PRESIDING JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioners, the County of Du Page (County) and the Du Page County sheriff (Sheriff)(collectively, petitioners), seek administrative review of the certification of representative made byrespondent the Illinois Labor Relations Board (Board), which certified respondent MetropolitanAlliance of Police, Du Page County Sheriff's Police Chapter No. 126 (MAP) (collectively,respondents), as the exclusive bargaining representative of certain sheriff's deputies employed bypetitioners. We reverse the Board's order and remand the cause.

In 1987, some deputies employed by the Du Page County sheriff sought to organize into aunion. To that end, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) filed a representation petition with thepredecessor to the Board. The FOP sought to represent a unit comprised of only patrol deputies. This unit would have excluded deputies working in the court security and corrections divisions of theSheriff's office. The rationale for excluding court security and corrections deputies was that theywere not "peace officers" as defined by the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) (5 ILCS315/3(k) (West 2002)). Petitioners opposed this attempt at unionization, fearing that the deputy workforce would become fragmented unless all deputies--patrol, court security, and corrections--were included in the same bargaining unit.

The Board's predecessor agreed in part with the FOP, ruling that deputies working in thepatrol and court security divisions should be included in the bargaining unit and that deputies workingin the corrections division should be excluded. Ultimately, however, the deputies rejectedrepresentation by the FOP, and the decision as to who should be included in the bargaining unit wasmooted.

In 1993, MAP filed a representation petition, seeking to organize a portion of the Sheriff'sdeputies, including only deputies working in the patrol and court security divisions. The Boarddetermined that, along with patrol and court security deputies, selected corrections deputies shouldalso be included in the bargaining unit. A secret ballot election was held to ratify the union, but thedeputies rejected representation by MAP.

In December 1999, MAP filed its second representation petition, this time seeking torepresent all Sheriff's deputies who qualified as "peace officers" under the Act (5 ILCS 315/3(k)(West 2002)). A fact-finding hearing was convened, and an administrative law judge concluded thatthe bargaining unit should be limited to those deputies in the administrative bureau, the lawenforcement bureau, the fugitive apprehension unit within the corrections bureau, and a number ofspecial stand-alone and interdepartmental units. The remaining deputies who worked in thecorrections bureau would be excluded from the bargaining unit.

The Board confirmed the decision of the administrative law judge and directed that a secretballot election be held among the eligible deputies. In May 2002, the election was held, and theeligible deputies again rejected representation by MAP. No appeal was taken of the Board'sdetermination of which deputies qualify as "peace officers" under the Act.

Subsequently, the General Assembly amended the Act's certification process to include a "majority interest" procedure. Pub. Act 93--444, eff. August 5, 2003 (adding 5 ILCS 315/9(a--5)(West Supp. 2003)). By its terms, the amendment was to take effect upon becoming law. On August5, 2003, the governor signed the amendment into law. See 5 ILCS 315/9(a--5) (West Supp. 2003).

As a result of the passage into law of the amendment to the Act, the Board promulgatedemergency rules to govern the procedures for processing majority interest representation petitions. The Board justified the emergency rules: "This emergency rulemaking implements PA 93--427 andPA 93--444 which became effective immediately on August 5, 2003. The legislation provided a newmeans by which the Board can certify unions as the exclusive representative for a group ofemployees." 27 Ill. Reg. 15563 (adopted September 22, 2003).

On December 18, 2003, MAP filed a majority interest representation petition, again seekingto represent deputies not in the corrections bureau of the Sheriff's office. The Board requested theSheriff to submit objections, and the Sheriff filed a position statement and requested a fact-findinghearing based on its assertion of changed circumstances. On March 19, 2004, the Board issued a"Tally and Certification" in which it rejected the Sheriff's objections as well as the request for a fact-finding hearing. The Board's tally showed that 99 out of 186 eligible deputies favored representationby MAP. The tally did not include over 180 deputies assigned to the corrections bureau. Also onMarch 19, 2004, the Board issued a certification of representative in which MAP was certified as theexclusive bargaining representative for deputies below the rank of sergeant in the administrativebureau, the law enforcement bureau, and the fugitive apprehension unit within the corrections bureau(along with various stand-alone and interdepartmental units). Pursuant to the Act, on April 22, 2004,petitioners timely filed their petition for administrative review in this court. See 5 ILCS 315/9(i)(West 2002); 735 ILCS 5/3--113 (West 2002); 155 Ill. 2d R. 335.

