JUSTICE GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Rhonda Fiumetto, appeals an order of the circuit court of LakeCounty dismissing her two-count second amended complaint against defendants,Garrett Enterprises, Inc. (the corporation), and Claudia Dunbar Garrett (Garrett)(collectively defendants). In count I, plaintiff asserted an action forretaliatory discharge based on violations of portions of the UnemploymentInsurance Act (Unemployment Act) (820 ILCS 405/100 et seq. (West 1996)). In countII, plaintiff sought recovery on the theory that her discharge constitutedtortious interference with a business advantage. Plaintiff also appeals a grantof partial summary judgment made by the trial court prior to the filing of hersecond amended complaint, holding that plaintiff was not entitled to pierce thecorporate veil and impose liability on Garrett individually. For the followingreasons, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand this case for furtherproceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed as a dance and gymnastics instructor by GarrettEnterprises, Inc., working between 16 and 28 hours per week. The availability ofwork diminished over the summer, as did the number of hours plaintiff worked;however, she was scheduled to work late in July 1997. Plaintiff alleges that onJuly 21, 1997, she informed Garrett that she had filed for unemployment. According to plaintiff, Garrett replied, "This is the end to a bad marriage. Ican't believe you filed for unemployment. *** [Y]ou're going to cost me $100 aweek." Plaintiff was then terminated. Thereafter, Garrett contested plaintiff'sunemployment claim and, during that proceeding, allegedly admitted that plaintiffwas terminated for filing for unemployment. Garrett filed an answer disputingplaintiff's version of events.

Plaintiff was employed with the business when Garrett purchased it in 1994. Garrett was the sole shareholder and president of the corporation. No director'smeetings were held. Garrett infused money into the corporation through a seriesof loans. Subsequent to the initiation of this action, Garrett sold all of theassets of the corporation and used some of the proceeds to satisfy loans fromherself and her ex-husband. Additional facts will be discussed as they relate tothe issues raised by the parties.

Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her claimfor retaliatory discharge pursuant to section 2--615 of the Code of CivilProcedure. 735 ILCS 5/2--615 (West 1998). The propriety of a dismissal undersection 2--615 is a question of law, which we review de novo. Board of Directorsof Bloomfield Club Recreation Ass'n v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 186 Ill. 2d 419, 424(1999). In order to establish a cause of action for retaliatory discharge,plaintiffs must demonstrate that they were discharged in retaliation for theiractivities and that the discharge violated a clear mandate of public policy. Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 151 Ill. 2d 142, 160 (1992). Retaliatorydischarge actions have traditionally been allowed in two situations: when anemployee is discharged for seeking workers' compensation benefits and when anemployee is discharged for reporting misconduct by the employer. Howard v. ZackCo., 264 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1022 (1994). It is undisputed that plaintiff wasdischarged, and plaintiff has alleged that the motivation for this discharge wasretaliation for seeking unemployment benefits. Hence, the issue presented hereis whether a discharge in retaliation for seeking benefits under the UnemploymentAct (820 ILCS 405/100 et seq. (West 1996)) violates public policy such that itsupports a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. We conclude that it does.

Plaintiff asserts that her discharge violated public policy as expressed inthe Unemployment Act. See 820 ILCS 405/100 (West 1996). The Unemployment Actcontains the following extensive statement of its underlying purpose:

"As a guide to the interpretation and application of this Act thepublic policy of the State is declared as follows: Economic insecurity dueto involuntary unemployment has become a serious menace to the health,safety, morals and welfare of the people of the State of Illinois. Involuntary unemployment is, therefore, a subject of general interest andconcern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to prevent itsspread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushingforce upon the unemployed worker and his family. Poverty, distress andsuffering have prevailed throughout the State because funds have not beenaccumulated in times of plentiful opportunities for employment for thesupport of unemployed workers and their families during periods ofunemployment, and the taxpayers have been unfairly burdened with the costof supporting able-bodied workers who are unable to secure employment. Farmers and rural communities particularly are unjustly burdened withincreased taxation for the support of industrial workers at the very timewhen agricultural incomes are reduced by lack of purchasing power in theurban markets. It is the considered judgment of the General Assembly thatin order to lessen the menace to the health, safety and morals of the peopleof Illinois, and to encourage stabilization of employment, compulsoryunemployment insurance *** is necessary." 820 ILCS 405/100 (West 1996).

