connor Tanks a drawing of the tank that it wanted fabricated and that Evans hadfinal approval of the specifications. According to Malcolm, the oxidizer tank was simply acontainer when it left O'Connor Tanks. He stated that O'Connor Tanks had nothing to dowith process piping installed on the tank. He further testified that O'Connor Tanks did notshare profits from the fabrication of the tank with any Koschitzky corporate entity.

Sometime after the second oxidizer tank was installed at IKO Chicago, but before theaccident resulting in Volpe's injuries, IKO Chicago's general manager, Reynold Hagle, decidedto inject waste oil into the oxidizer tank during the oxidation process as a means of disposingof such waste. The waste oil tank accumulates material, including water, from pollution controldevices throughout the IKO Chicago plant. Hagle testified at his deposition that he decidedto modify the oxidation system to allow for the transfer of material from the waste oil tank intothe oxidizer tank so that the material would burn off during the oxidation process. The wasteoil entered the air line outside of the oxidizer tank and was blown into the tank along with air. IKO Chicago employees or outside contractors modified the oxidation system in this manner.

Volpe testified at his deposition that, when he arrived at work the afternoon of August1, 1994, Joe Taylor, a co-worker, informed him that the plant had experienced a power outageearlier in the day. Taylor also stated that they were in the middle of a "blow" when the powerwent out so that the oxidizer tank was full of flux. The temperature inside the tank was 475degrees at the time. All other parts of the oxidation system were off and all of the valves relatedto the operation of the tank were shut. Volpe testified that, when Taylor finally restarted thesystem several hours later and opened the blower valve, the oxidizer tank was rumbling morethan usual and the vents on the "knock out box," which is used to vent fumes from the superheater, were blowing open and shut, indicating a tremendous amount of pressure. Shortlythereafter, the rupture disks on top of the oxidizer tank blew and hot asphalt spewed out of therupture openings onto Volpe, causing serious burn injuries. According to Volpe, after theaccident, Jim Meehan, an IKO Chicago maintenance mechanic, stated that he thought the valveof the waste oil tank was left in the open position the whole time that the oxidation system wasnot operational, allowing waste oil to flow freely into the oxidizer tank.

On July 24, 1996, Volpe and his wife, Kathleen Volpe, filed a complaint againstIndustries and numerous other defendants, alleging product liability claims and a claim for lossof consortium against each defendant. We note that the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed thecomplaint against certain defendants and that the trial court entered summary judgment infavor of all remaining defendants, including Industries. The plaintiffs appeal only from thesummary judgment entered in favor of Industries.

The plaintiffs' complaint alleged, inter alia, that Industries "purchased, shipped and/orsold" an oxidizer tank from O'Connor Tanks, for "delivery and use" at IKO Chicago. Accordingto the complaint, at the time the oxidizer tank was designed, manufactured, sold, anddistributed into the stream of commerce, it was in a defective and unreasonably dangerouscondition because it lacked an adequate means of relieving pressure which was likely to buildup during the use of the tank and because it lacked a means of deflecting the contents of thetank away from people in the event the tank became over-pressurized during use.

In answers to Supreme Court Rule 213(g) (177 Ill. 2d R. 213(g)) interrogatories, theplaintiffs identified William Cruice as an expert opinion witness who would testify at trial. According to those answers, Cruice would testify that the oxidizing tank was unreasonablydangerous for its intended use in that it failed to contain a mechanism to deflect material whichmight foreseeably escape the oxidizer through the rupture openings to an area unoccupied byworkers.

At his deposition, Cruice testified that he has a masters degree in chemistry and is alsoa member of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers. According to Cruice, he has hadexperience with tanks which have rupture disks, although those tanks were not used foroxidizing. Cruice had "never seen an oxidizer tank and asphalt tank in [his] life other than theone that [he] went to see in Chicago." Although he acknowledged that the suggested deflectordevice would have to be of sufficient strength so as to withstand any force that would be appliedagainst it as material erupted from the oxidizer tank, he admitted that he had not done anycalculations to determine how strong the deflector would have to be. He did not have anydrawings or plans of a deflector device intended for use on an oxidizer tank. Notwithstanding,he maintained that it would be feasible to install such a device. According to Cruice, amechanical engineer would do the calculations to determine the anticipated forces against thedeflector and then design a deflector that would withstand those forces. He was unaware of anyindustry standard, governmental regulation, or custom or practice in the industry that wouldbe violated by the absence of a deflector device around the rupture openings.

