JUSTICE GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court:

Pursuant to a judgment of dissolution entered on June 14,2000, the respondent, Gregory Carrier, was to transfer $725,000from his individual retirement account (IRA) to the petitioner,Mary Pixie Carrier. On November 27, 2000, Mary filed a rule toshow cause and requested an award of postjudgment interest afterGregory failed to execute the necessary documents to effectuate thetransfer. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded Marypostjudgment interest for the period of September 28, 2000, untilthe date that the transfer was finally accomplished. Additionally,because the market value of the IRA had decreased since the entryof the dissolution judgment, the trial court apportioned the lossbetween Gregory and Mary. Both parties have appealed from thisorder. Gregory argues that the trial court abused its discretionin awarding postjudgment interest. Mary argues that the trialerred in apportioning the loss in value of the IRA and in notawarding postjudgment interest from the date that the dissolutionjudgment was entered.

The facts relevant to the instant appeal are as follows. OnJune 14, 2000, pursuant to a marital settlement agreement, thetrial court entered a judgment dissolving the parties' marriage. Section 11.2 of the dissolution judgment provided as follows:

"11.2. As a further division of property rights, theWife shall retain as her sole and separate property, free andclear of any and all rights, claims or interest of theHusband, the following items:

d. The sum of $725,000 which shall be transferred to theWife (or her directed retirement account) from the Husband'sFidelity Investments IRA/SEP account #143-140279/143-133736pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order."

On June 14, 2000, prior to the entry of the dissolutionjudgment, the trial court conducted a prove-up of the settlementagreement. At the prove-up, Gregory testified that he understoodthat Mary would receive $725,000 from his IRA account regardless ofwhether the market value of the account rose or fell following theentry of the judgment.

On November 27, 2000, Mary filed a petition for a rule to showcause. In her petition, Mary alleged that, on three differentoccasions, her attorney had written to Gregory's attorneyrequesting his cooperation in effectuating the transfer of the$725,000. Mary alleged that, despite these efforts, Gregory failedto execute a letter of direction instructing Fidelity to transferthe funds. Mary requested the entry of an order requiring Gregoryto execute all documents necessary to effectuate the transfer. Mary also requested an award of 9% postjudgment interest.

On February 23, 2001, the trial court conducted an evidentiaryhearing on the petition for the rule to show cause. At thehearing, numerous correspondences between the parties wereintroduced into evidence. In a letter dated June 22, 2000, Mary'sattorney advised Gregory's attorney that Mary's financial advisorwould be "effectuating" the transfer. In another letter datedAugust 9, 2000, Mary's attorney wrote to Gregory's attorney andindicated that Fidelity was "dragging their feet." The letterrequested that Gregory execute a letter of direction instructingFidelity to transfer the funds.

On August 16, 2000, Gregory wrote to Mary's attorney andindicated that he had spoken to Fidelity that day and that Fidelityneeded some direction as to how the "assets [would] be split." Gregory advised that Mary might want to speak with Fidelity priorto "firing off the letter you enclosed for my signature." Gregorytestified that he had enclosed a letter of direction to Fidelity inthis August 16, 2000, correspondence to Mary's attorney.

Mary's attorney, however, denied that the letter of directionwas enclosed in Gregory's August 16, 2000, correspondence. Mary'sattorney sent Gregory's attorney letters on August 21, 2000, andSeptember 18, 2000, again requesting that he provide a letter ofdirection. As of the date of the hearing, Mary's attorney stillhad not received the requested letter of direction from Gregory.

Gregory testified that sometime after September 1, 2000, themarket value of the account started to decrease. By the time ofthe hearing, the account was worth $120,000 less than it was at thetime the dissolution judgment was entered. Gregory testified thathis understanding of the settlement agreement was that the partieswere to divide the IRA account on a percentage ratio, with Mary toreceive 76% and him to receive 24%. At the time the dissolutionjudgment was entered, 76% of the IRA was worth approximately$725,000. However, because the value of the account had gone down,Gregory asserted that the value of Mary's share had also decreased.

Gregory further testified that he cooperated in the efforts totransfer the funds and provided the requested letter of direction. After receiving several letters from Mary's attorney in August2000, he went to Fidelity's offices to attempt to effect thetransfer in September 2000. Gregory testified that he wanted toliquidate the funds in order to preserve the principal. However,he was unable to accomplish any of these tasks because the accounthad been frozen as a result of the divorce proceedings. Gregoryacknowledged that he had taken no further action to attempt totransfer the funds.