Thus, the plain language of the Unemployment Act indicates that its purpose is tolessen the burden of unemployment upon unemployed workers. See Chicago TransitAuthority v. Didrickson, 276 Ill. App. 3d 773, 777 (1995); Jones v. Department ofEmployment Security, 276 Ill. App. 3d 281, 284 (1995). It is well establishedthat the Unemployment Act is remedial in nature. See, e.g., Bailey & Associates,Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 289 Ill. App. 3d 310, 318 (1997);Howard v. Forbes, 185 Ill. App. 3d 148, 151 (1989). As a remedial act, it mustbe liberally construed. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141,155 (1997); Bethania Ass'n v. Jackson, 262 Ill. App. 3d 773, 777 (1994).

The Unemployment Act, however, does not expressly grant a private right ofaction for individuals discharged in retaliation for seeking unemploymentbenefits. 820 ILCS 405/100 et seq. (West 1996). This omission does notnecessarily resolve this issue against plaintiff. Fisher v. Lexington HealthCare, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 455, 460 (1999). In appropriate circumstances, a privateright of action may be implied from a statute. Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hospital,149 Ill. 2d 302, 308 (1992). The existence of such a right of action may beimplied if "(1) the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit thestatute was enacted; (2) the plaintiff's injury is one the statute was designedto prevent; (3) a private right of action is consistent with the underlyingpurpose of the statute; and (4) implying a private right of action is necessaryto provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute." Fisher, 188 Ill.2d at 460.

In Fisher, the supreme court emphasized that employment-at-will is thegeneral rule in Illinois and that the tort of retaliatory discharge provides onlya narrow exception. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 467. The court noted that it has"consistently sought to restrict" this tort. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 467. In theabsence of explicit legislative authority, courts must hesitate to imply theseactions. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 468. However, the Fisher court also reaffirmedthat private rights of action could be implied in appropriate circumstances. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 460. Indeed, our supreme court recently pronounced that"[i]mplied private rights of action are an established feature of ourjurisprudence." Noyola v. Board of Education, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 128 (1997). Thus,while a court should not lightly conclude that a private right of action isimplied by a statute, if the four-prong test set forth in Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at460, is satisfied, such a right exists under Illinois law.

Under the first prong of this test, plaintiffs must be members of the classthat the statute was intended to benefit. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 460. Thepurpose of the Unemployment Act must be considered as a whole. Fisher, 188 Ill.2d at 462-63. The primary purpose of the Unemployment Act is to lessen the burdenof unemployment upon unemployed workers. Wadlington v. Mindes, 45 Ill. 2d 447,452 (1970), quoting Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Board of Review of theDepartment of Labor, 413 Ill. 37, 43 (1952) ("The primary purpose of the IllinoisUnemployment [Insurance] Act is to relieve 'economic distress caused byinvoluntary unemployment' "). Plaintiff, as an unemployed person, is clearly amember of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted.

Defendants argue that plaintiff is not a member of this class because shehas not filed this action as a person seeking interim monetary relief to alleviatethe burden of being unemployed. Additionally, according to defendants, plaintiffhas already availed herself of the proper remedy by seeking benefits under theUnemployment Act (820 ILCS 405/100 (West 1996)). Defendants read this prong toonarrowly and ignore the fact that, at the time of her discharge, plaintiff was anunemployed person seeking unemployment insurance. Whether she filed the presentaction as a person seeking interim benefits or as a person seeking compensationfor a retaliatory discharge sheds no additional light upon whether plaintiff isa member of the class protected by the Unemployment Act. See Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 146 (1984) (where the plaintiff, alleging he wasdischarged for filing a workers' compensation claim, filed an action forretaliatory discharge after the workers' compensation claim had been settled). The mere fact that plaintiff was an unemployed person places her squarely withinthe class the statute was intended to benefit.

