"Until February 1, 1978, Illinois had a system of indeterminate sentences in which those committed to the Departmentof Corrections for commission of a felony were sentenced to minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment[citation]. Good-conduct credits were applied to the minimum term to advance the date of parole eligibility and to themaximum to advance the date beyond which a prisoner could not be incarcerated. The Department was required toprescribe, at a rate within its discretion, a schedule of good-conduct credits for good behavior [citation]. These wereknown as 'statutory good time credits.' The Department was also empowered to award good-conduct credits toprisoners who performed work assignments or participated in other Department programs [citation]. These creditswere known as 'compensatory good time credits.'

Effective February 1, 1978, the General Assembly amended the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) and replaced insome instances the indeterminate sentencing system with a fixed or determinate sentencing system [citation]. TheCode no longer gives the Department authority to award compensatory good-conduct credits [citation] and no longergives the Department authority to award statutory good-time credit at a discretionary rate [citation]. The Codeexpressly directs the Department to prescribe rules and regulations providing for good-conduct credits on aday-for-day basis." Johnson, 77 Ill. 2d at 516.

The Johnson court described two systems for calculating a prisoner's good-time credit. Under the old system (pre-1978), theDepartment of Corrections (Department) awarded statutory and compensatory good-time credits. Under the new system(since February 1, 1978), the Department awards day-for-day good-time credit. We realize that there is a third system nowused in some cases based on truth-in-sentencing legislation; however, this system does not affect plaintiff's sentence (seegenerally People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999)), and therefore we need not discuss it.

Johnson addressed the question of which of the two systems it described should be used to calculate good-time credit whena prisoner was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence and served part of his sentence before February 1, 1978, and part ofhis sentence after that date. Johnson held that the Department should use the old system to calculate such a prisoner'sgood-time credit for the part of the sentence he served before February 1, 1978, and the new system to calculate such aprisoner's good-time credit for the part of the sentence he served after that date.

However, the appellate court's opinion in Williams showed that determining a prisoner's proper good-time credit is notalways that straightforward. In Williams, each petitioner was a prisoner who had been sentenced to an indeterminatesentence and had served part of his sentence prior to February 1, 1978, and part of his sentence after that date. Relying onJohnson, the petitioners in Williams claimed that they were entitled to the full amount of the statutory good-time credit thatthe Department had nominally awarded them when they began to serve their sentences in addition to day-for-day good-timecredit for the parts of their sentences they had served after February 1, 1978. The appellate court agreed with theDepartment's argument that, in some cases, it was appropriate to continue to use the old system for awarding good-timecredit to prisoners for both the time they served before February 1, 1978, and the time they served after that date. Theappellate court agreed with the Department's argument because it recognized that, in some cases, it was to a prisoner'sadvantage to do so. It was to a prisoner's advantage because doing so resulted in an earlier expiration of the prisoner'smaximum sentence (out date) than if the Department strictly followed Johnson and used both systems. Williams, 98 Ill.App. 3d at 326.

The Williams court also decided that when it was to a prisoner's advantage to receive day-for-day good-time for the part ofhis sentence that he served after February 1, 1978, i.e., to use both systems, such a prisoner was not entitled to the fullamount of the statutory good-time credit that the Department nominally awarded to him when he began serving hissentence. Rather, such a prisoner was eligible only for a pro rata share of the statutory good-time credit that was calculatedunder the old system. This pro rata share was to be based on the actual time the prisoner served before February 1, 1978.Williams, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 328.

In this case, notwithstanding his protestations to the contrary, it is clear that plaintiff, like the petitioners in Williams, soughtto be credited for the full amount, rather than only a pro rata share, of his statutory good-time credit for the time he servedon his sentence prior to February 1, 1978, and day-for-day good time for the time he has served since February 1, 1978. Inhis appellate brief, for example, plaintiff expressly argues that he is entitled to the full amount of his statutory good-timecredit as applied to the maximum part of his indeterminate sentence. This is exactly what Williams prohibited, and the trialcourt therefore correctly relied on Williams in denying plaintiff's petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the extent that itsought full statutory good-time credit plus day-for-day good-time credit.

