This interlocutory appeal is brought pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 307(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)) and involves thepropriety of enforcing an injunctive order in the context of adissolution of marriage proceeding filed by petitioner, Mariamma T.Ignatius, against respondent, Tharayil O. Ignatius. Respondentappeals from the trial court's orders entered following the deathof petitioner and the dismissal of the cause of action. We affirmin part and vacate in part.

At the outset, we note that respondent's counsel has violatedSupreme Court Rule 342(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 342(a)) by failing toinclude a copy of the notice of appeal with the appendix to hisappellate brief. Where an appellant's brief fails to comply withsupreme court rules, this court has inherent authority to dismissthe appeal for noncompliance. Kuzmanich v. Cobb, 276 Ill. App. 3d634, 636 (1995). In the present case, we do not believe that thesanction of dismissal is warranted; rather, it is our hope that ourdiscussion here will serve as an admonition to attorneys practicingbefore this court to comply with our supreme court's rules.

Petitioner and respondent were married in January 1961, andtwo children were born of the marriage, both now adults. InFebruary 2001 petitioner filed a petition seeking a dissolution ofmarriage from respondent. During the course of the dissolutionproceeding, the trial court enjoined the parties from transferringor otherwise disposing of the marital assets, including the maritalresidence, two apartment buildings, personal property in themarital residence, and other property contained in a safe depositbox.

Following a hearing on May 1, 2002, the trial court granted amotion brought by petitioner to modify the injunctive order. Atthe time of the hearing, petitioner had been diagnosed with bonecancer and was about to undergo medical treatment. Petitionersought to modify the injunction for estate planning purposes. Petitioner requested permission to sever the joint ownership ofmarital assets so that she could plan the disposition of her assetswithout alienating them from the marital estate. With thismodification, petitioner asked the trial court to continue theinjunctive order in full force and effect. The trial courtmodified the injunctive order to the extent that it ordered "[a]llassets jointly held by the parties shall be transferred intotenancy in common interests as soon as practicable."

On July 20, 2002, petitioner died. Shortly thereafter,respondent moved the trial court to dismiss petitioner's petitionfor dissolution of marriage. The record reflects no judgment ofdissolution had been entered. In September 2002 Susan Ignatius(intervenor), as executor and trustee of petitioner's estate anddeclaration of trust, requested leave to intervene in theproceedings, which the trial court granted. In her petition tointervene, intervenor requested that the trial court enforce theterms of the preliminary injunction as modified by the May 1, 2002,order. In her prayer for relief, intervenor requested the trialcourt to perform an accounting of the property and divide the jointmarital property in accordance with the terms of the May 1, 2002,order.

On December 5, 2002, the trial court entered a memorandumopinion and order. It found that petitioner died without havingcompleted the transfer of all jointly held marital assets. Relyingon New York Life Insurance Co. v. Sogol, 311 Ill. App. 3d 156(1999), the trial court determined that the May 1, 2002,"modification of a preliminary injunction entered [pursuant] to theprovisions of 750 ILCS 5/501(a)(2) of the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act" survived the death of petitioner. Thetrial court granted intervenor's petition and ordered an accountingof the parties' property and a division of the parties' jointmarital property in accordance with its May 1, 2002, order.

On December 13, 2002, respondent filed a motion forclarification, requesting that the trial court clarify the timeframe in which the accounting was to occur. Respondent also askedthe trial court to resolve the issues raised in his previouslyfiled motion to dismiss, in which he sought the dismissal of thedissolution petition and the dissolution of the prior injunctiveorders as a result of petitioner's death and the abatement of thedissolution proceeding.

On January 10, 2003, the trial court entered its memorandumopinion and order. The trial court granted respondent's motion todismiss petitioner's dissolution petition but denied respondent'srequest to dissolve the prior injunctive orders. The trial courtexplained that the injunctive orders survived the abatement of thedissolution proceedings. It further ordered the accounting tocommence immediately. Respondent filed a timely notice ofinterlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (188Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)), challenging the trial court's authority tocontinue the injunction and order an accounting and a division ofassets following the dismissal of the cause of action.

