Respondent, Jackie Hughes, appeals from a jury trial in the circuit courtof Lake County in which he was found to be a sexually dangerous person under theSexually Dangerous Persons Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 205/0.01 through 12 (West1998)) and was committed to the Illinois Department of Corrections. For thefollowing reasons, we affirm the jury verdict and order of commitment.

FACTS

On August 11, 1999, respondent was indicted on various charges pertainingto sex offenses involving minors. Respondent was taken into custody on thesecharges on July 22, 1999, and was denied bond on July 27, 1999. The trial courtset the trial date for September 13, 1999.

On September 10, 1999, the trial court granted respondent's oral motion fora continuance and set the trial for October 13, 1999. On October 13, 1999,respondent moved to continue the trial because he needed to review DNA testresults and possibly consult with an expert. The trial was continued untilNovember 29, 1999.

On November 4, 1999, respondent filed a motion to suppress, which was heardon November 10 and 17, 1999. Also, on November 17, a hearing was conductedpursuant to section 115--10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Code)(725 ILCS 5/115--10 (West 1998)). The section 115--10 hearing was continued toNovember 24, 1999.

On November 24, 1999, the State moved to continue the trial, asserting itneeded more time to prepare the minor victims for trial because it had recentlylearned that one had a learning disability and the other was having difficultyspeaking due to fear. Over respondent's objection, the trial court granted theState's motion and set the trial for January 10, 2000.

On December 30, 1999, the State filed its petition to declare respondenta sexually dangerous person. On that same date, respondent objected to thefiling of the "sexually dangerous person" petition, objected to any furtherdelay, and filed a demand for a speedy trial. The trial court set the matter forstatus on January 24, 2000, and for trial on February 14, 2000. Also, onDecember 30, 1999, the trial court suppressed certain statements respondent madeto the police because the State failed to prove they were voluntary and failedto prove that respondent waived his right to counsel.

On January 5, 2000, the trial court denied respondent's motion to precludedisclosure to court-appointed psychiatrists of the previously suppressedstatements he made to the police. On January 6, the trial court orderedrespondent transported for a penile plethysmograph (plethysmograph) test andordered respondent to cooperate with all psychiatrists and their testing. Thetrial court also ordered respondent to be transported on January 13, 2000, to Dr.Oris Wasyliw for psychological evaluation.

On February 14, 2000, the trial court granted the State's motion toreschedule the hearing to March 31, 2000. Respondent's counsel answered readyfor the February 14 trial.

On March 21, an attorney from the public defender's office moved for acontinuance because respondent's former counsel had left the public defender'soffice. The trial court continued the trial to June 5, 2000. On June 2,respondent requested another continuance, and the trial was set for August 14,2000. The jury trial commenced on August 14, 2000.

During jury selection, the State exercised a peremptory challenge againstjuror 135. Respondent objected because juror 135 was the only black person inthe venire. The trial court commented that the challenged venire person was "theonly African-American in the whole courtroom" and found that, balanced "with theother factors," respondent had established a prima facie case of discrimination. The trial court then asked the State to offer a race-neutral reason forchallenging juror 135.

The State contended it was challenging juror 135 because she had givenbirth to a child at the age of 17 and her son had also had a child at 17 yearsold. The State further argued that juror 135 did not know the names of thecompanies employing her children or where their spouses worked. The State alsopointed to the fact that the juror had two children who did not work.

The State further offered that, "based on her response[,] she doesn'tunderstand things, she is having difficulty listening. It would seem difficultto me that she doesn't know where her husband worked. Took her awhile toremember." The State contended that, based on juror 135's response, it did notbelieve "she is perhaps understanding."

The trial court ruled that the State had not offered a race-neutral reasonfor challenging juror 135. The State asked for time to submit case law on theissue of race-neutral reasons for excusing jurors. The trial court allowed theState to do so and allowed the parties to "backstrike" a juror if appropriate.

During his portion of the voir dire, respondent asked juror 135 if shecould be fair and impartial regarding testimony from a psychologist orpsychiatrist. She responded, "I guess so according to what it is all about, youknow. I suppose yes, because I wouldn't know nothing about the person was underthe strain."

After lunch, the State submitted several cases to the trial court. TheState further argued that, as to the question of impartiality regardingpsychological or psychiatric testimony, juror 135 "seemed not to understandreally the issue or the questions. She did not provide a clear and unequivocalanswer to that one way or the other, and seemed that she may have troublefollowing that proposition of law." The trial court put off its ruling until allthe jurors had been selected.