On March 12, 2001, the trial court entered its written order. The trial court found that Mary had initially undertaken theresponsibility to effect the transfer and that all losses in themarket value of the account between the date of the judgment andSeptember 1, 2000, would be allocated to her. The trial courtfound that for the period between September 1, 2000, and September28, 2000, each of the parties should assume a proportion of theloss in market value in accordance with his or her ratio ofinterest (Mary 76.32% and Gregory 23.68%). Finally, the trialcourt found that Gregory was responsible for all of the delayfollowing September 28, 2000, and that all losses in the account'svalue during this time would be allocated to him. The trial courtalso awarded Mary 9% interest on the amount she was entitled toreceive on September 28, 2000. Interest was to be calculated fromthe date of September 28, 2000, until the date that the transferwas finally accomplished. The trial court found that the totalamount due to Mary through March 9, 2001, was $733,078. The trialcourt ordered Gregory to send a letter of direction to Fidelitywithin 48 hours instructing a transfer of this amount to Mary.

On May 11, 2001, Mary presented an emergency motion requestingthat Gregory be ordered to sign certain transfer documents andrequesting that an additional $10,875 in interest be added to thejudgment amount. On May 21, 2001, the trial court ordered Gregoryto execute a letter of direction instructing Fidelity to transferan additional $10,875. Gregory subsequently filed a timely noticeof appeal and Mary filed a timely notice of cross-appeal.

Gregory's sole argument on appeal is that the trial courterred in awarding judgment interest. Gregory argues that section2--1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--1303 (West 2000)) does not apply to a judgment rendered in adivorce proceeding. Although Gregory concedes that the trial courtmay award judgment interest at its discretion, he contends thatsuch an award was not warranted in this case. On cross-appeal,Mary argues that she was entitled to a lump-sum transfer of$725,000 from Gregory's IRA and that the trial court erred inapportioning the loss in the market value of the account betweenthe parties. Mary also argues that the trial court erred in notawarding interest from the entry of the dissolution judgment onJune 14, 2000.

Prior to considering the propriety of the award of interest,we must first construe that portion of the dissolution judgmentconcerning the division of Gregory's IRA. As noted above, thetrial court's dissolution judgment incorporated the maritalsettlement agreement entered into between the parties. Interpreting the terms of a marital settlement agreement is amatter of contract construction and the court should seek toeffectuate the parties' intent. In re Marriage of Wenc, 294 Ill.App. 3d 239, 243 (1998). Ordinarily, the best guide to theparties' intent is the language they used. Wenc, 294 Ill. App. 3dat 243. The trial court should consider parol evidence to decidewhat the parties intended only when the language contained in thesettlement agreement is ambiguous. Wenc, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 243. The interpretation of a marital settlement agreement is a questionof law. Wenc, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 243.

We find no ambiguity in the language of section 11.2(d) of themarital settlement agreement, which is quoted above. Thatprovision plainly requires that "the sum of $725,000 *** betransferred to the Wife *** from the Husband's Fidelity InvestmentsIRA/SEP account." According to this language, Mary is to receivethe sum of $725,000 from the account. There is no language in thesettlement agreement that defines Mary's share of the IRA in termsof a percentage or indicates that Mary's share would be impacted bysubsequent fluctuations in market value. We therefore concludethat the trial court erred in finding that Mary's share of the IRAwas affected by the change in the market value of the accountbetween the time of the dissolution judgment and the date of thetransfer.

Although we find the language of the marital settlementagreement to be unambiguous, we nonetheless note that ourinterpretation is supported by Gregory's own testimony at theprove-up. Gregory testified that his understanding of the maritalsettlement agreement was that Mary was to receive a lump-sumpayment of $725,000 from his Fidelity IRA account. Gregoryacknowledged that this amount was final and would not changeregardless of the fluctuation in the market value of the accountfollowing the entry of the dissolution judgment. Accordingly, wehold that the trial court erred in altering the amount Mary was toreceive from Gregory's IRA. Mary was clearly entitled to receive$725,000 from that account.

We next turn to a consideration of the trial court's award ofpostjudgment interest. The parties initially dispute whethersection 2--1303 of the Code applies in dissolution actions. Section 2--1303 provides that "[j]udgments recovered in any courtshall draw interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date ofthe judgment until satisfied." 735 ILCS 5/2--1303 (West 2000).

