JUSTICE CALLUM delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, John Hart, sued defendant, Boehmer Chevrolet Sales,Inc., asserting claims under the Consumer Fraud and DeceptiveBusiness Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq.(West 2000)) and common-law fraud in connection with his purchaseof a vehicle from defendant. Plaintiff appeals from the trialcourt's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment, arguing that there exist genuine issues of material fact with respect toboth counts of his complaint. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 26, 1996, plaintiff purchased a 1996 Chevrolet Tahoefrom defendant. Defendant had acquired the vehicle on July 5,1996, in a dealer trade from Muller's Chevrolet-Geo (Muller's). Muller's had acquired the vehicle from General Motors Corporationon June 13, 1996. On plaintiff's purchase date, the truck'sodometer read 94 miles. Plaintiff's invoice and receipt noted thatthe vehicle was "new." The invoice listed Bill Henders as thesalesperson on the transaction.

Plaintiff first noticed problems with the paint work on thedriver's side of the car in August 1998. On November 19, 1999,plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against defendant, allegingviolations of the Consumer Fraud Act and common-law fraud. In hisConsumer Fraud Act count, plaintiff alleged that defendant'semployee, Thomas P. Gallivan, represented defendant in the sale toplaintiff and that Gallivan misrepresented to plaintiff that thevehicle was a "beautiful new truck" that defendant had receivedfrom another dealer. Defendant concealed from plaintiff, with theintent that plaintiff rely on the omission, that the Tahoe had beenin a severe accident prior to its sale to plaintiff. Plaintifffurther alleged that defendant was aware that the representationsmade to plaintiff were false, and it should have been aware of thetrue history of the vehicle. Because of defendant'smisrepresentation, plaintiff suffered damages.

In his common-law fraud count, plaintiff alleged thatdefendant intentionally or recklessly misled plaintiff when itsagent stated that plaintiff's truck was a "beautiful new truck"; defendant intended that plaintiff rely on its representations inorder to induce plaintiff to purchase the vehicle; and plaintiffreasonably relied on defendant's representations.

On October 3, 2001, defendant moved for summary judgment (735ILCS 5/2--1005 (West 2000)), arguing that plaintiff presented noevidence that defendant knew that the Tahoe was involved in anaccident or had sustained any damage prior to delivery toplaintiff. Plaintiff could not establish a violation of theConsumer Fraud Act where Gallivan's statement, if it was actuallymade, was not a material misrepresentation but rather hissubjective and accurate description of the Tahoe. Moreover,defendant asserted that plaintiff could not prove the requisiteintent because Gallivan was defendant's service manager and was notinvolved in the sale to plaintiff and thus could not have intendedfor plaintiff to rely on his statement. Defendant also relied on the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (Franchise Act) (815 ILCS 710/1 etseq. (West 2000)). Section 5 of the Franchise Act requires dealersto disclose any damages to a vehicle prior to delivery to apurchaser if the dealer has actual knowledge of such damage. 815ILCS 710/5 (West 2000). Defendant argued that plaintiff did notestablish a material misrepresentation because there was noevidence that the Tahoe was in an accident or that defendant hadactual knowledge of any damage to the vehicle prior to delivery toplaintiff.

As to the common-law fraud count, defendant argued thatGallivan's statement was mere opinion, as opposed to a statement ofmaterial fact, and that plaintiff could not establish thatGallivan's statement was untrue, that he relied on it, or that thestatement was intended to induce plaintiff to purchase the car.

In support of its motion, defendant submitted the affidavitsof Steven Boehmer, owner and general manager of defendant. Boehmerstated that Gallivan was not involved in the sale of the Tahoe toplaintiff. Rather, at the time of plaintiff's purchase, Gallivanwas the manager of defendant's service department. Boehmer alsostated that no agent of defendant caused the flaws in the clear-coat finish on the vehicle.

Defendant also submitted Gallivan's affidavit, whereinGallivan stated that he was not involved in vehicle sales and didnot recall making the statement to plaintiff. If he did, though,it would not have been based on any substantive information aboutthe vehicle, but would have been his personal opinion based upon abrief view of the vehicle's exterior.

