FOURTH DIVISION
February 13, 2003

Plaintiff Paul Williams, a person found not guilty of by reason of insanity of first degreemurder, filed a petition in the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 10-124 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 2000)). In that petition, plaintiff allegedthat his confinement in the custody of the Department of Human Services was rendered unlawfulby the expiration of his maximum period of confinement under section 5-2-4(b) of the UnifiedCode of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2000)). The trial court denied plaintiff'spetition, and he now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

On December 19, 1982, the trial court, the Honorable Fred G. Suria, found plaintiff notguilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) on the charge of first degree murder and admitted him,involuntarily, to the custody of the Illinois Department of Mental Health and DevelopmentalDisabilities, now the Department of Human Services (DHS). Thereafter, plaintiff was confined atthe Elgin Mental Health Center, an inpatient psychiatric facility operated by the DHS.

On December 8, 2000, the trial court, once again the Honorable Fred G. Suria, issued anorder granting the plaintiff conditional release for a period of five years under Code section 5-2-4(d)(2) (730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(d)(2) (West 2000)). The court also set September 26, 2001, as the lastday for plaintiff's maximum period of confinement under Code section 5-2-4(b). Sometime afterSeptember 26, 2001, plaintiff allegedly violated the terms of his conditional release agreement bypreliminarily testing positive for cocaine. Accordingly, the State filed a petition to revokeplaintiff's conditional release.

On November 28, 2001, plaintiff specially appeared to challenge the trial court's continuedjurisdiction past the expiration of his maximum period of confinement, i.e., September 26, 2001,and moved to dismiss the State's petition to revoke his conditional release. The trial court deniedthe plaintiff's motion and remanded him to the custody of the DHS. Plaintiff claims that his returnto custody was for an evaluation as to whether he should be subject to involuntary admission.

On December 21, 2001, plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, againchallenging his confinement past the expiration of the maximum period of confinement underCode section 5-2-4(b). On December 28, 2001 the trial court, the Honorable William S. Wood,heard arguments regarding plaintiff's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. No evidence wasproduced at the hearing, and neither party asked the court to take judicial notice of any otherorders. In addition to the facts that plaintiff alleged in his petition, he also revealed that JudgeSuria issued a contempt citation and a $100,000 warrant for plaintiff's arrest following his testingpositive for cocaine. According to the plaintiff's representations at the hearing, he was arrestedfour days later. The defendant, Nancy Staples, the director of the Elgin facility, responded thatJudge Suria had held a hearing regarding plaintiff's conditional release and that the State hadargued in favor of the trial court's continuing jurisdiction. The defendant also noted that after thehearing regarding the court's jurisdiction over plaintiff's conditional release violation, Judge Suriaheld that he had jurisdiction and ordered that the DHS evaluate the plaintiff. Finally, the Statenoted that plaintiff's contempt citation was still pending. The trial court then denied plaintiff'spetition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The issues in the instant case involve only questions of law and statutory interpretation; therefore, the standard of review is de novo. People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (2000).

Plaintiff's only argument on appeal is identical to that which he made twice before the trialcourt in his special appearance and in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus; namely, that he isbeing unlawfully confined past the expiration of his maximum period of confinement under Codesection 5-2-4(b). By way of background, proceedings after acquittal by reason of insanity aregoverned by Code section 5-2-4, which provides, in pertinent part, that if a NGRI acquittee is to beinvoluntarily committed to the DHS, that confinement:

"[S]hall not exceed the maximum length of time that the defendant would havebeen required to serve, less credit for good behavior, before becoming eligible forrelease had he been convicted of and received the maximum sentence for the mostserious crime for which he has been acquitted by reason of insanity. The Courtshall determine the maximum period of commitment by an appropriate order." 730ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2000).

