No. 2--01--1479

JUSTICE GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Christy F., appeals the orders of the circuitcourt of Winnebago County finding her an unfit parent andterminating her parental rights to three of her children, KennethF., Justin S., and Angel F. On appeal, respondent raises thefollowing two issues: (1) whether respondent was properlyadmonished as required by section 1--5(3) of the Juvenile Court Actof 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1--5(3) (West 2000)),and (2) whether the trial court conducted a proper permanencyreview hearing as required by section 2--28 of the Juvenile CourtAct (705 ILCS 405/2--28 (West 2000)). For the reasons that follow,we affirm.

A trial court's determination that a parent is unfit isentitled to great deference and will not be disturbed unless it iscontrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or constitutes aclear abuse of discretion. In re A.A., 324 Ill. App. 3d 227, 234(2001). Nevertheless, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Inre A.J., 323 Ill. App. 3d 607, 609-10 (2001). When a trial courtbases a finding of unfitness upon more than one ground, we mustaffirm if any one of the grounds justifies the finding. In reC.L.T., 302 Ill. App. 3d 770, 772 (1999).

In the instant case, the trial court found respondent unfit ontwo of the grounds defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2000)). First, based upon respondent's sporadicvisitation with the children, the trial court found that respondentfailed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, orresponsibility as to the children's welfare. See 750 ILCS50/1(D)(b) (West 2000). Second, the trial court found thatrespondent had failed to make reasonable efforts or reasonableprogress toward having the children returned to her. See 750 ILCS50/1(D)(m) (West 2000). We must affirm if either of these groundswarrants a finding of unfitness (C.L.T., 302 Ill. App. 3d at 772),and we will thus focus on the former ground, where relevant, in thebalance of this opinion. Relevant facts will be discussed as theypertain to the issues raised by the parties.

I. ADMONISHMENTS

We will first address respondent's argument that the trialcourt failed to properly admonish her that she risked thetermination of her parental rights if she did not comply withservice plans, cooperate with the Department of Children and FamilyServices (DCFS), and correct the conditions that required herchildren to be in care. See 705 ILCS 405/1--5(3) (West 2000). Respondent asserts that the record contains no such admonishment. Implicit in respondent's argument is the premise that if she hadbeen properly admonished as to this possibility, she would havealtered her behavior in such a manner that would have prevented thetermination of her parental rights. Given the state of the record,we find this premise untenable.

Section 1--5(3) of the Juvenile Court Act provides, inpertinent part, the following:

"If the child is alleged to be abused, neglected ordependent, the court shall admonish the parents that if thecourt declares the child to be a ward of the court and awardscustody or guardianship to the Department of Children andFamily Services, the parents must cooperate with theDepartment of Children and Family Services, comply with theterms of the service plans, and correct the conditions thatrequire the child to be in care, or risk termination of theirparental rights." 705 ILCS 405/1--5(3) (West 2000).

We considered this portion of the Juvenile Court Act and itspredecessors in In re Andrea F., 327 Ill. App. 3d 1072 (2002). Inthat case, we reversed an order of a trial court because the trialcourt failed to admonish the respondent that he could lose hisparental rights if he did not cooperate with DCFS. Andrea F. isfactually distinguishable from the instant case.

Before proceeding further, however, we note that respondenthas waived this argument. On January 14, 1998, the trial courtadjudicated the minors neglected. Neither a transcript of thisproceeding nor a bystander's report (see 166 Ill. 2d R. 323(c))appears in the record. The burden is on the appellant to presenta sufficient record on appeal to substantiate any claims of error. Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). Any doubtsarising as a result of omissions in the record must be resolvedagainst the appellant. Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d525, 546-47 (1996). Given this omission, we must presume that thetrial court acted properly and that respondent received the properadmonishments.

Even if we were to deem this argument properly preserved forreview, respondent would not prevail, for the error that shecomplains of was harmless. In Andrea F., before holding that thetrial court's failure to properly admonish the respondent requireda reversal, we observed the following:

"Here, the record fails to disclose that respondent was everadmonished that he could lose his parental rights to his childif he failed to cooperate with DCFS and comply with theservice plans. Without a warning of the risks, at least bythe time of the dispositional hearing, respondent could notappreciate the importance of compliance." Andrea F., 327 Ill.App. 3d at 1079.

Thus, in Andrea F., the record did not demonstrate that respondentwas aware of the importance of compliance. By implication, had therespondent been aware of the consequences of noncompliance, he maywell have complied with his service plans. Conversely, where therecord demonstrates that, even if properly admonished, a respondentwould not have complied with a service plan or cooperated withDCFS, the failure to admonish the respondent results in noprejudice and the error is harmless.

In Andrea F., this court relied primarily on In re Smith, 77Ill. App. 3d 1048 (1979) and In re Moore, 87 Ill. App. 3d 1117(1980), which interpreted a predecessor to section 1--5(3) of theJuvenile Court Act. Both Smith and Moore recognize that aharmless-error analysis is appropriate when a trial court fails toproperly admonish a respondent in a proceeding such as the presentone. In Smith, the court observed that the respondent, "apparentlyunaware that her son could be taken from her, was unprepared tochallenge [the] evidence or to present evidence to the contrary." Smith, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 1054. Thus, the Smith court was notconcerned with admonishments merely for their own sake; it reversedbecause the failure to admonish the respondent had a tangibleeffect on the outcome of the proceedings. In other words, theerror was prejudicial. We also note that the Smith court statedthat a nonprejudicial defect in the pleadings would not warrantreversal. Smith, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 1052. Pleadings are likeadmonishments in that they are intended to put parties on notice ofthings that are important to the conduct of an action. Johnson v.Illini Mutual Insurance Co., 18 Ill. App. 2d 211, 221 (1958)(Reynolds, J., dissenting); J. Parness, Illinois Civil Procedure