No. 2--03--1082

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiffs, Golf Trust of America, L.P., Eagle Ridge Land Development, LLC, and EagleRidge Lease Co., LLC (collectively, objectors), appeal from the order of the trial court enteringjudgment in favor of defendant, Carol A. Soat, treasurer and ex officio county collector of Jo DaviessCounty. We affirm.

Objectors own property commonly known as Eagle Ridge Inn and Resort in Jo DaviessCounty. Objectors paid all the extended real estate taxes on the subject property for 1999 but alsofiled an assessed valuation complaint for the year with the Jo Daviess County Board of Review, whichreduced the assessed value from $6,000 per acre to $4,000 per acre. Objectors then filed a taxobjection complaint in the trial court in November 2000 and subsequently sought to amend thecomplaint to include the 2000 and 2001 tax years, for which objectors also paid taxes and filedcomplaints. This proposed amendment was denied by the trial court. However, the trial courtsubsequently allowed objectors to proceed to trial on all three tax years. Following a bench trial, thetrial court found in favor of Soat, and this appeal followed.

Objectors first contend that the trial court erred in its rulings regarding their request to admitfacts, filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 216(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 216(a)). Objectors served theirrequest on the office of the State's Attorney of Jo Daviess County on May 13, 2002. The responsewas not delivered to objectors until June 15, 2002, 33 days later. According to Supreme Court Rule216(c), matters of fact that are the subject of a request to admit are admitted if no response is servedwithin 28 days. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 216(c). Objectors sought summary judgment and argued that allthe facts contained in their request were admitted, as the response was not timely filed. The trialcourt allowed Soat's response to stand and later allowed amendment of the response. The courtsubsequently denied objectors' motion for summary judgment.

Objectors now argue that the trial court failed to enforce Supreme Court Rule 216(c) byallowing Soat to file her response late and subsequently amend her response. We disagree. Section23--15(a) of the Property Tax Code (Code) provides that, once a tax objection complaint is filed,"[n]o appearance or answer by the county collector to the tax objection complaint, nor any furtherpleadings, need be filed." (Emphasis added.) 35 ILCS 200/23--15(a) (West 2002). Objectors arguethat section 23--15(a) is irrelevant because a response to a request to admit is not a pleading.

A pleading is defined as, "A formal document in which a party to a legal proceeding (esp. acivil lawsuit) sets forth or responds to allegations, claims, denials, or defenses." Black's LawDictionary 1191 (8th ed. 2004). The purpose of a pleading is to present, define, and narrow theissues and limit the proof needed at trial. People ex rel. Fahner v. Carriage Way West, Inc., 88 Ill.2d 300, 307 (1981). A pleading produces an issue asserted by one side and denied by the other sothat a trial may determine the actual truth. Fahner, 88 Ill. 2d at 307-08.

There can be no doubt but that objectors' request to admit and Soat's response werepleadings. A request to admit seeks to compel the opposing party to respond to the factualallegations made in the request-to either admit or deny the allegations. The purpose of a request toadmit is to establish some of the material facts in the case without the necessity of formal proof attrial. Szczeblewski v. Gossett, 342 Ill. App. 3d 344, 349 (2003). Such a request is not designed toproduce evidence but to limit the issues at trial and withdraw admitted facts from contention. Ellisv. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 322 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1010 (2001). Because a responseto a request to admit is a pleading, Soat was not required, pursuant to section 23--15(a), to file aresponse. In the absence of a requirement that a response be filed, we cannot conclude that anyresponse that was filed was untimely and would invoke the strictures of Supreme Court Rule 216(c). We find no error here.

Objectors next contend that the subject parcels were improperly reassessed in 1999. According to objectors, 1999 was not a general assessment year for the subject property and therewas nothing to require a reassessment in a non-general-reassessment year.

In a county with fewer than 3 million inhabitants, an assessor may in any year revise andcorrect an assessment "as appears to be just." 35 ILCS 200/9--75 (West 2000). This court haspreviously held that an assessor does not have the authority to revise or correct; such an adjustmentcan be made only to cure an incorrect assessment from the quadrennial year or to reflect changesmade to the property. See Albee v. Soat, 315 Ill. App. 3d 888, 891 (2000). Objectors argue that the1998 assessment was correct; therefore, there was no valid basis for the 1999 reassessment, as therewas nothing to be corrected. Objectors' brief cites mainly to the request to admit for "proof" of theirallegation that the 1998 valuation of the subject parcels was correct and not in need of correction. However, we have already concluded that Soat was not required to respond to that pleading. Therefore, the late answer is not deemed an admission of that allegation. Furthermore, in her answer,Soat specifically denied that the 1998 assessed valuations were correct.

At trial, Nancy Miller, supervisor of assessments and chief county assessment officer of JoDaviess County, testified that the general assessment year for the property in question was 1997. However, the Guilford Township assessor "was not doing any of his work," so the job of reassessingthe Guilford Township properties fell to Miller and her staff. Miller published the assessments for1997 but was unable to actually reassess all the properties, including those at issue here, until 1999. It was in 1999 that Miller discovered "a considerable amount" of improvements that had not beenassessed before.