The end of this period is known as the "Thiem" date. See People v. Cross, 274 Ill. App. 3d 159,161 (1995); People v. Thiem, 82 Ill. App. 3d 956, 962 (1980) (holding that "the trial court shoulddetermine and fix a definite maximum period of commitment"). According to the supreme court,"[t]he maximum thus determined will represent the outer limit of the defendant's possiblecommitment. The defendant cannot be held beyond that maximum." People v. Tanzy, 99 Ill. 2d19, 21 (1983).

Consequently, when institutionalized NGRI acquittees reach their Thiem date, the DHSeither releases them or recommits them as civil patients, voluntarily or involuntarily depending onthe circumstances. See Lucas v. Peters, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5 (2000). In turn, the decision ofwhether NGRI acquittees are to be released or recommitted arises from a court's weighing of his orher liberty interest in not being institutionalized indeterminably⁽¹⁾ against the State's interest inprotecting society from the premature release of mentally ill persons. See People v. Jurisec, 199Ill. 2d 108, 129 (2002); People v. Palmer, 148 Ill. 2d 70, 94 (1992); People v. Winston, 191 Ill.App. 3d 948, 959 (1989).

Regardless of how a trial court wishes to proceed, however, Illinois courts consistentlyhave held that the NGRI acquittees' Thiem date is the outside limit for their period of confinementin the criminal or "forensic"⁽²⁾ context. For example, in People v. Leppert, 105 Ill. App. 3d 514(1982), this court held that "[t]he statute provides a clear formula for commitment: the time shallbe indefinite, and the maximum is set by operation of law. * * * The court may not state amaximum length of commitment any different than that provided by statute." Leppert, 105 Ill.App. 3d at 519-20. Such language indicates that a court's duty in that regard is ministerial ratherthan discretionary. See also People v. Pastewski, 164 Ill. 2d 189, 201 (1995) ("Given the rationalefor the statute, it would be odd to place in the trial judge discretion to select, as a maximum periodof commitment, a time other than the longest span provided by statute").

Moreover, we have found reversible error where the trial court extended an NGRIacquittee's period of confinement for an additional 15 months beyond the maximum provided byCode section 5-4-2(b) because he was involved in several altercations during his confinement. InIn re Commitment of Guy, 126 Ill. App. 3d 267 (1984), this court held that an NGRI acquittee'sconduct during commitment was irrelevant to the determination of the maximum confinementperiod "because the maximum length of the commitment period must be set before the period haseven begun." Guy, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 269-70. Specifically, the Guy court found that the trialcourt erred in using the petitioner's later conduct as a basis for revoking good-time credits thatwere factored into a previously correct calculation of his Thiem date. Guy, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 270. Ultimately, the court found that because that revocation unlawfully extended his Thiem date, hispetition for a writ of habeas corpus should have been granted because it was filed after hiscorrectly calculated Thiem date. Guy, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 270-71.

In the present case, the defendant apparently concedes that plaintiff's release date ofSeptember 26, 2001, was correctly calculated. However, plaintiff notes, the court continued toconfine him past that date. Under Guy, plaintiff claims that neither his conditional release periodnor his alleged violation of that conditional release may extend his statutory maximum period ofcommitment. Accordingly, where the laws of habeas corpus provide that a person may bedischarged from the custody of the court "[w]here the court has exceeded the limit of itsjurisdiction, either as to the matter, place, sum or person" (735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 2000)), andwhere plaintiff filed his petition of a writ of habeas corpus on December 21, 2001, nearly twomonths after the expiration of his Thiem date, plaintiff argues that we should reverse the trial courtand find that he is entitled to his immediate release.