Cruice further testified that the eruption of the rupture disks on top of the oxidizer tankand the discharge of asphalt that occurred at the time of Volpe's accident was the result of theintroduction of water through the pipe from the waste oil tank to the oxidizer tank. He opinedthat there was a defect in the configuration of the piping between the waste oil tank and theoxidizer tank. Specifically, the pipe from the waste oil tank drained into the air line from theblower. As a result, during the power outage on the day of the accident, a large quantity ofwater from the waste oil tank drained into the air line and accumulated behind the blower valve. Thus, when the blower valve was opened, a large amount of waste material was blown into theoxidizer tank. The water immediately changed to steam and the oil vaporized due to the hightemperature of the flux inside the tank. The rapid expansion in volume due to thetransformation of water to steam caused the flux to pile up and burst through the rupture diskson top of the tank and rain down to the ground around the tank. According to Cruice, the waterwhich caused the eruption could only have come from the waste oil tank. He opined that,absent the introduction of water from the waste oil tank, the eruption of asphalt from theoxidizer tank would not have been possible.

In contrast to Cruice's testimony, Industries' expert, Dirk Duffner, a mechanicalengineer, testified at his deposition that the original design, fabrication, installation, andoperation of the oxidizer tank was proper and in compliance with industry standards. Hefurther opined that a rupture disk on a tank is meant to release a build up of gas, not asphalt. He explained that a deflector device around the rupture openings would not be feasible because,in the event of over-pressurization of the tank or an internal explosion, the deflector devicemight be blown off the tank due to the force of the explosion or the device might block therelease of gases. According to Duffner, explosions are unpredictable and therefore it is difficultto determine the forces associated with them, thereby rendering the design of a deflector devicearound the rupture openings not feasible.

On March 3, 2000, Industries filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia,that it could not be held liable because an alteration of the oxidizer tank caused Volpe's injury,to wit: the addition of waste oil during the oxidation process; and that there was no evidence tojustify the imposition of strict liability on Industries because there was no evidence that it eitherprovided the specifications for the oxidizer tank or reaped a profit from the sale of the tank toIKO Chicago. Industries further argued that the claim for loss of consortium must fail becausesuch a claim is dependent on establishing Industries' liability for Volpe's injury.

Contemporaneously with the filing of its motion for summary judgment, Industries fileda motion to strike the expert opinion testimony of Cruice on the grounds that he was of thewrong professional discipline and, therefore, not qualified to render an opinion regarding theoxidizer tank's design. Specifically, Industries argued that Cruice, a chemist/chemical engineer,admitted that a mechanical engineer would be needed to do the calculations to reach aconclusion regarding the actual feasibility of designing a deflector device to be placed aroundthe rupture openings. Further, Cruice stated that he had never designed nor seen a design ofsuch a deflector device. In fact, he had never seen an oxidizer tank. Industries also sought tostrike Cruice's testimony which was critical of the piping configuration since the undisputedtestimony established that the piping was added years after the oxidizer tank was originallydesigned and installed and that Industries had nothing to do with the alteration of the pipingwhich allowed the transfer of material from the waste oil tank to the oxidizer tank.

In response to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued that Industries'"alteration" argument must fail because, although the contents of the oxidizer tank came underpressure due to the injection of waste oil through the modified piping, the reason the asphaltwas able to injure Volpe was because it was not deflected once it exited the oxidizer tank. Theyfurther argued that Industries was liable under strict product liability theory because itparticipated in the design of the tank, it determined who the manufacturer would be, and itsowners profited by an increased product output at the IKO Chicago plant.

With respect to the motion to strike Cruice's testimony, the plaintiffs argued that Cruicewas qualified to render an expert opinion regarding the oxidizer tank at issue given hisexperience with tanks and vessels that hold chemicals, including petroleum products. Theyfurther argued that Cruice should be allowed to comment on the configuration of the pipingbecause it affected the rate at which water entered the tank which explained why the eruptionoccurred.

