JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioner, Norma Bates, n/k/a Norma Perez, filed an appeal(No. 2--02--0488) from the order of the circuit court of Du PageCounty granting the request of respondent, Edward Bates, for achange of custody and awarding custody of the minor child torespondent. Petitioner also filed a separate appeal (No. 2--02--0516) from that same order. The same order denied respondent'spetition to terminate unallocated family support and he filed hisown appeal (No. 2--02--0597). This court consolidated the threeappeals, and petitioner proceeded as the appellant/cross-appelleeand respondent proceeded as the appellee/cross-appellant. For thefollowing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit courtgranting respondent's request for a change of custody and affirmthe order denying respondent's request for termination ofunallocated support.

MOTIONS IN THE APPELLATE COURT

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BACKGROUND

As the parties are familiar with the facts, we will set forthonly those facts necessary to establish the background for theissues raised in this appeal. We will discuss additional factswhere necessary in our analysis of the various issues.

The original judgment of dissolution of marriage was enteredon July 14, 2000. The judgment included a joint custody agreement,which required petitioner and respondent to cooperate in raisingtheir child. Also pursuant to the joint parenting agreement, thechild was to reside primarily with petitioner and respondent was tohave certain visitation.

The judgment further provided that respondent must payunallocated family support to petitioner. Such payments wouldcontinue until one of several situations occurred. Of relevance tothis appeal, one of those situations was the "cohabitation of[petitioner] on a resident, continuing, conjugal basis as found bya Court of competent jurisdiction upon proper notice, petition andhearing."

On May 15, 2001, respondent filed a petition to modify thejudgment of dissolution to award him sole custody of the child. OnJuly 3, 2001, he also filed a petition seeking to terminateunallocated family support based on allegations that petitioner wascohabiting on a continuing and conjugal basis.

On March 9, 2001, petitioner petitioned for modification ofthe visitation schedule and also sought appointment of a guardianad litem under section 506(a) of the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/506(a) (West 2000)). On March 19, 2001, the trial court appointed attorney John Bush asthe child's representative under section 506. The trial court alsoset a trial date of December 19, 2001.

On the scheduled trial date, petitioner filed several motions,including a motion to dismiss respondent's petition to modifycustody pursuant to section 2--615 of the Code of Civil Procedure(735 ILCS 5/2--615 (West 2000)), a motion to bar the testimony ofDr. Richard Gardner, a motion to order the child representative totestify or, alternatively, to strike his written recommendation andto declare section 506 of the Act unconstitutional, and a motionunder section 2--619(a)(9) (735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(9) (West 2000)) todismiss the petition to modify custody. Respondent moved to strikethese motions as having been filed in violation of the timerequirements under the local rules.

The trial court denied petitioner's request to order the childrepresentative to testify or, alternatively, to declare section 506unconstitutional. It ruled in that regard that the childrepresentative's report be "redacted and removed" from the courtfile. The trial court also struck petitioner's motion to bar Dr.Gardner's testimony based on a lack of timely notice but decided toconsider it as a motion in limine to be decided at the appropriatetime during trial. The court also ordered a hearing pursuant toFrye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), to determinethe admissibility of evidence regarding parental alienationsyndrome (PAS) and set the hearing for January 15, 2002. The courtalso struck the section 2--619 motion as untimely but deemed it amotion in limine to be renewed at the appropriate time duringtrial. The court denied petitioner's section 2--615 motion. Thetrial date was also continued.

At a hearing on January 7, 2002, the trial court grantedrespondent's motion to bar Dr. Jeffrey Johnson from testifyingbecause his expert report had not been disclosed in a timelymanner. The trial court also denied petitioner's motion to bar Dr.Robert Shapiro from testifying.

On that same date, the trial court denied petitioner's motionto bar respondent from testifying because of his alleged failure toanswer certain deposition questions pertaining to physical andemotional health issues. The trial court explained that althoughrespondent's deposition had occurred on September 26, 2001,petitioner waited until January 3, 2002, to file her motion andnever filed a motion to compel answers during the intervening threemonths.

Following the Frye hearing, the trial court ruled that PAS hadgained general acceptance in the field of psychology and that Dr.Gardner and other experts would be able to testify regarding PAS inthis case. The trial court noted, however, that the issue of itsadmissibility based on the factual basis would be decided at trial.

On February 26, 2002, the trial court began hearing testimonyon the issues of respondent's petition to modify custody andterminate support. On April 17, 2002, the trial court pronouncedits oral ruling in the case. In doing so, the trial courtexplained that it considered the child representative's reportalong with the exhibits, the expert testimony, the testimony ofrespondent and petitioner, the nonparty testimony, and thearguments of counsel. In regard to respondent's request toterminate support, the court stated it had "strong suspicions as towhat may actually be occurring here." Nonetheless, the trial courtruled that respondent had not shown a "de facto marriage" betweenpetitioner and another and denied the petition to terminatesupport.

