Caroll v. Curry

SUPREME COURT CASES

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Caroll v. Curry

State: Illinois

Court: 2nd District Appellate

Docket No: 2-07-0812 Rel

Case Date: 06/26/2009

Preview:No. 2--07--0812 Filed: 6-26-09 ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ JAMES B. CARROLL, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Du Page County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 06--LM--1875 ) ALISON E. CURRY, ) Honorable ) Joseph S. Bongiorno, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court: Following the termination of their romantic relationship, plaintiff, James B. Carroll, brought a two-count action in replevin against defendant, Alison E. Curry, to recover possession of several items of personal property. See 735 ILCS 5/19--101 et seq. (West 2006). Count I of plaintiff's complaint sought the return of an engagement ring. Count II sought to reclaim other items of personal property, including a plasma television and audio equipment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant as to count I, ruling that plaintiff was entitled to possession of the ring and ordering defendant relinquish it to plaintiff. The trial court nonsuited count II with prejudice. Defendant timely appeals following the trial court's denial of her motion to reconsider. Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, because it utilized a "no-fault" approach to determine which party was entitled to possession of the ring and because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding

No. 2--07--0812 whether plaintiff committed acts of infidelity while he and defendant were engaged. For the following reasons, we affirm. The pleadings, depositions, and affidavits reflect that plaintiff proposed marriage to defendant in late April 2000. At that time, plaintiff offered defendant the ring at issue, which he purchased specifically for the marriage proposal. Although plaintiff and defendant selected the ring together, the parties do not dispute that plaintiff alone paid for the ring or that plaintiff presented the ring to defendant for the sole purpose of encouraging her to marry him. Defendant accepted plaintiff's proposal, the two became engaged, and some months later plaintiff moved into defendant's residence. On November 16, 2005, their relationship ended after defendant accused plaintiff of infidelity and ordered him to leave her home. Plaintiff testified that he considered the engagement terminated as of November 16, 2005. Defendant testified that she intended to end the engagement when she ordered plaintiff to leave and that she later informed her friends and family that the engagement had ended. Plaintiff made no demands for the return of the ring prior to filing the instant replevin action. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. On April 18, 2007, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant as to count I of the complaint. Defendant filed a timely motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied following argument of the parties. In denying defendant's motion to reconsider, the trial court stated that the appropriate analytical framework lay in contract principles. In particular, the trial court stated that "fault" should not be considered when determining whether plaintiff was entitled to the return of the ring, instead stating that the issue turned on plaintiff's donative intent in presenting the ring to defendant. According to the trial court, defendant's subjective intent in breaking off the engagement should not be considered; instead, the inquiry should be a purely objective analysis of whether defendant failed

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No. 2--07--0812 to perform under her portion of the contract created by the marriage proposal. The trial court also nonsuited count II with prejudice, and defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. Defendant challenges only the trial court's judgment as to count I. Summary judgment provides an efficient means of disposing of a lawsuit; however, it is a drastic method and should be granted only when the moving party's right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 417 (2008). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 2006). The initial burden of production on a motion for summary judgment lies with the movant (Bourgonje v. Machev, 362 Ill. App. 3d 984, 994 (2005)), and if he or she "supplies facts which, if not contradicted, would entitle such a party to a judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party cannot rely upon his complaint or answer alone to raise genuine issues of material fact" (Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 57 Ill. 2d 376, 380 (1974)). We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2004). Furthermore, we need not rely on the trial court's reasoning to affirm its ultimate decision. Kibort v. Westrom, 371 Ill. App. 3d 247, 251 (2007) (stating that "[o]n appeal, the reviewing court is not bound by the trial court's reasoning and it may sustain the trial court's decision on any basis appearing in the record"). A vital aspect of this case is the nature of the action itself. Plaintiff's complaint is an action in replevin. Replevin is a strict statutory proceeding, and the statute must be followed precisely. Universal Credit Co. v. Antonsen, 374 Ill. 194, 200 (1940); Jim's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Harris, 42 Ill. App. 3d 488, 490 (1976). The primary purpose of the replevin statute is to test the right of