The next morning, the trial court allowed both sides to further argue aboutthe race-neutral issue as to juror 135. The State noted that, when asked if anymember of her family had ever been arrested or convicted, juror 135 said no. TheState had checked the evening before (August 14, 2000) and discovered her son wascurrently on probation for domestic battery and had prior felony convictions. Thus, the State contended that juror 135 was "mistaken or gave the Courtmisinformation." The State then stated that "this is yet another reason that wewould add to the reasons we stated yesterday which certainly is a race neutralreason, certainly a valid reason for dismissing any juror that, in fact, thereis a pending case not against her but against one of her children."

After listening to the court reporter read back respondent's counsel's voirdire and juror 135's responses, the trial court reversed its ruling, finding theState presented race-neutral reasons for excusing juror 135. The trial courtexplained that it considered juror 135's answer about impartiality to beequivocal, because she answered "I guess so," and that the State could considerthat answer to be a race-neutral reason to challenge juror 135 because the Statewas "relying on a big chunk of [its] case being a psychiatrist." The trial courtalso considered the fact that juror 135 incorrectly answered no to the questionof whether any family member had ever been arrested or convicted to be a race-neutral reason. The court further explained that, while the State raised theissue of conviction late, it could not "hold that against the State," because itallowed the parties further argument and had delayed its ruling accordingly. Thetrial court agreed with respondent that having a child at age 17 and having twounemployed children are not race-neutral reasons. The trial court also did notconsider the juror's delay in remembering where her husband worked to be a race-neutral justification. Nor did the trial court agree that juror 135 haddifficulty listening. The trial court then struck juror 135.

In addition to the other evidence at trial, the State offered the experttestimony of several witnesses. Oris Wasyliw, the director of adult clinicalpsychology at the Isaac Ray Center in Chicago, testified that he evaluatedrespondent. As part of that evaluation, he conducted a clinical interview ofrespondent as well as several objective tests. Wasyliw also reviewed priorevaluations, prior treatment records, police reports, and court documents.

According to Wasyliw, in the interview respondent said that he wasattracted to young girls because of how they conducted themselves, including howthey talked about what they saw their mothers do with their mothers' boyfriends. To Wasyliw, this meant that respondent was not talking about an individual butabout an idea he had of how children conducted themselves as a group.

As for objective tests, Wasyliw administered a Minnesota MultiphasicPersonality Inventory (MMPI). The MMPI determines whether a subject is beinghonest and whether he is exaggerating or minimizing a problem. It furtherassesses the presence, type, and severity of any emotional difficulties. TheMMPI showed that respondent was minimizing or denying his problems. The testalso indicated a very high score on the scale of anti-social personality andhostility.

Wasyliw also conducted a Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI). Though similar to the MMPI, the MCMI is designed to conform more closely to themanual of mental health disorders that psychologists and psychiatrists use forclassifying disorders.

The MCMI results were consistent with the MMPI in showing that respondentwas trying to minimize or deny problems or areas of difficulty in his life. According to Wasyliw, that is a complicated way of saying that respondent is"hiding something."

Wasyliw also conducted a Rorschach inkblot test. The test showed thatrespondent is under a substantial amount of tension and somewhat emotionallyfragile, suggesting that under increased stress he could have emotional problems. Second, it showed that respondent has very poor judgment in understanding otherpeople. Third, the results indicated that respondent has a substantiallynarcissistic personality, which means he has an inflated view of himself andblames others when something goes wrong. According to Wasyliw, this indicatesrespondent does not accept responsibility for his actions.

Based upon his entire evaluation, Wasyliw opined that respondent sufferedfrom a paraphilia disorder, which is a sexual arousal occasioned by somethingthat society considers inappropriate and which can cause harm to either theindividual or another person. Specifically, respondent suffers from pedophiliain that he is sexually attracted to female children and children outside his ownfamily. Wasyliw further opined that respondent continues to be at risk forinappropriate sexual behavior because of his lack of insight into his problem,his minimizing or hiding of his problem, and his lack of motivation to change. Further, Wasyliw found this significant in light of respondent having beeninvolved in treatment for over three years.

The State also offered the testimony of Rodgers Wilson, a forensicpsychiatrist, also employed at the Isaac Ray Center. Wilson reviewed records,police reports, and test results for respondent. He also conducted a clinicalinterview of respondent.

