JUSTICE CALLUM delivered the opinion of the Court:

The minor respondent, C.L.P. (the minor), born June 10, 1986,appeals from a final dispositional order of the circuit court thatcommitted him to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division(DOC), for an indeterminate term. The minor contends that thedispositional order violated section 5--710(7) of the JuvenileCourt Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5--710(7) (West 2000))because, as written, the order would allow him to remain committedto the DOC for a period greater than the period for which an adultcould be sentenced for the same act. The minor asserts that he istherefore entitled to have the dispositional order vacated and thecause remanded for the entry of a new dispositional order thatcomplies with section 5--710(7). The minor also asserts that thenew order should include credit for the time that he served incustody prior to the disposition. For the reasons that follow, wemodify the dispositional order so that it complies with section 5--710(7) and otherwise affirm.

We recite the facts only to the extent necessary for anunderstanding of the issues presented. On January 24, 2000, theState filed a petition alleging that the minor was delinquent. Asamended, the petition alleged that the minor committed aggravatedbattery (720 ILCS 5/12--4(b)(3) (West 2000)), aggravated assault(720 ILCS 5/12--2(a)(3) (West 2000)), and two counts of disorderlyconduct (720 ILCS 5/26--1(a)(1) (West 2000)). All of the offenses,except the aggravated assault and one of the counts of disorderlyconduct, were alleged to have occurred on different dates.

On March 13, 2000, pursuant to an agreement, the minor admitted to aggravated battery and to the two counts of disorderlyconduct. The charge of aggravated assault was dismissed. TheState also refrained from filing an additional assault charge. After accepting the minor's admissions, the trial court adjudicatedhim delinquent, made him a ward of the court, and placed him onprobation for two years.

On April 21, 2000, and May 18, 2000, the State filed separatepetitions to revoke the minor's probation. On August 31, 2000,after the minor admitted some of the allegations in the petitions,the trial court found that the minor had violated his probation. On September 1, 2000, the trial court committed the minor to theDOC and specified that the matter was set for review on December 5,2000. On December 5, 2000, the trial court reinstated the minor'sprobation.

On January 2, 2001, the State filed a third petition to revokethe minor's probation. As amended, the third petition alleged thaton January 1, 2001, the minor committed mob action and violated his probation by associating with other minors on probation. OnFebruary 5, 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the thirdpetition and found that the minor had violated his probation.

On February 9, 2001, the trial court entered a dispositionalorder and mittimus. The order committed the minor to the DOC forthe offenses for which he had been placed on probation, i.e., onecount of aggravated battery and two counts of disorderly conduct. The trial court stated that the minor was committed to the DOC foran indeterminate period. This court subsequently allowed the minorto file a late notice of appeal.

On appeal, the minor first contends that he is entitled tohave the dispositional order vacated and the cause remanded for theentry of a new dispositional order because the trial court erred incommitting him to the DOC for an indeterminate period. The minorargues that the dispositional order violated section 5--710(7) ofthe Act. The minor construes section 5--710(7) as prohibiting thecommitment of a juvenile offender to the DOC for a period greaterthan the maximun adult sentence for the same offense. The minormaintains that, as written, the dispositional order allows him toremain in the DOC until he attains the age of 21 years. In theminor's view, the dispositional order violated section 5--710(7)because, if he remained in the DOC until he attained the age of 21years, he would have been committed to the DOC for a period greaterthan the period for which an adult could be incarcerated for thesame offense.

The State initially responds that the minor has waived thisissue because he failed to raise it in the trial court. The minorcounters that he may raise the issue at any time because the trialcourt's judgment was void to the extent that it violated section 5--710(7). We agree that the minor has framed an issue that couldinvolve a void judgment, and a void judgment may be attacked at anytime. People v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (1987). We will thereforeaddress the merits of the issue.

The minor raises an issue of statutory construction. Thecardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and giveeffect to the true intent of the legislature. In re D.D., 196 Ill.2d 405, 418 (2001). The best indication of legislative intent isthe language of the statute. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000). When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, a courtmay not read into it exceptions, limitations, or other conditions(D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 419), and there is no need to resort to otheraids of construction (D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 9). We review de novoan issue of statutory construction. D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 418.

The minor relies on his construction of section 5--710(7) ofthe Act. Section 5--710(7) provides:

"In no event shall a guilty minor be committed to theDepartment of Corrections, Juvenile Division for a period oftime in excess of that period for which an adult could becommitted for the same act." 705 ILCS 405/5--710(7) (West2000).