The defendant first responds that the plaintiff violated Supreme Court Rule 321 (155 Ill. 2dR. 321) by not including Judge Suria's November 28, 2001, order which confined the plaintiff tothe DHS for an evaluation.⁽³⁾ Supreme Court Rule 321 provides:

"The record on appeal shall consist of the judgment appealed from, thenotice of appeal, and the entire original common law record, unless the partiesstipulate for, or the trial court, after notice and hearing, or the reviewing court,orders less. The common law record includes every document filed and judgmentand order entered in the cause and any documentary exhibits offered and filed byany party. Upon motion the reviewing court may order that other exhibits beincluded in the record. The record on appeal shall also include any report ofproceedings prepared in accordance with Rule 323. There is no distinction betweenthe common law record and the report of proceedings for the purpose ofdetermining what is properly before the reviewing court." 155 Ill. 2d R.321.

Defendant notes that the failure to present an adequate record on appeal results in waiver of anyissue for which the record is insufficient to support a claim of error. People v. Green, 288 Ill. App.3d 402, 407 (1997).

For example, in Best Coin-Op, Inc. v. Fountains on Carriage Way Condominium Ass'n,239 Ill. App. 3d 1062 (1992), the plaintiff appealed a trial court's ruling granting partial summaryjudgment to the defendant. Quoting Rule 321, we found that the record which the plaintiff filedwas inadequate because it did not contain the trial court's order of summary judgment. Best Coin-Op, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 1063. Instead, the plaintiff included the trial court's subsequent orderdenying the plaintiff's motion to reconsider. Best Coin-Op, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 1063. Wedismissed the appeal with prejudice and held:

"An order denying an appellant's motion for reconsideration is not the orderor judgment of the trial court which is brought before this court on appeal. Our roleas a reviewing court is to consider the legal propriety of the trial court's decision,not in granting or denying a motion for reconsideration, but the underlying order orjudgment which is at issue on a motion for reconsideration." Best Coin-Op, 230 Ill.App. 3d at 1063.

Defendant argues that the case at bar is analogous to Best Coin-Op, because even thoughthe present case deals with plaintiff's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the relevant issue is thelegal propriety of the underlying order in which Judge Suria had the plaintiff confined for anevaluation. Here, defendant argues, where the plaintiff failed to include the underlying orderconfining him for an evaluation, as well as the report of proceedings relevant to that confinement,he is no different from the plaintiff in Best Coin-Op who failed to include the underlying summaryjudgment order.

At the outset, we agree with the defendant that the plaintiff's failure to include theNovember 28, 2001, order in the record makes it most difficult to determine how, exactly, JudgeSuria exercised jurisdiction over the plaintiff and how he justified the plaintiff's continuedconfinement. As a result, even the parties disagree on appeal as to why the plaintiff was before thetrial court on November 28, 2001, and why the trial court reached its result. On one hand, theplaintiff claims that the trial court remanded him to the custody of the DHS to determine whetherhe was in need of further inpatient care. On the other, the defendant claims that the trial courtremanded plaintiff for an evaluation to determine whether he was capable of forming the requisiteintent to commit contempt of court.

Interestingly, the logical conclusions of those conflicting theories are the bases for eachparty's argument. If plaintiff was remanded for a determination of his involuntary admission, thetrial court necessarily would be extending its jurisdiction over the defendant for the underlyingmurder past the plaintiff's Thiem date. However, if the plaintiff was remanded for a determinationas to whether he could intentionally commit contempt of court, then the court simply would beexercising the jurisdiction it afforded itself when it granted the defendant a conditional release -something that defendant claims is altogether different from plaintiff's Thiem date.

However, regardless of the analysis the court used in its determination to remand theplaintiff, the issue remains the same: whether the NGRI statute's conditional release provision canextend a court's jurisdiction over an NGRI acquittee past his expired Thiem date. As that is amatter of statutory interpretation, it is a question of law. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96,103 (2001). It is well established that if an issue presented on appeal is solely a question of law,the absence of a complete record will not prevent appellate review. Jackson v. Naffah, 241 Ill.App. 3d 1043, 1046 (1993). Accordingly, we decline defendant's invitation to dismiss this appealbased upon an incomplete record.