However, we believe that the trial court's disposition did not fully resolve plaintiff's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Inhis petition, plaintiff alleged that he was being wrongfully held because his maximum sentence had expired. The petitionwould therefore have been sufficient to bring it within the scope of the habeas corpus statute (735 ILCS 5/10--101 et seq.(West 1998)) if its allegation regarding the expiration of plaintiff's sentence was correct. See 735 ILCS 5/10--124(2) (West1998) (habeas corpus lies where some act, omission, or event has occurred subsequent to party's lawful imprisonment thatentitles party to release); Barney v. Prisoner Review Board, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 431 (1998) (habeas corpus lies where timeduring which party may be legally detained has expired).

The trial court's disposition was correct to the extent that it determined that plaintiff was not entitled to full statutorygood-time credit for the portion of his sentence that he served prior to February 1, 1978, and day-for-day good-time creditfor the portion of his sentence that he has served since that date. However, the trial court's disposition did not address thepossibility that plaintiff's maximum sentence could have expired if the Department had awarded him a pro rata share of hisstatutory good-time credit for the portion of his sentence that he served prior to February 1, 1978, and day-for-daygood-time credit for the portion of his sentence that he served thereafter.

Defendants responded to plaintiff's petition by filing a motion to dismiss the petition. Defendants' motion asserted thatplaintiff's claims were not cognizable under the habeas corpus statute. In a supporting memorandum, defendants notedplaintiff's claim that he was entitled to day-for-day good-time credit. Defendants argued that plaintiff was not entitled today-for-day good-time credit because "he was sentenced under the pre-1978 statute."

Without more, defendants' argument is contrary to the holding of Johnson that a prisoner, such as plaintiff, who wassentenced to an indeterminate sentence before February 1, 1978, is entitled to day-for-day good-time credit for the portionof his sentence that he serves after that date (see Johnson, 77 Ill. 2d at 522). We realize that under Williams the Departmentmay determine that it is to a prisoner's advantage to calculate all of his good-time credit under the old system. But that is notthe same as defendants' argument that plaintiff is not entitled to day-for-day good-time credit because he was sentencedprior to February 1, 1978. Defendants' argument does not address the possibility that it may be to plaintiff's advantage tocalculate his good-time credits under both systems, which would mean awarding him day-for-day good-time credit for thepart of his sentence that he has served since February 1, 1978.

Defendants could have assisted in resolving this problem by supplying a set of calculations of plaintiff's good-time creditsusing just the old system and a set of calculations using both the old and new systems. The trial court then would have beenable to definitively determine whether plaintiff's allegation that his out date had expired was correct.

However, attached to their motion to dismiss, defendants merely provided a sentence calculation work sheet dated February4, 1992. The work sheet shows an "Adjusted Projected Maximum" date for plaintiff of August 16, 2003, and that plaintiff's"S.G.T." (presumably "statutory good-time") was restored to the maximum on January 29, 1992. Because the work sheetawards plaintiff statutory good-time credit but does not award plaintiff any day-for-day good-time credit, we assume thework sheet represents the Department's calculation of plaintiff's projected out date using only the old system of calculatingplaintiff's good-time credit.

The information provided by the Department therefore does not address whether plaintiff's out date would be earlier, or,perhaps, already have occurred, if the Department had followed Johnson by calculating plaintiff's good-time credit using theold system for the time he served prior to February 1, 1978, and calculating his good-time credit using the new system forthe time he served since February 1, 1978. The issue should be resolved because plaintiff's petition alleged that he would beentitled to immediate release on the ground that his maximum sentence was expired if he had been awarded day-for-daygood-time credit.

In order to resolve this issue, we could remand the matter to the trial court. However, for the sake of judicial efficiency, andbecause we are able to calculate the maximum amount of good-time credit plaintiff could have received if both the old andnew systems were used to calculate his good-time credit, we will resolve the matter.

On April 27, 1973, plaintiff was sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of 70 years (840 months). During the timeplaintiff served from that date until the new system took effect on February 1, 1978, the Department could award statutorygood-time to prisoners at the following rate: one month for the first year; two months for the second year; three months forthe third year; four months for the fourth year; five months for the fifth year; and six months for every year after the fifthyear. See Barksdale v. Franzen, 700 F.2d 1138, 1139 (7th Cir. 1983). In addition, the Department could awardcompensatory good-time at a maximum rate of 7