Antioch Community High School v. The Board of Education

SUPREME COURT CASES

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State: Illinois

Court: 2nd District Appellate

Docket No: 2-06-0430 Rel

Case Date: 05/04/2007

Preview:No. 2--06--0430 Filed: 5-4-07 _________________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT _________________________________________________________________________________ ANTIOCH COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 17, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Lake County. ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 05--AR--2045 ) THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, ) PROVISO TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL ) DISTRICT 209, ) Honorable ) Wallace B. Dunn, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. _________________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff, Antioch Community High School District 17 (Antioch), filed a three-count complaint seeking reimbursement from defendant, the Board of Education, Proviso Township High School District 209 (Proviso), for the educational component of residential services provided to Carlos J., a minor. For three months, Carlos was a resident at the Gateway Youth Care Foundation (Gateway), which is a private residential alcohol and drug treatment facility within Antioch's attendance borders. During Carlos's stay, his mother resided in Maywood, which is within Proviso's attendance borders. Antioch alleges that section 10--20.12a of the School Code (Code) (105 ILCS 5/10--20.12a (West 2004)) obligated Proviso to pay for Carlos's educational services because his mother had retained custody of him and resided within Proviso's boundaries. Proviso responds that Carlos was

No. 2--06--0430 placed at Gateway pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1--1 et seq. (West 2004)), and because Proviso had no input into Carlos's placement, the reimbursement provisions of the Code do not apply. The parties filed opposing motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Proviso summary judgment, concluding that Carlos was a ward of the juvenile court and that, therefore, the court had placed him as a resident of Antioch. Antioch appeals, arguing that the reimbursement provisions of the Code entitle it to reimbursement from Proviso. Consistent with the supreme court's recent decision in In re D.D., 212 Ill. 2d 410 (2004), we hold that, because Carlos's placement was accomplished not under the Code but exclusively pursuant to the Act and Proviso had no input into his placement, Antioch may not obtain reimbursement under the Code. We affirm. FACTS On October 5, 2005, Antioch filed a three-count complaint alleging claims for reimbursement under the Code (see 105 ILCS 5/10--20.12a (West 2004)), unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. Antioch alleges damages of $6,052 for Gateway's cost of educational services to Carlos. On January 9, 2006, Proviso moved for summary judgment, arguing that, while the Code generally provides for the type of reimbursement sought by Antioch, such reimbursement is not warranted in this case because (1) Proviso was not involved in placing Carlos at Gateway, (2) Proviso was never alerted to his special needs, and (3) there was no determination that Proviso could not meet Carlos's needs within its own boundaries. In support of its summary judgment motion, Antioch attached documents showing that, since January 2004, Carlos' mother, Sharese Bell, has lived at a residence within Proviso's attendance borders. Proviso countered with an affidavit in which Proviso's superintendent stated that Carlos has

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No. 2--06--0430 never been enrolled in one of Proviso's schools. Proviso also submitted an order dated April 19, 2004, in which the circuit court of Cook County ordered that Carlos "complete the Gateway Youth Care Residential Program in Lake Villa." The record also contains a document labeled "Gateway Educational Program Intake Face Sheet," which identifies the Juvenile Probation Department of Cook County as the agency placing Carlos at Gateway. In its opening brief, Antioch admits that "th[e] placement was ordered as a condition of Carlos' probation in Juvenile Court case number 02-JD--04694, a delinquency matter." From May 5, 2004, to August 6, 2004, Carlos was enrolled at Gateway for 56 school days. Each month during Carlos's stay, Antioch billed Proviso for the educational services. Proviso denied financial liability and refused to pay any of the bills. According to Proviso, it did not learn of Carlos's placement until Antioch began submitting the bills. The trial court granted Proviso summary judgment on count I of the complaint, which sought reimbursement under the Code (see 105 ILCS 5/10--20.12a (West 2004)). The parties stipulated that, for purposes of appeal, the summary judgment ruling would also apply to counts II and III, which alleged the claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. The trial court entered a written finding of appealability under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), and Antioch's timely appeal followed. ANALYSIS The law of summary judgment is well settled. In an appeal from a summary judgment ruling, we conduct a de novo review. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992). Summary judgment is governed by the provisions of section 2--1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2--1005 (West 2004). Under section 2--1005(c), a party is entitled