Defendant attached transcripts of plaintiff's depositiontestimony, wherein plaintiff testified that he inspected the Tahoeprior to purchase and noticed no problems with the paint work. Moreover, plaintiff stated that he had no actual knowledge that anyof defendant's employees knew that his vehicle was in an accidentor that any of defendant's employees caused the paint damage to hisvehicle.

In his response to defendant's motion, plaintiff asserted thatmaterial issues of fact precluded the grant of defendant's motionwith respect to both counts. Plaintiff argued that Gallivan'sstatement was a material misrepresentation made to induce plaintiffto purchase the Tahoe. Plaintiff also argued that, althoughdefendant had a duty to disclose accident damage under theFranchise Act, it failed to do so in order to induce plaintiff topurchase the vehicle. Plaintiff purchased the car relying ondefendant's misrepresentations.

Plaintiff pointed to the Franchise Act, which requiresdisclosure of damages where the cost to repair the vehicle exceeds6% of the suggested retail price. 815 ILCS 710/5 (West 2000). Plaintiff's expert Kenneth Klein inspected the Tahoe on June 12,2000. Klein's inspection report reflects an estimate of $2,099.84to make paint and body repairs to the Tahoe, including parts,labor, supplies, and taxes. Plaintiff argued that the cost toappropriately repair the Tahoe exceeded 6%. Thus, when defendantfailed to inform plaintiff of the damage, it engaged in a deceptiveact.

Plaintiff further argued that defendant knew of the Tahoe'sdamage. He pointed to defendant's responses to interrogatorieswherein it acknowledged repairs to the Tahoe. Defendant statedthat it had some paint work performed to the vehicle's left sideprior to its sale to plaintiff. Further, defendant's repair ordersfor the paint work were dated July 10, 1996, several days beforeplaintiff's purchase.

Plaintiff also submitted the deposition testimony of hisexpert William Anderton. Anderton inspected the Tahoe on December26, 1999, and concluded that the vehicle had been involved in oneor more collision impacts that required straightening and/orrepainting of the left body panels. Anderton testified thatsignificant areas of the repairs were incomplete and/or poorlyrepaired and thus unacceptable by industry standards for a newvehicle. Moreover, the left-side panels had been repainted morethan once. Anderton could not place specific dates on the variousdefects that he observed on the vehicle. He stated that therepaint-related defects should have been obvious to a professionalworking in the automobile sales or repair business.

On December 12, 2001, the trial court granted defendant'smotion for summary judgment on both counts of plaintiff'scomplaint, finding that plaintiff's expert did not state thatdefendant's repairs were faulty; there was no evidence that thevehicle was not damaged while in plaintiff's possession; there wasno expert opinion as to when the vehicle was damaged; and hingerepair by defendant was inadmissible through Anderton's testimony. The court awarded defendant $712.50 in attorney fees and costs.

Plaintiff appeals, arguing that there exist genuine issues ofmaterial fact with respect to both counts of his complaint. On theConsumer Fraud Act claim, he argues that issues exist regarding (1)the extent of the pre-sale damage to the vehicle; (2) whether amisrepresentation of a material fact was made to plaintiff; and (3)defendant's intent. With respect to the common-law fraud claim,plaintiff argues that a triable issue exists regarding whetherdefendant made a false statement of a material fact.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is properly granted if the pleadings,affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, whenviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, reveal thatthere exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that themovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 2000); Stone v. Clifford Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 333Ill. App. 3d 363, 367 (2002). The nonmovant need not prove itscase at the summary judgment stage (Bickerman v. Wosik, 245 Ill.App. 3d 436, 438 (1993)), but must come forward with evidence thatestablishes a genuine issue of material fact (Salinas v. ChicagoPark District, 189 Ill. App. 3d 55, 59 (1989)). We review de novoa grant of summary judgment. Miller v. William Chevrolet/GEO,Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 642, 648 (2001).

B. Consumer Fraud Act Count

The elements of a claim under the Consumer Fraud Act are (1)a deceptive act or practice by defendant; (2) defendant's intentthat plaintiff rely on the deception; and (3) the deceptionoccurred in the course of conduct involving trade and commerce. Siegel v. Levy Organization Development Co., 153 Ill. 2d 534, 542(1992).

Section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act defines what constitutesan unlawful practice under the statute. It provides, in relevantpart:

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