The defendant next addresses the plaintiff's substantive argument. She asserts thatregardless of whether the plaintiff is considered to be an NGRI acquittee, the trial court's order ofhis conditional release remains in effect for a period of at least five years and allows the trial courtto punish the plaintiff for contempt based on violations of the court's order. The NGRI statute'sconditional release provision reads:

" 'Conditional Release' means: the release from either the custody of theDepartment of Human Services or the custody of the Court of a person who hasbeen found not guilty by reason of insanity under such conditions as the Court mayimpose which reasonably assure the defendant's satisfactory progress in treatmentor habilitation and the safety of the defendant and others. The Court shall considersuch terms and conditions which may include, but need not be limited to, outpatientcare, alcoholic and drug rehabilitation programs, community adjustment programs,individual, group, family, and chemotherapy, periodic checks with the legalauthorities and/or the Department of Human Services. The person or facilityrendering the outpatient care shall be required to periodically report to the Court onthe progress of the defendant. Such conditional release shall be for a period of fiveyears, unless the defendant, the person or facility rendering the treatment, therapy,program or outpatient care, or the State's Attorney petitions the Court for anextension of the conditional release period for an additional three years. *** In noevent shall the defendant's period of conditional release exceed eight years." 730ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(D) (West 2000).

Accordingly, defendant argues that where the plaintiff's current confinement is based on the trialcourt's arrest warrant and contempt citation for plaintiff's failure to comply with the terms of hisconditional release -and is not related to his NGRI status regarding the underlying offense- theplaintiff is properly under the five-year jurisdiction of the trial court as indicated in the conditionalrelease provision.

Defendant further argues that the plaintiff's focus on his Thiem date as the absolute limit ofthe trial court's jurisdiction over him ignores the language of the conditional release provision ofthe NGRI statute. As noted, Code section 5-2-4(a)(1)(D) states that a "conditional release shall befor a period of five years." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(D) (West 2000). Suchlanguage, she argues, clearly mandates a five-year period of jurisdiction over an individual andprovides no exceptions except for a possible three-year extension.

Moreover, defendant notes that there is nothing in the statute that limits conditional releaseto individuals who have five or more years remaining in their Thiem period and that to read such alimitation into the statute would lead to absurd results. Defendant asserts that people nearing theexpiration of their Thiem dates are those who have benefitted from the majority of the term oftheir court-imposed treatment and, most likely, would be better candidates for conditional releasethan those with a great deal of time remaining in their Thiem periods.

However, following the plaintiff's arguments, defendant asserts that trial courts would beunable to grant conditional release to people with less than five years remaining in theirThiem periods, as the courts would be unable to comply with the minimum five-year jurisdictionalperiod prescribed by the statute. Accordingly, those people would be divested automatically of theprogressive step benefits of a conditional release. In addition, defendant argues, this result wouldencourage courts to grant conditional release at least five years prior to the expiration ofThiem dates, which, in some cases, might be premature for some individuals except for the court'sinability to grant such release when those individuals are within five years of their Thiem dates. Because absurd constructions must be avoided (In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 418-19 (2001)),defendant argues that only rational interpretation of Code section 5-2-4 is that the provisionrequiring a five-year length of conditional release supercedes an individual's Thiem date.

Defendant asserts that the case of People v. Marshall, 273 Ill. App. 3d 969 (1995), supportsher contention. In Marshall, the defendant had been found not guilty by reason of insanity for thecrimes of first degree murder, armed violence, and aggravated battery. Marshall, 273 Ill. App. 3dat 970. The trial court found that the defendant was subject to involuntary admission and placedhim in the custody of the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities fora period not to extend past a Thiem date of February 29, 2003. On November 15, 1988, thedefendant was granted a conditional release which, because no petition had been filed seeking anextension, expired on November 15, 1993. Marshall, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 970. At a later courthearing, the State argued that the trial court retained jurisdiction over the defendant until theexpiration of his Thiem date even though his conditional release had expired and no extension wassought. Marshall, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 971. After a hearing to determine the defendant's mentalhealth status, the trial court concluded that the defendant was in need of mental health services onan inpatient basis, that he was a danger to himself and others, and that he was subject toinvoluntary admission. Marshall, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 972-73.