Before reaching the merits of the appeal, we must firstaddress intervenor's claim that respondent has waived appellatereview of the trial court's May 1, 2002, injunctive order. Intervenor asserts that, in his response to intervenor's petitionfor intervention, respondent requested the injunctive order enteredonly in 2001 be dissolved and, therefore, he should be barred fromseeking review of the May 2002 injunctive order. Intervenor alsoclaims that the trial court's orders of December 5, 2002, andJanuary 10, 2003, are separate and distinct and, as such,respondent should be allowed to challenge only the January 10,2003, order.

In Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center v. Berlin, 268 Ill. App.3d 184, 186-87 (1994), rev'd on other grounds, 179 Ill. 2d 1(1997), the reviewing court determined it could consider, in aninterlocutory appeal from a preliminary injunction, whether thetrial court erred in denying a motion for substitution of judge. The reviewing court noted the propriety of an order granting ordenying interlocutory injunctive relief could be determined only inan appeal brought pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (155Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). Berlin, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 187. It held,however, the scope of review under Rule 307 included the review ofany prior error bearing directly upon the question of whether theorder on appeal was proper. Berlin, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 187.

In the present case, the May 1, 2002, injunctive order was amodification of a prior injunctive order and was predicated on aninjunctive order entered in February 2001. Had the trial courtgranted respondent's motion and dissolved the injunctive orderentered in 2001, the modification order entered on May 1, 2002,would certainly have been affected as well. Accordingly, the scopeof our jurisdiction to review the trial court's rulings is notlimited to the orders entered only in 2001, despite respondent'sfailure to specify the other ruling in his notice of appeal,because they are all steps in the procedural progression leading tothe specified judgment on appeal. See Berlin, 268 Ill. App. 3d at187.

Turning to the merits, respondent contends that the trialcourt erred when it entered the December 5, 2002, and the January10, 2003, orders denying his motion to dissolve the priorinjunctive orders, continuing the injunction, and ordering anaccounting. According to respondent, the injunctions should havebeen dissolved because the trial court dismissed the cause ofaction following the death of petitioner. Respondent also contendsthat the trial court erred when it ordered an accounting and adivision of the parties' assets because this, too, was subsequentto the dismissal of the underlying cause of action.

Intervenor counters that an injunction survives abatement ofthe dissolution proceedings, citing New York Life, 311 Ill. App. 3d156, in support of her assertion. Intervenor maintains that thetrial court's January 10, 2003, order properly effectuates theenforcement of the May 1, 2002, order. Intervenor additionallyresponds that the trial court did not distribute any property butthat it merely provided for a change in the way that title washeld. Finally, intervenor argues that equity demands theinjunction remain in full force and effect.

Generally, in an interlocutory appeal brought pursuant to Rule307(a)(1), the only question before this court is whether asufficient showing was made to the trial court to sustain its ordergranting, denying, or modifying the interlocutory relief. Keefe-Shea Joint Venture, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 332 Ill. App. 3d 163,168 (2002), citing Postma v. Jack Brown Buick, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d391, 399 (1993). However, where a party's right to injunctiverelief is dependent on the resolution of a question of law, areviewing court determines the question independently of the trialcourt's judgment. Hamlin v. Harbaugh Enterprises, Inc., 324 Ill.App. 3d 612, 616 (2001), citing In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523(1996).

Respondent is not appealing the entry of earlier injunctiveorders. Rather, the parties have directed their arguments to thequestions concerning the continuing viability of the injunctiveorder and the trial court's authority to enforce the injunctiveorder and to order an accounting and a division of propertyfollowing the dismissal of the petition for dissolution. Becausethese are legal questions, our review is de novo. See Hamlin, 324Ill. App. 3d at 616.

Section 401(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution ofMarriage Act (the Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/401(b) (West 2000))provides in relevant part:

"Judgment shall not be entered unless, to the extent ithas jurisdiction to do so, the court has considered, approved,reserved or made provision for *** the maintenance of eitherspouse and the disposition of property. The court may entera judgment for dissolution that reserves any of these issueseither upon (i) agreement of the parties, or (ii) motion ofeither party and a finding by the court that appropriatecircumstances exist.

The death of a party subsequent to entry of a judgmentfor dissolution but before judgment on reserved issues shallnot abate the proceedings." 750 ILCS 5/401(b) (West 2000).

