Chief Judge of the 18th Judicial Court v. Labor Relations Bd., No. 2-98-1182

2nd District, 1 March 2000

JUSTICE BRESLIN delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioner Chief Judge of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit (Chief Judge) appeals from a decision of the Illinois State LaborRelations Board (Labor Relations Board or Board) which found that the probation officers of the Chief Judge's circuit arecovered by the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Labor Relations Act or Act) (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 1998)).Subsequently, the Board directed the election of a bargaining unit composed of the probation officers. On appeal, the ChiefJudge argues that the Board violated the separation of powers doctrine by exercising jurisdiction over him and the probationofficers or, alternatively, that the probation officers are excluded from the Act because they are managerial employees. Wedisagree and affirm. In so doing, we hold that the supreme court cannot be construed as a joint employer of the probationofficers of the Chief Judge's circuit and that the probation officers do not meet the Act's definition of managerialemployees.

FACTS

The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (AFSCME), filed a representation/certification petition with the Labor Relations Board seeking to represent a unit consisting of approximately 130 probationofficers employed by the Department of Probation and Court Services in the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit (ProbationDepartment). Subsequently, an eight-day hearing was held before the Board's administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJmade extensive factual findings, the vast majority of which are not in dispute. A brief summary of the relevant evidencepresented at the hearing is as follows.

The Illinois Supreme Court's Division of Probation Services (Probation Services) is statutorily charged with thedevelopment and enforcement of uniform probation services throughout the state. See 730 ILCS 110/15 (West 1998).Probation Services is part of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts (AOIC), the administrative body of thesupreme court.

The probation officers' terms and conditions of employment are established by the Chief Judge, by Du Page County and byProbation Services. The decision to appoint and remove probation officers is completely within the discretion of the ChiefJudge. See 730 ILCS 110/13, 15 (West 1998). The Chief Judge, however, can hire only applicants who have satisfied jobrequirements established by the AOIC. See 730 ILCS 110/15(2)(b) (West 1998). Further, the AOIC requires that theprobation officers be covered by a pay plan which is implemented on the circuit level by the Probation Department. TheProbation Department in this case is organized into five divisions: adult, adults special services, juvenile, juvenile detentionand administrative support. A probation officer's duties vary with respect to which division he or she is assigned. Thegeneral duties of probation officer are detailed in the Probation and Probation Officers Act (Probation Act) (730 ILCS110/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)).

Under the Probation Act, Illinois probation officers have the following responsibilities: (1) to investigate the case of anyperson placed on probation; (2) to notify the court in writing of any previous convictions; (3) to make written reports andnotifications; (4) to make and keep records concerning probationers; (5) to develop and operate programs of reasonablecommunity service for persons ordered by the court to perform community service; (6) to report to probation officers inother counties with respect to probationers who remove from one county to another; (7) to authorize travel permits toindividuals under their supervision; and (8) to perform other duties as provided in the Probation Act or by rules of court.See 730 ILCS 110/12 (West 1998).

Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a recommended decision and order finding that, for the purposes of the Act, (1) thesupreme court was not an employer of the probation officers; (2) the Chief Judge was the sole employer of the probationofficers; (3) the Board had jurisdiction over the Chief Judge; and (4) the probation officers were not managerial employeesas a matter either of law or fact. The Chief Judge filed exceptions to the ALJ's recommended order and concurrently filed apetition for a writ of prohibition and a motion to stay the proceedings before the Board with the supreme court. Thesupreme court denied these motions. Subsequently, the Board affirmed the decision of the ALJ and directed the secret ballotelection of a unit representative. AFSCME won the election and the Chief Judge now appeals.

Additional facts relevant to this appeal will be introduced as they become necessary to our analysis.

ANALYSIS

Separation of powers is implicit in the organizational structure of the State's government and the division of power amongits three branches. Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts v. State & Municipal Teamsters, Chauffeurs & HelpersUnion, Local 726, 167 Ill. 2d 180, 657 N.E.2d 972 (1995). The doctrine finds voice in article II of the Illinois Constitution,which states that the "legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate" and that no "branch shall exercise powersproperly belonging to another." Ill. Const. 1970, art. II