The second prong of the test requires that the injury suffered by theplaintiff be one that the statute is designed to protect. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at460. Here, we note that the Unemployment Act is intended to provide interimeconomic relief to persons who become unemployed. Wadlington, 45 Ill. 2d at 452. Plaintiff alleged that she had been earning $18.25 per hour. Thus, plaintiff'sunemployment caused her to suffer a significant reduction in income. Alleviatingthe burden caused by such a reduction is the evil the Unemployment Act seeks toremedy. See 820 ILCS 405/100 (West 1996). Being discharged for seeking benefitsobviously compounds this problem. In particular, it turns a temporary period ofunemployment into a permanent one, subjecting the employee to continued economicdistress. Furthermore, if an employer is allowed to threaten an employee withtermination, the employee might be dissuaded from seeking benefits. Terminatingone employee might cause other employees to refrain from seeking benefits duringperiods of unemployment. Thus, the defendants' conduct, as alleged, would serveto perpetuate the injury that the Unemployment Act seeks to cure. Cf. Kelsay v.Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 184 (1978) ("[W]e cannot accept a construction ofsection 11 which would allow employers to put employees in a position of choosingbetween their jobs and seeking their remedies under the [Workers' Compensation]Act [(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.)]. Accordingly,defendants' argument that plaintiff's injuries are unrelated to those that theUnemployment Act was designed to prevent is untenable.

Third, implying a cause of action must be consistent with the underlyingpurpose of the statute. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 460. As noted previously, thepurpose of the Unemployment Act is to lessen the burden of unemployment uponunemployed workers. 820 ILCS 405/100 (West 1996). The Unemployment Act isremedial in nature. Bailey & Associates, Inc., 289 Ill. App. 3d at 318. Wherean act is remedial, a private right of action is likely consistent with itspurpose. See Davis v. Dunne, 189 Ill. App. 3d 739, 743 (1989); Rhodes v. MillRace Inn, Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1027 (1984). As discussed above, a privateright of action would both benefit those that the statute was enacted to protectand dissuade employers from interfering with employees attempting to seek benefitsunder the Unemployment Act. Thus, a private right of action is consistent withthe underlying purpose of the statute. Cases where a private right of action hasbeen found inconsistent with the purpose of a statute generally have involvedsituations where such a right would impede the operation of the statute in someway. For example, where the legislature intended to vest an agency with broaddiscretion to address a particular problem, one court refused to imply a privateright of action because it would interfere with that discretion. Moore v.Lumpkin, 258 Ill. App. 3d 980, 995-98 (1994). Similarly, where the purpose of astatute was to induce restaurant patrons to provide voluntary aid to chokingvictims, a private right of action was held inconsistent, presumably because anyaid rendered would no longer be voluntary. Parra v. Tarasco, Inc., 230 Ill. App.3d 819, 825 (1992). In the present case, allowing a private right of action inno way impedes the Unemployment Act's primary purpose of lessening the burden ofunemployment. Thus, a private right of action is consistent with the underlyingpurpose of the Unemployment Act.

Finally, implying a private right of action is necessary to provide anadequate remedy for a violation of the statute. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 460. Aprivate right of action is appropriate where a statute would, as a practicalmatter, be ineffective if the right were not implied. Abbasi v. Paraskevoulakos,187 Ill. 2d 386, 395 (1999). That a statute provides for criminal penalties doesnot preclude the implication of a private right of action. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at185. In the present case, a private right of action is necessary to make theUnemployment Act effective. Absent such a right, employers could freely coerceemployees to refrain from seeking benefits under the Unemployment Act throughthreats of termination. Employers have a motivation to do so, because the amountthey are required to contribute toward unemployment insurance is dependent uponthe amount of benefits received by their employees. Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v.State of Illinois Department of Employment Security, 131 Ill. 2d 23, 28-29 (1989).

Defendants point out that the Unemployment Act makes it a Class Bmisdemeanor for any person to "[a]ttempt to induce any individual *** to refrainfrom claiming or accepting benefits *** under this Act." 820 ILCS 405/2800 (West1996). A Class B misdemeanor is punishable by a $1,500 fine (730 ILCS 5/5--9--1(West 1998)) and imprisonment for not more than six months (730 ILCS 5/5--8--3(West 1998)). Where the defendant is a corporation, of course, imprisonment isnot possible. According to defendants, this provision provides an adequateremedy. However, an employer who is able to successfully coerce an employee torefrain from seeking unemployment insurance can also likely coerce the employeeto refrain from reporting the coercion. In Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296,315 (1991), our supreme court noted that "[it] is unlikely that patients, injuredby unqualified and unregistered psychologists, will initiate or pursue theircomplaints through the administrative or criminal justice system without apotential for a tangible reward." This reasoning carries even more force here. Absent a private right of action, employees not only would lack the potential fora tangible reward but also would run the risk of retaliation. Furthermore,keeping in mind that the Unemployment Act is remedial in nature (Howard, 185 Ill.App. 3d at 151), imposing criminal sanctions on an employer does nothing toalleviate the plight of a discharged employee (Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 185).