Petitioners raise a number of issues. First, they contend that the Board's emergency ruleswere improperly enacted, rendering invalid the Board's decision on MAP's majority interestrepresentation petition. Next, petitioners contend that the Board deviated from the plain languageof section 9(a--5) of the Act (5 ILCS 315/9(a--5) (West Supp. 2003)) by not requiring MAP tosubmit proper evidence of majority interest. Petitioners also argue that, in the 2002 fact-findinghearing, the Board erred in determining which deputies are "peace officers" under the terms of theAct, and petitioners seek to revisit this determination. Last, petitioners contend that the Boarderroneously refused to allow a new fact-finding hearing in light of newly acquired evidence on theissue of which deputies are "peace officers."

During the pendency of this case, the Appellate Court, Fourth District, issued Champaign-Urbana Public Health District v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel, 354 Ill. App. 3d 482(2004). Petitioners filed a motion requesting leave to cite Champaign-Urbana Public Health Districtas additional authority in support of their position on appeal. We granted petitioners' motion andordered supplemental briefing to allow the parties an opportunity to comment on that case.

As an initial matter, we note that the amicus curiae, American Federation of State, Countyand Municipal Employees, Council 31, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), challenges petitioners' standing tochallenge the Board's enactment of the emergency rules. AFSCME made this same argument inChampaign-Urbana Public Health District, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 486-87, in which the same standingissue was raised. The court there noted that, while Public Act 93--444 added section 9(a--5) to theAct, it did not affect section 9(i) of the Act, which confers standing on any party aggrieved by a finalorder certifying a representative. Champaign-Urbana Public Health District, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 487.

AFSCME asserts that, pursuant to American Federation of State, County & MunicipalEmployees, Council 31 v. Ryan, 347 Ill. App. 3d 732 (2004), petitioners lack a cognizable legalinterest sufficient to confer standing. Ryan, however, dealt with whether private lawsuits could beused to enforce permit requirements of the Health Facilities Planning Act (20 ILCS 3960/1 et seq.(West 2000)). AFSCME does not demonstrate how the analysis in Ryan leads to the conclusion that,here, petitioners lack standing under the Act. We reject AFSCME's argument.

AFSCME also states that the history and language of section 9(a--5) of the Act demonstratethe legislature's intention to exclude the employer from the representation proceedings in the case ofa majority interest petition. As noted above, however, Public Act 93--444 did not amend section 9(i)of the Act. Because an aggrieved party may seek review of a certification of representative, andbecause petitioners' interests are implicated in this case, they have standing to maintain this appeal. See Champaign-Urbana Public Health District, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 487.

Before turning to petitioners' substantive arguments, we must first review the principles thatguide our consideration of the issues before us. The standard of review applied to an agency'sdecision depends upon whether the issue presents a question of fact or a question of law. CarpetlandU.S.A., Inc. v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 369 (2002). Where theissue is purely a question of law, we review it de novo. Carpetland, 201 Ill. 2d at 369. Where theissue is the assessment of the agency's purely factual findings, we deem those findings to be primafacie true and correct, and we review them under the manifest weight of the evidence standard. Carpetland, 201 Ill. 2d at 369. Where the issue presents a mixed question of law and fact, we employthe intermediate, clearly erroneous standard of review. Carpetland, 201 Ill. 2d at 369. Under theclearly erroneous standard, we are less deferential to the agency than we would be if the agency'sdecision were solely factual, because the agency's decision was "based on fact-finding that [was] inseparable from the application of law to fact." Carpetland, 201 Ill. 2d at 369. Under this standard,"[w]e will reverse only if, after review of the entire record, we are ' "left with the definite and firmconviction that a mistake has been committed." ' " Carpetland, 201 Ill. 2d at 369, quoting AFMMessenger Service Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 395 (2001), quotingUnited States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 92 L. Ed. 746, 766, 68 S. Ct. 525,542 (1948).