While Industries' motion for summary judgment and motion to strike were pending, theplaintiffs filed an emergency motion for leave to file an amended complaint, wherein theyasserted that discovery revealed that Industries provided the design specifications for the subjectoxidizer tank to O'Connor Tanks. The record reflects that the plaintiffs did not attach aproposed pleading to their motion. However, the motion itself states that they sought to amendthe complaint to add a claim of negligence on the part of Industries in the design of the tankand an additional claim of loss of consortium predicated on Industries' alleged negligence. OnApril 7, 2000, Judge Donald P. O'Connell denied the plaintiffs' motion, due to the prejudice toIndustries that would result since discovery had been "virtually completed" and becauseIndustries did not have an opportunity to explore the issues relevant to a negligence claim.

Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to continue the trial date in thiscause for the purpose of filing an amended complaint. To this motion, the plaintiffs attacheda proposed two count amendment, wherein they alleged that Industries negligently: (1)designed the oxidizer tank; (2) designed, specified, and supplied the oxidizer tank without areasonably adequate means of deflecting the emission of hot asphalt from the tank away fromworkers; (3) failed to provide reasonably adequate warnings and instructions to IKO Chicagoregarding the proper installation of the tank given that Industries knew or should have knownthat the emission of hot asphalt from the tank was a foreseeable danger; and (4) failed toproperly supervise the installation of the tank to ensure that any emission of hot asphalt fromthe tank would be contained or directed to an area to which workers were denied access. Thereason the plaintiffs sought leave to add the negligent installation allegation was based onMitchell Moneta's testimony that Industries' employee, John Evans, oversaw the installation. Because Industries would be precluded from filing a motion for summary judgment on thenegligence claims by Cook County circuit court rule 2.1(f), which requires such motions to befiled at least 45 days prior to trial, the plaintiffs requested that the trial court exercise itsdiscretion and continue the trial date to allow Industries to file a motion for summary judgmenton the additional claims. Judge O'Connell denied the plaintiffs' motion on April 13, 2000.

On May 9, 2000, Judge Mary A. Mulhern heard oral argument on Industries' motion forsummary judgment and motion to strike Cruice's testimony and, by a written order dated May16, 2000, took the motions under advisement.

On June 5, 2000, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to reconsider the denial oftheir motion for leave to file an amended complaint. In that motion, they asserted that the trialof the case was continued to July 7, 2000, due to the unavailability of a material witness. Giventhe additional time, they asked the trial court to reconsider its previous denial and allow themto amend the complaint to add claims based on negligence and thereby conform the pleadingto the evidence adduced during discovery. In an order dated June 5, 2000, Judge O'Connell seta briefing schedule on the motion and provided that the court's clerk would contact the partiesonce the court had reviewed the pleadings.

On June 12, 2000, Judge Mulhern entered a written order granting Industries' motionto strike Cruice's opinion testimony and granting summary judgment in favor of Industries. The trial court held that Cruice was not competent to testify that the lack of a deflector devicearound the rupture openings on the tank constituted a design defect because "he has neitherdesigned nor seen designs for such a device and is unaware of any custom or practice in theindustry or any industry or government standard requiring the installation of such a device." In granting summary judgment in favor of Industries, the trial court stated that, while the recordindicated that Industries "may have been the source of the design specifications for the oxidizertank at issue," there was no evidence that the design was defective.

On June 29, 2000, Judge O'Connell denied the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the denialof their motion for leave to file an amended complaint predicated on the untimeliness of themotion and the prejudice that would inure to Industries. The trial court noted that the plaintiffshad ample notice that Industries was not the manufacturer of the tank and had almost threeyears in which to amend the complaint adding its negligent design and installation allegations. It pointed out that Industries filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in May 1997, asserting thatit was not the manufacturer of the tank and that, during the respective depositions of JohnEvans and Mitchell Moneta in June 1998 and April 1999, both testified regarding themanufacture and installation of the tank.

The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal and present the following issues for ourconsideration: (1) whether the trial court erred in striking Cruice's expert opinion testimony;(2) whether summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Industries; and (3) whetherthe trial court should have granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to assert claimsof negligence.

The plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred by striking Cruice's opinion. The trialcourt has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of expert opinion testimony(Schaffner v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 129 Ill. 2d 1, 36, 541 N.E.2d 643(1989)), and this court will not disturb such a ruling absent an abuse of that discretion (Van Holtv. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 283 Ill. App. 3d 62, 70, 669 N.E.2d 1288 (1996)). On review,we conclude that striking of the plaintiffs' expert testimony evidence did not constitute an abuseof discretion.

