Plaintiff, Mary Lynn Godee, sued defendants, Illinois YouthSoccer Association (IYSA), Northern Illinois Soccer League (NISL),and coaches Mark West and Rob Salazar, seeking damages for injuriesshe sustained when she slipped and fell in a drainage ditch by aschool's field as she walked to the parking lot following her son'spractice soccer game. The trial court granted summary judgment fordefendants. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that (1) defendants owedher a duty of care because of the parties' relationship; (2)alternatively, defendants owed her a duty of care because theyoperated and controlled the premises; and (3) the open-and-obviousexception to the duty of care does not apply. We affirm.

Plaintiff's third amended complaint contained the followingallegations. On September 16, 1998, West and Salazar, each avolunteer coach, scheduled a practice soccer game to be played ata field in Carol Stream. When the teams arrived at the setlocation for the practice game, they discovered that the field wasin use. The coaches moved the game to Spring Trail ElementarySchool in Carol Stream, which had a field that the league had notauthorized for games. The coaches did not advise either the IYSAor the NISL of the game. The leagues administer youth soccer gamesbetween their teams. The NISL schedules league games at approvedfields. Neither the IYSA nor the NISL owned the field at SpringTrail Elementary. Rather, Illinois School District U-46 owned thefield and surrounding area. Plaintiff attended her son's practicegame at that field, and, as a result of defendants' negligence, shewas injured when she tripped and fell in a drainage ditch on thepremises as she walked to the parking lot after the game.

Defendants moved for summary judgment (735 ILCS 5/2--1005(West 2000)). They argued that plaintiff proffered no evidencethat they owed a duty because (1) plaintiff was neither aparticipant in the game nor a member of the IYSA; (2) neither theIYSA nor the NISL owned, operated, controlled, or maintained thefield; (3) Spring Trail Elementary's field was not an authorizedfield; and (4) the game played there was not an authorized game.

Plaintiff responded that the IYSA and the NISL, through theiragents, specifically their coaches, owed her a duty because of herrelationship to defendants. She asserted that there was a highlikelihood and great foreseeability of injury at the site and thatthe burden on defendants of guarding against injury was not great. Plaintiff also responded that defendants operated and controlledthe field and, therefore, owed her a duty to make the premises safeor to warn of any danger on the property. The trial court enteredsummary judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appealed.

Summary judgment is properly granted if the pleadings,affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, whenviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, reveal thatthere exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that themovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Zekman v.Direct American Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 374 (1988); see735 ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 2000). The nonmovant need not proveits case at the summary judgment stage (Bickerman v. Wosik, 245Ill. App. 3d 436, 438 (1993)), but must come forward with evidencethat establishes a genuine issue of material fact (Salinas v.Chicago Park District, 189 Ill. App. 3d 55, 59 (1989)). We reviewde novo a grant of summary judgment. Zekman, 182 Ill. 2d at 374.

To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must establishthat the defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care, that defendantbreached that duty, and that plaintiff suffered an injuryproximately caused by the breach. Dunbar v. Latting, 250 Ill. App.3d 786, 790 (1993). Whether a duty of care exists is a question oflaw to be determined by the court, and it thus may be determined ona motion for summary judgment. Dunbar, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 790. We agree with defendants that they owed plaintiff no duty undereither a general negligence theory or a premises liability theory,and, therefore, we do not address plaintiff's third argument.

Plaintiff argues first that defendants owed her a dutybecause it was very foreseeable that a parent would attend herson's practice game and slip and fall in the drainage ditch on theschool's property and that the potential for injury as a result ofthe fall was high. She further argues that the burden ondefendants of guarding against such an injury was not great. Plaintiff suggests that defendants could have ensured that thefield was properly lit, that they could have placed signs near theditch, or that they could have warned both participants andspectators of the existence of the ditch and its potential danger. The existence of a duty under a general negligence theory isdetermined by considering the following factors: the relationshipof the parties, the likelihood of injury, whether there is areasonable foreseeability of injury, the magnitude of the burden ofguarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing thatburden on the defendant. Castro v. Chicago Park District, 178 Ill.App. 3d 348, 352 (1988). In Loosier v. Youth Baseball andSoftball, Inc., 142 Ill. App. 3d 313 (1986), a minor member of ayouth baseball team sued a nonprofit sports organization after hesustained injuries when he tried to cross a highway to go to ashopping center to sell baseball raffle tickets. The court heldthat defendants had a duty to supervise the games while the playerswere on the field and participating in the sport and entrusted bytheir parents to the coaches. However, the sports organization hadno duty to protect the member from injury at all times when hemight sell tickets or be en route to sell tickets because "publicpolicy does not require that citizens, who do volunteer work incoaching baseball and softball teams, provide supervision of allteam members at the time when a team member is engaged in theactivity of selling a raffle ticket." Loosier, 142 Ill. App. 3d at317. The court stated that such a requirement would impose an"unreasonable burden" upon those who operate and sponsor thebaseball program. Loosier, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 318-19. Here, itwould be inconsistent with public policy to impose upon anorganization that administers soccer games the unreasonable burdenof a duty to spectators to inspect for and warn of dangers onpublic property. The relationship between a spectator anddefendants is too remote for us to find that defendants had a dutyto inspect the premises and warn plaintiff of any dangers off thefield.

In Castro, a foul ball hit a minor baseball player while hewas seated on the players' bench during a game played on a publicfield. The court held that the league and its president had a dutyto supervise and safeguard game participants because the nature ofthe sport was such that injury was likely and because the burden ondefendants of guarding against the injury was not great. "Thescope of the duty to guard against negligence in a voluntaryundertaking is limited to the extent of the undertaking." Castro,178 Ill. App. 3d at 354. The court stated that, while the leaguepresident was not an insurer of the player's safety, "he mustexercise reasonable care to the extent of his undertaking, here theorganization and administration of the league." Castro, 178 Ill.App. 3d at 354. Here, defendants' undertaking was limited to theadministration of youth soccer games. Therefore, any duty theyowed was to the participants. Defendants had no duty to spectatorsto inspect the entire premises and warn of any dangers on theproperty.

Plaintiff next argues that defendants owed her a duty of carebecause they operated and controlled the field and surrounding areaat Spring Trail Elementary. For a duty to arise under the law ofpremises liability, the defendant must possess and control the realproperty on which the tort occurred. Esser v. McIntyre, 267 Ill.App. 3d 611, 617 (1994), aff'd, 169 Ill. 2d 292 (1996). Adefendant does not owe a duty to a plaintiff if the defendant doesnot control or intend to control the land. Collins v. Mid-AmericaBag Co., 179 Ill. App. 3d 792, 794 (1989). In Collins, the courtheld that the organizer of a softball game owed no duty under atheory of premises liability to a player who was injured whileparticipating in a game because the organizer did not control theland, where the organizer was a permissive user of the park for hisown purposes and, therefore, "was a licensee whose only interest inthe land was permission to use the land." Collins, 179 Ill. App.3d at 794. Plaintiff in the present case argues that, because thecoaches supervised a game on the field, they operated andcontrolled the entire property, including the area that containedthe drainage ditch. We disagree. Plaintiff presented no evidencethat the coaches maintained the area or physically enclosed it. See Esser, 169 Ill. 2d at 302 (defendant did not occupy hotel areawith the intent to control; where the area was not enclosed, it wasopen to anyone, and defendant did not clean and maintain the area). Therefore, because defendants did not possess and control theproperty, they had no duty to plaintiff to guard her againstinjury, and the trial court properly entered summary judgment.

The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

BOWMAN and KAPALA, JJ. concur.