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No. 2--06--0430 to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 2004). Because summary judgment is a drastic method of terminating litigation, the movant's entitlement must be free from doubt. Logan v. Old Enterprise Farms, Ltd., 139 Ill. 2d 229, 233 (1990). Accordingly, the reviewing court must construe the evidence strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Logan, 139 Ill. 2d at 234. Where reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences from undisputed facts, summary judgment should be denied. Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263, 272 (1992). When, as in this case, "the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they concede the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and invite the court to decide the questions presented as a matter of law." Bangert v. Northern Trust Co., 362 Ill. App. 3d 402, 407 (2005). "However, the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not establish the absence of issues of material fact and does not oblige a trial court to rule without further fact-finding; this court, reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, may determine that, despite the summary judgment filings, a material issue of fact remains which precludes the entry of summary judgment for either party." Kalis v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 357 Ill. App. 3d 172, 174 (2005). Antioch confines its appellate argument to count I of its complaint, which alleged a claim for reimbursement under the Code. For purposes of section 10--20.12b of the Code, the residence of a person who has legal custody of a pupil is deemed to be the residence of the pupil, and "legal custody" can mean custody exercised by a natural or adoptive parent with whom the pupil resides. 105 ILCS 5/10--20.12b(a) (West 2004). Antioch argues that, pursuant to section 10--20.12b(a), Loyola Academy v. S & S Roof

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No. 2--06--0430 Carlos was a resident of Proviso during his stay at Gateway because his mother lived within Proviso's borders and had legal custody of him. Based on the premise that Carlos was treated at Gateway for drug and alcohol dependency while a resident of Proviso pursuant to section 10--20.12b(a) of the Code, Antioch alleges a claim for reimbursement for educational services under section 10--20.12a. Section 10--20.12a of the Code provides in relevant part as follows: "Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties involved and where the educational services are not otherwise provided for, educational services for an Illinois student under the age of 21 in a residential program designed to correct alcohol or other drug dependencies shall be provided by the district in which the facility is located and financed as follows. The cost of educational services shall be paid by the district in which the student resides in an amount equal to the cost of providing educational services in a treatment facility. Payments shall be made by the district of the student's residence and shall be made to the district wherein the facility is located no less than once per month unless otherwise agreed to by the parties." 105 ILCS 5/10--20.12a (West 2004). Proviso argues that Carlos was placed at Gateway pursuant to the Act and that, therefore, any potential reimbursement would be prescribed by the Act, not the Code. Proviso concludes that the Act does not obligate it to reimburse Antioch. Antioch counters that, because (1) it stakes its claim for reimbursement under the Code rather than the Act; and (2) Carlos remained a resident of Proviso under the Code, section 10--20.12a of the Code obligates Proviso to pay for the educational component of Carlos's residential placement. Contrary to Antioch's assertion, this case is governed by D.D., which supports Proviso's position.

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No. 2--06--0430 D.D., a special education student, was adjudicated a delinquent minor and placed on probation under section 5--715 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5--715 (West 1998)). As a condition of probation, the juvenile court placed D.D. at a residential treatment and education center in Utah. D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 412. The juvenile court ordered D.D.'s resident school district to pay the State for the educational component of D.D.'s residential placement at the center. The appellate court reversed the order, ruling that the juvenile court lacked authority under the Code and the Act to order the school district to pay the State for the educational component of D.D.'s residential placement. D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 413. In D.D., the supreme court harmonized the Act and the Code in the context of reimbursement for a special education student's educational expenses, and that harmonization guides our analysis. At issue was whether either the Act or the Code obligated D.D.'s resident school district to reimburse the State for the educational portion of his out-of-state residential placement. D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 419. The court began by setting forth the State's obligation under the Code to arrange placement for special education students like D.D. Article 14 of the Code, entitled "Children With

Disabilities," provides that the State Board of Education must promulgate rules to insure that children with disabilities are provided a "free and appropriate public education" (FAPE) as mandated by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C.

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