The Marriage Act is a statutory enactment from our legislature. Accordingly, a trial court's authority to act in dissolutionproceedings is conferred only by statute. In re Marriage ofRhodes, 326 Ill. App. 3d 386, 388 (2001). The trial court may notrely upon its general equity powers. In re Marriage of Burkhart,267 Ill. App. 3d 761, 765 (1994).

In Brandon v. Caisse, 145 Ill. App. 3d 1070 (1986), the wifepetitioned for a dissolution of marriage from her husband. At theclose of the evidence and before final judgment, the wife died. The trial court allowed the executor of the wife's estate to besubstituted into the proceeding. Approximately two months afterthe wife died, the trial court entered its judgment for dissolutionand an order distributing the property. Brandon, 145 Ill. App. 3dat 1070-71. The reviewing court reversed the trial court'sjudgment, holding that a cause of action for dissolution ofmarriage abated upon the death of a party prior to judgment in thetrial court and, therefore, removed from the trial court itsjurisdiction over all aspects of the marriage relationship. Brandon, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 1072-73. Similarly, in In re Marriageof Black, 155 Ill. App. 3d 52 (1987), the reviewing court affirmedthe trial court's refusal to allow substituted parties to proceedin a dissolution of marriage action when the husband in thedissolution proceeding died prior to an entry of judgment. Black,155 Ill. App. 3d at 53-54.

In the present case, there is no indication in the record thatthe trial court entered a judgment of dissolution of the marriageprior to petitioner's death. A trial court's judgment ofdissolution is essential to preclude abatement of the proceedings. See 750 ILCS 5/401(b) (West 2000); Black, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 54. "It has long been the rule in Illinois that the death of eitherparty to a divorce action prior to final judgment deprives thecircuit court of jurisdiction over all aspects of the marriagerelationship." In re Estate of Chandler, 90 Ill. App. 3d 674, 677(1980), citing Bushnell v. Cooper, 289 Ill. 260 (1919). Under theprinciples articulated in Brandon, Black, and Chandler, because nojudgment of dissolution was entered here, the cause of actionabated upon the death of petitioner in July 2002. As a result, thetrial court lost its jurisdiction to rule on all of the othermatters concerning petitioner and respondent's marriagerelationship. See Chandler, 90 Ill. App. 3d at 677.

This case is unlike Copeland v. McLean, 327 Ill. App. 3d 855(2002), wherein the wife, whose health was deteriorating, filed adissolution petition against her husband. The wife sought animmediate dissolution, alleging that, because of her failing healthand because the majority of the marital assets were held in jointtenancy with her husband, she wished to " 'dispose of her justportion of the assets' " prior to her death. Copeland, 327 Ill.App. 3d at 858. The trial court entered a bifurcated judgment ofdissolution, reserving all other issues, and the husband appealed. The reviewing court affirmed, holding that the impending death ofa party is an " 'appropriate circumstance' " for the entry of abifurcated judgment of dissolution. Copeland, 327 Ill. App. 3d at866. Because the trial court had entered a judgment of dissolutionprior to the death of the wife, the dissolution proceeding had notabated, and the trial court retained jurisdiction to rule on thereserved issue of property division even after the wife's death. Copeland, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 866.

In the present case, intervenor was essentially asking thetrial court to carry on with the wishes of petitioner and dividethe marital property as if petitioner had survived. The MarriageAct contains no provision authorizing the trial court to act inthis manner without the prior entry of a judgment of dissolution. Because petitioner died and because no judgment for dissolution hadbeen entered, the dissolution proceeding abated. Marital propertycannot be divided in a proceeding that no longer exists. SeeBlack, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 53-54; Brandon, 145 Ill. App. 3d at1072-73. Pursuant to Chandler, the trial court lost jurisdictionto rule on all other aspects of the marital relationship, includingthe parties' property issues. Therefore, the trial court shouldnot have conferred upon itself continuing jurisdiction to order anaccounting and a division of property when there was no longer adissolution proceeding.

The trial court properly granted respondent's motion todismiss petitioner's petition for dissolution because the cause ofaction had abated upon the death of petitioner and no judgment ofdissolution had been entered. We therefore affirm that portion ofthe judgment. However, we vacate the trial court's orders callingfor an accounting and a division of the property in accordance withthe May 1, 2002, order.