In Finley v. Finley, 81 Ill. 2d 317, 331-32 (1980), oursupreme court held that section 2--1303 does not apply todissolution actions. The court explained that a divorce proceedingpartakes so much of the nature of a chancery proceeding that itmust be governed by the rules that are applicable in chancerycases. Finley, 81 Ill. 2d at 332. In a chancery proceeding, theallowance of interest lies within the sound discretion of the trialjudge and is allowed where warranted by equitable considerationsand is disallowed if such an award would not comport with justiceand equity. Finley, 81 Ill. 2d at 332. For this reason, thesupreme court concluded that the award of interest is not mandatorybut instead lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge,whose determination will not be set aside absent an abuse of thatdiscretion. Finley, 81 Ill. 2d at 332.

As Mary correctly notes, this court has held that the rulearticulated in Finley is not applicable in instances where theparties have entered a marital settlement agreement. In reMarriage of Sloane, 255 Ill. App. 3d 653, 659 (1993). In Sloane,we explained that a marital settlement agreement is a contractbetween the parties. We reasoned that, when a dissolution judgmentis entered pursuant to such a contract, the obligations of theparties arise from the contract and are not imposed by the trialcourt for equitable reasons. Sloane, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 659. Wefound that, in such an instance, the trial court exercises noequitable discretion in entering the dissolution judgment and thatthe rationale expressed in Finley does not apply. Sloane, 255 Ill.App. 3d at 659. Accordingly, we concluded that section 2--1303should be applied in instances where the dissolution judgment isentered pursuant to a marital settlement agreement. Sloane, 255Ill. App. 3d at 659.

However, we note that our decision in Sloane is at odds withnumerous other appellate decisions that have given broad effect tothe reasoning in Finley. See In re Marriage of Ahlness, 229 Ill.App. 3d 761, 763 (4th Dist. 1992); Robinson v. Robinson, 140 Ill.App. 3d 610, 612 (1st Dist. 1986); In re Marriage of Bjorklund, 88Ill. App. 3d 576, 580-81 (1st Dist. 1980). These courts have heldthat, under the rule expressed in Finley, section 2--1303 of theCode does not apply to dissolution judgments awarding property,maintenance, or attorney fees. The only exception to the generalrule expressed in Finley is a judgment awarding child support,which now may be taxed with statutory interest under section 2--1303. See 735 ILCS 5/12--109 (West 2000).

Moreover, we note that our reasoning in Sloane has beenrejected by the Illinois Appellate Court, First District. In reMarriage of Kaufman, 299 Ill. App. 3d 508, 511 (1998). In Kaufman,the court held that section 2--1303 could not be applied to recoverinterest for the late payment of maintenance. Kaufman, 299 Ill.App. 3d at 511. The court criticized Sloane for giving such narrowapplication to Finley and for basing its decision on the type ofaward at issue. Kaufman, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 511. The courtexplained that it was not the specific type of award that wascrucial to the supreme court's rationale in Finley but, rather, theequitable character and nature of the entire dissolution action. Kaufman, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 511. Accordingly, the court concludedthat Finley should be applied in all dissolution proceedings andthat the award of interest was a matter for the trial court'sdiscretion. Kaufman, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 511. Although thereasoning in Kaufman no longer applies to judgments for childsupport (735 ILCS 5/12--109 (West 2000)), it still applies to allother types of dissolution judgments.

After a careful reexamination, we agree that Sloane improperlynarrowed the scope of Finley. Simply because the parties haveentered into a settlement agreement resolving the issues in disputedoes not change the character and the nature of the dissolutionproceeding. The trial court does not abandon its equitable powersover the parties and the subject matter simply because the partieshave entered into a marital settlement agreement. See In reMarriage of Osborne, 327 Ill. App. 3d 249 (2002). The proceedingremains in the nature of a chancery proceeding and the rulesgoverning such proceedings still apply. Finley, 81 Ill. 2d at 332. We find no compelling support for our conclusion in Sloane that ajudgment entered pursuant to a marital settlement agreement somehowtransmutes the nature of a dissolution proceeding for purposes ofsection 2--1303. Indeed, we note that our conclusion in Sloanelacks any citation to authority. Accordingly, we overrule Sloaneas it is irreconcilably inconsistent with Finley. We thereforehold that the decision to award interest on any dissolutionjudgment, other than a judgment for child support, is adiscretionary matter for the trial court.