Courts have often recognized that inadequate criminal penalties provideinsufficient motivation for an entity to comply with a statute. Compare Moore,258 Ill. App. 3d at 999, and Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 185 (1978), with Stern v. GreatWestern Bank, 959 F. Supp. 478, 484 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding $1,000 fine adequateto insure bank's compliance with confidentiality rules where a violation of therules provided virtually no benefit to the bank). In the present case, not onlyis the penalty relatively minor but also the likelihood of its being imposed isreduced because the employee being coerced is likely the only individual in aposition to report a violation. Some employers conceivably would be willing torisk sanctions under these circumstances to avoid their obligations under theUnemployment Act. See Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 185. As such, the implication of aprivate right of action is necessary to make the statute effective in a practicalsense.

Defendants rely extensively on Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d 455, in support of theirposition. We find that case distinguishable. In that case, the supreme court wasaddressing whether a private right of action existed under the Nursing Home CareAct (210 ILCS 45/3--608 (West 1996)). Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 456. The plaintiffswere nursing home employees who were harassed and discharged after providinginformation during an investigation concerning the death of a resident. Fisher,188 Ill. 2d at 457-58. The Nursing Home Care Act contained a provision makingsuch retaliation unlawful but did not grant employees who were retaliated againsta right to seek damages for such retaliation. 210 ILCS 45/3-608 (West 1996). Oursupreme court concluded a private right of action could not be implied. Fisher,188 Ill. 2d at 468.

The Nursing Home Care Act was intended to benefit nursing home residents byimproving their care and treatment. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 461. The Fisherplaintiffs were not nursing home residents and, thus, not members of the class thestatute was intended to protect. Conversely, the Unemployment Act was implementedto lessen the burden of unemployment upon unemployed workers. 820 ILCS 405/100(West 1996). Plaintiff, as an unemployed worker, is a member of the class theUnemployment Act was intended to benefit. Additionally, plaintiff, unlike theFisher plaintiffs, suffered the type of injury the Unemployment Act was intendedto prevent. Plaintiff was subjected to an economic burden arising out of herunemployment. The Nursing Home Care Act was intended to prevent abuse and neglectof residents, an injury that the Fisher plaintiffs did not suffer. Fisher, 188Ill. 2d at 462.

The Nursing Home Care Act contains a provision requiring employees to reportthe abuse and neglect of residents. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 459, citing 210 ILCS45/2--107 (West 1996). Such an affirmative duty has been held to be an adequatesafeguard to insure public policy is not violated. See Jacobson v. Knepper &Moga, P.C., 185 Ill. 2d 372, 377-78 (1998) (rejecting a retaliatory dischargeclaim where an attorney was discharged for reporting ethical violations becausethe ethical rules imposed a duty upon the attorney to report such violations). The Unemployment Act imposes no affirmative duty to report retaliatory conduct. 820 ILCS 405/100 et seq. (West 1996). Because no individual has a duty to reportviolations of the Unemployment Act, it is more likely that retaliatory conductwill remain hidden and unremedied. Moreover, the Nursing Home Care Act granteda private cause of action allowing residents to seek damages for violations ofthat statute. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 461. Thus, the possibility of actionsbrought by residents served to deter violations of the Nursing Home Care Act. Conversely, in the present case, there is no alternate class of potentialplaintiffs to deter employers from violating the Unemployment Act.

Furthermore, as a practical matter, a violation of the Nursing Home Care Actis more visible, and hence more likely to be reported, than retaliation forseeking unemployment insurance benefits. Threats and retaliation can take placewithout any witnesses other than the employer and employee. In a nursing home," ' "friends, relatives and community supporters can regularly keep an eye on theconditions existing in facilities." ' [Citation.]" Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 465. Thus, others are available to report the abuse and neglect of residents, which arethe primary evils the Nursing Care Home Act is aimed at curing. Fisher, 188 Ill.2d at 462.

Finally, we note that violations of the Nursing Home Care Act are punishableby a fine over six times greater than that imposed for retaliation againstunemployment claimants. The Nursing Home Care Act makes such conduct punishableby a fine of up to $10,000 and may also result in the suspension or revocation ofa facility's license. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 466-67. Retaliation againstunemployment claimants carries a fine of up to $1,500. 820 ILCS 405/2800 (West1996).

