"(1) When marital and non-marital property are commingled by contributing one estate of property into anotherresulting in a loss of identity of the contributed property, the classification of the contributed property is transmuted tothe estate receiving the contribution ***." 750 ILCS 5/503(c)(1) (West 1998).

Notwithstanding any transmutation, however, section 503(c)(2) of the Act provides that the contributing estate shall bereimbursed from the estate receiving the contribution, unless the contribution cannot be retraced by clear and convincingevidence or was a gift. 750 ILCS 5/503(c)(2) (West 1999).

The parties here do not dispute that the checking account at issue was in existence prior to the parties' marriage and thusinitially was nonmarital property. The funds deposited into the checking account following the parties' marriage weremarital property, as remuneration in whatever form to a spouse during a marriage is considered marital property. In reMarriage of Phillips, 229 Ill. App. 3d 809, 818 (1992). Therefore, under a strict application of section 503(c)(1) of the Act,marital funds were contributed to Marvin Jr.'s nonmarital checking account, resulting in a loss of identity of the maritalfunds so that the classification of the marital funds was transmuted to the nonmarital estate, subject to reimbursement.Because the parties were married for 16 years, however, it likely would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to retracethe contributions to the checking account for all those years. If Adele could not trace the contributions, all the funds in thechecking account for the past 16 years would be considered nonmarital property.

We do not believe that such a strict application of section 503(c)(1) of the Act is proper under these facts. The testimony attrial established that the checking account was used to pay for all household and family expenses, as well as for all farmingexpenses, during the course of the parties' marriage. The parties never opened a joint checking account, and Adele did nothave a checking account of her own prior to the parties' separation. The money that went into the checking account was theprofit from Marvin Jr.'s farming operations. Despite Marvin Jr.'s attempt to insinuate that Marvin Sr. had some connectionwith the checking account, there was no evidence in the record to support such an inference. Aside from any money presentin the account prior to the marriage, then, all the funds that went into the account for the past 16 years have been marital.

We believe that to hold that those funds were transmuted to nonmarital property would contravene the intent behind section503(c) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(c) (West 1998)). Section 503(c) of the Act was amended in 1983 to remedy the resultreached by the supreme court in In re Marriage of Smith, 86 Ill. 2d 518 (1981), where the court held that a nonmaritalapartment building valued at $45,000 had been transmuted into marital property because $3,800 of marital funds had beenused to improve the property. See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, par. 503(c), Supplement to Historical & Practice Notes, at 74(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992). At the time that Smith was decided, there was a presumption that when marital and nonmaritalproperty were commingled the commingled property became marital property. Smith, 86 Ill. 2d at 529. In amending section503(c) of the Act, the legislature rejected the presumption that commingled property always was transmuted to maritalproperty. In re Marriage of Harmon, 133 Ill. App. 3d 673, 675 (1985).

The instant case presents the opposite situation of that sought to be ameliorated by the amendment to section 503(c) of theAct, where a small amount of marital property was contributed to a large amount of nonmarital property. The record doesnot show the amount of money present in the checking account prior to the marriage. Nonetheless, 16 years of marital fundswere contributed to some amount of nonmarital funds. Presumably, the amount of marital funds contributed over 16 yearsgreatly exceeded the amount of nonmarital funds initially present in the account. Under the circumstances, we do notbelieve that the marital funds put into the checking account were transmuted to nonmarital property. Rather, we hold that,under the unique circumstances of this case, the checking account contained marital funds and therefore was properlycharacterized as marital property.

In so holding, we find this case distinguishable from our decisions in In re Marriage of Phillips, 229 Ill. App. 3d 809(1992), and In re Marriage of Perlmutter, 225 Ill. App. 3d 362 (1992). In those cases, marital funds were contributed to anonmarital employer savings plan (Phillips, 229 Ill. App. 3d at 817) and various nonmarital investment accounts(Perlmutter, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 378). This court held that the nonmarital accounts retained their classification as nonmaritalproperty but also held that the marital estate was entitled to reimbursement of its contributions because those contributionswere clearly traceable. Phillips, 229 Ill. App. 3d at 818; Perlmutter, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 379. It does not appear in either casethat funds were ever withdrawn from the nonmarital accounts or that funds from the nonmarital accounts were ever used topay family and household expenses. Here, in contrast, funds were deposited and withdrawn from the checking accountthroughout 16 years of marriage and were used to pay all family, household, and farming expenses during that time.Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the checking account was marital property was not against the manifest weight ofthe evidence.

