PRESIDING JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Brian L. Hobbs, sued defendants, Mark Lorenz, M.D.,and Stanley Fronczak, M.D., for medical malpractice. Ondefendants' motion (see 735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(9) (West 2000)), thetrial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice because it didnot comply with section 2--622 of the Code of Civil Procedure (theCode) (735 ILCS 5/2--622 (West 2000)). On appeal, plaintiffcontends that (1) the trial court erred when it assumed that it hadto dismiss the complaint for noncompliance with section 2--622, and(2) even if the court recognized that dismissal was discretionary,the court abused its discretion when it dismissed the complaint. We affirm.

Plaintiff's complaint, filed in Cook County on February 2,2001, alleged that, on or about February 5, 1999, defendantsperformed surgery on plaintiff, who was suffering from a herniateddisc. Plaintiff was in defendants' care until May 1999. On orabout August 1, 1999, plaintiff learned that his vagus nerve wasdamaged. Plaintiff further alleged that he suffered serious andpermanent injuries as a result of defendants' deviation from thestandard of care before, during, and after the surgery. A healthprofessional's report was not attached to the complaint. However,the complaint did include an affidavit from plaintiff's attorney,David Baum, stating that he had been unable to consult with ahealth professional before the limitations period expired.

On plaintiff's motion, the case was transferred to Du PageCounty. On July 31, 2001, defendants moved to dismiss thecomplaint, citing section 2--622(g) of the Code, which providesthat the failure to file a section 2--622 certificate shall begrounds for dismissal. See 735 ILCS 5/2--622(g) (West 2000). Defendants observed that, although the 90-day extension undersection 2--622(a)(2) had expired on May 8, 2001, plaintiff had notfiled the required report from a health professional or sought anextension. In his response, plaintiff sought leave to amend hiscomplaint to attach an updated affidavit pursuant to section 2--622(a)(3) to notify the court of the current status of plaintiff'smedical records request.

In the accompanying affidavit prepared pursuant to section 2--622(a)(3) of the Code, Baum asserted that on February 7, 2001, heasked Northwestern Memorial Hospital for records of the treatmentplaintiff received after defendants treated him but that thehospital was still searching for the records. Baum also statedthat on July 18, 2001, he had sent defendants' counsel a notice toproduce (see 166 Ill. 2d R. 237(b)) copies of plaintiff's medicalrecords but that defendants had not complied. Plaintiff soughtleave to amend his complaint to include this information so that hecould file the health professional's affidavit within 90 days afterhe received the records.

Defendants replied that plaintiff could not now invoke section2--622(a)(3) of the Code because his original complaint did notinform the trial court that plaintiff was awaiting the receipt ofthe records he needed from defendants. Defendants observed that,when plaintiff filed his complaint, he could not have invokedsection 2--622(a)(3) because he did not send defendants the noticeto produce until five months later. Defendants also noted thatplaintiff could have obtained the pertinent records in ample timesimply by requesting them directly from defendants under section 8--2003 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/8--2003 (West 2000)).

After hearing arguments, the trial court granted defendants'motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The trial courtcommented, "Based upon the facts that I am now aware of, if I didnot grant this [2--619] motion to dismiss, that would not beenforcing [2--622] at all." The trial court added:

"I am aware of no case law that would allow a plaintiffto completely fail to comply with the plain language of [2--622] based upon the procedural history of this case. Therewere opportunities for you to request extensions and now atthis late date I simply cannot grant any further time *** foryou to go out and find a report that could have been done[sic] prior to the filing of the suit.

Based upon my review of the procedure, based upon theoral argument, based upon the plain language of [2--622], I dogrant the motion to dismiss by both *** defendants under [2--619] with prejudice."

Plaintiff timely appeals.

The legislature enacted section 2--622 of the Code todiscourage frivolous suits for medical malpractice and to eliminatesuch actions in the early stages, before the expenses of litigationhave mounted. DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, 147 Ill. 2d 57,65 (1992). Section 2--622 of the Code directs a plaintiff tofollow one of three options when filing a complaint. Under section2--622(a)(1) of the Code, a plaintiff must attach a report from aqualified health professional stating that she or he has reviewedthe medical records and believes that the plaintiff has areasonable and meritorious cause to file the action. 735 ILCS 5/2--622(a)(1) (West 2000). Under section 2--622(a)(2) of the Code, an affidavit must be provided, stating that the report cannot beprocured prior to the expiration of the limitations period, inwhich case the plaintiff is given 90 days to procure and file therequired documents. 735 ILCS 5/2--622(a)(2) (West 2000). Undersection 2--622(a)(3) of the Code, the affidavit must state thatcounsel has made a request for records pursuant to section 8--2001of the Code (735 ILCS 5/8--2001 (West 2000)), and that the party towhom the request was made failed to comply within 60 days,whereupon the plaintiff is granted 90 days from the time therecords are received to file the required report.

Section 2--622 of the Code should be liberally construed sothat plaintiffs do not lose substantive rights merely because theyhave not strictly complied with the statute. Comfort v. WheatonFamily Practice, 229 Ill. App. 3d 828, 832 (1992). If a plaintiffdoes not comply with section 2--622, the trial court may in itsdiscretion dismiss the complaint with prejudice. See McCastle v.Sheinkop, 121 Ill. 2d 188, 193 (1987). A reviewing court will notreverse a dismissal unless the trial court abused its discretion. Cuthbertson v. Axelrod, 282 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1034 (1996).

Plaintiff argues first that the trial court mistakenlybelieved that plaintiff's violation of section 2--622 required thecourt to dismiss the complaint. See McCastle, 121 Ill. 2d at 193-94. However, we must presume that the trial court understood thelaw. See Village of Cary v. Jakubek, 121 Ill. App. 3d 341, 345-46(1984). Plaintiff has not overcome this presumption.

The record, including the trial court's explanation of itsruling, affirmatively demonstrates that the court read the caseauthority that the parties submitted and decided that, under thecircumstances here, even a liberal reading of section 2--622 wouldnot excuse plaintiff's neglect of his obligations. The trial courtnoted not only that plaintiff's counsel violated section 2--622 butalso that he "completely failed to comply" with section 2--622. Weare fully satisfied that the trial court did not misapprehend thelaw.

We turn to plaintiff's second contention on appeal. Plaintiffasserts that, even if the trial court consciously exercised itsdiscretion when it dismissed the complaint, the court abused thatdiscretion. According to plaintiff, he initially complied with thelaw by attaching a proper section 2--622(a)(2) affidavit, and thetrial court later could have allowed him to amend his complaint toinclude a proper section 2--622(a)(3) affidavit. We agree withdefendants that plaintiffs' minimal compliance with section 2--622is of little consequence and that his reliance on section 2--622(a)(3) is misplaced. Therefore, we believe that the trial courtwas within its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiff a furtheropportunity to satisfy section 2--622.

Plaintiff is correct that his original complaint complied withsection 2--622(a)(2), thus giving him 90 days more in which to filethe health professional's report that he knew he needed. However,in those 90 days, plaintiff did little or nothing toward supplyingthe report. Although plaintiff's attorney could have immediatelyordered plaintiff's medical records from defendants via section 8--2003 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/8--2003 (West 2000)), counselinexplicably failed to do so. Furthermore, counsel not onlyneglected to use section 8--2003 but also allowed the 90-dayextension to expire without seeking a further extension from thetrial court. Not until about five months after filing thecomplaint did plaintiff demand the records by issuing a notice toproduce under the discovery rules.

The trial court recognized that plaintiff initially followedsection 2--622(a)(2), and it did not dismiss the action because the complaint was unsatisfactory when it was filed. Instead, the courtdismissed the suit because of what plaintiff failed to do after hefiled the complaint. Plaintiff's unexcused lapses delayed thelitigation considerably. When the complaint was dismissed,approximately seven months after it had been filed, plaintiff hadnot obtained the needed medical records, let alone the requiredconsultation with a qualified health professional.

Moreover, we conclude that the trial court was not obligatedto grant plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to invoke section2--622(a)(3) of the Code. See Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority,152 Ill. 2d 432, 467 (1992) (stating that the decision whether togrant leave to amend a pleading rests within the sound discretionof the trial court). Defendants assert that, to invoke section 2--622(a)(3) at all, plaintiff needed to submit the proper affidavitat the time he filed his complaint. We need not decide whetherthis reading of section 2--622 is correct. If, arguendo, plaintiffcould have added the affidavit several months after filing suit,the trial court was within its discretion in refusing to let him doso.

Plaintiff's proposed amendment did not comply with section 2--622(a)(3) because it did not state that plaintiff had ever made theneeded request under section 8--2001 of the Code. Even ifplaintiff's notice to produce under Rule 237(b) was a suitablesubstitute, plaintiff did not file it until about five months afterhe filed the complaint and two months after the 90-day extension hereceived under section 2--622(a)(2) had expired. At the hearing ondefendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court explained thatplaintiff had done little to advance the litigation and that it sawno reason to allow him another "out" at that late date. We find noabuse of the trial court's discretion occurred.

The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and CALLUM, JJ., concur.