The proponent of expert testimony has the burden of demonstrating to the trial courtthat the proffered opinion is worthy of admission into evidence. People v. Jordon, 103 Ill. 2d 192,208, 469 N.E.2d 569 (1984). Specifically, the offering party must demonstrate that the witnessis properly qualified as an expert based on his education, training, experience, or a combinationof each (People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 104, 643 N.E.2d 762 (1994)), and that the witness'sopinion is not be based on speculation or conjecture (Dyback v. Weber, 114 Ill. 2d 232, 244, 500N.E.2d 8 (1986)). In addition, the basis of the opinion must be reliable (People v. Baynes, 88 Ill.2d 225, 240, 430 N.E.2d 1070 (1981)) and have gained general acceptance in accordance withFrye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 187,670 N.E.2d 721 (1996)).

In Dyback, 114 Ill. 2d 232, the plaintiff sued a home-construction business following afire that damaged her home. She alleged that the fire was caused by the defendants' negligencein leaving a fuel-oil heater on the premises. A licensed public adjustor, who was qualified asan expert on causes and origins of fires and the valuation of losses produced by fires, "concededthat he did not know the cause of the fire[; however,] he stated his opinion that the fire wouldnot have occurred if the heater had not been on the premises." Dyback, 114 Ill. 2d at 237. Onappeal, our supreme court affirmed the trial court's determination that the witness wasunqualified to offer opinions on the duty of care the defendants owed because, in part, heconceded that he had "no idea" as to what ignited the fire. Dyback, 114 Ill. 2d at 244. As such,the adjustor's opinion was based on speculation.

Similarly, in Dhillon v. Crown Controls Corp., 269 F.3d 865, 868 (7^th Cir. 2001), theplaintiff sued the manufacturer of a forklift truck, alleging that the truck's design was defectivebecause it did not have a rear door on the operator's compartment that would have preventedhis injury. The plaintiff's experts opined that the truck design was defective because it lackeda rear door; however, the experts did not design a prototype of a truck with a rear door or testsuch a model to determine whether it was both economically feasible and either as safe or saferthan the model without the door. The trial judge ruled that the witnesses could not testify, andon appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that "[o]f course, hands-on testing is notan absolute prerequisite to the admission of expert testimony, but the theory here easily lendsitself to testing and substantiation by this method, such that conclusions based only on personalopinion and experience do not suffice." Dhillon, 269 F.3d at 870. Like Dhillon, the plaintiffs inthe instant case offer an expert who opined, without building a prototype or conducting anytests, that a product was defective because it lacked an alternative design. Cruice admitted thathe had not designed a deflector device of the type he testified should have been installed on thetank and had never seen such a device. Furthermore, he testified that a mechanical engineerwould be needed to do the calculations necessary to reach a conclusion as to the feasibility ofdesigning such a device. In our view, without either a model or test results, Cruice's opinionwas unsubstantiated and speculative.

We next address whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favorof Industries. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider theaffidavits, depositions, admissions, exhibits, and pleadings on file and must construe themstrictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. In re Estate of Hoover,155 Ill. 2d 402, 410-11, 615 N.E.2d 736 (1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when thereis no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party's right to judgment is clear and freefrom doubt. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998); Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d at 410. Our review of thetrial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet &Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 649 N.E.2d 1323 (1995).

Summary judgment in favor of a defendant is proper when a plaintiff cannot establishan essential element of his or her cause of action. Lavazzi v. McDonald's Corp., 239 Ill. App. 3d403, 408, 606 N.E.2d 845 (1992). To prevail on a theory of strict product liability, a plaintiffmust plead and prove, inter alia, that the injury or damage resulted from a condition of theproduct, that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one, and that the condition existedat the time the product left the defendant's control. Korando v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 159Ill. 2d 335, 343, 637 N.E.2d 1020 (1994).