Based on his review of medical records, his clinical interview, policereports, an Able screening test, which assesses sexual interest, and plethysmograph test results, Wilson concluded that respondent is a sexuallydangerous person. Specifically, he opined that respondent is a pedophile andthat he presents an ongoing risk to society. Wilson defined "pedophile" as aperson "who has demonstrated dangerous sexual behaviors that pose a risk tosociety." The three factors that are considered in that diagnosis are the levelof psychological disease, the person's insight into the disease and how itimpacts others, and the person's ability to have remorse and refrain from certainbehavior. According to Wilson, past behavior is considered an indicator offuture conduct.

Wilson, who did not administer the test himself, described a plethysmograph as a test used to measure sexual interest. A gauge is placedaround the subject's penis and he is exposed to a variety of visual and audiostimuli. The visual stimuli consist of pictures of males, females, adults, andchildren. The examiner looks for changes in circumference of the penis when thesubject is shown or played the stimuli. In defendant's case, the test showed hehad a sexual interest in prepubescent females, as well as adolescent males andfemales and adult males and females. The threshold for sexual arousal is a 10%increase in the circumference of the penis. Respondent exhibited a 35% increaseas to prepubescent females and a 20% increase regarding adolescent females. Wilson defined prepubescent as before the age of 12. Respondent's reaction toprepubescent females was the strongest he displayed on the test.

Respondent was also administered a sexual interest questionnaire. According to Wilson, some of respondent's answers indicate he justifies hisdeviance by blaming the victims. Part of the questionnaire focuses on childmolestation. Respondent answered that he had manipulated a child to get sexualpleasure and that he had molested more than one child.

In regard to his 1996 conviction, respondent admitted to abusing the childbut explained that he became sexually aroused after the child touched him. Wilson explained this was significant to his diagnosis of respondent as apedophile because of respondent's inclination to distort and rationalize hisbehavior.

Wilson also reviewed police reports that contained statements respondentmade to the police about prepubescent girls. Wilson found some of thosestatements to be consistent with his assessment of respondent's rationalization. For example, Wilson stated it is clinically significant that respondent told thepolice it is easier for him to achieve a full erection when he is sexuallyengaged with a child as opposed to an adult woman. This was particularlyrelevant to Wilson's assessment of respondent as a sexually dangerous personbecause it shows a "poor prognosis" for treating defendant. Wilson also reviewedthe reports from respondent's counselor, Evaristo Ruiz, in which respondentadmitted molesting a child in 1985 and, again, in 1991.

Wilson explained that there are various levels of dangerousness or severityof pedophilia. If a person is justifying or rationalizing his behavior, thatshows a "very poor treatment prognosis." Also, narcissism, from which respondentsuffers, indicates poor treatment prognosis because the person has no sense ofany consequences. Finally, respondent's lack of empathy makes it difficult forhim to succeed in counseling.

Wilson defined pedophilia based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual,or DSM-IV. The manual, published by the American Psychiatric Association, isbased on clinical research and is nationally recognized as a text of mental disorders. Respondent meets the criteria for pedophilia under the DSM-IV. Wilson also considered respondent's prognosis to be "extremely poor" and statedthat "he is at high risk to reoffend." He described respondent as displaying"severe" symptoms of pedophilia. Wilson pointed out examples of respondent'ssymptoms, including respondent engaging in vaginal penetration of children,experiencing arousal related to coercion, and his responses during the plethysmograph testing.

Norman Miller, a licensed psychiatrist, also testified for the State. Miller conducted a clinical interview of respondent for the purpose ofdetermining if he was sexually dangerous and had a propensity to commit sexualoffenses against children. Miller also had a clinical psychologist performobjective tests on respondent, including an MMPI. Based on the interview, theMMPI, and a review of respondent's records, Miller opined that respondent is asexually dangerous person who has suffered from pedophilia since at least 1983or 1984. Miller also opined that, because respondent continues to spend timearound children, his "risk for reoffending is very high." According to Miller,respondent's prognosis is poor based on his long history of pedophilia, his poorresponse to treatment, and his current level of denial. Also, due to his anti-social behavior, respondent has a personality that makes it difficult for him toaccept responsibility and change. Miller admitted on cross-examination that notevery pedophile or person with an anti-social personality would be sexuallydangerous.

Also testifying for the State was Evaristo Ruiz, who was employed byAdelante, P.C., a practice that specializes in evaluating and treating sexoffenders. In February or March of 1996, Ruiz performed a sex offenderevaluation on respondent to determine whether he was qualified for an outpatientsex offender treatment program.