Having concluded that the award of judgment interest in theinstant case was discretionary, we turn to a consideration of thetrial court's interest award. Here, the trial court found that theaward of judgment interest was appropriate from the period ofSeptember 28, 2000, until the date that the transfer was completed. The trial court apparently found that, after September 28, 2000,the failure to transfer the money was solely attributable toGregory. Based upon the record before us, we cannot say that sucha determination was an abuse of discretion.

As detailed above, in June 2000, Mary's attorney advisedGregory that Mary would take the responsibility for initiating thetransfer. Mary's attorney did not contact Gregory again untilAugust 2000, at which time she requested the execution of certaindocuments. The parties exchanged correspondence during theremainder of August 2000. In September 2000, Gregory went toFidelity's office but was unsuccessful in his attempt to effectuatethe transfer. Based upon such evidence, we believe that the trialcourt could reasonably conclude that the delay in transferring theassets up until this time was not solely attributable to Gregory.

After September 2000, however, the evidence demonstrates thatGregory did not take any action to effectuate the transfer. Gregory failed to take any action despite the repeated requests ofMary's attorney to execute the necessary letter of directioninstructing Fidelity to transfer the assets from the IRA. Based onsuch evidence, we believe that the trial court could reasonablyconclude that Gregory's failure to cooperate during this period wasintentional and wilful and that equity required the award ofjudgment interest. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial courtdid not abuse its discretion in awarding judgment interest fromSeptember 28, 2000.

On cross-appeal, Mary asserts that she should have beenawarded judgment interest dating back to the date of the originaldissolution judgment. In light of our determination that the awardof interest was not mandatory, we must reject this contention. Because equitable considerations govern the award of interest in adissolution proceeding (Finley, 81 Ill. 2d at 332), we see noreason why the trial court could not have selected September 28,2000, as the date to begin imposing interest. Prior to this date,the court determined that interest was not appropriate becauseGregory was not solely to blame for the delay in the transfer. After this date, however, the trial court determined that Gregorywas solely responsible and that equity demanded the imposition ofinterest. We therefore do not believe that the trial court abusedits discretion in imposing interest from September 28, 2000, untilthe date of the transfer. We also find that the trial court didnot abuse its discretion in awarding interest at a rate of 9%.

Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's orders of March 12,2001, and May 21, 2001. The cause is remanded with instructionsthat the trial court enter an order requiring the transfer of$725,000 from Gregory's IRA to Mary in accordance with the terms ofthe dissolution judgment. The trial court shall recalculate theinterest due on that amount dating from September 28, 2000, untilthe date the transfer is complete and enter judgment accordingly.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Lake County is vacated, and the cause is remanded withinstructions.

Vacated and remanded.

BYRNE, J., concurs.

JUSTICE O'MALLEY, dissenting:

The majority holds that the language from the dissolutionjudgment is unambiguous. Ambiguous or not, the quoted languagedoes not address how the transfer of funds is to be effectuated orwho is responsible for effectuating the transfer of the funds. Thus, the legal maxim that parol evidence will not be used tointerpret an unambiguous agreement does not help resolve thepresent dispute, which centers on affixing the responsibility (andthus the consequences) for the failure to timely transfer themoney. The dissolution judgment simply recites that the fundsshall be transferred; it does not affix responsibility upon Gregoryto effectuate the transfer. In fact, the record amply supports thenotion that both Gregory and Mary had to take action to effectuatethe transfer. The trial court recognized this joint responsibilitywhen it chose the wording of the dissolution judgment and when itmade its express findings allocating the responsibility for thefailure of the transfer to occur.

The flaw in the majority's analysis also is revealed in theremand instructions directing the trial court to enter an orderrequiring the transfer of $725,000 from Gregory's IRA to Mary. What if the IRA has diminished in value below $725,000? If thatwere to occur, the propriety of the trial court's detailedallocation of the responsibility for the failure to follow itsorder to transfer the money would be quite clear. Such allocationis just as proper even if the value of the fund has not diminishedbelow $725,000.