In their petition for administrative review, petitioners argue that the emergency rules underwhich MAP's majority interest representation petition was considered were improperly created andpromulgated, because there was no "emergency" under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS100/1 et seq. (West 2002)). The Administrative Procedure Act provides a procedure by which anagency may create and implement administrative rules and regulations. 5 ILCS 100/5--40 (West2002). Among other things, the general rulemaking provision sets forth the requirements of publicnotice and a minimum time frame during which formal hearings must be held and comments on theproposed rules must be received. In contrast, where the agency determines that an "emergency"exists, it may adopt emergency rules for a period of no more than 150 days without following therequirements of the general rulemaking provision (5 ILCS 100/5--40 (West 2002)). 5 ILCS 100/5--45(b), (c) (West 2002). The Administrative Procedure Act defines "emergency" as "the existence ofany situation that any agency finds reasonably constitutes a threat to the public interest, safety, orwelfare." 5 ILCS 100/5--45(a) (West 2002). The Administrative Procedure Act does not otherwisedefine the terms comprising its definition of "emergency."

Petitioners argue that the Board's emergency rules implementing section 9(a--5) of the Actare invalid, as they were promulgated without the existence of an actual emergency--an actual threatto the public interest, safety, or welfare. Instead, petitioners assert that the Board created andimplemented the emergency rules merely as an administrative convenience.

Little case law exists to guide us in our determination of the propriety of the Board'senactment of the emergency rules at issue here. Generally, an agency's recognition of the existenceof an emergency is primarily a matter of its discretion; however, courts are not conclusively boundto accept the agency's determination that an emergency exists. Citizens for a Better Environment v.Pollution Control Board, 152 Ill. App. 3d 105, 109 (1987). In Citizens for a Better Environment, theemergency rules at issue involved a statute passed in 1981 and scheduled to become effective onJanuary 1, 1987. Citizens for a Better Environment, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 107-08. In June 1986, thePollution Control Board began hearings on the adoption of rules to implement the amended statuteon January 1, 1987. Thereafter, in October 1986, the Pollution Control Board adopted emergencyrules relating to the amended statute. Citizens for a Better Environment, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 108. The Pollution Control Board justified its actions because the emergency rules would reduce thenumber of appeals from its determinations and would ease the transition period when the final ruleswould be adopted. Further, the Pollution Control Board noted that the amended statute was not self-executing and that emergency rules were necessary to effectuate the amended statute. Citizens fora Better Environment, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 109. The appellate court found that these reasons andcircumstances were insufficient to support the determination that an emergency existed, especiallywhere the Pollution Control Board's own inaction and tardiness in enacting rules meant that theeffective date of the amended statute would pass before any regularly enacted rules would be in place. Citizens for a Better Environment, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 109-10. Further, the court noted that theadministrative convenience to be engendered by the emergency rules was not the standard by whichthe emergency rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedure Act could be invoked to bypassthe public notice and comment requirements of the general rulemaking provision of theAdministrative Procedure Act; rather, the court emphasized that there must exist an actual threat tothe public interest, safety, or welfare. Citizens for a Better Environment, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 109-10.

In reaching this result, the court relied heavily on Senn Park Nursing Center v. Miller, 118 Ill.App. 3d 733 (1983). There, the court did not accept that the agency's self-created "emergency"justified the use of the emergency rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedure Act toattempt to extricate itself from the problems caused by its failure to follow the correct procedures inthe first place. Senn Park, 118 Ill. App. 3d at 744-45.

Recently, the Appellate Court, Fourth District, considered whether the emergency rulespromulgated in the wake of the adoption of section 9(a--5) of the Act complied with the requirementsof the Administrative Procedure Act. Champaign-Urbana Public Health District, 354 Ill. App. 3d482. In considering this question, the court reviewed both Citizens for a Better Environment andSenn Park, as well as the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court noted thatthe Board's stated justification for resorting to emergency rulemaking sounded almost entirely in therealm of administrative convenience. Champaign-Urbana Public Health District, 354 Ill. App. 3d at491. As a result, the emergency rules were invalidly enacted and the Board's certification ofrepresentative was ineffective. Champaign-Urbana Public Health District, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 491. We find Champaign-Urbana Public Health District to be squarely on point. Here, the Board'sjustification for its resort to the emergency rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedure Actis virtually nonexistent. Respondents point to no facts demonstrating any sort of threat to the public. The amendment to the Act did not prohibit public employees from either organizing altogether ororganizing by utilizing only the newly added provision in section 9(a--5) of the Act; instead, it merelyadded another method by which public employees would be permitted to organize. Thus, there wasno existing situation constituting a threat to the public interest, safety, or welfare. See Champaign-Urbana Public Health District, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 490-91. Accordingly, we hold that the Boardinvalidly adopted the emergency rules.

