Thomas D. Murray, the independent executor of the estate of John R. Lundahl, deceased, appeals a judgment granting claimant,Elizabeth Gabel, relief against the Lundahl estate. Gabel's claimrelies on a 1990 agreed order annulling Lundahl's marriage to Gabeland requiring the estate of Lundahl, who was then alive butdisabled, to pay Gabel $1,700 month "for the balance of her naturallife." The trial court ordered Murray to pay Gabel $1,700 monthlyout of the estate as long as she lives or to purchase an equivalentannuity. Murray timely appealed.

On appeal, Murray argues that the judgment is erroneousbecause (1) Gabel's right to payments under the agreement endedwhen Lundahl died; (2) Gabel's claim is merely contingent and thusnot a valid charge on the decedent's estate; (3) Gabel's claim isnot ripe; and (4) recognizing Gabel's claim would keep the estateopen unreasonably long. Because we agree with the first assertion,we reverse without considering Murray's other arguments.

We set out the pertinent facts. Lundahl executed a will in1983 and a codicil in 1985. On August 22, 1988, Lundahl and Gabelwere purportedly married in Florida. By 1989, Lundahl had becomedisabled and the court had appointed guardians for his person andhis estate. That year, the plenary guardians of Lundahl's personand estate sued in Du Page County to invalidate the marriage. OnJune 13, 1990, the circuit court declared the marriage void, and"Lundahl and Associates" (the guardians of Lundahl's estate andperson, Lundahl's two children, and the attorneys for theseparties) and "Gabel and Associates" (Gabel and her attorneys)entered into the agreement on which Gabel now bases her claim. (Itis helpful to keep in mind that, as Lundahl was alive at this time,the "Estate" the agreement references is not the testamentaryestate that was created upon his death.)

The agreement recites that each party releases any possibleclaims against the other and that these mutual releases protect the"heirs, executors, *** and agents of the individuals comprisingLundahl and Associates and Gabel and Associates." (Emphasisadded.) Also, part of the consideration for the mutual releases isthe guardians' desire "to preserve the assets of John R. Lundahl[and] his Estate." Paragraph 6(a) reads:

"John R. Lundahl, his estate. and Keith E. Roberts asGuardian of the Estate of John R. Lundahl *** agree to payElizabeth L. Gabel the sum of seventeen hundred dollars permonth for the balance of her natural life commencing on July1, 1990 and the first day of each month thereafter. Saidmoney will be in lieu of any money now being received byvirtue of her alleged marital relationship with John R.Lundahl. Any and all Orders or other activities providingElizabeth L. Gabel-Lundahl with monies by virtue of theceremony of August 22, 1988 will be vacated and void as ofsaid date. The Estate of John R. Lundahl *** will make noclaim for monies and/or property heretofore received byElizabeth L. Gabel by virtue of any events including but notlimited to those of August 22, 1988. The Estate of John R.Lundahl reserves the right to fund any part of said lifetimepayments of seventeen hundred dollars per month to ElizabethL. Gabel by *** purchase of a life annuity contract." (Emphasis added.)

On June 12, 2000, Lundahl died. On August 4, 2000, thecircuit court admitted Lundahl's will to probate and appointedMurray the independent executor of Lundahl's testamentary estate. On February 26, 2001, Gabel filed her claim. She assertedthat, while he lived, Lundahl paid Gabel $1,700 per month per the1990 agreement; that Lundahl's contract survived his death; andthat Lundahl's testamentary estate owed her $1,700 per month forthe rest of her life.

Murray responded with several arguments. First, Gabel's claimwas not ripe because, since Lundahl died, the estate had still paidGabel $1,700 each month, albeit under protest. Second, Gabel'sclaim was contingent and thus impermissible under section 18--4 ofthe Probate Act of 1975 (Act) (755 ILCS 5/18--4 (West 2000)),because any future payment vested only in the uncertain event thatGabel was still alive when it came due.

