JUSTICE GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court:

The respondent, Robert E. (Robert), appeals from the March 30, 2000, order ofthe circuit court of Winnebago County denying his motion to dismiss the custodypetition filed by petitioners, David and Jeanne Rydell. In their petition, theRydells sought custody of their grandson, D.J.E. Robert filed a motion todismiss the petition, arguing that the Rydells lacked standing to seek custodyunder section 601(b)(2) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act(the Act) (750 ILCS 5/601(b)(2) (West 1998)). The trial court denied the motion,finding that Robert had voluntarily and indefinitely relinquished custody ofD.J.E. to the Rydells. On appeal, Robert argues that the trial court's rulingwas against the manifest weight of the evidence. We dismiss the appeal for lackof appellate jurisdiction.

D.J.E. was born on November 20, 1995, to Jodi E. and Robert. Jodi and Robertwere married on July 21, 1995. The Rydells are the maternal grandparents ofD.J.E. When D.J.E. was five months old, Jodi was diagnosed with a brain tumor.In February 1997, Jodi's illness became worse and she was confined to thehospital. At that time, D.J.E. moved in with the Rydells. Jodi died on May 27,1997.

Following Jodi's death, the Rydells continued to care for D.J.E. during thenext 25 months. During this time, Robert periodically visited D.J.E. at theRydells' home. On March 13, 1999, Robert picked up D.J.E. from the Rydells for avisit and did not return him. Robert then informed the Rydells that it was hisintention to keep and raise D.J.E.

On April 14, 1999, the Rydells filed a petition for legal custody of D.J.E.pursuant to section 601(b)(2) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/601(b)(2) (West 1998)). TheRydells alleged that they had standing to seek custody of D.J.E. because he hadbeen in their physical custody since the death of Jodi and because Robert hadabandoned D.J.E. by failing to provide for his emotional and financial support.

On April 20, 1999, Robert filed a motion to dismiss the Rydells' custodypetition. The motion alleged that the Rydells were without standing to seekcustody under section 601(b)(2) of the Act because D.J.E. was in Robert'scustody at the time the petition was filed. The motion further argued thatRobert had not voluntarily and indefinitely relinquished custody of the minor.

On March 14, 2000, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court deniedthe motion to dismiss. The trial court found that, between February 1997 andMarch 1999, complete care of D.J.E. had been assumed by the Rydells and thatD.J.E. had bonded with them. The trial court further found that Robert hadvoluntarily and indefinitely left D.J.E. to be cared for by the Rydells. Thetrial court also found that Robert's act of taking D.J.E. in March 1999 did notrevest him with physical custody for purposes of the Act. The trial courtconcluded that the Rydells had standing under section 601(b)(2) of the Act topetition for custody of D.J.E.

Prior to the entry of the written order denying the motion to dismiss, Robertrequested that language be included making the ruling immediately appealablepursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). Robert arguedthat the order disposed of an important and separate part of the controversy, i.e.,the Rydells' standing to pursue their custody petition. Robert argued that theorder permitting the Rydells to seek custody of his child was a significantintrusion upon his parental rights and that fairness required that he be giventhe opportunity to immediately appeal the decision. The Rydells objected to therequest, arguing that the order was not appealable pursuant to Rule 304(a)because it did not dismiss their claims or make a final adjudication on themerits of their claims. The trial court's written order of March 30, 2000,denying the motion to dismiss did not contain Rule 304(a) findings. Followingthe denial of his motion to reconsider, Robert filed the instant appeal pursuantto Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301).

Prior to considering the merits, we must consider the Rydells' argument thatwe are without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Rydells argue that thedenial of the motion to dismiss was an interlocutory order and was not final forpurposes of appeal. We agree.

An order is final and appealable if it terminates the litigation between theparties or disposes of their rights on some definite, separate part of thelitigation. In re Marriage of Alush, 172 Ill. App. 3d 646, 650 (1988). Anorder denying a motion to strike or dismiss generally is not a final appealablejudgment, as it does not conclusively determine the parties' rights or interferewith the continuation of the proceedings. In re Estate of Stepp, 271 Ill.App. 3d 817, 819 (1995); In re Marriage of Wass, 94 Ill. App. 3d 436, 439(1981). Supreme Court Rule 308 permits appeals from such interlocutory ordersonly upon a written finding by the trial court that the order involves aspecific, identified question of law on which there is substantial difference ofopinion and that immediate appellate resolution of the question may materiallyadvance the termination of the litigation. 155 Ill. 2d R. 308; Wass, 94Ill. App. 3d at 439. Robert did not request the trial court to make a Rule 308finding, and such a finding is not contained in the trial court's order.

Although Robert recognizes that rulings on motions to dismiss are not alwaysappealable, he nonetheless argues that each case is unique and that there is noabsolute rule that such rulings are not final and subject to appeal. He arguesthat the trial court's order in the instant case was final because it determinedthe status and right of the parties as to the issue of standing. He contendsthat the denial of his motion to dismiss "divested him of his fundamentalsuperior right of parenthood and *** clearly defined the rights and status ofthe parties."

In support of his position, Robert relies upon language contained in BrauerMachine & Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co., 383 Ill. 569 (1943). In thatcase, our supreme court held that a judgment is final for purposes of appeal ifit terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case, sothat, if affirmed, the trial court has only to proceed with the execution ofjudgment. Brauer Machine, 383 Ill. at 574. However, the supreme courtfurther noted that an order may also be considered final for purposes of appealif it:

"refer[s] to the final determination of a collateral matter, distinctfrom the general subject of the litigation, but which, as between the parties tothe particular issue, settles the rights of the parties. *** A final judgment isone which finally disposes of the rights of the parties, either upon the entirecontroversy or upon some definite and separate branch thereof." BrauerMachine, 383 Ill. at 574-75.