Focusing on the mandatory time limits in the NGRI statute, this court reversed and held:

"[W]hen a court grants a person a conditional release for five years, the provisionsof the NGRI statute take effect. The defendant can no longer be held by theDepartment until the maximum prison sentence would have expired under Thiem. Once a court finds, after hearing on a petition for condition release, that a defendantis entitled to be granted his request, and is awarded a conditional release, adefendant cannot be held for treatment beyond the five-year period unless a petitionrequesting that he be returned to the Department [of Mental Health] is filed withinthe five-year period. In that event, if the court grants the petition, the conditionalrelease period may be extended an additional three years. The maximumconditional release period is a total of eight years. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par.1005-2-4(a)(1)(d) (now 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(d) (West 1992))." Marshall, 273Ill. App. 3d at 975.

Put another way, defendant argues, the Marshall court determined that once a trial court hasgranted a conditional release to an NGRI acquittee, his Thiem date no longer applies. Instead, thecourt then exercises its jurisdiction under either Code section 5-2-4(h) or Code section 5-2-4(i)(730 ILCS 5/5-2-4 (h), (i) (West 2000)) if it chooses to discharge a defendant because he no longerrequires mental health services or if it finds that a defendant has not fulfilled the conditions ofrelease.

In the present case, therefore, defendant claims that once the court granted plaintiff aconditional release, it immediately stripped itself of its Thiem date jurisdiction over him, andinstead obtained the minimum five-year period of jurisdiction dictated by the conditional releaseprovision. Such a result, defendant concludes, is also consistent with the conditional releaseprovision's explicit instruction that the trial court's contempt powers are not to be limited by theNGRI statute. 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(i) (West 2000). Here, therefore, where there was an outstandingcontempt charge against the plaintiff for his alleged violation of the conditional release, thedefendant argues that the court was simply holding the plaintiff for a hearing to determine hiscapacity to commit the crime of contempt. See People v. Sheahan, 150 Ill. App. 3d 572, 575(1986) (held that in situations where a trial court is considering holding in contempt a defendantsuffering from mental illness, a hearing on the defendant's mental capacity to commit the crimewas required).

The supreme court has held:

"When determining legislative intent, the starting point always is the language ofthe statute, which is the most reliable indicator of the legislature's objectives inenacting the particular law. [Citations.] When the language of a statute is plain andunambiguous, courts may not read in exceptions, limitations, or other conditions.[Citations.] Only when the meaning of the enactment cannot be ascertained fromthe language may a court look beyond the language and resort to aids forconstruction. [Citations.]" In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 419 (2001).

In the present case, we think that Code section 5-2-4 is open to at least two interpretationsregarding the calculation of the time period of a trial court's jurisdiction over an NGRI acquitteeand, therefore, is ambiguous. "When there is an alleged conflict between two statutes, the courthas the duty to construe the statutes in a manner that avoids inconsistency and gives effect to bothstatutes, where such an interpretation is reasonably possible. McNamee v. Federated Equipment& Supply Co., 181 Ill. 2d 415, 427, 692 N.E.2d 1157, 1163 (1998)." Gibbs v. Lewis & ClarkMarine, Inc., 298 Ill. App. 3d 743, 747 (1998). Consequently, we will look to supplementaryprinciples of statutory construction.