Thus, the situation confronting the Fisher court was markedly different fromthe instant case, and defendants' reliance on that case is misplaced. We believethe reasoning that supports implying a private right of action under the Workers'Compensation Act provides sounder guidance. See Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d 172. Applyingthe four-pronged test set forth in Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 460, the parallelsbetween the two acts become clear. The purpose of the Workers' Compensation Actis to provide "efficient remedies for and protection of employees and, as such,[the Workers' Compensation Act] promotes the general welfare of th[e] State." Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 181. Thus, like the Unemployment Act, the Workers'Compensation Act is intended to benefit employees, who are the individuals to whoma cause of action is granted, and the first prong of the test is satisfied. Regarding the second prong, that the injury is one the statute was designed toprevent (Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 460), both Acts provide mechanisms for employeesto seek compensation for matters related to their employment. Being dischargedfor seeking workers' compensation benefits, like being discharged for seekingunemployment benefits, would compound the injuries the acts seek to alleviate. Regarding the third prong, that a cause of action is consistent with the purposeof the statute (Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 460), a private right of action under bothacts would dissuade an employer from interfering with employees attempting toinvoke their protections. Furthermore, the Workers' Compensation Act, like thestatute at issue here, is remedial in nature. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 181.

Finally, the reasons a private cause of action is necessary under theWorkers' Compensation Act are identical to the reasons one is necessary under theUnemployment Act. As in the present case, an employer facing a workers'compensation claim has a financial incentive to dissuade the employee from goingforward with the claim. See Palos Electric Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 314 Ill.App. 3d 920, 923 (2000). While both acts forbid retaliation (820 ILCS 305/4(h)(West 1998); 820 ILCS 405/2800(A)(7) (West 1996)), in neither case will thissanction be imposed unless the employee reports the retaliation. In both cases,a retaliating employer could also coerce an employee to refrain from reporting theretaliation. In the absence of a private right of action, employers, subject toonly limited criminal liability, which may not even be imposed, would be able toput employees in a position where they are required to choose between their jobsand their rights under the Unemployment Act. See Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 184.

Furthermore, we note that both acts create a body to adjudicate claims madeunder them. The Workers' Compensation Act is enforced through the IndustrialCommission (820 ILCS 305/13 (West 1998)), while unemployment claims areadjudicated by the Department of Employment Security (820 ILCS 405/800 (West1996)). Although both acts provide an enforcement mechanism, both mechanisms aredependent upon an employee initiating a complaint. Thus, if an employer is ableto coerce an employee to refrain from claiming benefits and reporting threats,both mechanisms are ineffective.

In Kelsay, the supreme court reasoned that the workers' compensation system"would be seriously undermined if employers were permitted to abuse their powerto terminate by threatening to discharge employees for seeking compensation underthe [Workers' Compensation] Act." Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 182. This reasoning isequally applicable to the unemployment insurance system. The implication of aprivate right of action under the Unemployment Act satisfies the four-part testset forth in Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 460, and serves the same policies underlyingour supreme court's decision in Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d 172. Accordingly, we concludethat such an action is implied under the Unemployment Act.

III. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A BUSINESS ADVANTAGE

In the second count of her complaint, plaintiff attempts to set forthagainst Garrett individually a cause of action for tortious interference with abusiness advantage, based on Garrett's alleged violation of section 2800 of theUnemployment Act. 820 ILCS 405/2800 (West 1996). Section 2800 provides that, ifan entity that violates the Unemployment Act "is a corporation, the president ***shall *** be subject to the aforesaid [criminal] penalties for the violation ofany provisions of this Section of which he *** had or, in the exercise of his *** duties, ought to have had knowledge." 820 ILCS 405/2800(B) (West 1996). Thus,if Garrett violated the Unemployment Act in her capacity as president, shecommitted a Class B misdemeanor. 820 ILCS 405/2800(B) (West 1996). Plaintiff'stheory, although somewhat ambiguous, is that Garrett's action in dischargingplaintiff was a violation of section 2800 and, because Garrett is individuallyliable under the statute, her actions also constitute an interference with thebusiness relationship between plaintiff and the corporation.

Plaintiff's argument suffers from two fatal flaws. First, in count II ofher complaint, plaintiff has alleged that Garrett was acting in her officialcapacity when she discharged plaintiff. It is well established that a partycannot tortiously interfere with a contract to which he is a party. DouglasTheater Corp. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 288 Ill. App. 3d 880, 884 (1997). Since Garrett was acting in her official capacity, she was acting on behalf of thecorporation. Thus, plaintiff's claim amounts to an assertion that the corporationtortiously interfered with a contract to which it was a party. This claim mustbe rejected.