We agree with the minor that the plain language of section 5--710(7) prohibits the commitment of a juvenile offender to the DOCfor a period greater than the maximum adult sentence for the sameoffense.

In this case, the minor admitted committing aggravatedbattery, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/12--4(e) (West 2000)), andtwo counts of disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor (720 ILCS5/26--1(b)(1) (West 2000)). The maximum period of incarcerationfor an adult who commits a Class 3 felony is five years. 730 ILCS5/5--8--1(a)(6) (West 2000). The maximum period of incarcerationfor an adult who commits a Class C misdemeanor is 30 days. 730ILCS 5/5--8--3(a)(3) (West 2000). Nothing in the record suggeststhat the trial court contemplated committing the minor to the DOCfor a period that was analogous to consecutive sentences for anadult. Therefore, under section 5--710(7), the maximum period forwhich the trial court could commit the minor to the DOC was themaximum sentence that an adult could receive for aggravatedbattery, i.e., five years.

The dispositional order committed the minor to the DOC for anindeterminate period. This was in accordance with section 5--750(3) of the Act, which provides, in pertinent part:

"[T]he commitment of a delinquent to the Department ofCorrections shall be for an indeterminate period which shallautomatically terminate upon the delinquent attaining the ageof 21 years unless the delinquent is sooner discharged fromparole or custodianship is otherwise terminated in accordancewith this Act or as otherwise provided for by law." 705 ILCS405/5--750(3) (West 2000).

Thus, under the plain language of section 5--750(3) of the Act, theindeterminate period for which the minor was committed to the DOCwill not automatically terminate until he attains the age of 21years.

The trial court entered the dispositional order on February 9,2001. The minor will attain the age of 21 years on June 10, 2007. Therefore, if the minor remained committed to the DOC until heattained the age of 21 years, he would have been committed for aperiod greater than the 5-year maximum period for which an adultcould be incarcerated for aggravated battery. If that occurred,the minor's period of commitment would violate section 5--710(7).

We recognize that section 5--750(3) of the Act provides forthe termination of a juvenile offender's commitment to the DOC "inaccordance with this Act or as otherwise provided for by law" (705ILCS 405/5--750(3) (West 2000)). The State urges us to view thisprovision as a safeguard that will prevent a minor from beingcommitted to the DOC longer than an adult who has committed thesame offense. However, we believe that the better practice wouldbe for a trial court to specify in a dispositional order that anindeterminate period of commitment to the DOC cannot exceed themaximum period of incarceration for an adult who committed the sameoffense. Such an order would comply with the clear legislativeintent embodied in section 5--710(7) of the Act. See In re JesusR., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 1072 (2002) (dispositional orderallowing minor's commitment to DOC until minor's twenty-firstbirthday, a period longer than comparable adult offender could beincarcerated, violated section 5--710(7)).

For these reasons, we conclude that a trial court that entersa dispositional order committing a minor to the DOC for anindeterminate period must consider whether, if the minor remains inthe DOC until he attains the age of 21 years, the commitment periodwould exceed the maximum sentence that an adult could receive forthe same offense. If so, to comply with section 5--710(7), thedispositional order must include a limitation on the period ofcommitment so that it does not exceed the maximum period ofincarceration for a comparable adult.

In this case, the trial court did not include in thedispositional order the maximum period for which the minor may becommitted to the DOC for the offense of aggravated battery. Consequently, the order did not comply with section 5--710(7). Theminor is therefore entitled to the modification of thedispositional order to include a limitation on the period ofcommitment to a period that is no greater than the maximum sentencefor a comparable adult, i.e., five years.

The minor also requests that the maximum period that he may becommitted to the DOC be reduced to reflect credit for the time heserved in custody prior to the entry of the dispositional orderthat committed him to the DOC. This court has held that a juveniledelinquent who has been committed to the DOC for an indeterminateperiod is not entitled to credit for time served. In re J.J.M.,299 Ill. App. 3d 327, 332 (1998). We are aware that thelegislature has significantly amended the Act (705 ILCS 405/1--1 etseq. (West 2000)) since this court's opinion in J.J.M. However,after reviewing the amended Act, we believe that J.J.M. remainssound. Accordingly, the minor is not entitled to credit for timeserved with respect to his commitment to the DOC for anindeterminate period.

Based on the foregoing, we modify the dispositional order thatcommitted the minor to the DOC for an indeterminate period to showthat the maximum period that the minor may remain in the DOC isfive years. In all other respects, the judgment of the circuitcourt of Winnebago County is affirmed.

Affirmed as modified.

GEIGER and O'MALLEY, JJ., concur.