Murray argued third that the agreement did not entitle Gabelto any payments at all after Lundahl died. Murray reasoned thatthe payments were akin to maintenance. As such, they stopped atthe payor's death unless the agreement plainly stated otherwise,which it did not. Murray observed in part that, under section510(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act(Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/510(c) (West 2000)), the obligation topay future maintenance ends when either party dies, unless theparties have agreed otherwise in writing.

Gabel replied that she could file her claim even if the estatehad not yet refused to pay her, that the claim was not contingentbecause Lundahl's contractual obligation was fixed before he died,and that the parties did agree in 1990 that Gabel would receivepayments even after Lundahl died. The trial court ruled thatGabel's right to monthly payments survived Lundahl's death and thather claim was not contingent under the Act. The court orderedMurray to pay Gabel $1,700 per month from the estate for the restof Gabel's life or to purchase an annuity as provided in the 1990agreement. Murray timely appealed.

On appeal, Murray advances several reasons for reversing thejudgment in whole or in part. However, we need address only one ofthese arguments because it wholly disposes of the case. We agreewith Murray that Gabel's entitlement to payments under theagreement ended with Lundahl's death. Therefore, because Gabel hasno claim against the estate, we reverse the judgment completely.

Gabel has moved to strike part of the statement of facts inMurray's appellate brief. The first four paragraphs of thisstatement of facts lack any references to the record and merelyreiterate unsupported and unsworn assertions that Murray made in atrial court brief. A party's statement of facts may not rely onmatters outside the record and must refer appropriately to thepages of the record on appeal. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(6); In reMarriage of Drysch, 314 Ill. App. 3d 640, 643 (2000). Therefore,we strike the first four paragraphs of Murray's statement of facts.

Turning to the merits, we agree with Murray that Gabel's rightto monthly payments under the agreement ended with Lundahl's death. Therefore, after making the payment due June 1, 2000, the estateowed her nothing more. Because the 1990 agreement does notunmistakably extend Lundahl's financial obligation past his death,we presume that the parties intended that the monthly payments,which resemble periodic maintenance, would end when Lundahl died.

We do agree with Gabel that the Marriage Act does not controlthis case directly. Murray argues that, because the 1990 orderawarded Gabel maintenance on the dissolution of her marriage toLundahl, the court could not order that the payments continue toaccrue after Lundahl died. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par.510(c); In re Marriage of Clarke, 125 Ill. App. 3d 432, 436 (1984). However, the 1990 judgment did not dissolve a valid marriage butdeclared a purported marriage void. Also, the judgment did notforce Lundahl's estate to support Gabel; the estate agreed to doso. Thus, the issue is not what a court could have requiredLundahl's estate to do without the estate's consent but what theestate bound itself to do.

Because Gabel and Lundahl never validly married, the 1990agreement is not a "marital settlement agreement" or a "maintenanceagreement" in the strict sense. However, Gabel and Lundahl didhave what, in practical terms, was a marriage, and the 1990agreement settled disputes that arose from the invalidation of thatrelationship. Thus, although we have found no case quite akin tothis one, we may look to opinions that consider whether a maritalsettlement agreement that requires periodic maintenance entitlesthe recipient to keep receiving maintenance even after the payorhas died. Generally, courts do not impose such a burden on thelate spouse's estate unless the agreement itself unmistakablydemonstrates that the husband and wife intended this result.

Lennahan v. O'Keefe, 107 Ill. 620 (1883), appears to be theearliest Illinois opinion on point. Lennahan turned on theconstruction of a simple divorce decree with no settlementagreement. Nonetheless, the court set out the rule that courtslater applied to agreements.