The Board assails the propriety of the Fourth District's decision in Champaign-Urbana PublicHealth District, but not its applicability to this case. As the Board's arguments challenging the resultin Champaign-Urbana Public Health District are largely similar to those it raises as to this appeal, wesee no need to respond further to them, except in the context of the Board's arguments as to thisappeal. AFSCME challenges both the propriety of the decision as well as its applicability to thisappeal. As to the applicability, AFSCME argues that the fact that the agency may have invalidlyenacted (for purposes of argument) the emergency rules does not render the order void, therebydivesting the agency of jurisdiction. Rather, the order is merely voidable and the agency's jurisdictionis not subject to collateral attack. We find this argument to be nonresponsive. Petitioners do notchallenge the jurisdiction, but, rather, the propriety of the order entered under invalid rules. Thus,petitioners have properly attacked the substance of the rules, and the decision in Champaign-UrbanaPublic Health District, which deals with precisely the same issue, is squarely applicable to this matteras well. AFSCME's challenges to the propriety of the decision are also largely similar to those raisedherein, and we will also deal with them in the context of the arguments raised as to this appeal.

Respondents attempt to conjure the requisite emergency by noting that the legislature'sdetermination that the amendment would become immediately effective would be frustrated if theBoard had to wait the necessary time to proceed under the general rulemaking provision of theAdministrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/5--40 (West 2002)). According to respondents, theimmediate effectiveness of the amendment created the emergency that the emergency rules wereenacted to address. We disagree. Again, we note that the amendment provided an alternative forpublic employees seeking to organize--it did not terminate their ability to organize using thepreviously existing methods. The Board asserts that the legislative intent and public interest wouldhave been frustrated by at least six months had it not employed the emergency rulemaking provisionto promulgate the emergency rules. While true, this argument does not demonstrate that anemergency existed. Rather, it demonstrates the administrative convenience providing the impetus tocreate the emergency rules.

Respondents also attempt to distinguish Citizens for a Better Environment by noting that,there, the Pollution Control Board's delay and inaction caused the emergency that it claimed requiredemergency rules in response. While this is true, and while it is also true that the Board here did notbring about the situation caused by the amendment of the Act, these facts do not change the centralfact that the emergency rules advanced the Board's administrative interests and were not required toaddress a threat to the public interest, safety, or welfare. Indeed, it fairly may be said that the Board'sdecision to bypass the public notice and comment requirements of the general rulemaking provisionof the Administrative Procedure Act was as much a threat to the public interest, safety, and welfareas was the situation the Board was addressing, because the public interest embodied in theAdministrative Procedure Act was frustrated by the Board's bypassing the public notice and commentrequirements. We find respondents' attempt to distinguish Citizens for a Better Environment to beunavailing.

As noted above, the Board invalidly adopted the emergency rules. Administrative agenciesmust comply with the public notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Champaign-Urbana Public Health District, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 488. Unless a rule conforms with thepublic notice and comment requirements, "it is not valid or effective against any person or party andmay not be invoked by an administrative agency for any purpose." Kaufman Grain Co. v. Directorof the Department of Agriculture, 179 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1047 (1988). Here, the emergency rulesare invalid, as not being promulgated in conformance with the public notice and commentrequirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. As a result, the Board's order also is not valid oreffective, because it employed the invalid emergency rules. Accordingly, we reverse the Board'scertification of MAP. In light of our decision on this issue, we need not address petitioners' remainingissues.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Illinois Labor Relations Board certifying MAP asthe exclusive representative is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

BOWMAN and KAPALA, JJ., concur.