Initially, we find that language from Marshall is persuasive, but not for the defendant. InMarshall, this court analyzed language from a supreme court decision which found that the timelimits in the NGRI statute are mandatory and not discretionary:

"In the case of Radazewski v. Cawley (1994), 159 Ill. 2d 372, 375, 639 N.E.2d 141,the court had to decide whether the provision stating that the 'court shall set ahearing to be held within 30 days,' was discretionary or mandatory. In that case, thepetitioners were not granted hearings to determine whether they should be releasedwithin the 30-day period. The court ruled that the time period to hold a hearingwas mandatory. The court explained '[i]t is well settled that detention of anindividual at a mental health care facility implicates a substantial liberty interest.[Citations.] Statutes involving involuntary admission procedures are thereforeconstrued narrowly.' 159 Ill. 2d at 378; see People v. Bledsoe (1994), 268 Ill. App.3d 869, 873; and In re Splett (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 225, 230, 572 N.E.2d 883." Marshall, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 974-75.

Accordingly, this court found:

"It would seem to follow that all persons who are found not guilty by reasonof insanity have a substantial liberty interest. They have not been convicted of anycrime. Any time limits contained in that statute must be considered mandatory,including the time period for conditional release." Marshall, 273 Ill. App. 3d at975.

In so finding, the Marshall court held that the terms of the conditional release provision of theNGRI statute would operate mandatorily to release an NGRI acquittee from the trial court'sjurisdiction if the State did not petition the court for an extension of that release within five years. In other words, in construing the statute, the court focused heavily on the substantial libertyinterests of the NGRI acquittee and found that, once the court granted him or her a conditionalrelease, it effectuated the possibility that its own jurisdiction over that individual could be halted ifthe State chose not to pursue an extension of the release.

Importantly, however, there is nothing to suggest that the Marshall court intended that thetime periods listed in the conditional release provision of the NGRI statute should supercede anindividual's Thiem period in every circumstance. Instead, the court concentrated only on whetherthe conditional release provision could operate to abbreviate the trial court's jurisdiction over adefendant who still had 10 years remaining until the expiration of his Thiem date. Nowhere in thecourt's reasoning is it at all apparent that the court even analyzed the reciprocal of its eventualholding, namely, whether the conditional release provision could operate to extend a court'sjurisdiction over an individual past his Thiem date. Accordingly, in light of the Marshall court'sfocus on assigning mandatory status to the time limits in the statute that could shorten a court'sjurisdiction over an NGRI acquittee based on his or her substantial liberty interests, we think itwould be antithetical to Marshall to find that a court could, by granting conditional release, expandits jurisdiction over an NGRI acquittee beyond his or her Thiem date. As noted, it has long beenheld that the Thiem date is simply the outside limits of the court's jurisdiction. Tanzy, 99 Ill. 2d at21; People v. Spudic, 144 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1076 (1986) ("[o]nce *** the statutory maximum hasbeen reached, the defendant may no longer be held under the terms of section 5-2-4"); People v.Hampton, 121 Ill. App. 3d 273, 277 (1983).

"In determining the intent of the legislature, the court may properly consider not only thelanguage of the statute, but also the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to beremedied, and the purpose to be achieved." People v. McGee, 326 Ill. App. 3d 165, 169 (2001),citing People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 345 (1992). A review of the legislative debate on PublicAct 81-1497, effective September 19, 1980, also sheds light on the role of the five-year time framemandated by the conditional release provision in the NGRI statute. The bill's sponsor,Representative Katz, stated in floor debate that the purpose of his proposed amendment to theNGRI statute was to provide more control over NGRIs for the protection of society:

"I doubt if there is an issue that is brought to legislators more often in terms ofcomplaint of the citizenry than the instances of individuals who are found not guiltyby reason of insanity who are released because they are not in need of mentaltreatment and they are released and then they go on to commit another violentcrime. *** What this bill does is to provide that in the instance of an individualfound not guilty by reason of insanity that that individual will be sent to thefacilities of the Department of Mental Health where they will make an evaluation ofthe defendant. On the evaluation, they may find that he can be involuntarilyadmitted because he is a danger to himself or others and that's currently thesituation. However, they can also find that the individual is in need of mentalhealth services. If the individual is found to be in need of mental health services heis given a conditional discharge, or a conditional release by the courts and for aperiod of five years he will be under the jurisdiction of the Department of MentalHealth. They may decide that he needs hospitalizing and institutionaliz[ing] andmay keep him in the hospital. They may also put him on an outpatient basis. Butrather than letting the individual simply float around in the community and beunknown to everyone until he commits a violent crime or act again, thesuperintendent of the Department of Mental Health follows that individual. ***This is . . . will be a great help in terms of trying to eliminate those terrible cases inwhich individuals who have committed violent crimes are released to go on tocommit another crime." 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 17, 1979,at 101-02 (statements of Representative Katz).