This testimony clearly shows that the 1999 reassessment was done to revise and correct thegeneral reassessment that had not been completed by the township assessor. A trial court need notmake any findings of fact, and the failure to make a specific finding is not grounds for reversal;instead, in reviewing a judgment, this court will assume that all issues and controverted facts werefound in favor of the prevailing party. McMahon v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 221 Ill. App. 3d935, 951 (1991). The question before us, then, is not whether the trial court made a specific finding,but whether its final determination is correct. McMahon, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 951. Here, the trialcourt's overruling of the tax objection, based upon Miller's testimony, is not against the manifestweight of the evidence; therefore, the 1999 reassessment was permissible pursuant to section 9--75of the Code. We find no error here. Objectors next contend that Soat failed to properly publish the list of assessments and thatsuch failure "vitiates the tax resulting from the increase in assessed valuations." Section 12--10 ofthe Code (applicable to counties with fewer than 3 million inhabitants) requires that, in years otherthan years of general reassessment, the chief county reassessment officer must publish a list ofproperty for which assessments have been added or changed since the preceding assessment. See 35ILCS 200/12--10 (West 2000). For each property listed, the publication "shall include [among otherthings] *** the total amount of its assessment and how much of the assessment is attributable to theimprovements on the property." 35 ILCS 200/12--25 (West 2000). Objectors argue that thepublication of the assessments in this case failed to include the amounts attributable to improvements,thereby vitiating the tax.

In general, the statutory publication requirements of the Code are mandatory, not directory,and require strict compliance. See Andrews v. Foxworthy, 71 Ill. 2d 13, 19-23 (1978); People ex rel.Republican-Reporter Corp. v. Holmes, 98 Ill. App. 2d 11 (1968). However, section 21--185 of theCode provides in relevant part:

"No error or informality in the proceedings of any of the officers connected with theassessment, levying or collection of the taxes, not affecting the substantial justice of the taxitself, shall vitiate or in any manner affect the tax or the assessment thereof." 35 ILCS200/21--185 (West 2000).

We do not see how the failure to list separately the amount of the assessment that is attributable tothe improvements on the property prejudiced objectors or affected the substantial justice of the taxlevy. Objectors do not tell us how they were injured by this failure or how the failure affected thejustice of the levy; they merely argue the mandatory nature of the publication requirements. SeePeople ex rel. Martin v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 286 Ill. App. 3d 189, 193 (1997) (an objectionto a tax levy should disclose the injury caused by the levying process). In addition, objectors' onlycitation to the record in this argument is to the request to admit facts, with which we have alreadydealt. While we do not condone or encourage such an omission, we do not conclude that anotherwise timely publication of tax information is insufficient and requires the vitiation of the tax. There is a strong legislative preference in favor of upholding tax levies that are otherwise legal butfor a parliamentary or procedural error. Martin, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 193. Therefore, we find noprejudicial error here.

Objectors next contend that Jo Daviess County violated numerous statutes by failing tomaintain a detailed property record system, a proper permanent index numbering system, tax maps,indices of legal descriptions, lists of new or added improvements, or recorded surveys or platsdepicting the subject property. We disagree.

Donna Berlage, deputy supervisor of assessments, testified that Jo Daviess County had apermanent index numbering system for parcels of land and tax maps for part, but not all, of thecounty. Information on parcels of land was kept on individual property record cards. Nancy Millertestified that the county had a property index numbering system, in place since at least 1950, andmaintained property record cards on each parcel. The county had also prepared and maintained taxmaps for part, but not all, of the county. All of the subject parcels were mapped as of the day of trial. The county had been working on tax maps since 1986, but the mapping department was not set upuntil 1999 and is "in the process of maintaining tax maps." The Illinois Property Appraisal Manualis a guideline used in the preparation of tax maps, but it does not carry the force of law. Also, theIllinois Property Appraisal Manual is out of date, as it was published in 1976, when tax maps were"hard copy maps." Consequently, the county used a geographical information system that mappedparcels on a computer. By using the computer, someone could also research a permanent indexnumber to obtain a legal description of the parcel.

The trial court found that the alleged errors did not affect the substantial justice of the tax. In light of the testimony of Berlage and Miller, that finding was not against the manifest weight ofthe evidence. Therefore, we find no error here.

Objectors next contend that they were denied equal protection and due process of law by theproperty tax assessment process. Objectors first argue that the "great and dominant idea of theconstitution is uniformity of taxation," such that property should be assessed uniformly with otherproperty in the same class within the county.

Objectors presented evidence of open-space assessments for property used for golf coursesin Jo Daviess County. While objectors' property was assessed at $4,000 per acre, all other open-space parcels at four other golf courses were assessed at between $1,500 and $2,500 per acre. According to objectors, such dissimilar valuations for similarly classified parcels demonstrates a lackof uniformity and a denial of due process. We disagree.

The uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution requires that "taxes upon real property shallbe levied uniformly by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly shall provide by law." Ill.Const. 1970, art. IX,