No. 2--01--0787

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

JUSTICE BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Daniel Boylan, filed a complaint in the circuitcourt of Du Page County against Larry Matejka, in his capacity asexecutive director of the Illinois Student Assistance Commission,and the Illinois Student Assistance Commission (collectively theCommission) seeking review of the Commission's final decisiondenying Boylan's application for an Illinois Veteran Grant. Onappeal, Boylan contends that the trial court erroneously upheld theCommission's determination that Boylan was ineligible for anIllinois Veteran Grant because he was not honorably discharged fromthe United States Navy.

The pertinent facts are not in dispute. Boylan began serving in the Navy on September 19, 1996. After completing nucleartraining, he was assigned to the U.S.S. Dwight D. Eisenhower, anuclear aircraft carrier. In September 1998, Boylan and all othercrewmembers on the Eisenhower were told that they had to take ananthrax vaccine, pursuant to an order issued by the Secretary ofDefense. When Boylan's captain ordered him to take the vaccine,Boylan refused because of concerns over the vaccine's efficacy andsafety. As a result of his refusal, Boylan's rank was reduced byone grade, he was reassigned from nuclear technician duty to galleywork, and he was restricted to the ship for 60 days.

In March 1999, Boylan's commanding officer recommended anadministrative separation from the Navy for Boylan. According toBoylan's "Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty" he received a "General (Under Honorable Conditions)" discharge. Thecommanding officer's report regarding Boylan's separation indicatedthat, in addition to refusing to take his anthrax vaccine, Boylanalso failed to report at his restricted personnel musters on fiveoccasions. The commanding officer's report contained the followingcomments about Boylan:

"MMFN Boylan has repeatedly refused to take his Anthraxvaccination. His continuing misconduct is incompatible withthe Naval service. I have determined that MMFN Boylan has nopotential for future service and should be separated with aGeneral (Under Honorable Conditions) discharge by reason ofmisconduct due to a pattern of misconduct and misconduct dueto commission of a serious offense."

Following his separation from the Navy, Boylan returned toIllinois, where he had resided prior to his Navy service. Heapplied for an Illinois Veteran Grant, which exempts eligibleIllinois veterans from paying tuition and fees at State-controlledcolleges, universities, and community colleges. 110 ILCS 947/40(West 1998). The Commission denied Boylan's application on theground that he was not honorably discharged from the Navy. Following an administrative hearing, the executive director of theCommission issued a final decision denying Boylan's application. Boylan filed a complaint in the circuit court for administrativereview of the Commission's decision. The court entered an orderupholding the Commission's decision. Boylan filed a timely noticeof appeal from the circuit court's order, and this appeal ensued.

The issue before us is whether, under section 40 of the HigherEducation Student Assistance Act (Act) (110 ILCS 947/40 (West1998)), a person who receives a general discharge from the armedforces under honorable conditions and who otherwise meets therequirements of section 40 is eligible for an Illinois VeteranGrant. This appears to be an issue of first impression.

An agency's finding on a question of law, such as theinterpretation of a statute, is not binding on this court. OregonCommunity Unit School District No. 220 v. Property Tax AppealBoard, 285 Ill. App. 3d 170, 175 (1996). We review questions oflaw de novo. Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247,254 (1995). However, courts "must give substantial weight anddeference to statutory interpretations made by an administrativeagency charged with administration of a particular statute." Oregon Community Unit School District, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 175. "Asignificant reason for this deference is that courts appreciatethat agencies can make informed judgments upon the issues, basedupon their experience and expertise." Illinois ConsolidatedTelephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 95 Ill. 2d 142, 153(1983).

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertainand give effect to the intent of the legislature. Paciga v.Property Tax Appeal Board, 322 Ill. App. 3d 157, 160 (2001). Inorder to do this, we look first to the words of the statute as thebest indicators of legislative intent. Paciga, 322 Ill. App. 3d at160-61. Where the statutory language is unambiguous, we mustinterpret the statute according to its terms and may not considerother aids in construction. Branson, 168 Ill. 2d at 254. Further,we may not depart from a statute's clear and unambiguous languageand read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions. People v.Patterson, 308 Ill. App. 3d 943 (1999). A statute is ambiguous ifit is capable of two reasonable and conflicting interpretations. Paciga, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 161. We presume that the legislaturehad a definite purpose in enacting the statute and drafted thestatute so that each part would be in harmony with that purpose. Harvel v. City of Johnston City, 146 Ill. 2d 277, 283 (1992). Consequently, if a statute's language is susceptible to oneconstruction that will carry out the purpose of the statute andanother construction that will defeat it, the statute will receivethe former construction. Harvel, 146 Ill. 2d at 284.

With these principles in mind, we examine the statute andadministrative rule at issue in this case. Section 40 of the Actprovides in pertinent part:

"Any person who served in the armed forces of the UnitedStates *** who at the time of entering service was an Illinoisresident or was an Illinois resident within 6 months ofentering such service, and who returned to Illinois within 6months after leaving service or, if married to a person incontinued military service stationed outside Illinois, within6 months after his or her spouse has left service or has beenstationed within Illinois, and who has been honorablydischarged from such service, and who possesses all necessaryentrance requirements shall, except as otherwise provided inthis Act, upon application and proper proof, be awarded anIllinois Veteran Grant consisting of the equivalent of 4calendar years of full-time enrollment, including summerterms, to the State-controlled college or university orcommunity college of his choice. ***

* * *

A grant authorized under this Section shall not beawarded to veterans who received a discharge from the armedforces of the United States under dishonorable conditions***." (Emphasis added.) 110 ILCS 947/40 (West 1998).

Also at issue is a rule promulgated by the Commission thatstates that "[a]n individual is not a qualified applicant if theindividual's separation from the Armed Forces of the United Stateswas characterized as other than honorable." 23 Ill. Adm. Code