Marvin Jr. then argues that Adele's guilty plea to four counts of theft with regard to signing Marvin Jr.'s name to checkswritten on the checking account constitutes a judicial admission that the checking account was nonmarital propertybelonging to Marvin Jr. We disagree. It does not follow that the funds in that account were nonmarital funds merely becauseMarvin Jr. was the only signatory to the account. Consequently, Adele's plea of guilty to forging Marvin Jr.'s signature tochecks written on the account does not constitute an admission that those funds were not marital funds.

Marvin Jr. next claims that the trial court's ruling concerning the farm equipment was against the manifest weight of theevidence. As noted, with regard to the farm equipment purchased following the parties' marriage, the trial court classifiedthe equipment as marital property with a value of $270,250 and awarded that property to Marvin Jr. Marvin Jr. contendsthat the trial court's ruling concerning the new farm equipment was against the manifest weight of the evidence because theequipment had been obtained by trading in the farm equipment that he had owned prior to marriage. In addition, Marvin Jr.argues that, because the cost difference between the old and new equipment was paid through the checking account, whichhe claimed was nonmarital, the farm equipment was nonmarital. We need not address this claim because we have held thatthe checking account was marital property. Marvin Jr. then argues that, even if the checking account was marital property,the nonmarital estate should have been reimbursed for the trade-in value of the old farm equipment.

Section 503(a)(2) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(a)(2) (West 1998)) provides that property acquired during marriage inexchange for property acquired before marriage or by gift is nonmarital property. In order to classify such newly acquiredproperty as nonmarital property, a party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the new property was acquired inexchange for nonmarital property. In re Marriage of Eddy, 210 Ill. App. 3d 450, 456 (1991). Any doubts are resolved infavor of finding that the new property is marital. Eddy, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 456-57.

Upon review, we find that Marvin Jr. did not show by clear and convincing evidence that the new farm equipment wasacquired in exchange for the old farm equipment. Although Marvin Jr. testified that he traded in his old equipment, he didnot testify concerning which specific pieces of equipment were traded in, what equipment he purchased in exchange for theold equipment, or what amount he received for trading in his old equipment. The doubts must be resolved in favor offinding that the new equipment was marital property.

In a similar case analyzing the trade-in of farm equipment under section 503(c)(1) of the Act, the reviewing court foundthat, when nonmarital farm equipment was traded in for new equipment and marital funds were used to pay the differencein value, the marital and nonmarital estates were transmuted into newly acquired marital property. In re Marriage ofPatrick, 233 Ill. App. 3d 561 (1992). The nonmarital estate was subject to reimbursement if the husband could show byclear and convincing evidence the amount he had received for trading in his old equipment. Patrick, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 570.However, because the husband had failed to present any evidence concerning the amount he had received for trade-in, thehusband was not able to overcome the presumption of a gift to the marital estate. Patrick, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 570.

Relying on his claim that the checking account was nonmarital, Marvin Jr. claims that Patrick is distinguishable from theinstant case because in Patrick marital funds were used to pay the difference between the trade-in value of the oldequipment and the cost of the new equipment. Because we have found that the money in the checking account was marital,however, there is no merit to Marvin Jr.'s claim that this case is distinguishable from Patrick. In fact here, as in Patrick,Marvin Jr. failed to present any evidence concerning the amount of money he had received for the trade-in of his oldequipment and, therefore, failed to establish that the nonmarital estate was entitled to reimbursement for that trade-in value.Although Marvin Jr. suggests that this court credit the nonmarital estate with the value of the old farm equipment as setforth in Mecklenburg's 1981 inventory, Marvin Jr. did not present sufficient evidence to show what equipment from the1981 inventory had been traded in or whether he had received the value shown on the 1981 inventory upon trade-in. Absentclear and convincing evidence concerning the contribution of the nonmarital estate, the nonmarital estate is not entitled toreimbursement.

