JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Tamara J., appeals from the order of the trialcourt terminating her parental rights to her son, Christopher J. We affirm.

On March 30, 2001, Christopher J. was adjudicated a neglectedminor. On May 14, 2002, the State filed a petition to terminateparental rights, alleging, among other things, that Tamara failedto make reasonable progress toward Christopher's return within thenine-month period from August 14, 2001, to May 14, 2002. Followinga hearing, the trial court found the State's petition proved as tothat single allegation and found Tamara unfit. The courtsubsequently found that the termination of Tamara's parental rightswas in Christopher's best interests and terminated Tamara'sparental rights. This appeal followed.

Tamara now contends that the court's finding of unfitness mustbe reversed because the nine-month period alleged in the State'spetition was not the nine-month period required by section1(D)(m)(iii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii) (West2000)), under which she was found to be unfit. Section1(D)(m)(iii) states that a parent may be found unfit if she fails:

"to make reasonable progress toward the return of thechild during any 9-month period after the end of the initial9-month period following the adjudication of neglected orabused minor ***." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii) (West 2000).

In this case, Christopher was adjudicated a neglected minor onMarch 30, 2001, and the court's dispositional order was entered onApril 27, 2001. The State alleged that Tamara failed to makereasonable progress during the nine-month period of August 14,2001, to May 14, 2002. Tamara argues that the nine-month periodshould not have begun until at least January 27, 2002, nine monthsafter the court's dispositional order. Thus, the State's petitionfor termination did not conform to the statute, and the court'sfinding of unfitness must be reversed.

We first note, however, that Tamara did not raise this issuein the trial court. Pleading defects must be raised in the trialcourt so that they may be remedied; otherwise, they are waived. Inre Andrea D., 336 Ill. App. 3d 335, 337 (2003). This court maychoose to address a waived issue if the evidence is closelybalanced or the error affects substantial rights. Andrea D., 336Ill. App. 3d at 337. While the termination of parental rightsaffects a fundamental liberty interest, we decline to address theissue under the circumstances of this case. There is no allegationthat Tamara was denied a fair hearing on the petition, nor is thesufficiency of the evidence contested. Tamara was not denied dueprocess in this case and has shown no prejudice. Therefore, wefind the issue waived.

For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of KaneCounty is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GROMETER and KAPALA, JJ., concur.