Later, Representative Katz was asked specifically why he included the five-year jurisdictionalperiod, and he responded:

"The five year period that we put in is five years longer than the present lawis . .

* * *

Alright. So this was an attempt to strengthen the present law, not to weakenit. It strengthens the present law. You have an individual who has been found notguilty by reason of insanity . . . it was felt here and it is the experience in Marylandthat five years is an adequate time to monit[or] that individual and see his return tosociety. That individual has been found not be have committed a crime, five yearswas felt to be a reasonable period of time to monit[or] and supervise the case. ***Under the present law, if the individual is brought in and he is found not in need oftreatment, the Judge can release him immediately. This bill broadens that concept.*** It is a stronger bill than the present [law]." 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., HouseProceedings, May 17, 1979, at 106-07 (statements of Representative Katz).

Representative Katz repeated those sentiments in his closing:

"This bill gives the Department of Mental Health the power to put anindividual who is a danger to himself or to others, they can put him in involuntaryadmission and confine him in a State hospital to [sic] as long as he is such a threat. If he does not fall into that category, rather than releasing him as maybe the case insome instances now, if he is in need of mental health services, he is given aconditional discharge, a release for five years. During the five year period he ismonitored. He is required to report regularly. If he does not do so, he can then beput by the Department of Mental Health into the hospital and kept there as long asthey feel that he needs [to be kept.]" 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings,May 17, 1979, at 108-09 (statements of Representative Katz).

Those statements by the bill's sponsor, in turn, were echoed in the Senate proceedings by SenatorSangmeister:

"There have been a lot of proposals that have been made as to what weought to do in the insanity area, particularly when a defendant is found not guilty byreason of insanity. Under the present law, as you know, a person if found not guiltyby reason of insanity is committed to the Department of Mental Health. There's anevaluation made there and the person can be, by the department, put back out in thestreet. There's long been [the] feeling that we ought to do something more than thatand that's what Committee Bill 1010 does. It sets up the fact that you still go to theDepartment of Mental Health, there's an evaluation made there. Whether you are tobe released, which would be very doubtful under those circumstances, whether youshould need . . . outpatient care or inpatient care, you're then brought back to thecourt and the court has to hear that testimony and [an] evaluation is made. Fromthere on the . . . the defendant is under the jurisdiction of that court for five yearssubject to whatever . . . orders the court may wish to impose on that particulardefendant." 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 27, 1979, at 340-41(statements of Senator Sangmeister).

That language supports the conclusion that the intent of the legislature in enacting theconditional release provision was to protect against the premature release of NGRI acquittees intosociety without the ability to monitor their behavior. Moreover, it appears that the five-yearjurisdictional time period was included only to allow the Department of Mental Health and thecourts an acceptable time to supervise the release of NGRI acquittees who, under the previous law,would have been released into society without any restrictions. Nothing, however, suggests thatthe legislature intended this five-year time period as a way for courts to extend their jurisdictionover an NGRI acquittee past his or her Thiem date. The following colloquy on the Senate floorreveals as much:

"SENATOR NIMROD: Senator Sangmeister, it seemed to me that the unfitto . . . or not guilty by reason of insanity, that we had a provision in there thatwould have kept the individual under the jurisdiction of the court for the sameperiod of time as though he had been found guilty. Have we . . . have we changedthat section at all? That was a bill that we passed here . . . I had sponsored here acouple of years ago and I want to make sure that we're not affecting that particularprovision.