Finally, Marvin Jr. claims that this case is similar to In re Marriage of Werries, 247 Ill. App. 3d 639 (1993). There, thehusband had a premarital partnership interest in a farm operation. Werries, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 643. The wife claimed thatfarm equipment and hog confinement buildings acquired by the partnership following the parties' marriage were maritalproperty. Werries, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 644. The reviewing court disagreed, noting that the farm equipment was purchased tokeep the nonmarital farm partnership operating, and further noting that a partnership is a separate legal entity for purposesof owning property. Werries, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 645. Given the separation of the nonmarital farm partnership from themarital assets, the court in that case held that the farm equipment and hog confinement buildings were nonmaritalpartnership property. Werries, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 646. In so holding, the court distinguished its decision in Patrick, whichhad involved a farm operation run as a sole proprietorship. Werries, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 645.

Although Marvin Jr. attempted to establish at trial that he had a partnership with Marvin Sr., the evidence did not supportsuch a finding. Consequently, the instant case is distinguishable from Werries. We therefore affirm the trial court's findingthat the new farm equipment was marital property.

Marvin Jr. next claims that the trial court's classification of all the vehicles as marital property was against the manifestweight of the evidence. Marvin Jr. notes that a 1994 van, a 1993 Corvette, and a 1996 Ford truck all were purchased withfunds from the checking account. Because he contends that the checking account is nonmarital, he argues that the vehiclespurchased with funds from the checking account also are nonmarital. We have held, however, that the checking account wasproperly classified as marital property. Accordingly, the three vehicles purchased during the marriage with funds from thechecking account also were properly classified as marital property.

Marvin Jr. then argues that the trial court's classification of a 1987 Corvette as marital property was against the manifestweight of the evidence because the 1987 Corvette was purchased with proceeds from a 1982 Corvette that he had purchasedprior to the parties' marriage. At trial, Marvin Jr. testified that two weeks prior to his marriage he had purchased the 1982Corvette. In 1983, the 1982 Corvette was totaled in a car accident. Marvin Jr. then used the insurance proceeds from thataccident to purchase a 1982 collector Corvette. Marvin Jr. later sold the 1982 collector Corvette and bought the 1987Corvette.

As noted, section 503(a)(2) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(a)(2) (West 1998)) provides that property acquired during marriagein exchange for property acquired before marriage or by gift is nonmarital property. In order to classify such newly acquiredproperty as nonmarital property, a party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the new property was acquired inexchange for nonmarital property. Eddy, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 456. Any doubts are resolved in favor of finding that the newproperty is marital. Eddy, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 456-57.

As with the farm equipment, Marvin Jr. has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 1987 Corvette wasacquired in exchange for the original 1982 Corvette. Although Marvin Jr. testified that the original 1982 Corvette wasreplaced by the collector's edition 1982 Corvette, which then was sold and the proceeds used to purchase the 1987 Corvette,Marvin Jr. failed to provide any documentary evidence in support of this claim. We also note parenthetically that theautomobile insurance premiums paid on the original 1982 Corvette, which Marvin Jr. purchased two weeks prior to theparties' marriage, presumably were paid from marital funds, so that the insurance proceeds paid when the Corvette wastotaled likewise were marital funds. In any event, any doubts that the trial court may have had concerning Marvin Jr.'stestimony were properly resolved in favor of finding the 1987 Corvette to be marital property.

Marvin Jr.'s next claim of error concerns the trial court's classification of his life insurance policy as marital property.Marvin Jr. notes that the policy indicates that it was issued on March 22, 1976, six years before the parties were married.Because the life insurance policy was issued prior to the parties' marriage, Marvin Jr. contends that the trial court's findingthat the policy was marital property was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

In response, Adele acknowledges that the life insurance policy was issued prior to the parties' marriage but claims that,because the premiums on the policy were paid for 15 years with funds from the checking account, the life insurance policywas transmuted to marital property.

