May 22, 2001

JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

Frances K. was a mental health patient. Her psychiatristfiled a petition pursuant to the Mental Health and DevelopmentalDisabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/1--100 et seq.(West 1998)) seeking a court order authorizing the involuntaryadministration of nonemergency psychotropic medication. 405 ILCS5/2--107.1 (West 1998). The matter proceeded to trial before ajury of six. The jury returned a verdict finding that respondentwas a person who qualified for the involuntary administration ofpsychotropic medication. The trial court entered judgment on theverdict, authorizing the involuntary administration of five specific medications over a period of 90 days. On appeal,respondent asserts that the judgment must be reversed since, inviolation of the Mental Health Code, the State improperly commentedon her failure to attend the trial; she also asserts that thecourt's judgment authorizing the administration of specificmedications in specific doses was inconsistent with the generalverdict. For the following reasons, we reverse.

The following facts were adduced from the record. Respondentwas admitted for mental health treatment at the Elgin Mental HealthCenter on January 20, 2000. She was diagnosed with aschizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, which is a mental illness. During her admission to the Elgin Mental Health Center, respondentexhibited symptoms of psychosis, including hallucinations, paranoiddelusions, disorganized thoughts and behavior, and affectivesymptoms of sleep disturbance, irritability, and affectivelability, or mood swings.

While respondent was a resident at the Elgin Mental HealthCenter, her psychiatrist noticed that she paced the hallscontinuously while talking loudly to herself and answering underher breath. She would not allow a physician to examine her butinsisted that she had "belly" cancer and that wearing a pink knitwinter hat helped the cancer. She had delusions of grandeur,characterized by comments that she was a police officer and wasgoing to send the staff at the mental health center to jail.Respondent's psychiatrist characterized her as hostile,distrustful, and irritable. She became angry and verballythreatening to any person who approached her.

Respondent was encouraged to take medication while at themental health facility. When the subject was broached, she becameangry and irritable, yelled, screamed, and raised her arm in athreatening manner. She tore the written authorization foradministration of medication and refused to speak about the subjectwith her psychiatrist.

Respondent's condition deteriorated. Prior to her admissionto the mental health center, she had been working, livedindependently, and had no contact with the police. During heradmission, however, respondent lost her housing, had no money, wasnot able to get along with others due to her verbal threats andangry disposition, and would not accept medical care. She couldnot be released because her psychiatrist did not believe she couldtake care of herself safely.

On January 31, 2000, Elizabeth Tomar, M.D., respondent'spsychiatrist, filed a petition seeking the involuntaryadministration of the following psychotropic medications: Haldol,Cogentin, Risperdal, Zyprexa, and lithium. The matter proceeded toa jury trial on May 8, 2000. Dr. Tomar gave testimony concerningrespondent's mental illness, her refusal to take medication, andthe risks and benefits of the medications she sought to administer. She also testified that respondent's refusal to attend the trialexemplified respondent's disorganized thoughts or behaviors.

The jury returned a general verdict, finding in favor ofpetitioner and against respondent and further finding thatrespondent was a person who qualified for the involuntaryadministration of psychotropic medication. The trial court enteredjudgment on the verdict that specifically authorized theinvoluntary administration of Haldol, Cogentin, Risperdal, Zyprexa,and lithium. The order also authorized lab work for the safeadministration of such medications. Respondent timely appealed. Her motion for a stay of the judgment pending appeal was denied.

At the outset, we determine that this case would normally bemoot. See In re Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d 167, 172 (2000). Thetrial court's order granting the petition for involuntaryadministration of psychotropic medication was entered on May 8,2000. The terms of the order limited the duration of theadministration of medication to 90 days. This time has sincepassed. At this point, respondent could be forced to takepsychotropic medication against her will only if a new petition wasfiled and a new hearing was conducted. The original judgment nolonger has any force or effect. As a result, our review of thepropriety of the evidence concerning respondent's failure to attendthe hearing or the court's order authorizing the administration ofspecific medications would not affect the outcome of thecontroversy.

However, when a challenged action is of short duration and is" 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' " (In re Barbara H.,183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998), quoting In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d247, 258 (1989)), it may be reviewed on the merits, even ifotherwise moot, if (1) the duration of the challenged action is tooshort to be fully litigated prior to its cessation and (2) there isa reasonable expectation that respondent would be subjected to thesame action again. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 491. Bothcriteria are satisfied here. By statute, psychotropic medicationcannot be administered involuntarily for more than 90 days withoutan additional hearing. 405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a)(5) (West 1998). This period of time is far too brief to permit appellate review. In virtually every case, the challenged medication orders wouldexpire before appellate review was completed, as occurred here. Ifthe mootness doctrine were applied under such circumstances, recipients of involuntary administration of psychotropic medicationwould be deprived of legal recourse in challenging the trialcourt's orders. The right to appeal as provided by the MentalHealth Code would be a nullity. 405 ILCS 5/3--816 (West 1998).

The second requirement to apply the exception to the mootnessdoctrine is also present. Although respondent's current status isnot revealed by the record filed on appeal, it does indicate thatshe had a history of mental illness and hospitalization for suchillness as recently as 2