In re D.D., No. 2-99-0179
2nd District, 19 April 2000
| In re D.D., a Minor (The Department of Children and Family Services,Appellant). | Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County. No. 96--JD--530, 98--JD--567 Honorable Victoria A. Rossetti, Judge, Presiding. |
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:
The appellant, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), appeals an order of the trial court ordering theDepartment of Probation to place a minor, D.D., in Maryville Academy and ordering the DCFS to reimburse Lake Countyfor half of the cost of placement. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The following facts are taken from the record. D.D. was born in 1985. In 1995 D.D., his mother, older brother, youngerbrother, and sister became temporarily homeless. Shortly thereafter they moved to Waukegan, and D.D.'s mother receivedpublic aid.
On December 10, 1996, D.D. was found to be a delinquent minor having committed residential burglary. 720 ILCS 5/19--3(a)(West 1996). The trial court adjudged D.D. a ward of the court and put D.D. on probation for five years. The State alsoalleged that D.D. committed the offense of criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21--1(1)(a) (West 1996)) inSeptember 1996, but the State withdrew this petition.
A 1997 report indicated that, late in 1996 or early in 1997, D.D.'s mother became employed full time. In 1996, D.D. wasdiagnosed with attention deficit disorder and was prescribed medication. D.D. stopped taking the medication because hiscondition did not improve. D.D. received counseling, was not involved in gangs, did not use alcohol or drugs, and wasinvolved with someone from the Big Brother's organization. However, a psychological report indicated that D.D. wasattracted to negative influences like gangs, was combative, was unable to relate to other children, frequently engaged inphysical fights in school, and needed a structured environment.
On April 8, 1997, the State filed a petition to revoke D.D.'s probation, alleging that D.D. committed a battery (720 ILCS5/12--3(a)(1) (West 1996)) when he struck a girl in the head. The State later withdrew this petition.
A May 1997 report indicated that D.D.'s behavior had improved. However, on June 23, 1998, D.D. ran away from home. Awarrant was issued, and D.D. was taken into custody and remanded to secure detention. A report indicated D.D.'s motherstated that she was not able to control her son and that his friends were a bad influence on him. D.D.'s parole officerreported that D.D. was out of control. D.D. was released to his mother but ran away again the following month. D.D. wasagain taken to secure detention and was again adjudicated a delinquent minor. The court ordered D.D.'s probation to becontinued.
At an October hearing, the supervisor of juvenile probation, the public defender, and the guardian ad litem recommended aresidential placement for D.D. The assistant State's Attorney agreed with this recommendation. The DCFS did not agreeand recommended foster care for D.D.
On October 2, 1998, the State filed a petition for a hearing on a violation of probation, alleging that theft (720 ILCS 5/16--1(a)(2)(A) (West 1996)) occurred when D.D. stole a bicycle. At the hearing on the State's petition, Bob Schroeder, D.D.'sprobation officer, opined that Maryville was the appropriate placement for D.D.
On November 12, 1998, after a hearing to determine the placement of D.D., the trial court ordered that the probationdepartment place D.D. in Maryville Academy in Durand, Illinois, a residential placement facility. The court stated that"placement in foster care, whether it's traditional, specialized, or a group home facility, based on the background and thecontinued runaway behavior and continued delinquent behavior by the minor [sic], and I will not allow DCFS to place[D.D.] in foster care." On November 16, 1998, D.D. was sent to Maryville Academy. The trial court ordered theDepartment of Probation to place D.D. at Maryville and ordered the DCFS, as guardian, to reimburse Lake County for one-half of the cost of placement.
On December 10, 1998, after a hearing, D.D. was readjudicated a delinquent minor. D.D. was made a ward of the court andplaced on probation. The trial court ordered D.D. to "cooperate with and successfully complete placement at" Maryville.
Subsequently, the DCFS filed a motion to vacate the trial court's December 10, 1998, order regarding placement. At thehearing on the DCFS's motion, Assistant State's Attorney Pierson asked the court to deny the DCFS's motion. Piersonstated that the court acted within its discretion and acted in the best interests of the minor. Guardian ad litem Moormanagreed with the State's position. The trial court denied the DCFS's motion to vacate. The DCFS filed a timely notice ofappeal. The State failed to file an appellee's brief.
On appeal, the DCFS argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and had no authority under the JuvenileCourt Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5--1 et seq. (West 1996)) to place D.D. and order the DCFS to pay half of the cost.The DCFS argues that, since it was the child's custodian and guardian, it had the sole authority to decide which placementwas in the child's best interest. The State Appellate Defender argues that the trial court had the authority to place D.D.because D.D. was a ward of the court and the Act did not limit the trial court's power to place the child in a particularfacility. The appellate defender did not respond to the DCFS's argument regarding reimbursement of half of the cost of theplacement.
Because this case involves the interpretation of a statute, the standard of review is de novo. See In re Adoption of L.R.B.,278 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1093 (1996). The purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is:
"[T]o secure for each minor subject hereto such care and guidance, preferably in his or her own home, as will servethe moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community; *** and,when the minor is removed from his or her own family, to secure for him or her custody, care and discipline as nearlyas possible equivalent to that which should be given by his or her parents ***." 705 ILCS 405/1--2(1) (West 1996).
The Act is to be "liberally construed to carry out the foregoing purpose." 705 ILCS 405/1--2(4) (West 1996). After the courtfinds the minor guilty of an offense, it must conduct a sentencing hearing and decide whether it is in the best interest of theminor to be made a ward of the court. 705 ILCS 405/5--20 (West 1996). If the court orders wardship, the court must"determine the proper disposition best serving the interests of the minor and the public." 705 ILCS 405/2--22(1) (West1996).
The Act grants the trial court broad authority in determining the proper disposition of a delinquent minor. See In re M.P.,297 Ill. App. 3d 972, 976 (1998). Nothing in the Act specifically limits the court from making specific placements. Thus,we determine, as a matter of law, that the trial court had the authority to place D.D. at Maryville.
The DCFS cites In re T.L.C., 285 Ill. App. 3d 922 (1996), and In re Chiara C., 279 Ill. App. 3d 761 (1996), to support itsposition. These cases are distinguishable because they discuss the limitations of the court regarding abused, neglected, ordependent minors and not delinquent minors. The statutory language that concerns abused, neglected, or dependent minorsexpressly prohibits the trial court from ordering a specific placement. 705 ILCS 405/2 23(3) (West 1994). However, theparallel provision that discusses the disposition of delinquent minors does not contain this limiting language or any otherlanguage that prohibits the court from ordering a specific placement. See 705 ILCS 405/5--23 (West 1996). Under thewell-known maxim of construction, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, or the inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other,it is clear that the legislature did not intend to prohibit the court from ordering a specific placement of a delinquent minor.See Schanowitz v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 299 Ill. App. 3d 843, 848 (1998). If the legislature wishedto preclude circuit courts from placing delinquent minors in specific residences, it could have added language like thatabove to the dispositional section of article V of the Act.
Next, the DCFS argues that, even if the court had the authority to specifically place D.D., the court exceeded its authority inthis case because it did not follow DCFS's rules in deciding the appropriate placement. The DCFS cites to sections of theIllinois Administrative Code which require, inter alia, the DCFS to explore less restrictive settings before placing a child ina residential placement facility. 89 Ill. Adm. Code