Upon review, we agree with Marvin Jr. that the trial court erred in classifying the life insurance policy as marital property.The life insurance policy was acquired prior to the marriage and therefore was nonmarital property under section 503(a)(6)of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6) (West 1998)). Marital funds were contributed to the nonmarital life insurance policy whenused to pay policy premiums. Under section 503(c)(1) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(c)(1) (West 1998)), the marital fundswere transmuted to nonmarital property, subject to reimbursement to the marital estate. See In re Marriage of Ryman, 172Ill. App. 3d 599 (1988) (reviewing court held that trial court erred in not reimbursing marital estate for its contributions tohusband's nonmarital life insurance policies). Consequently, we vacate the trial court's finding that the life insurance policywas marital property and remand this issue to the trial court. On remand, the trial court should include the life insurancepolicy in Marvin Jr.'s nonmarital estate and should determine the amount of reimbursement, if any, to which the maritalestate is entitled.

In holding that the life insurance policy should have been classified as nonmarital property, we observe that thecircumstances surrounding the life insurance policy differ from the circumstances surrounding the checking account.Although marital funds were paid into the life insurance policy, no payments were made from the life insurance policy, norwere proceeds from the life insurance policy used to pay family or household expenses. Consequently, the life insurancepolicy is similar to the employer savings plan in In re Marriage of Phillips, 229 Ill. App. 3d 809 (1992), and the investmentaccounts in In re Marriage of Perlmutter, 225 Ill. App. 3d 362 (1992).

Marvin Jr. next argues that the trial court erred in failing to classify the grain bins and Morton building as marital ornonmarital property. Marvin Jr. claims that the trial court further erred in ordering that the marital estate should bereimbursed $120,000 for marital funds expended on the grain bins and Morton building. Marvin Jr. first contends that thegrain bins and Morton building were nonmarital because the funds used to pay for the structures came from the checkingaccount. Based upon our finding that the checking account was marital property, there is no merit to this claim. Marvin Jr.then contends that the trial court's award of $120,000 in reimbursement was against the manifest weight of the evidencebecause Adele's expert had testified that the grain bins enhanced the value of the property between $25,000 and $50,000and that the Morton building enhanced the value of the property by $40,000, for a total of no more than $90,000 inenhanced value.

At the outset, we find no merit to Marvin Jr.'s claim that the trial court failed to classify the grain bins and the Mortonbuilding as either marital or nonmarital property. In ordering reimbursement to the marital estate for funds expended on thegrain bins and the Morton building, the trial court necessarily found that those items were nonmarital property. Further, thetrial court observed that Marvin Sr. and his wife had assigned a beneficial interest in the Home Farm to Marvin Jr. and heldthat Marvin Jr.'s interest in the Home Farm was nonmarital property. Consequently, improvements to the Home Farm alsowould be considered nonmarital property.

We also find no error in the trial court's order reimbursing the marital estate $120,000 for the funds expended on the grainbins and the Morton building. Section 503(c)(2) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(c)(2) (West 1998)) provides that, "[w]hen oneestate of property makes a contribution to another estate of property, *** the contributing estate shall be reimbursed fromthe estate receiving the contribution notwithstanding any transmutation; provided, that no such reimbursement shall bemade with respect to a contribution which is not retraceable by clear and convincing evidence."

Here, marital funds were contributed to nonmarital property when the grain bins and Morton building were built on theHome Farm, so the marital estate was entitled to reimbursement if the contribution was traceable by clear and convincingevidence. Adele testified that the parties had spent $80,000 to build the grain bins. In addition, Adele testified that theMorton building was built for $100,000 and that the parties still owed $60,000 of that amount in the form of a juniormortgage on the Clark Farm. Adele's testimony was sufficient to trace the contributions of the marital estate to thenonmarital property by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court, therefore, properly determined that the marital estatehad contributed $80,000 to the nonmarital grain bins and $40,000 to the nonmarital Morton building, for a total of$120,000. Pursuant to section 503(c)(2) of the Act, the marital estate was entitled to reimbursement in that amount.