* * *

SENATOR SANGMEISTER: That . . . that's not in this bill at all, SenatorNimrod. This is a five-year period from the date that that finding is entered.

* * *

SENATOR NIMROD: Yeah, and . . . and . . . then we're probably nottouching that section, because I couldn't read it in here." 81st Ill. Gen. Assem.,Senate Proceedings, June 30, 1980, at 27-28 (statements of Senators Nimrod andSangmeister).

From all appearances, the legislature never intended or even contemplated the applicabilityof this section to NGRI acquittees found to be subject to involuntary admission who later areconditionally released. The reason for this seems clear, for if an NGRI acquittee is involuntarilyadmitted, he or she does not pose a danger or risk to society at that point. Nevertheless, asMarshall later held, the DHS may, in its discretion, choose to conditionally release an NGRIacquittee before the expiration of his or her Thiem date without violating the Thiem date, at whichpoint the court's jurisdiction is abridged to five or eight years, depending on the circumstances. Marshall, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 976-77. As noted, however, such a holding does not allow a court toconfer additional jurisdiction to itself over an NGRI acquittee in violation of Thiem; it only allowsa court to reduce the extent of its jurisdiction over an NGRI acquittee.

We wish to emphasize that we do not disagree or take issue with the holding in Marshall. In fact, we also espouse the idea of mandatory time limits for NGRI acquittees in light of theirsubstantial liberty interests. Therefore, in attempting to give effect to both statutes, we interpretthe conditional release provision of the NGRI statute, Code section 5-2-4(a)(1)(D), to read thatsuch conditional release shall be for a period of five or eight years as long as such period does notviolate the NGRI acquittee's Thiem date, as mandated by Code section 5-2-4(b). In other words,an involuntarily committed NGRI acquittee with less than five years in his Thiem period may begranted a conditional release, but the court's jurisdiction over the NGRI acquittee is ultimatelylimited by however much time is remaining in his or her Thiem period, i.e., the "outer limit of thedefendant's possible commitment." Once an NGRI acquittee's Thiem date has expired, his or herperiod of conditional release must necessarily expire as well.

Therefore, with regard to the present case, we find that the circuit court lost jurisdictionover the plaintiff on September 26, 2001, when his Thiem date expired. The provisions of theconditional release provision simply do not countenance a Thiem violation. Consequently, wehold that plaintiff's petition for writ of habeas corpus should have been granted, and the orderremanding him to the DHS is reversed. Nevertheless, we also remand this case to the circuit court,with directions to appoint the Cook County public guardian for the plaintiff, for the purpose ofascertaining whether civil commitment procedures should be commenced. If the court determinesthat no civil commitment procedures are necessary, the jurisdiction of the circuit court is to beterminated.

For the reasons listed, we reverse the circuit court's decision to remand the plaintiff to thecustody of the DHS. In addition, we remand the case to the circuit court for a determination as toplaintiff's potential civil commitment.

Reversed and remanded.

THEIS, P.J., and KARNEZIS, J., concur.

1. See Radazewski v. Cawley, 159 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1994) ("detention of an individual at amental health care facility implicates a substantial liberty interest").

2. "The Department has classified certain of its mental health facilities as 'forensic.' Thepatients at the forensic facilities are all NGRIs, criminal defendants found unfit to stand trial(USTs) and patients considered to be behavior management problems." Lucas, 318 Ill. App. 3d at5.

3. The defendant also argues that the plaintiff did not include a written order fromDecember 28, 2001, in the record. However, as plaintiff points out, there is nothing to suggest inRule 321 that a written order is required - it only states that the appellant must include a copy ofthe "order appealed from." Here, plaintiff is appealing from an oral ruling, and the defendantacknowledges that plaintiff "did *** include the court's oral ruling." Accordingly defendant'sargument is without merit.