Interpreting the terms of a marriage settlement agreement isa matter of contract construction. Wenc, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 243. One principle of contract construction is that a contract will notbe construed to permit an absurd result. Rubin v. Laser, 301 Ill.App. 3d 60, 68 (1998). Another is that a contract should be givena fair and reasonable interpretation based upon all its languageand provisions. Fox v. Commercial Coin Laundry Systems, 325 Ill.App. 3d 473, 475 (2001). The value of Gregory's IRA obviously isvariable; if the majority's reading of the marriage settlementagreement would result in an absurdity in a scenario that hardly isremote from the facts before us, I dispute the soundness of thatinterpretation.

The majority states that "[a] trial court does not abandon itsequitable powers over the parties and the subject matter simplybecause the parties have entered into a marital settlementagreement." Slip op. at 10. However, the majority does notconsistently apply equitable principles in its analysis. Themajority does not dispute the trial court's finding that Marysolely was responsible for the depreciation of the IRA thatoccurred between the date of the dissolution judgment and September1, 2000, that both Gregory and Mary were responsible for thedepreciation that occurred between September 1, 2000, and September28, 2000, and that Gregory solely was responsible for thedepreciation that occurred after September 28, 2000. Based onthese findings, the majority considers it equitable and just toaward Mary postjudgment interest only for the latter period. However, the majority apparently considers these findingsirrelevant to another question of equity: Who was responsible for,and hence who should bear the consequences of, the IRA's diminutionin value between the date of the dissolution judgment and the dateof the transfer of the funds?

The finding that Mary solely was responsible for a certainperiod of time means that Gregory could not have transferred the$725,000 to Mary during that period of time. In other words, evenif Mary unambiguously was entitled to have $725,000 transferred toher from Gregory's IRA, it would be patently unfair to saddleGregory with the loss incurred during that period of time. If Mary solely was responsible for the funds being left in Gregory's IRA,then she, as the trial court found, solely is responsible for thediminution in value during that period of time. Given that Marysolely was responsible for a certain period of time and jointlyresponsible for another period of time for the failure to transferthe funds to her, the trial court's decision that she should sharein any diminution during those times in accordance with herpercentage of ownership was appropriate. In fact, if her conductprevented Gregory from removing his share of the value of thediminishing IRA, she arguably is responsible for the diminution invalue of his share as well.

As noted, the agreement is silent as to who has what duties tocause the transfer of the funds. Even if Gregory had a duty totransfer the funds to Mary, however, she had a duty to cooperate inthe transfer. Every contract contains an implied covenant of goodfaith and fair dealing. Northern Trust Co. v. VIII South MichiganAssociates, 276 Ill. App. 3d 355, 367 (1995). This covenantincludes the condition that, whenever the cooperation of one partyis necessary for the other party's performance, such cooperationwill be given. See Kipnis v. Mandel Metals, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d498, 505 (2000). The failure to perform a contractual obligationis excused where the other party prevents performance. See Barrowsv. Maco, Inc., 94 Ill. App. 3d 959, 966 (1981). The trial courtfound, and the majority agrees, that Mary was solely responsiblefor the delay that occurred between the date of the dissolutionjudgment and September 1, 2000. By failing to initiate thetransfer of the funds, she violated the implied covenant ofcooperation and excused Gregory's nonperformance during thatperiod.

The majority relies on Gregory's interpretation of the maritalsettlement agreement. Asked during his testimony at the prove-upif he understood that the portion of the IRA that Mary was givenunder the settlement agreement would not be affected by marketfluctuations, Gregory relied in the affirmative. However,Gregory's opinion is not relevant to the issue at hand because hewas not asked whether he believed Mary's share would be affected bymarket fluctuations that occurred during a delay in the transfer ofthe funds for which Mary solely was responsible.

For the foregoing reasons, the majority's position is notsupported by principles of contract law. Nor does equity permitMary, who had delayed the transfer of the funds, to avoid any sharein the loss in the IRA's value that occurred during the delay. Shewho requests equity must do equity. Peddinghaus v. Peddinghaus,314 Ill. App. 3d 900, 907 (2000). That is, " '[g]ood faith,conscience, and reasonable diligence of the party seeking itsrelief are the elements that call a court of equity into activity' [citations]" (Huszagh v. Holloway, 116 Ill. App. 2d 455, 464(1969)). In my view, Mary has proved her claim to the sum of$725,000 under neither contract principles nor equity. Rather, thelegal or equitable principles relevant to this case all support thetrial court's allocation of the IRA funds.