In Brauer Machine, the court held that a plaintiff could immediatelyappeal a trial court's ruling quashing service made through the IllinoisSecretary of State on an out-of-state defendant. The court noted that, becauseservice could not be obtained on the defendant in any other manner, the decisionon the issue effectively barred any further proceedings and was therefore asfinal and conclusive as any decision on the merits. Brauer Machine, 383Ill. at 577-78. The court noted that if the order was not considered a finalorder, then the plaintiff would be left in the position of having its suitfinally disposed of without the right to seek review of the order quashingservice. Brauer Machine, 383 Ill. at 578.

We believe that Brauer Machine is readily distinguishable from theinstant case. Unlike the order in Brauer Machine, the order entered bythe trial court herein did not have the effect of terminating the litigation.Although the order established that the Rydells had standing to seek custody ofD.J.E. under section 601(b)(2) of the Act, the order did not resolve any portionof the litigation or determine the rights of the parties as to the custody ofD.J.E. The order did not alter Robert's parental rights to D.J.E. or his rightto custody of his son. Rather, the order merely permitted the Rydells to proceedin their custody petition.

Support for the conclusion that the trial court's order was not final can befound in In re Marriage of Wass, 94 Ill. App. 3d 436 (1981). In thatcase, the father filed a petition for change of custody. The mother thereafterfiled a motion to dismiss the petition, which was denied by the trial court. Themother immediately filed a notice of appeal seeking review of the trial court'sorder. Wass, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 438. The reviewing court declined to takejurisdiction over the appeal, noting that an order denying a motion to dismisswas not a final appealable judgment. The court held that the order wasinterlocutory in nature and could be appealed only after the trial court made afinding pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). Wass, 94Ill. App. 3d at 439.

The supreme court's recent decision in Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455(2000), is also instructive on this jurisdictional question. In that case, thematernal grandmother filed a petition seeking visitation with her threegrandchildren pursuant to section 607(b)(1) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1)(West 1998)). Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d at 457-58. The parents of thegrandchildren filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that section607(b)(1) unconstitutionally infringed upon their parental rights in raisingtheir children. Although the trial court denied the parents' motion to dismiss,it certified the question for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 308. Thesupreme court subsequently granted the parents' petitions for leave to appeal.Although no jurisdictional question was presented in Lulay, the courtcharacterized the appeal as interlocutory. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d at 458.

The order entered in the instant case, similar to those entered in Wassand Lulay, did not resolve the rights of the parties or conclude anyaspect of the litigation. Rather, the order merely permitted the Rydells topursue the relief sought in their petition. As such, the order was interlocutoryand was not appealable absent a specific finding pursuant to Supreme Court Rule308.

Indeed, we are aware of no authority holding that the determination that aparty has standing to petition for custody under section 601(b)(2) of the Act isa final and appealable order. All of the reported cases reviewing such findingsare contained in appeals from a ruling on the merits of such petitions followingan evidentiary hearing. See In re A.W.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 91 (2000); Inre Marriage of Rudsell, 291 Ill. App. 3d 626 (1997). Although we are awareof reported cases reviewing the trial court's dismissal of a custody petitionfor lack of standing under section 601(b)(2), such dismissals terminated thelitigation between the parties and were therefore final orders. See In reCustody of Peterson, 112 Ill. 2d 48 (1986); In re Marriage of Siegel,271 Ill. App. 3d 540 (1995).

The other authorities relied upon by Robert also do not persuade us that theorder entered in the instant case was final. See In re Marriage of Alush,172 Ill. App. 3d 646 (1988); In re Winks, 150 Ill. App. 3d 657 (1986). InAlush, the reviewing court held that it had jurisdiction to review thetrial court's denial of the husband's petition for a rule to show cause why thewife should not be held in contempt of court for violations of an Israelidivorce decree. Alush, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 650. At the time the trialcourt entered the order, the wife's petition for modification of the parties'Israeli divorce decree was still pending. The reviewing court held that theorder was nonetheless appealable because a contempt proceeding is an originalspecial proceeding that is collateral to and independent of the case in whichthe contempt arises. Additionally, the trial court made a finding pursuant toRule 304(a) that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal. Alush,172 Ill. App. 3d at 649-50.

In Winks, two nonparents appealed from an order dismissing them asrespondents in a proceeding brought to declare six minor children dependentunder the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37,par. 701--1 et seq.). The reviewing court held that it had jurisdictionto hear the appeal because the order was final as to the nonparents even thoughthe determination as to the status of the minor children remained as an issuebefore the court. Additionally, the trial court made a finding pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 304(a) that there was no reason to delay enforcement orappeal of the order. Winks, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 659.

The orders entered by the trial courts in Wink and Alush eitherterminated a party's participation in the proceeding or disposed of a collateraland independent proceeding, even though the entirety of the litigation had yetto be concluded. Such final judgments as to fewer than all parties or claims maybe appealed if the trial court has made the requisite finding under Rule 304(a).However, unlike Wink or Alush, the order entered by the trialcourt in the instant case did not terminate Robert's participation in theproceeding or dispose of any collateral or independent proceeding or claim. Thetrial court's order merely provided that the Rydells had standing to presenttheir claims. The order did not dispose of or terminate any portion of thecustody proceeding.

We therefore conclude that the order entered in the instant case wasinterlocutory in nature and not appealable absent a finding entered pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 308. Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to hear thecase and must dismiss the appeal. In so holding, we note that Robert will havethe opportunity to seek appellate review of the trial court's denial of hismotion to dismiss following the trial court's resolution of the merits of theRydells' custody petition.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

O'MALLEY and BYRNE, JJ., concur.