THIRD DIVISION
FILED: 04/16/03

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

This case is before us for direct review of an order of theIllinois Human Rights Commission (Commission) dismissing, for wantof jurisdiction, a complaint charging that the respondent, ITTTechnical Institute (ITT), terminated the employment of thepetitioner, Freda Weatherly, in retaliation for her opposition todiscriminatory practices. For the reasons which follow, we confirmthe Commission's order.

On August 6, 1998, ITT fired the petitioner, stating as itsreason for doing so that she violated a company rule and committedtheft by ordering a calculator for her personal use. On September10, 1998, the petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with theIllinois Department of Human Rights (Department), asserting thereinthat she was discharged by ITT because of her race. The writtencharge states, in relevant part, as follows:

"I. A. ISSUE/BASIS

DISCHARGED ON AUGUST 6, 1998, BECAUSE OF MYRACE, BLACK.

B. PRIMA FACIE ALLEGATIONS

1. My race is black and I was the only blackemployee in my department.

2. My work performance as a Special ServiceCoordinator was very good.

3. On August 6, 1998, I was discharged. Thereason given by Sandee Rusiniak (white),Director of Placement and actingDirector, for my discharge was forordering a personal item which isconsidered a theft.

4. I ordered a calculator to use in theperformance of my job. To my knowledge,I did not violate a work related policyby having ordered the calculator. LisaBreitenberg (white), Marketing Secretary,was found to have falsified her timecard. To my knowledge, she was notdischarged. I was replaced byBreitenberg."

The written charge form contains a heading labeled "Cause OfDiscrimination Based On." The only box checked under that headingis the one labeled "Race." The box labeled "Retaliation" is notchecked.

On June 23, 1999, the petitioner amended her charge ofdiscrimination to include a count based upon retaliation. Thewritten amendment states, in relevant part, as follows:

"II. A. ISSUE/BASIS

DISCHARGED AUGUST 6, 1998, IN RETALIATION FOROPENLY OPPOSING RACE DISCRIMINATION.

B. Prima facie case

1. I complained to Sandee Rusiniak (white),Director of Placement and Acting Director,that Lisa Breitenberg was treated differentlybecause she is white. My opposition to therace discrimination due to the differenttreatment was reasonably [sic] and in goodfaith.

2. On August 6, 1998, I was discharged. Thereason given by Rusiniak was for ordering apersonal item which is considered a theft.

3. I was subsequently discharged followingopposition to discrimination within such a periodof time as to raise an inference of retaliatorymotivation."

On the same date that the petitioner amended her charge to includea claim of retaliation, she withdrew her race discrimination claim.

The Department filed a complaint with the Commission onDecember 3, 1999, charging ITT with a civil rights violation. Thecomplaint alleged that ITT's stated reason for discharging thepetitioner was pretextual and that she was discharged inretaliation for having opposed an unfair and discriminatoryemployment practice. The complaint specifically noted that thepetitioner withdrew her claim of race discrimination on June 23,1999, and that the Department had administratively closed itsinvestigation as to that count.

ITT answered the Department's complaint, denying the chargingallegations contained therein and asserting, inter alia, that thecomplaint is untimely. Thereafter, on September 28, 2000, ITTfiled a motion for summary judgment arguing both that the complaintis time-barred, as the petitioner's charge of discrimination basedupon retaliation was filed with the Department more than 180 daysafter her discharge, and that insufficient evidence exists toestablish a prima facie case of retaliation.

After briefing and argument on ITT's motion, an administrativelaw judge (ALJ) issued a recommended order and decision, concludingthat the Commission lacked jurisdiction over the matter because thepetitioner's charge of retaliation was filed with the Departmentafter the expiration of the 180-day period set forth in section 7A-102(A)(1) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A)(1) (West 1998)) and recommending that the action bedismissed for want of jurisdiction. Thereafter, the petitionerfiled her exceptions to the ALJ's recommended order and decision.

On June 13, 2001, the executive director of the Commissionfiled a notice pursuant to section 8A-103(E)(3) of the Act (775ILCS 5/8A-103(E)(3) (West 2000)), informing the parties that theCommission had declined to review the ALJ's recommended order anddecision and, as a consequence, the recommended order and decisionhad become the order of the Commission. On June 27, 2001, thepetitioner filed her timely petition for review of the Commission'sdecision with the clerk of this court pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335).

In urging reversal of the Commission's decision, thepetitioner argues that the amendment which she filed with theDepartment on June 23, 1999, was not untimely as it related back tothe timely filing of her original charge on September 10, 1998. The petitioner also appears to argue that an application of thedoctrines of equitable tolling and estoppel prevent the dismissalof the instant action on jurisdictional grounds. We reject each ofthe petitioner's arguments.

The claimant's amended charge of discrimination alleges acivil rights violation as defined in section 6-101(A) of the Act. 775 ILCS 5/6-101(A) (West 1998). The Act is the "exclusive sourcefor redress of civil rights violations" (Village of Maywood Boardof Fire & Police Commissioners v. Department of Human Rights, 296Ill. App. 3d 570, 581, 695 N.E.2d 873 (1998)) and, except forlimited exceptions not relevant to the disposition of this case,the Commission is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over thesubject of alleged civil rights violations (see Castaneda v.Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 322, 547 N.E.2d 437(1989); 775 ILCS 5/8-111(C) (West 1998)).

Section 7-102(A)(1) of the Act fixes the time within which acharge of a civil rights violation may be filed with theDepartment. See 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A)(1) (West 1998). TheCommission has no power to act beyond that power granted it by thelegislature, and the Act does not confer upon the Commission theauthority to consider complaints based on untimely filed charges. Robinson v. Human Rights Comm'n, 201 Ill. App. 3d 722, 728, 559N.E.2d 229 (1990). Because the Act creates a remedy which wasunknown at common law and also sets the time within which a chargemay be filed with the Department, compliance with the statutorytime limit is a condition precedent to the right to seek a remedy(Robinson, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 728; see also Fredman BrothersFurniture Co. v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 209-10,486 N.E.2d 893 (1985)) and is a prerequisite to the Commission'sacquisition of subject matter jurisdiction (Robinson, 201 Ill. App.3d at 727-29; Pickering v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 146 Ill.App. 3d 340, 344-47, 496 N.E.2d 746 (1986)).

First, we address the issue of whether the petitioner's chargeof discrimination predicated upon ITT's alleged retaliation wasfiled timely. Section 7A-102(A)(1) of the Act provides:

"Within 180 days after the date that a civil rightsviolation allegedly has been committed, a charge inwriting under oath or affirmation may be filed with theDepartment by an aggrieved party or issued by theDepartment itself under the signature of the Director." 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A)(1) (West 1998).

It is undisputed that the petitioner's original charge of racediscrimination was filed with the Department within the 180-dayperiod provided in section 7A-102(A)(1). It is also undisputedthat the amendment the petitioner filed on June 23, 1999, chargingdiscrimination based upon retaliation was filed after theexpiration of that period. Nevertheless, the petitioner arguesthat her retaliation claim was not untimely, contending that thefiling of the amendment relates back to the timely filing of heroriginal charge.

Pursuant to the procedural rules promulgated by theDepartment, "[a] charge may be amended to cure technical defects orto set forth additional facts or allegations related to the subjectmatter of the original charge, and such amendments shall relateback to the original filing date." 56 Ill. Adm. Code