Without Cruice's testimony, the record in this case is devoid of evidence establishing thatthe absence of a deflector device around the rupture openings on top of the oxidizer tankconstituted a design defect. In fact, the only remaining evidence in the record is to the contrary. Industries' expert, Dirk Duffner, opined that the original design, fabrication, installation, andoperation of the oxidizer tank was proper and in compliance with industry standards and thatthe design of a deflector device around the rupture openings was not feasible. Further, it isundisputed that, well after the oxidizer tank was originally designed and installed, either IKOChicago employees or outside contractors modified the piping configuration of the system toallow for the injection of waste oil into the oxidation tank during the oxidation process. Becausethe plaintiffs failed to submit counter-evidentiary material to rebut this evidence, their claim ofstrict product liability must fail as there is no genuine issue of material fact on the question ofwhether the design of the oxidizer tank before it was altered by IKO Chicago was unreasonablydangerous. Sorce v. Naperville Jeep Eagle, Inc., 309 Ill. App. 3d 313, 328-29, 722 N.E.2d 227(1999).

We note that, on appeal, the plaintiffs also argue that the trial court should have grantedthem leave to file an amended complaint, alleging that Industries was negligent in designingand installing the tank and the system in which it was used. However, they concede that, if thiscourt were to affirm the trial court's order striking the testimony of Cruice, there would be nobasis upon which to reverse the order denying them leave to file an amended complaint. Weagree.

Although courts are encouraged to freely and liberally allow pleadings to be amended(Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 467, 605 N.E.2d 493 (1992)), litigants do nothave an absolute right to file amended pleadings (Strickland v. Communications & Cable ofChicago, Inc., 304 Ill. App. 3d 679, 686, 710 N.E.2d 55 (1999)). A trial court's ruling to allow ordeny an amendment is a matter of discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of thatdiscretion. Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d at 416. In determining whether a trial court's denial of a party'smotion to amend constituted an abuse of discretion, we must consider: (1) whether theproposed amendment will cure the defective pleading; (2) whether the proposed amendmentwould surprise or prejudice the opposing party; (3) whether the proposed amendment wastimely filed; and (4) whether the movant had previous opportunities to amend. Loyola Academyv. S & S Roof Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263, 274-76, 586 N.E.2d 1211 (1992).

In this case, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying theplaintiffs leave to file an amended pleading prior to the entry of summary judgment. Given thatdiscovery was "virtually completed" and trial of the case was one month away, the trial courtcorrectly concluded that Industries would suffer prejudice as a result of any amendment addingadditional claims. Industries would not have had any time to investigate those claims, file amotion for summary judgment, or formulate a strategy for defending against those claims priorto trial. Second, as the trial court noted, the plaintiffs' motion was untimely. Winter v. HenryService Co., 143 Ill. 2d 289, 573 N.E.2d 822 (1991). The parties deposed John Evans in June1998 and Mitchell Moneta in April 1999, both of whom testified regarding the design andinstallation of the subject oxidizer tank; yet, the plaintiffs did not seek leave to amend until April2000. The plaintiffs offered no reason for this delay.

Further, we find no abuse of discretion in denying the plaintiffs leave to amend thecomplaint after Cruice's testimony was stricken and summary judgment was entered in favorof Industries. In order to recover on a theory of negligence, the plaintiffs would need to pleadand prove that Industries owed them a duty of care, that Industries breached that duty, and thatthis breach was the proximate cause of Volpe's injuries. Bier v. Leanna Lakeside Property Ass'n,305 Ill. App. 3d 45, 51, 711 N.E.2d 773 (1999). In their proposed amended complaint, theplaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that Industries breached its duty of care in that it negligentlydesigned and installed the oxidizer tank because the tank did not have a reasonably adequatemeans of deflecting the emission of hot asphalt from the tank away from workers. However,as stated previously, without Cruice's testimony, the record in this case is devoid of evidenceestablishing that the absence of a deflector device around the rupture openings on top of theoxidizer tank constituted a design defect. The only remaining evidence in the record is to thecontrary. Thus, the plaintiffs would not be able to establish any breach of duty on the part ofIndustries in the design or installation of the tank predicated on the absence of a deflectordevice. The same evidentiary material on file which supported summary judgment in favor ofIndustries on the plaintiffs' strict product liability claim would also support summary judgmentin favor of Industries on their negligence claim. As such, there was no basis upon which togrant the motion to amend the complaint after summary judgment had been entered in favorof Industries.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the orders of the trial court granting Industries' motionto strike the expert opinion testimony of Cruice, granting summary judgment in favor ofIndustries, and denying the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint.

Affirmed.

HARTMAN and THEIS, JJ., concur.