Second, inherent in plaintiff's argument is the proposition that a privateright of action against corporate officers can be implied under the UnemploymentAct. We reject this contention. One of the elements necessary to imply a privateright of action under a statute is that a private action is necessary to providean adequate remedy. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 460. In the preceding section of thisopinion, we held that such a right was implied against employers. Given theavailability of this remedy against the actual employer, and the incentive itprovides for complying with the statute, there is no need to imply a second rightof action against corporate officers in their individual capacity.

Plaintiff argues that, if the trial court was correct in granting summaryjudgment in favor of Garrett on the issue of piercing the corporate veil, thenGarrett must be a third party capable of interfering with the contract betweenplaintiff and the corporation. In this count of her complaint, plaintiff seeksto impose liability upon Garrett in her capacity as president for conduct allegedto violate the Unemployment Act. See 820 ILCS 405/2800 (West 1996). Piercing thecorporate veil involves Garrett's conduct regarding the establishment andmaintenance of the corporate entity. See Jacobson v. Buffalo Rock ShootersSupply, Inc., 278 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1088 (1996). Whether plaintiff can piercethe corporate veil is immaterial as to whether Garrett can be held individuallyliable under the Unemployment Act in her individual capacity.

Finally, plaintiff's contention that the business judgment rule does not barthis claim is inapposite. The business judgment rule is merely a presumption thatcorporate officers make business decisions in good faith. Ferris Elevator Co. v.Neffco, Inc., 285 Ill. App. 3d 350, 354 (1996). Negating this presumption saysnothing as to whether plaintiff has adequately pleaded a cause of action. Weconclude that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action in the second countof her complaint.

IV. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL

Prior to dismissing plaintiff's second amended complaint, the trial courtgranted partial summary judgment for defendant, holding that plaintiff could notimpose liability on Garrett personally. Summary judgment is appropriate onlywhere no genuine issues of material fact exist and the movant is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law. Amsted Industries, Inc. v. Pollak Industries, Inc.,65 Ill. App. 3d 545, 549 (1978). Because it is a drastic means of disposing oflitigation, it should only be granted where the movant's right to judgment isclear and free from doubt. Rivas v. Westfield Homes of Illinois, Inc., 295 Ill.App. 3d 304, 307-08 (1998). In assessing the propriety of a grant of summaryjudgment, the record must be construed liberally in favor of the opposing partyand strictly against the movant. Largosa v. Ford Motor Co., 303 Ill. App. 3d.751, 753 (1999). Review is de novo. Corona v. Malm, 315 Ill. App. 3d 692, 694(2000).

In order to pierce the corporate veil, a plaintiff must demonstrate thefollowing: "(1) there must be such unity of interest and ownership that theseparate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, (2)and circumstances must be such that an adherence to the fiction of a separatecorporate existence would promote injustice or inequitable consequences." Pederson v. Paragon Pool Enterprises, 214 Ill. App. 3d 815, 819-20 (1991). Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy. Graham v. Mimms, 111 Ill.App. 3d 751, 768 (1982). The trial court's summary judgment order appears to bebased entirely on the first prong of this test. Accordingly, we will confine ourreview to this prong as well.

Several factors are relevant in determining whether a sufficient unity ofinterest exists between a corporation and an individual to warrant piercing thecorporate veil. These factors include "(1) inadequate capitalization; (2) failureto issue stock; (3) failure to observe corporate formalities; (4) nonpayment ofdividends; (5) insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time; (6)nonfunctioning of other officers or directors; (7) absence of corporate records;and (8) whether the corporation is a mere facade for the operation of dominantstockholders." Ted Harrison Oil Co. v. Dokka, 247 Ill. App. 3d 791, 795 (1993). Generally, the decision to disregard the corporate entity will not rest upon asingle factor. Hills of Palos Condominium Ass'n v. I-Del, Inc., 255 Ill. App. 3d448, 480 (1993). While courts are normally reluctant to pierce the corporate veil(In re Estate of Wallen, 262 Ill. App. 3d 61, 68 (1994)), the issue before us ismerely whether sufficient evidence exists in the record to preclude summaryjudgment against plaintiff on this issue.