During the course of Ruiz's evaluation, respondent admitted to molestingtwo young girls. He also told Ruiz he was "out of control, that he couldn'tcontrol these fantasies." On cross-examination, Ruiz admitted that, as part ofhis evaluation of respondent's treatment, Ruiz had reported that as of July 1999respondent was making "good progress" and had developed a "good level of victimempathy."

During closing argument, the State discussed the plethysmograph as follows:

"[Pedophilia] is also told by tests that check yourphysiological responses to certain stimuli the way doctors talkedand that is the plethysmograph thing you heard about. Spend 30seconds thinking about a plethysmograph. This is a test thatdetermines or measures sexual arousal, basically involuntaryreaction. Picture it. You are going in some sterile, the mostunerotic setting you can ever imagine with several people all aroundyou.

* * *

There are people in the room in his case at least Dr. Wasyliwwith all his machinery in what can never be described in a sensualkind of way and they show dirty pictures of little kids and they doit with this wire wrapped around the man's penis. A man who in Mr.Grant's word has a cloud of a sexually dangerous person hanging overhis head. A man who has to be thinking in his head I am going totry to be as unaroused as possible.

I don't know if a person would be thinking about MickeyMantle's baseball scores or whatever but anything but arousal. Andin that context they show him pictures of prepubescent girls andwhile trying to put himself into a mental cold shower he still hasa 35 percent increase."

During rebuttal, the State further argued:

"He is sitting in a room as sterile as this with a band aroundhis penis and he is having reactions to dirty pictures of littlegirls. But what does the respondent say? No. No. That neverhappened.

So the doctor lied. Why? I have no idea, but Dr. Wasyliw[,]court-appointed man who is an expert in the field who has years ofeducation[,] made this up. The reality of the situation is that iswhat happened. The respondent can deny it all he wants, just likehe denies anything else. You want to talk about distortion, that isdistortion because he knows what that is going to produce. We gota problem here."

The court instructed the jury that a person is sexually dangerous if thatperson: "suffers from a mental disorder for not less than one year immediatelyprior to the filing of a petition to declare him sexually dangerous and hedemonstrates propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexualmolestation of children and he continues to have criminal propensities to commitsex offenses."

The jury found respondent to be a sexually dangerous person, and judgmentwas entered on the verdict. Respondent filed a posttrial motion in which heobjected to the striking of juror 135. He did not raise any error as to thereference to the plethysmograph, the constitutionality of the Act, or the denialof a speedy trial. The posttrial motion was denied, and respondent filed thistimely appeal.

DISCUSSION

We first address the issue of whether respondent was denied a speedy trial. In this regard, he contends that the Illinois speedy trial statute, section 103--5 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/103--5 (West 1998)) (Speedy Trial Act), applies to aproceeding under the Act and that, because he was in custody, the State had tobegin the trial within 120 days from the time he was taken into custody. Alternatively, he argues that he was denied his constitutional speedy trialright.

We note initially that respondent concedes that he waived the speedy trialissues by not moving to dismiss or raising the issues in his posttrial motion. As for the issue of whether he was denied a statutory right to a speedy trial,respondent seeks to sidestep waiver by contending that his trial counsel wasineffective for failing to raise the issue in the trial court.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendantmust show both that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) thedeficient performance prejudiced the defendant such that he was deprived of afair trial. People v. Nunez, 325 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42 (2001), citing Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Thefailure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test precludes a finding ofineffective assistance of counsel. Nunez, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 42. With regardto respondent's claims under the Speedy Trial Act, we conclude that respondent'scounsel's performance did not result in prejudice to respondent for the reasonthat the Speedy Trial Act is not applicable to a proceeding under the Act.

By its own language, the Speedy Trial Act is limited to criminalprosecutions. It provides, in relevant part, that "[e]very person in custody inthis State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court." (Emphasisadded.) 725 ILCS 5/103--5 (West 1998). This language speaks of a trial for acharged offense, as opposed to any other type of proceeding, such as one underthe Act. The Code defines an offense as "a violation of any penal statute ofthis State." 725 ILCS 5/102--15 (West 1998). While a respondent under the Actmust be accorded the essential protections available at a criminal trial, theproceedings are civil in nature and the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2--101 etseq. (West 1998)) applies. 725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1998); People v. Trainor, 196Ill. 2d 318, 328 (2001). As such, we consider the Speedy Trial Act, by its ownterms, not to apply to the Act. Cf. People v. Glenn, 142 Ill. App. 3d 1108,1109-10 (1986) (no right to speedy trial in forfeiture action under section 36--1of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 36--1) becauseit is not a criminal action).

