Nos. 2--01--0371, 2--01--0372, 2--01--0373, 2--01--0374 cons.

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

JUSTICE BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

In this consolidated appeal, the County of Will (Will County)appeals from an order entered by the circuit court of Du PageCounty requiring Will County to pay one-quarter of the residentialplacement costs for minor Keri B. The sole issue before us iswhether, under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS405/1--1 et seq. (West 2000)), the circuit court of Du Page Countyhas the authority to order Will County, a county outside of itscircuit, to pay a portion of the residential placement costs for aminor who resides in Will County. We hold that the circuit courtdoes have such authority.

The record reveals that four original delinquent petitions were filed against Keri B. in Du Page County. The first threepetitions alleged that Keri B. committed criminal offenses in DuPage County and also resided in Du Page County. The fourthpetition alleged that Keri B. committed a criminal offense in DuPage County and resided in Will County. The court adjudged Keri B.delinquent, made her a ward of the court, and appointed herprobation officer as her guardian.

At Keri B.'s sentencing hearing, the court sentenced her tothree years' probation under the supervision of the Du Page Countyprobation department and, pursuant to section 5--740 of the Act(705 ILCS 405/5--740 (West 2000)), ordered her to complete aresidential placement program selected by the Du Page Countyprobation department. The court further ordered that Will Countywas responsible for the entire cost of the residential placement. Will County then appeared before the circuit court and filed amotion to vacate the court's order, arguing that the court exceededits authority in requiring Will County to pay for Keri B.'sresidential placement. Reasoning that Keri B. was a resident ofWill County only at the time the fourth original delinquentpetition was filed, the trial court amended its order to requireWill County to pay one-quarter of the residential placement costsand Du Page County to pay three-quarters of the costs.

Will County filed a timely notice of appeal from the trialcourt's order. No response brief has been filed. Nonetheless, wechoose to address the merits of the appeal because the record inthe case is simple and the issues are such that we can easilyresolve them without the aid of an appellee's brief. First CapitolMortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133(1976).

The issue before us is one of statutory interpretation. TheAct "is a comprehensive statutory scheme which creates rights andduties that have no counterparts in common law or equity." In reD.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 416 (2001). When, as in this case, acourt's authority to act is controlled by statute, the court isgoverned by the rules of limited jurisdiction and must proceedwithin the stricture of the statute. In re Detention of Hayes, 321Ill. App. 3d 178, 192 (2001). We review de novo whether a trialcourt's order falls within the authority the legislature hasgranted. Hayes, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 192.

This court's role in construing a statute is to give effect tothe legislature's intent. D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 418. We must firstexamine the statute's language. D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 419. When thelanguage is plain and unambiguous, courts may not read inexceptions, limitations, or other conditions. D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at419. We may also consider "the reason and necessity for the law,the evils to be remedied, and the objectives to be obtained." Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 178 Ill. 2d 474, 479(1997). In addition, we will presume that the legislature did notintend to create an absurd or unjust result. Cummins, 178 Ill. 2dat 479.

To determine the legislature's intent regarding the scope ofa court's authority to order the payment of a minor's residentialplacement costs, we must examine sections 6--7 and 6--8 of the Act(705 ILCS 405/6--7, 6--8 (West 2000)). Section 6--7(1) of the Actrequires the county board of each county in the State to set asideannually a reasonable sum for payments for the care and support ofminors. 705 ILCS 405/6--7(1) (West 2000). Section 6--7(2) furtherprovides that "[n]o county may be charged with the care and supportof any minor who is not a resident of the county unless his parentsor guardian are unknown or the minor's place of residence cannot bedetermined." 705 ILCS 405/6--7(2) (West 2000).

A court's authority to order a county to pay for a minor'sresidential placement is derived from section 6--8 of the Act (705ILCS 405/6--8 (West 2000)). Section 6--8(3) provides in relevantpart:

"The court may, when the health or condition of any minorsubject to the Act requires it, order the minor placed in apublic hospital, institution or agency for treatment orspecial care, or in a private hospital, institution or agencywhich will receive him without charge to the publicauthorities. If such treatment or care cannot be procuredwithout charge, the court may order the county to pay anamount for such treatment from the fund established pursuantto Section 6--7." 705 ILCS 405/6--8(3) (West 2000).

Notably, section 6--8(3), and the rest of section 6--8 aswell, speaks only generally of "the court" and "the county" anddoes not indicate that a court may only order counties within itsown circuit to pay for a minor's treatment. Pursuant to section 6--7(2) it is clear that "the county" referred to in section 6--8(3) must be the county in which the minor resides, provided that noneof the exceptions applies. Nowhere, though, does the act specifythat "the court" and "the county" must be in the same circuit forsection 6--8(3) to apply. Accordingly, we conclude that thelanguage of section 6--8(3) is plain and unambiguous and does notlimit the circuit court's authority in the manner suggested by WillCounty.

Moreover, limiting the circuit court's authority in the mannerWill County suggests would not be consistent with the reason andnecessity for the Act, the evils to be remedied, and the objectivesto be obtained. Such a limitation would in fact frustrate thelegislative intent of the Act, and of sections 6--7 and 6--8 inparticular, in cases where a delinquent petition is filed againsta minor in a county that is in a judicial circuit different fromthe minor's county of residence and the court determines thatresidential placement is required. In such a situation, section 6--7(2) would bar the court from ordering the county in which thepetition is filed to pay the relevant costs because the minor isnot a county resident. Further, under Will County's interpretation,the court could not order the county where the minor resides to paythe costs because that county is not within the same circuit as thecourt. Consequently, the court would be powerless to order theproper county to pay the minor's residential placement costs. Sucha result would contravene the legislature's clearly expressedintent that the county of a minor's residence shall be responsiblefor paying the costs associated with the minor's court-orderedtreatment. See 705 ILCS 405/6--7(1), (2). In addition, we notethat Will County does not challenge the circuit court's authorityto order Keri B. into residential placement. It would make littlesense to conclude that the Act provides the court with theauthority to order Keri B. into residential placement but does notprovide it with the authority to order payment for her treatment.

Will County argues that sections 6--1(1), 6--2, 6--4(2), and6--5 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/6--1(1), 6--2, 6--4(2), 6--5 (West2000)) provide support for its position. We disagree. Section 6--1 requires the chief judge for each circuit to provide forprobation services for each county in his or her circuit. Section6--2 allows two counties in the same judicial circuit to form ajoint probation district. Section 6--4(2) enables a chief judge ofthe circuit court to appoint a Director of the PsychiatricDepartment for any county or probation district in the circuit. Section 6--5 addresses compensation of probation departmentpersonnel. These sections of the Act refer to certainresponsibilities or activities that are particular to each circuit,but they do not demonstrate that the legislature intended torestrict a circuit court's ability to enter an order under section6--8(3) to counties within the court's own circuit.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment ofthe circuit court of Du Page County.

Affirmed.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and GEIGER, J., concur.