In Lennahan, the decree required the husband to pay the wifeyearly alimony until further court order and made the obligation alien on certain property. After the husband died, the circuitcourt, on application by his estate, held that the wife's right toalimony ended with the husband's death. The supreme courtaffirmed, rejecting the wife's claim that the divorce decree boundthe husband's estate to pay her periodic alimony. Noting that thedecree had made alimony modifiable, the court held:

"[T]he only question is, what effect has the death of the[husband] upon such a decree? In the absence of languageshowing, unequivocally, that the intention was to bind theheir by such a decree, we are of opinion [sic] that it doesnot do so, but that its life terminates with the life of the[husband]." Lennahan, 107 Ill. at 626.

The court used both history and policy to support its rule ofstrict construction. At common law, the court observed, alimonywas "but an allowance during the joint lives of the husband andwife, or so long as they should live separately." Lennahan, 107Ill. at 626. Even under more recent American law, alimony hadnever been considered a debt against the heir because the husband'sduty to maintain the wife ended with his death. Lennahan, 107 Ill.at 626. Moreover, to presume that a divorce decree obligated ahusband's estate to pay his wife maintenance would unduly interferewith the rightful claims of the decedent's heirs and creditors aslong as the wife lived, perhaps even effecting "an entireappropriation of the husband's estate." Lennahan, 107 Ill. at 627.

In Storey v. Storey, 125 Ill. 608 (1888), the wife sought tocompel her late husband's estate to pay her $2,000 yearly alimonyunder a consent decree that entitled her to receive alimony "for solong as she may be and remain sole and unmarried." (Emphasis inoriginal.) Storey, 125 Ill. at 610-11. The supreme court heldthat the wife was entitled to receive alimony even after thehusband died.

The Storey court distinguished Lennahan by reading the decreein conjunction with other legal instruments to conclude that thehusband and wife had intended to bind his estate. Specifically,the decree created a lien on certain real estate, required thehusband to keep the property insured for $2,000 per year, andordered him to execute a trust deed on the property. The husbandexecuted a trust deed and a bond that expressly bound him and his"heirs, executors and administrators" to pay the bond and maintaininsurance on the property. (Emphasis in original.) Storey, 125Ill. at 613. The court reasoned that, had the husband not intendedthat the wife receive alimony after he died, he would not have soobligated his heirs, executors, and administrators. Storey, 125Ill. at 613.

In Luce v. Providence Union National Bank, 122 F. Supp. 21 (D.R.I. 1954), aff'd, 217 F.2d 648 (1st Cir. 1954), the court,applying Illinois law, refused to grant the claimant alimonyallegedly accruing after her ex-husband's death. The claimantrelied on a consent divorce decree that ordered the husband to pay$165-per-month alimony as long as the claimant remained single. The district court explained that Lennahan controlled. The decreewas merely silent on whether alimony survived the husband's death. Without a clear statement that the estate would be liable foralimony, the claimant could not recover. Luce, 122 F. Supp. at 24. Storey was distinguishable because there, the documents executedwith the consent decree clearly implied that the alimony obligationsurvived the husband's death. Luce, 122 F. Supp. at 23-24.

In Cross v. Cross, 5 Ill. 2d 456 (1955), the wife sought toestablish her right to permanent alimony from her deceasedhusband's estate. The claim was based on a divorce decree thatexpressly reserved the issue of alimony. In denying the wifepermanent alimony, the supreme court held that the reservation inthe divorce decree was not evidence that the husband and wifeagreed to bind his heirs to pay the wife alimony after he died. Cross, 5 Ill. 2d at 462-63. Reading such an agreement into thedecree would be contrary not only to precedent but also to "theavowed objective of alimony, which is to continue in a measure theobligation of support that exists only during the lifetime of theparties." Cross, 5 Ill. 2d at 463-64.

Courts elsewhere usually follow Lennahan's rule, refusing torequire the late spouse's estate to pay "post-mortem" maintenanceunless the marital judgment or settlement agreement unmistakablyrequires that result. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kettering, 376P.2d 983, 986 (Colo. 1962); O'Malley v. Pan American Bank ofOrlando, N.A., 384 So. 2d 1258, 1260 (Fla. 1980); Dolvin v. Dolvin,248 Ga. 439, 284 S.E.2d 254 (1981); In re Estate of Sweeney, 210Kan. 216, 224-25, 500 P.2d 56, 64-65 (1972).