Such evidence does exist. Construing the record liberally in plaintiff'sfavor, significant evidence indicates the corporation was undercapitalized fromits inception. The capitalization of a corporation is a major factor in assessingwhether a legitimate separate corporate entity existed. McCracken v. Olson Cos.,149 Ill. App. 3d 104, 111 (1986). The policy behind this consideration has beendescribed as follows:

" ' "If a corporation is organized and carries on business withoutsubstantial capital in such a way that the corporation is likely to have nosufficient assets available to meet its debts, it is inequitable thatshareholders should set up such a flimsy organization to escape personalliability. *** It is coming to be recognized as the policy of the law thatshareholders should in good faith put at the risk of the businessunencumbered capital reasonably adequate for its prospective liabilities.*** " ' [Citation.]" Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, Inc., 91 Ill. App. 3d999, 1005 (1980).

To determine whether a corporation is adequately capitalized, one must compare theamount of capital to the amount of business to be conducted and obligations to befulfilled. Jacobson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1090. Absent adequate capitalization,a corporation becomes a mere liability shield, rather than an independent entitycapable of carrying on its own business.

In her deposition, Garrett testified that the corporation was set up witha $1,000 capital investment in January 1995. Garrett also testified that thecorporation had five employees when she bought it in 1995. In July of that year,the corporation received the first of a series of monthly loans. These loansranged from between $1,000 and $4,000, the last occurring in July 1997. Giventhat the corporation had five employees, it is reasonable to infer that payrollexpenses were more than de minimis. Additionally, at the time she was discharged,plaintiff was making over $18 per hour, which further supports the inference thatthe corporation's payroll was a significant expense. Finally, the corporationstarted receiving significant sums through loans taken shortly after itsinception. Nothing in the record indicates any change in circumstances betweenincorporation and the first loan that would explain the necessity for these loans.These facts suggest that the initial $1,000 capital contribution was whollyinsufficient for the corporation to do business. Thus, a reasonable trier of factcould conclude that the corporation was undercapitalized.

Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that no director's meetings were held. The trial court noted that this was not unusual, since Garrett was the soleshareholder. For summary judgment purposes, however, plaintiff was entitled tohave the record construed in her favor. The trial court's explanation of thisfact amounted to construing the record in Garrett's favor. See Largosa, 303 Ill.App. 3d. at 753. Thus, the record also contains evidence that Garrett disregardedthe corporate formalities.

Finally, many corporate documents were not executed until after this actionwas filed and then ratified. While this action was not per se improper (seeDannen v. Scafidi, 75 Ill. App. 3d 10, 15-17 (1979)), this informality indicatesat least a possible neglect for the necessary corporate formalities. The casualmanner in which these matters were handled supports an inference that thecorporation was a mere facade through which Garrett, as the dominant stockholder,conducted business.

In her brief, Garrett argues that plaintiff was never misled into believingshe was working for Garrett personally and never relied on Garrett personally topay her for anything that was due her. Because plaintiff seeks recovery for atort, we find these considerations to be of little significance. When a partyenters into a contractual relationship with a corporation, a relevantconsideration is whether the party is misled into believing a shareholder ordirector is also a party. Philip S. Lindner & Co. v. Edwards, 13 Ill. App. 3d365, 369 (1973). However, tort victims, like plaintiff, do not choose to becomevictims of particular tortfeasors or rely upon the tortfeasor's ability tocompensate them. The significance of the distinction between tort victims andparties to a contract may be summarized as follows:

"The obvious difference between consensual and nonconsensual transactionsis that the claimants in consensual transactions generally have chosen theparties with whom they have dealt and have some ability *** to protectthemselves from loss. For example, the fact that a company isundercapitalized can be overcome in many contractual settings, because theparties can allocate a risk of financial failure as they see fit. But innonconsensual cases, there is 'no element of voluntary dealing, and thequestion is whether it is reasonable for businessmen to transfer a risk ofloss or injury to members of the general public through the device ofconducting business in the name of a corporation that may be marginallyfinanced.' [Citation.]" Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d1557, 1577 (10th Cir. 1990).

Because the present case involves a tort, whether plaintiff relied on Garrett tosatisfy the corporation's obligations is irrelevant. Material issues of factexist regarding this issue; therefore, the trial court erred in granting summaryjudgment.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's grant of summaryjudgment regarding Garrett's individual liability and the dismissal of count I ofplaintiff's complaint, affirm the trial court's dismissal of count II, and remandthe cause for further proceedings.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and McLAREN, J., concur.