Guerrero v. Gardner

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Guerrero v. Gardner

State: Illinois

Court: 2nd District Appellate

Docket No: 2-09-0013 Rel

Case Date: 01/15/2010

Preview:No. 2--09--0013 Filed: 1-15-10 _________________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT _________________________________________________________________________________ MARGARITA GUERRERO and DELORIS McCOY, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Ogle County. ) Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) ) v. ) No. 07--MR--16 ) CAMELA GARDNER, SHIRLEY ) CRAWFORD, and CAROL L. ADAMS, ) Honorable ) Michael T. Mallon, Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge, Presiding _________________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiffs, Margarita Guerrero and Deloris McCoy, applied separately to the Illinois Department of Human Services (Department) for medical assistance. The Department denied both applications on the ground that neither met the statutory criteria. Each plaintiff filed an administrative appeal, and the Department scheduled both appeals for December 7, 2006. Before the hearing, Guerrero's representative submitted a written request to appear by telephone, and McCoy's representative asked for a postponement pending receipt of additional medical records. The Department did not grant either request. When plaintiffs did not appear for their hearings, the Department dismissed the appeals as abandoned. The time for petitioning for administrative review passed, and plaintiffs filed a complaint for mandamus in the circuit court. Plaintiffs asked the court to direct defendants, Department officials

No. 2--09--0013 Camela Gardner, Shirley Crawford, and Carol Adams, to reinstate the administrative appeals, schedule hearings, and permit plaintiffs' representatives to appear by telephone. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that "[d]efendants routinely abuse their discretion and refuse to allow appellants and their representatives to appear by telephone for assistance hearings," while the hearing officers themselves routinely conduct the hearings by telephone. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2--615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--615 (West 2008)), arguing that (1) the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the mandamus action because the Department's dismissals were final administrative decisions that are reviewable only under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3--101 et seq. (West 2008)), and (2) the decisions whether to grant a continuance and to allow a party to appear telephonically are discretionary matters that are not subject to a mandamus action. The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss and, relying on the assertions of plaintiffs' counsel, entered an order granting plaintiffs mandamus relief. Defendants moved for reconsideration, the court denied the motion, and defendants timely appeal. ANALYSIS On appeal, defendants argue alternatively that (1) the Department's dismissals of the administrative appeals are reviewable only under the Administrative Review Law, and thus the circuit court's order must be vacated for lack of jurisdiction over the mandamus complaint; (2) even if the court had jurisdiction, the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate a clear legal right to relief or a manifest injustice, and therefore, the order must be reversed; and (3) even if the court had jurisdiction and correctly denied the motion to dismiss, the court's factual findings are improperly based on the assertions of plaintiffs' counsel and not on competent evidence. Because we agree with

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No. 2--09--0013 defendants that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the complaint, we need not address the remaining arguments of defendants. This court reviews de novo the issue of a circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction. In re Estate of Ahern, 359 Ill. App. 3d 805, 809 (2005). Generally, a party may not seek judicial relief from an administrative action unless the party has exhausted all available administrative remedies. Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520, 531 (2004). Requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies " 'allows the administrative agency to fully develop and consider the facts of the cause before it; it allows the agency to utilize its expertise; and it allows the aggrieved party to ultimately succeed before the agency, making judicial review unnecessary.' " Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d at 531, quoting Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 308 (1989). The exhaustion doctrine extends to administrative review in a circuit court. Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d at 532. Where the

Administrative Review Law applies and the circuit court may grant the relief that a party seeks within the context of reviewing the agency's decision, the circuit court has no authority to entertain independent causes of action regarding the agency's actions. Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d at 532. Where a statute adopts the Administrative Review Law, other modes of review, including mandamus, are unavailable. 735 ILCS 5/3--102 (West 2008); People ex rel. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. Hulman, 31 Ill. 2d 166, 169 (1964). " 'Any other conclusion would enable a party to litigate separately every alleged error committed by an agency in the course of the administrative proceedings.' " Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d at 532, quoting Dubin v. Personnel Board, 128 Ill. 2d 490, 499 (1989); see Burgess v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 275 Ill. App. 3d 315, 320 (1995) (affirming dismissal of action seeking declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus challenging agency hiring decision, where decision was reviewable under the Administrative Review Law).

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No. 2--09--0013 In this case, the Public Aid Code specifically adopts the Administrative Review Law, making it the only available method of review for a final administrative decision. 305 ILCS 5/11--8.7 (West 2008). The Public Aid Code provides that the term "administrative decision" is defined by section 3--101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 305 ILCS 5/11--8.7 (West 2008). Section 3--101 defines "administrative decision" as "any decision, order or determination of any administrative agency rendered in a particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the administrative agency." 735 ILCS 5/3--101 (West 2008). Consistent with section 3--101, Department regulations provide that, when the dismissal of an administrative appeal is based on the absence of the party or the party's representative at the hearing, the dismissal is a "final administrative decision." 89 Ill. Adm. Code

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