Respondent cites People v. Beshears, 65 Ill. App. 2d 446 (1965), and Peoplev. McVeay, 302 Ill. App. 3d 960 (1999), as support for his contention that theSpeedy Trial Act applies to the Act. Respondent's reliance on those cases,however, is misplaced.

The court in Beshears did not hold that the Speedy Trial Act applies to theAct. While the court discussed the language of section 103--5, it did so in thecontext of deciding whether the exception for competency hearings set forth insection 103--5 applied in that case. See Beshears, 65 Ill. App. 2d at 458. Thecourt otherwise never mentioned section 103--5 or its 120-day requirement. Rather, the court in Beshears held that the respondent had a due process rightto a speedy trial. In that regard, the court stated that "it is quite clear howthe requirements of due process were violated." (Emphasis added.) Beshears, 65Ill. App. 2d at 459. The court further noted that Illinois courts "havefrequently admonished that due process of law must be followed in proceedingsconducted under the [Act]." (Emphasis added.) Beshears, 65 Ill. App. 2d at 459. The court concluded, therefore, that because the respondent had been in custodyfor about nine months "it cannot be said that due process of law has been met."

(Emphasis added.) Beshears, 65 Ill. App. 2d at 459. There is no explicitlanguage in Beshears that the Speedy Trial Act applies. At best, the relianceon section 103--5 is equivocal as the holding is based on due process rather thanthe Speedy Trial Act itself.

We further note that our supreme court has stated that "the right to dueprocess" entitles a respondent in a proceeding under the Act to "the right to aspeedy trial." People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318, 328-29 (2001), citing UnitedStates ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 1975). Areading of the Coughlin case indicates that the court of appeals ruled that"principles of due process in general must govern proceedings brought under theSexually Dangerous Persons Act." Coughlin, 520 F.2d at 935. In stating that theIllinois courts have accorded some of the safeguards applicable in criminalproceedings to individuals charged under the Act, the court of appealsdistinguished statutorily recognized rights to a hearing, jury trial, and counselfrom other rights such as the right to confront witnesses, the right againstself-incrimination, and the right to a speedy trial. Coughlin, 520 F.2d at 935. As to the right to confront witnesses, Coughlin cites People v. Nastasio, 19 Ill.2d 524 (1960), wherein the Illinois Supreme Court banned the use of depositionsin proceedings under the Act. The supreme court stated, "difficultconstitutional issues would be raised by the use of depositions in proceedingswhich so closely resemble criminal prosecutions." (Emphasis added.) Nastasio,19 Ill. 2d at 529. As authority for applying the due process right to a speedytrial to Act proceedings, Coughlin cites Beshears. Coughlin, 520 F.2d at 935. Thus, we read the Coughlin decision, which is cited with approval by our supremecourt in Trainor, as interpreting Beshears to rely on due process rather than theSpeedy Trial Act in recognizing a respondent's right to a speedy trial.

Respondent also relies on the McVeay decision. McVeay, however, does notexpressly address the issue of whether the Speedy Trial Act applies to the Act. Rather, in discussing the issue of whether the Act gives a respondent the rightto retain, or have appointed, his own psychiatric expert, this court noted thatcertain procedural safeguards have been afforded to respondents involved in aproceeding under the Act. McVeay, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 964. In doing so, thiscourt stated, by way of example, that where a respondent is held for more thanfour months on a criminal charge and cannot be prosecuted, then the charge cannotserve as the basis for proceeding under the Act. McVeay, 302 Ill. App. 3d at964, citing People v. Beshears, 65 Ill. App. 2d 446 (1965). We do not readMcVeay as clear authority for the proposition that the Speedy Trial Act appliesto the Act, nor is it a ringing endorsement of the Beshears case in that regard.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the Speedy Trial Act does not applyto a proceeding under the Act. Thus, respondent was not prejudiced by his trialcounsel's failure to raise the statutory speedy trial issue and was not,therefore, denied the effective assistance of counsel in that regard.

As for respondent's contention based on a due process right to a speedytrial, we also conclude that his counsel's failure to raise that issue in thetrial court did not result in prejudice to respondent. As noted in Trainor, arespondent has a due process right to a speedy trial in a proceeding under theAct. We emphasize, however, that the due process right to a speedy trial in thiscontext does not implicate the specific speedy trial provisions of the Illinoisor United States Constitution. By their express terms, those provisions applyonly to criminal prosecutions. See U.S. Const., amend. VI ("[i]n all criminalprosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy *** trial"); Ill.Const. 1970, art. I,