June 5, 2001

Respondent, Ronald C. Hughes, appeals from orders of thecircuit court of Ogle County entered one year after his dissolutionof marriage from petitioner, Stacy J. Hughes, granting her petitionto increase child support. Ronald argues that the trial courterred in determining that a substantial change in circumstances hadoccurred since the entry of the original judgment for dissolutionof marriage. We reverse.

The record indicates that a judgment for dissolution ofmarriage was entered on December 2, 1998, between Stacy J. andRonald C. Hughes. The judgment apparently was not by agreement ofthe parties, as it was rendered after the court heard evidence andarguments of the parties. Pursuant to the judgment, Ronald wasordered to pay child support in the amount of $1,113 per month andnonmodifiable rehabilitative maintenance to Stacy in the amount of$788 per month for a period of 12 months, effective September 1,1998. Ronald was also ordered to pay 12 monthly payments on aHonda Odyssey awarded to Stacy, after which time Stacy would beresponsible for the debt.

On September 27, 1999, Stacy filed a petition to modify thejudgment for dissolution of marriage. Stacy alleged that (1)because of the termination of the maintenance and car payments,Ronald's expendable income has increased by $1,038 per month; (2)Ronald's income has substantially increased as a result of apromotion; (3) her income is very limited; (4) the children's needshave substantially increased; (5) her income has substantiallydecreased as a result of the termination of maintenance payments;and (6) her expenses have substantially increased as a result ofthe termination of the car payments and her responsibility formaking the car payments in the amount of $250 per month.

On October 25, 1999, Ronald filed a response denying theallegations of Stacy's petition. An evidentiary hearing on thepetition to modify the judgment for dissolution of marriage washeld on November 30, 1999.

Stacy testified that she had become employed since thedissolution and is now earning $1,000 per month as a part-timecollege clerk, but that, even with the addition of $1,113 per monthin child support, she is unable to meet her estimated $3,500 inmonthly expenses. She explained that she is unable to meet hermonthly expenses because she no longer receives maintenance and carpayments from Ronald. She also testified that the needs of thechildren have increased based on day-care expenses, increasedschool tuition, and extracurricular activities.

Ronald testified as an adverse witness that he is stillemployed as a new car manager at a car dealership and would earn$72,000 in 1999, several thousand dollars more than in the previousyear. Ronald also testified that the last quarter of each year isslow in the automobile business.

At the close of Stacy's case, Ronald moved for a judgment onthe ground that Stacy had failed to show that a substantial changein circumstances had occurred since the 1998 judgment fordissolution of marriage. The court took the issues underadvisement.

On December 15, 1999, the court entered an order grantingStacy's petition to modify and ordered Ronald to pay $1,275 permonth for child support. The court found that "there has been amaterial change in circumstances requiring modification of thechild support as previously ordered." The court reasoned:

"[Stacy] has show[n] that [Ronald's] financial situation haschanged and that change has taken place by the fact that he isno longer responsible [for] $788.00 in maintenance expensesand[,] in addition[,] is not required to pay $250.00 per monthtowards [Stacy's] automobile."

The court did not make any determination that the needs of thechildren had substantially increased, although it did note that itwas not awarding any additional day-care expenses based on the factthat Ronald is responsible for all uncovered medical, dental, andoptical expenses for the children.

On January 7, 2000, the trial court entered a support orderand an employer's income withholding order to implement the newchild support amount. On January 13, 2000, Ronald filed a timelynotice of appeal.

Ronald submits that the court's finding of a substantialchange in circumstances was based on a misapprehension of law andthat, therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law inmodifying the judgment for dissolution of marriage. Ronaldcontends that a determination of a "substantial change incircumstances" cannot be based on changes in financial conditionscontemplated by the judgment for dissolution of marriage. Specifically, Ronald argues that the termination of maintenance andcar payments cannot form the basis for a modification of childsupport because such termination of payments was contemplated bythe original judgment. Stacy argues that there has been asubstantial change in circumstances in that Ronald now has moreexpendable income due to the cessation of maintenance and carpayments to her.

Motions to modify judgments awarding child support aregoverned by section 510(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolutionof Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/510(a) (West 1998)). Section510(a) provides, among other things, that an order for childsupport may be modified only "upon a showing of a substantialchange in circumstances." 750 ILCS 5/510(a)(1) (West 1998). Tosatisfy this burden, the petitioner must show that a substantialchange in circumstances has occurred since the entry of thejudgment. In re Marriage of Fazioli, 202 Ill. App. 3d 245, 251(1990). "After the threshold question of whether a substantialchange in circumstances has occurred is answered, then and onlythen may the court determine the amount of the increase in childsupport." In re Marriage of Pylawka, 277 Ill. App. 3d 728, 731(1996).

The substance of this appeal revolves around whether a"substantial change in circumstances," required under section510(a)(1) of the Act to modify child support, may be founded onchanges in financial conditions contemplated by the judgment fordissolution of marriage. This is a question of the legal effect ofundisputed facts, which we review de novo. Gay v. Dunlap, 279 Ill.App. 3d 140, 145 (1996); In re Marriage of Demattia, 302 Ill. App.3d 390, 393 (1999).

In order to establish a substantial change in circumstances,the petitioning party must show an increased ability of thesupporting spouse to pay and an increase in the needs of thechildren since the previous order. In re Marriage of Schmerold, 88Ill. App. 3d 348, 350 (1980). The change in circumstances mustoccur after the date of the decree. Dixon v. Dixon, 45 Ill. App.3d 934, 937 (1977).

Here, the trial court found that a substantial change incircumstances had occurred as a result of the termination ofmaintenance and car payments to Stacy. The increase in Ronald'savailable income to pay child support following the termination ofmaintenance and car payments did not constitute a substantialchange in circumstances because these events were contemplated andexpected by the court when the judgment for dissolution of marriagewas entered.

Stacy argues that the judge entering the judgment fordissolution of marriage relied on inaccurate financial informationin establishing child support in the amount of $1,113. Apetitioner cannot use a motion to modify as a vehicle for launchinga collateral attack on the accuracy of the evidence upon which thecourt relied in formulating its judgment. See In re Marriage ofBean, 181 Ill. App. 3d 671, 674 (1989).

In any event, we have also examined this case under section510(a)(2)(A) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/510(a)(2)(A) (West 1998)). Section 510(a)(2)(A) of the Act provides that an order for childsupport may be modified without the necessity of showing asubstantial change in circumstances:

"upon a showing of an inconsistency of at least 20%, butno less than $10 per month, between the amount of the existingorder and the amount of child support that results fromapplication of the guidelines specified in Section 505 of thisAct unless the inconsistency is due to the fact that theamount of the existing order resulted from a deviation fromthe guideline amount and there has not been a change in thecircumstances that resulted in that deviation." 750 ILCS5/510(a)(2)(A) (West 1998).

Here, the increase of child support from $1,113 to $1,275, adifference of $162 or roughly 14.6%, does not meet the requirementsfor the modification of an order for child support under section510(a)(2)(A). We have examined this case under section510(a)(2)(A) of the Act merely to determine if an injustice hasbeen done. We note that this same section is applicable by its ownterms only in cases in which a party is receiving certain supportservices from the Illinois Department of Public Aid and only whenat least 36 months have elapsed since the order for child supportwas entered or last modified.

We conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law indetermining that a substantial change in circumstances permittingthe modification of child support had occurred since the entry ofthe judgment for dissolution of marriage.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Ogle County is reversed.

Reversed.

GROMETER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.