Marvin Jr.'s last claim of error with regard to the trial court's classification of property concerns the Clark Farm. Marvin Jr.contends that he initially purchased the Clark Farm on his own from Kate Clark for $320,000 pursuant to an installmentagreement, paid a $50,000 down payment with funds from a premarital certificate of deposit (CD), and made annualpayments from the checking account. Marvin Jr. argues that the $50,000 down payment from his premarital CD rebuts thepresumption that the Clark Farm is marital property.

Marvin Jr. argues that this case is similar to In re Marriage of Hunter, 223 Ill. App. 3d 947 (1992), where this court heldthat certain property held in joint tenancy was the wife's nonmarital property. The wife had testified that she alone managedand maintained the property, located tenants for the property, collected and deposited the rent into her personal accounts,and alone or in conjunction with family members made improvements to the property. Hunter, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 949. Inaddition, the evidence at trial established that throughout the parties' marriage they had maintained separate bank accountsand each was responsible for the payment of certain expenses. Hunter, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 949. Upon review, this court heldthat the trial court did not err in finding the property to be the wife's nonmarital property, as there was no evidence of"sharing" between the parties and there was no evidence that the parties each had made contributions to the property.Hunter, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 953.

Contrary to Marvin Jr.'s claim, we find this case to be distinguishable from Hunter. There is a presumption under the Actthat all property acquired during the marriage of the parties is marital property. 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 1998). Marvin Jr.does not dispute that the Clark Farm was acquired during the parties' marriage. Therefore, the Clark Farm is presumed to bemarital property. Unlike Hunter, Marvin Jr. and Adele did not maintain separate bank accounts and did not divide thepayment of expenses throughout their marriage. In fact, payments toward the Clark Farm were paid out of the checkingaccount, which we have found to be marital property. Further, although Marvin Jr. claims that he overcame the presumptionof marital property because he testified that he used $50,000 from a premarital CD as a down payment on the Clark Farm,we note that the vice president of the National Bank and Trust, Patrick Brennan, testified that he could not verify that themoney from Marvin Jr.'s CD was used as a down payment on the Clark Farm. In any event, even if Marvin Jr. had beenable to establish that money from his premarital CD was used as a down payment on the Clark Farm, that fact would onlyestablish that Marvin Jr.'s nonmarital estate was entitled to reimbursement of that money and would not establish that theClark Farm was nonmarital property. Consequently, the trial court's finding that the Clark Farm was marital property wasnot against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Marvin Jr.'s second issue on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in distributing the marital assets and debtsbetween the parties. In its distribution of assets, the trial court awarded Marvin Jr. $691,377 in marital assets and awardedAdele $552,978 in marital assets, including the Clark Farm. The trial court also allocated $436,000 in debt to Marvin Jr.and allocated $30,711 in debt to Adele. The trial court ordered Adele to assume the remainder of the $18,000 mortgage onthe Clark Farm, although it ordered Marvin Jr. to pay 10 months of the Clark Farm mortgage and to pay the 1998 real estatetaxes. Marvin Jr. claims that paying 10 months of the Clark Farm mortgage and the 1998 real estate taxes increases Adele'snet asset allocation by $21,000 and increases his debt allocation by $21,000. Consequently, Marvin Jr. argues thatsubtracting the division of debt from assets, he was awarded $234,377 in net assets and Adele was awarded $543,267 in netassets.

Section 503(d) of the Act provides that the trial court is to divide marital property in just proportions considering 12relevant factors set forth therein. 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 1998). An equal division of marital assets is not required, andone spouse may be awarded a larger share of the assets if the relevant factors warrant such a result. In re Marriage of Jacks,200 Ill. App. 3d 112, 119 (1990). The distribution of marital assets is within the trial court's discretion, and the trial court'sdistribution will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Jacks, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 119. A trial court abuses itsdiscretion only where no reasonable person would have distributed the property as the trial court. In re Marriage ofWerries, 247 Ill. App. 3d 639, 649 (1993).

The statutory factors include: