Respondent, Andre D., appeals the trial court's orders findinghim unfit and terminating his parental rights to his daughter,Andrea D.  Respondent raises two arguments in this appeal. First,he argues that the court's findings of unfitness were erroneous asa matter of law because the State's amended motion for terminationof parental rights was not sufficiently specific, where it (1) didnot state a cause of action; (2) did not comply with a statutorynotice requirement to apprise respondent that he could"permanently" lose his parental rights (705 ILCS 405/2--13(4) (West2000)); and (3) was not verified. Respondent next asserts that thetrial court's determination that he was unfit was against themanifest weight of the evidence. We reverse.

I. Motion Taken with the Case

In a motion that we ordered taken with this case, the Staterequests that we strike a paragraph of respondent's brief asimproper due to its argumentative nature. We note that, followingthe State's motion, respondent filed a motion to, inter alia, amendhis brief to delete the argumentative portion of the aforementionedparagraph. We allowed respondent's motion. Therefore, given ourdisposition of respondent's motion, the State's request is deniedas moot.

II. Failure to State a Cause of Action

Respondent argues first that the State's pleadings wereinsufficiently specific in that they failed to state a cause ofaction.

The sufficiency of pleadings is an issue of law, which wereview de novo. U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v. Zurich Insurance Co.,329 Ill. App. 3d 987, 1002 (2002). The essential test of thesufficiency of a petition is whether it reasonably informs therespondent of a valid claim against him. In re Harpman, 146 Ill.App. 3d 504, 512 (1986). The requirement of pleading withspecificity does not require more than a setting forth of thespecific statutory grounds of unfitness. In re M.S., 210 Ill. App.3d 1085, 1091-92 (1991).

In its amended petition, the State alleged that respondent wasan unfit parent under subsections (b), (i), (r), and (s) of section1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (i), (r), (s) (West2000)). The State recited the statutory language, without more.

In M.S., this court held that a petition that merely trackedthe statutory language "was sufficient to apprise the respondent ofthe claim against her." M.S., 210 Ill. App. 3d at 1093. Giventhis precedent, we conclude that the pleadings here weresufficiently specific.

III. Pleading Defect Relating to Permanent Termination ofParental Rights

Respondent next contends that the trial court's finding ofunfitness was erroneous because the State's petition was defectiveon its face in that it failed to apprise respondent that hisparental rights could be "permanently" terminated. 705 ILCS 405/2--13(4) (West 2000).

We note first that respondent did not raise this issue attrial. Generally, pleading defects must be raised at trial so thatthey may be remedied; otherwise, the defects are waived. In reDragoo, 96 Ill. App. 3d 1104, 1107 (1981). However, under theplain error doctrine, we may address a waived issue if the evidenceis closely balanced or the error affects substantial rights. 134Ill. 2d R. 615(a). The termination of parental rights affects afundamental liberty interest. In re J.J., 201 Ill. 2d 236, 243(2002). Here, we are not amenable to invoking waiver where thequestion is whether respondent was provided with a statutorilymandated notice. Thus, we choose to review this question. In reR.A.B., 315 Ill. App. 3d 620, 623 (2000) (plain error rule invokedwhere issue involved fundamental right to a jury trial); In reJ.C., 163 Ill. App. 3d 877, 891 (1987) (plain error rule invokedwhere issue involved fundamental right to effective assistance ofcounsel).

Section 2--13(4) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act)provides:

"(4) If termination of parental rights and appointmentof a guardian of the person with power to consent to adoptionof the minor under Section 2--29 is sought, the petition shallso state. If the petition includes this request, the prayerfor relief shall clearly and obviously state that the parentscould permanently lose their rights as a parent at thishearing.

In addition to the foregoing, the petitioner, by motion,may request the termination of parental rights and appointmentof a guardian of the person with power to consent to adoptionof the minor under Section 2--29 at any time after the entryof a dispositional order under Section 2--22." (Emphasisadded.) 705 ILCS 405/2--13(4) (West 2000).

The State's petition, in its prayer for relief, requests thatthe parental rights of Andrea's parents "be terminated with respectto said minor[]"; that the Guardianship Administrator be continuedas legal guardian of Andrea and that she "be given the power toconsent to [Andrea's] adoption should anyone desire to legallyadopt [Andrea]"; and that the consent of the "Guardian" to adoption"shall be binding upon" the parents "without any further notice tothem, or consent by them." Nowhere in the State's petition isthere an explicit request for "permanent" termination ofrespondent's parental rights.

Respondent argues that the State's failure to comply with theAct's explicit requirement that its petition "clearly andobviously" state that respondent could "permanently" lose hisrights as a parent renders the pleadings defective.

The State responds that its petition properly indicated torespondent that the State sought to terminate his parental rights. It points to the language in the prayer for relief that requeststhat the parental rights of the parents "be terminated"; that theGuardianship Administrator be given the power to consent toAndrea's adoption; and that the consent "shall be binding" on theparents "without any further notice to them, or consent by them."

In interpreting a statute, our objective is to ascertain andgive effect to the intent of the legislature. In re S.G., 175 Ill.2d 471, 480 (1997). The most reliable indicator of legislativeintent is the language of the statute. S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 480. The Act contains strict procedural requirements that embody apolicy favoring the superior right of parents to the custody oftheir own children. In re Y.B., 285 Ill. App. 3d at 385, 390(1996). Where the language of a statute applicable to juvenile oradoption proceedings is clear and unambiguous, "it is the duty ofthe court to apply it literally." Y.B., 285 Ill. App. 3d at 390.

The State's contention that its petition adequately complieswith the language in the second sentence of section 2--13(4) of theAct is unpersuasive. The aforementioned language in the State'spetition conforms to the requirements in the first sentence insection 2--13(4). However, the second sentence of that sectionassumes compliance with the first because it begins, "[i]f thepetition includes this request." 705 ILCS 405/2--13(4) (West2000). Section 2--13(4) then sets forth an additional requirementfor a valid petition in cases where the petition includes a requestfor termination and a request for the aforementioned adoptionpowers: the petition must "clearly and obviously" state that theparents could "permanently" lose their parental rights at thehearing. 705 ILCS 405/2--13(4) (West 2000). We are required togive full effect to each provision in a statute and construe thelanguage so that it is not rendered meaningless. See In re C.W.,199 Ill. 2d 198, 218 (2002). Thus, we conclude that the precedingrequirement was not satisfied in this case. The notice that thelegislature required was directed to laypersons/parents. It wasnot directed to persons trained in the law. In this context, theState's argument fails. The requirement that the notice be clearand obvious necessarily requires the use of the word "permanently"in the petition. The State's petition was therefore defective onits face and this defect warrants reversal.

IV. Verification of Pleadings

Respondent next argues that the State's pleadings wereinsufficient in that they were not verified. See 705 ILCS 405/2--13(2) (West 2000).

Upon filing its brief in this case, the State also moved forleave to supplement the record with a copy of its amendedpleadings. We allowed the motion. Upon review, the pleadingscontain a verification page. However, it is not clear from therecord whether the State attempted to admit the verification pagein the trial court. Should the State choose to file anotherpetition in this matter, it should note that the Act requiresverification of a petition for termination of parental rights filedthereunder. See 705 ILCS 405/2--13(2) (West 2000).

V. Conclusion

Because we hold that the State's petition was defective, theorders of the trial court finding respondent unfit and terminatinghis parental rights must be reversed. As such, we deem itunnecessary to rule upon the remaining issues presented in thisappeal.

The judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed.

Reversed.

McLAREN and GROMETER, JJ., concur.