Against such a rule of strict construction one could invokethe general rule that, because a marital settlement agreement is acontract, the parties' intent must be gleaned from all thecircumstances and ambiguities may be resolved with extrinsicevidence. See generally In re Marriage of Osborne, 327 Ill. App.3d 249, 251 (2002); In re Marriage of Findlay, 296 Ill. App. 3d656, 660 (1998). A few jurisdictions have used this approach torequire a decedent's estate to pay periodic maintenance even whenthe marital settlement agreement itself does not plainly requirethis result. See, e.g., In re Yoss' Estate, 24 N.W.2d 399 (Iowa1946); In re Estate of Gustafson, 287 N.W.2d 700 (N. D. 1980). Seealso Masters v. Masters, 155 Neb. 569, 573, 52 N.W.2d 802, 804-05(1952) (contrasting Lennahan rule with broader contract-lawapproach without deciding between them).

We decline to adopt the broader approach. Our courtsregularly state that we must treat a marital settlement agreementlike any contract, trying to ascertain the parties' intent andusing parol evidence to resolve ambiguities. However, no Illinoiscase applies these general rules, without more, to decide whetheran agreement binds a deceased spouse's estate to pay periodicmaintenance or child support after he has died. Lennahan's rule,which resolves any ambiguities against the claimant and thuseschews using extrinsic evidence of intent, is still good law.

Also, there are sound reasons to resolve doubtful casesagainst burdening estates with charges stemming from dissolved orinvalidated marriages. First, because courts have regularly statedthat maintenance is an allowance for the beneficiary while bothparties are alive (see Cross, 5 Ill. 2d at 464), it is fair toassume that the parties to a marital settlement agreement wereaware of this principle and planned accordingly. Second, an open-ended rule would produce much uncertainty, risking interferencewith the testator's right to dispose of his property as he wishesand threatening inconvenience and expense to the estate and theheirs. See Lennahan, 107 Ill. at 627; In re Estate of Kuhns, 550P.2d 816, 818 (Alaska 1976); Streight v. Streight, 226 Or. 386,390, 360 P.2d 304, 306 (1961). Thus, a court ought not saddle adecedent's estate with an obligation to pay periodic maintenanceunless the decedent clearly agreed to this open-ended arrangement.

Applying these considerations here, we must reverse the trialcourt's judgment. The 1990 agreement does not bind Murray, as theexecutor of Lundahl's testamentary estate, to pay Gabel anythingshe was not owed while Lundahl was alive. Nothing expressly statesthat the payments shall continue after Lundahl dies. Therecitation that Gabel shall receive payments for "the balance ofher natural life" is standard "boilerplate" that does notaffirmatively establish the intent to bind the decedent's estate. See Estate of Kettering, 376 P.2d at 986; Dolvin, 248 Ga. at 441,284 S.E.2d at 255-56; Estate of Sweeney, 210 Kan. at 227, 500 P.2dat 65.

Also, the agreement states that its mutual releases extend toLundahl's "heirs [and] executors" and that the consideration forthe releases includes the desire of Lundahl's representatives topreserve Lundahl's assets. These passages at least suggest thatthe parties' intent was not to bind Lundahl's testamentary estate,which did not exist at the time of the agreement and was thus nota party to the agreement, to pay Gabel indefinitely after Lundahl'sdeath. In any event, the agreement is ambiguous even without thesequalifications.

We cannot say that the 1990 agreement unmistakably entitlesGabel to receive the monthly payments even after Lundahl's death. Therefore, the trial court erred in holding that Gabel was entitledto monthly payments accruing after June 12, 2000.

The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County isreversed.

Reversed.

McLAREN and GROMETER, JJ., concur.