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No. 2--07--0812 possession of personal property and place the successful party in possession of the property. S.T. Enterprises, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 57 Ill. 2d 461, 469 (1974). Section 19--101 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) provides that, "[w]henever any goods or chattels have been wrongfully distrained, or otherwise wrongfully taken or are wrongfully detained, an action for replevin may be brought for the recovery of such goods or chattels, by the owner or person entitled to their possession." 735 ILCS 5/19--101 (West 2006). A plaintiff commences an action in replevin by filing a verified complaint "which describes the property to be replevied and states that the plaintiff in such action is the owner of the property so described, or that he or she is then lawfully entitled to its possession thereof, and that property is wrongfully detained by the defendant." 735 ILCS 5/19--104 (West 2006). The trial court then conducts a hearing to review the basis for the plaintiff's alleged claim to possession. 735 ILCS 5/19--107 (West 2006). Following the hearing, an order of replevin shall issue "[i]f the Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case to a superior right of possession of the disputed property, and if the plaintiff also demonstrates to the court the probability that the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the underlying claim to possession." 735 ILCS 5/19--107 (West 2006). Thus, in a replevin action, the plaintiff bears the burden to "allege and prove that he [or she] is lawfully entitled to possession of the property, that the defendant wrongfully detains the property and refuses to deliver the possession of the property to the plaintiff." International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Helland, 130 Ill. App. 3d 836, 838 (1985), citing Hanaman v. Davis, 20 Ill. App. 2d 111 (1959). Placing defendant's "fault" argument aside for the moment, the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits establish that plaintiff is entitled to possess the ring as a matter of law. There is no dispute between the parties that plaintiff alone purchased the ring or that he gave the ring to defendant for the explicit purpose of proposing marriage. Thus, it is undisputed that the ring was a gift in

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No. 2--07--0812 contemplation of marriage. See Vann v. Vehrs, 260 Ill. App. 3d 648, 652-53 (1994) (stating that an engagement ring is a gift in contemplation of marriage); Harris v. Davis, 139 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 104748 (1986) (same). Gifts given in contemplation of marriage are deemed conditional on the subsequent marriage of the parties, and "the party who fails to perform on the condition of the gift has no right to property acquired under such pretenses." Harris, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 1048; see also Hofferkamp v. Brehm, 273 Ill. App. 3d 263, 272 (1995), citing Prassa v. Corcoran, 24 Ill. 2d 288, 293-94 (1962) (no presumption in Illinois that gifts given during engagement, as opposed to after marriage, are unconditional). Given that the parties in this case did not marry and that defendant intended to terminate the engagement when she ordered plaintiff to leave her home, clearly the condition attached to the gift of the engagement ring was not fulfilled. The record reflects that plaintiff established his right of possession. For similar reasons, plaintiff established that defendant wrongfully detained the ring. See First Illini Bank v. Wittek Industries, Inc., 261 Ill. App. 3d 969, 970 (1994) (stating that a plaintiff in a replevin action must prove that the defendant is wrongfully detaining the property at issue). Initially, we note that a replevin action generally cannot be maintained until the plaintiff has made a demand for the surrender of the property and the defendant has refused. See First Illini Bank, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 970. The purpose of the presuit demand is to afford the defendant an opportunity to return the property to the one entitled to possession without being put to the expense and annoyance of litigation. National Bond & Investment Co. v. Zakos, 230 Ill. App. 608, 612 (1923). However, a demand is not necessary before bringing suit in a replevin action where the circumstances indicate its futility. First Illini Bank, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 970, citing Kee & Chapell Dairy Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 291 Ill. 248, 255 (1920); see also National Bond & Investment Co., 230 Ill. App. at 612. "[W]here

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No. 2--07--0812 it appears that the defendant either before the action was instituted or upon the trial contests the plaintiff's rights upon the merits, or where it appears that a demand would have been of no avail, then none is required, for the law never requires the doing of a useless thing." National Bond & Investment Co., 230 Ill. App. at 612, citing Wells on Replevin

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