As for the petition to modify custody, the trial court foundthat the child's "present environment seriously endangers herphysical, mental, moral, and emotional health," and that respondent"demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence upon the basis offacts that have arisen since the judgment of dissolution ofmarriage that a change in circumstances has occurred and thecircumstances of the child and the parties, and that a modificationof the judgment is necessary to serve [the child's] bestinterests."

The trial court further elaborated that petitioner "engaged ina systematic effort to undermine the integrity of the relationshipbetween [respondent] and [the child]." This effort included,according to the court, "denial of visitation, denial of regularcontact, withholding of information, at least tacitly approvingphysical intimidation of [respondent], filing or causing to befiled pleadings which at best are incorrect, and at worse are justoutright lies." The court stated, "I construe those pleadings tobe part of the conspiracy to undermine the relationship." Thetrial court further found that the parties no longer are able tocooperate sufficiently to effectuate the joint parenting agreementand that no remedial course of action is available that would allowthe present custodial situation to continue in the child's bestinterests.

The trial court also stated that it construed the factorsunder section 602(a) of the Act and that number 8, the willingnessand ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close andcontinuing relationship between the parents and the child, wasapplicable. In that regard, the trial court explained that itwould "throw out the words 'parental alienation syndrome' " andfollow the language of section 602 (a)(8).

The trial court further explained that its conclusions were"greatly impacted" by petitioner's testimony, which it found to be"largely invented, untruthful, manipulative, self-serving, andalmost wholely [sic] absent of any recognition or responsibilityfor [her] actions and the damage that [her] actions have done to[the] child, and that child's relationship with another and equalparent." The trial court also found that to be true "of many ofthe witnesses that were provided on [her] behalf, including Mr.Malik, and frankly, [her] mother." The trial court accordinglyterminated the joint custodial arrangement and awarded the solecare and custody of the child to respondent.

The trial court also expressly reserved the issue ofvisitation pending a recommendation by Dr. Roger Paul Hatcher andthe child's representative. The trial court further explained thatthe lack of immediate visitation was predicated upon section 607 ofthe Act and that visitation would "seriously endanger the child'shealth" during the change of custody.

The trial court also commented concerning the issue ofrespondent's consumption of alcohol. The trial court stated it wasnot convinced that respondent testified completely truthfullyregarding his use of alcohol. While the trial court did notconsider respondent to be an alcoholic, it did think respondent hada willingness to fabricate some of his testimony regarding his use. As a result, the trial court ordered that respondent is not toconsume any alcohol until further order of the court.

Lastly, petitioner's attorney asked the court about theoutstanding pleadings that remained undisposed. The trial courtdismissed the rule to show cause against petitioner. As for themotion for judgment and the requests for personal property andreimbursement of medical and dental expenses, petitioner asked tohave those set for status. Also, pursuant to petitioner's request,the trial court agreed to include language in the order pursuant toRule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)).

The trial court also entered a written order, which is datedApril 17, 2002, and file stamped April 18, 2002. The written orderprovides that it incorporates the oral findings of fact. Itfurther denies respondent's request to modify the judgment ofdissolution as to unallocated support. The written order alsodischarges the rule to show cause against petitioner. It alsostates that respondent proved by clear and convincing evidence thatthe child's present environment seriously endangers her physical,medical, moral, or emotional health, and that a substantial changeof circumstances has been proved by clear and convincing evidence,and that it is in the child's best interests that respondent havesole custody. The order further provides that under section 607 ofthe Act visitation by petitioner would seriously endanger the childand that visitation is abated and reserved until further order ofthe court. The order also states that respondent shall not consumealcohol. The order continues until May 17, 2002, "all remainingissues and pleadings."

DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner's Appeal

We will first address the issues raised by petitionerconcerning the trial court's termination of the joint parentingarrangement and award of sole custody to petitioner.

1. Constitutionality of section 506

The child representative's report and recommendation, whichwas submitted on the day trial was to begin, provides that thechild representative reviewed certain pleadings, certain doctors'reports, the child's school and medical records, and otherdocuments, photographs, and reports. According to the report, thechild representative also made personal observations duringmeetings and interviews with petitioner, respondent, and the child,as well as when he attended visitation between the child andrespondent. The report contains several factual assertions basedon these personal observations of the child representative whichprovide part of the underlying basis for the recommendations in thereport.

