Plaintiff, Jane Doe, appeals the judgment of the circuit courtof Du Page County that dismissed certain counts of her complaintagainst defendant Board of Education of Westmont Community UnitSchool District Number 201 (the Board) pursuant to section 2--619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(9) (West 2000)). Defendants Steven Dimovski, individuallyand as an agent of Westmont Community Unit School District No. 201,and Westmont Senior High School are not parties to the presentappeal. We reverse and remand the cause for further proceedings.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants on February 15,2000. The suit stems from allegations of sexual abuse in whichplaintiff alleges that, from November 1998 through May 1999,Dimovski, a teacher and varsity basketball coach at Westmont HighSchool (Westmont), engaged in an inappropriate sexual relationshipwith plaintiff, who was under the age of 18 and a student ofWestmont at the time. Of relevance to the present appeal arecounts V through VII of plaintiff's first amended complaint, whichare directed against the Board and sound in negligence (count V),negligent infliction of emotional distress (count VI), and willfuland wanton misconduct (count VII).

Count V of the complaint alleges that, before he initiated theinappropriate sexual relationship with plaintiff, Dimovski engagedin a course of inappropriate sexual harassment and abuse and madeinappropriate sexual advances and statements to a female studentunder the age of 18 at Westmont, including expressing his desire tosee the student naked, requesting that she perform a strip teasefor him, and following her to her place of work and her residence,where the sexual harassment, advances, innuendo, and suggestioncontinued. Count V further alleges that the female student and hermother provided this information before November 1998 to JenniferGliwa-Bell, an agent, servant, and employee of the Board, andCarole Wyrostek, also an agent, servant, and employee of the Board;that neither Gliwa-Bell nor Wyrostek undertook a thoroughinvestigation of this complaint, informed anybody else of thiscomplaint, undertook measures to prohibit Dimovski from engaging inthis inappropriate behavior in the future, or contacted theDepartment of Children and Family Services (DCFS) about thiscomplaint; and that the Board knew or should have known thatDimovski was engaging in inappropriate sexual conduct with anotherfemale student at Westmont and the Board's failure to properlyhandle this information ultimately led to and precipitated thecommencement of the sexual abuse of plaintiff.

Count V further alleges that the Board owed a duty to itsstudents to provide and employ appropriate educational services and competent teachers and counselors and to safeguard its studentsfrom harmful conduct that might be undertaken by its teachers. Italso alleges that the Board breached these duties by, inter alia,failing to hire competent and adequately trained personnel; failingto undertake a thorough investigation into previous complaints ofinappropriate sexual behavior leveled by a female student againstDimovski; failing to adequately supervise its agents, servants, andemployees; allowing Dimovski to abuse his position of authoritythrough a course of sexual abuse; and failing to notify DCFS aboutprevious complaints of inappropriate sexual behavior involvingDimovski.

In count VI, plaintiff alleges that the careless and negligentacts or omissions alleged in count V proximately caused injuries toplaintiff, including emotional distress. In count VII, plaintiffalleges that the Board knew or should have known that its failureto properly investigate previous complaints of sexual indiscretionsleveled against its teachers would likely and probably result ininjury to its students, including plaintiff; that the Boardknowingly and intentionally disregarded the substantial risk anddanger that it knew or should have known would result; and that, bydisregarding this knowledge of substantial risk posed by thisconduct, the Board was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct in,inter alia, failing to thoroughly investigate these previouscomplaints of inappropriate behavior made against Dimovski.

On August 23, 2001, the Board filed a motion to dismissplaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2--615, asserting thatplaintiff failed to sufficiently plead a cause of action. TheBoard also filed a section 2--619(a)(9) motion to dismiss, arguingin the alternative that it was entitled to immunity based onsections 2--201 and 3--108 of the Local Governmental andGovernmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745ILCS 10/2--201, 3--108 (West 2000)). The trial court denied theBoard's section 2--615 motion to dismiss, but granted the Board'ssection 2--619(a)(9) motion, finding that sections 2--201 and 3--108 of the Tort Immunity Act immunized the Board from liability. Plaintiff timely appeals.

Immunity under the Tort Immunity Act is affirmative matterproperly raised in a section 2--619(a)(9) motion to dismiss. Bubbv. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1995). Where a cause of action has been dismissed pursuant to a section 2--619 motion, the questions on appeal are whether a genuine issue ofmaterial fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law. Brown v. King, 328 Ill. App. 3d 717,721 (2001). On appeal, review is de novo. Brown, 328 Ill. App. 3dat 721.

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in findingthat section 2--201 of the Tort Immunity Act applied. Section 2--201 gives governmental entities immunity from liability forinjuries resulting from "the determination of policy or theexercise of discretion." 745 ILCS 10/2--201 (West 2000). In orderto obtain immunity under section 2--201, the particular act oromission sought to be immunized must be both discretionary and involve a policy choice. Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit SchoolDistrict No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475, 484 (2002). Plaintiff contendsthat, once the Board was informed that its employee had sexuallyabused a female student, any discretion the Board may have had wasremoved by the requirement that the matter had to be reported toDCFS under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (ReportingAct) (325 ILCS 5/1 et. seq. (West 2000)).

The Reporting Act provides that school personnel "havingreasonable cause to believe" a child known to them in theirprofessional or official capacity may be an abused child "shallimmediately report or cause a report to be made to [DCFS]." 325ILCS 5/4 (West 2000). The Illinois Administrative Code describesand categorizes specific harms that must be reported. 89 Ill. Adm.Code