At trial, petitioner filed a motion seeking to have the trialcourt order the child representative to testify or, alternatively,have section 506 declared unconstitutional. The trial court deniedthe motion in its entirety. On appeal, petitioner contends thatsection 506 of the Act denies her procedural due process because itallows the child's representative to submit a recommendationwithout testifying, which denies her the right to cross-examination concerning the underlying factual basis for his recommendation. For the reasons set forth below, we reject her constitutionalchallenge.

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of lawsubject to de novo review. People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, No.93412, slip op. at 14 (February 21, 2003). Statutes are presumedto be constitutional, and the party challenging the validity of thestatute has the burden to clearly establish the constitutionalinvalidity. Cryns, slip op. at 14. A court must construe astatute so as to affirm its constitutionality, if the statute isreasonably capable of such a construction. Cryns, slip op. at 14. If a statute's construction is doubtful, a court will resolve thedoubt in favor of its validity. Cryns, slip op. at 14.

While there are no cases addressing this issue, we resolve itunder a plain reading of section 506 itself. Section 506(a)provides, in relevant part, that a child representative may beappointed "subject to the terms or specifications the courtdetermines." 750 ILCS 5/506(a) (West 2000). We read section 506to give rise to three possible situations in which the childrepresentative might act as an advocate for the child.

First, he might advocate his recommendation based uponevidence at the trial. If the child representative makesrecommendations based only upon the evidence presented in court, heis doing no more than an attorney representing the child would do. In this situation, prohibiting the child representative from beingcalled as a witness is no more a denial of due process than prohibiting one party from calling the other party's attorney totestify regarding the attorney's in-court observations of theevidence at trial. To our knowledge no court has found a denial ofdue process under such circumstances and neither do we.

Second, he might advocate based upon information provided byinvestigators or witnesses. While it is true that the childrepresentative has the power to base his recommendation on information provided by third-party investigators or witnesseswithout being called as a witness, that does not leave a party withno recourse in attacking either the recommendation or theunderlying factual matters. Under the express terms of section506(a), a party can request the court to condition anyrecommendation of the child representative on revealing any factualsources underlying that recommendation, such as witnesses or third-party investigators, so that those individuals may be examined bythe opposing party.

Finally, the child representative might advocate based uponhis own observations as a direct witness. In the event the childrepresentative directly witnesses relevant facts and circumstancesthat are used to support the recommendation, then the childrepresentative has stepped out of his attorney role and has becomea witness who may be called and questioned at trial as any otherwitness under the terms or specifications as determined by thecourt. We do not read the prohibition against being called as awitness to be inconsistent with such an approach. We believesection 506(a) contemplates such a hybrid role for a childrepresentative. Having interpreted section 506(a) to allow a partyto request disclosure by the child representative of underlyingfactual matters or to cross-examine the child representative inthose instances where he acts as a witness, we hold section 506(a)does not deny a party procedural due process and is notunconstitutional as contended.

This interpretation may also be reconciled with Rule ofProfessional Conduct 3.7 (134 Ill. 2d R. 3.7), which prohibits anattorney, except under certain circumstances not applicable here,from being both a witness on behalf of his client and an advocate. Under section 506(a)(3) the court may appoint an additionalattorney to represent the child. In the event a childrepresentative was called to testify as a witness in the narrowcircumstances described above, an attorney could be appointed torepresent the child on that limited basis, thus avoiding anyconflict with Rule 3.7.

In the present case, respondent did seek to have the childrepresentative testify so she could subject him to cross-examination. The trial court denied this request. Under ourinterpretation of section 506, it was error to do so to the extentthe child representative's recommendation was based on his ownobservations as a witness. Such error was harmless, however, asthe recommendation did not play a significant role in the trialcourt's ruling and, therefore, did not affect the outcome of thetrial. See Argianas v. Chestler, 259 Ill. App. 3d 926, 947 (1994). When it decided it was going to consider the report, the trialcourt expressly noted that it was going to consider the report "forwhat it's worth" and that "[i]f it looks like it's things I shouldconsider, I will[,] [a]nd if it looks like it's way out on a limb,I'm not going to." Additionally, when it made its oral ruling, thetrial court commented that it considered the child representative'sreport along with the exhibits, the expert testimony, the testimonyof respondent and petitioner, the nonparty testimony, and thearguments of counsel, which included that of the childrepresentative. Under these circumstances, we cannot say any errorin considering the report was prejudicial and, thus, reversibleerror.

2. Section 2--615 motion

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B. Respondent's Cross-Appeal

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we grant in part and deny in partpetitioner's motion to strike portions of respondent's cross replybrief, deny respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack ofjurisdiction, affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du PageCounty awarding custody to respondent, and affirm the judgmentdeclining to terminate unallocated support.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and GROMETER, JJ., concur.