Having said that, we need to address the effect of our rulingvis-a-vis the May 1, 2002, modification of the injunctive order. Relying on New York Life, intervenor asserts that an injunctionsurvives abatement of the dissolution proceedings and that thetrial court should have retained jurisdiction to enforce theinjunction. Respondent argues that injunctions are terminated onthe dismissal of a cause of action, citing section 501(d)(3) of theMarriage Act (750 ILCS 5/501(d)(3) (West 2000)).

In New York Life, 311 Ill. App. 3d 156, the issue was whethera preliminary injunction issued in a dissolution proceeding, whichhad abated upon the death of one of the parties, survivedabatement. The trial court had enjoined the husband, Bruce Muslin,from transferring or otherwise disposing of property of theparties. Bruce, however, during the dissolution proceedings,effected a change of beneficiaries from his wife Linda Muslin andchildren to his girlfriend Marsha Sogol. Bruce died; the wifenever prosecuted the petition for dissolution to a final judgment. The plaintiffs, two insurance companies, filed an action ininterpleader against Linda Muslin and Marsha Sogol to determinewhich party should receive the proceeds of policies of decedentBruce Muslin. New York Life, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 157-58.

The trial court awarded the proceeds to Sogol, and thereviewing court reversed. The reviewing court noted that, undersection 501(d)(3) of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/501(d)(3) (West1998)), the preliminary injunction against Bruce did not terminateuntil his death. The reviewing court further noted that, until hisdeath, Bruce did not have the power or the authority to change thebeneficiary of the policies because the preliminary injunction wasstill in effect. It held that, while Bruce's death abated thedissolution of marriage action, it did not abate the preliminaryinjunction. New York Life, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 160.

To reconcile the rationale and holding in New York Life withthe circumstances of the present case, we must look to the contextin which the proceedings were brought. The New York Life actionwas not brought or litigated as part of the dissolution actionfollowing the death of Bruce. Rather, it was an independent suitto enforce the terms of the preliminary injunction entered duringthe course of the dissolution proceedings. This is a criticaldistinction. In the present case, intervenor sought within thecontext of the dissolution proceeding to protect petitioner'sownership interest in the marital property accumulated during theparties' nearly 40-year marriage but not transferred into tenancyin common before her death. However, because the trial court hadnot entered a judgment of dissolution, the dissolution proceedingabated following petitioner's death, and the trial court lost itsjurisdiction to decide the property issue.

Our decision not to allow intervenor to proceed with herlitigation in the context of the dissolution proceeding issupported by a review of two other cases. In Koenings v. FirstNational Bank & Trust, 145 Ill. App. 3d 14 (1986), the children ofa divorced couple were permitted to bring an independent suitoutside the context of the dissolution proceedings to enforce theterms of a property settlement agreement. In Milenkovic v.Milenkovic, 93 Ill. App. 3d 204 (1981), the child custodyprovisions of the Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par.601(b)(2)) conferred continuing jurisdiction on the trial court toaward custody to an intervening neighbor, despite abatement of thedissolution proceedings, which occurred when the husband shot thewife. In the present case, there was no other provision within theMarriage Act to confer the trial court with continuing jurisdictionto allow intervenor to proceed in her endeavor to protect andrecover her mother's assets.

Moreover, section 501(d)(3) of the Marriage Act provides thattemporary orders terminate "when the final judgment is entered orwhen the petition for dissolution of marriage *** is dismissed." 750 ILCS 5/501(d)(3) (West 2000). Therefore, in the context of theinstant dissolution proceeding, the injunctive orders terminatedwhen the trial court granted respondent's motion to dismisspetitioner's petition for dissolution.

In so holding, we do not imply that intervenor may not seekalternative avenues to accommodate the wishes of petitioner. Inher capacity as executor of petitioner's estate, intervenor mayhave a cause of action for injunctive relief outside of theMarriage Act, such as an independent suit for an injunction. See735 ILCS 5/11--101 et seq. (West 2000). Additionally, although thedissolution action abated, it is possible that the issue ofrespondent's alleged violation of the preliminary injunctionremains viable for resolution in a probate action.

Section 16--1 of the Probate Act of 1975 (the Probate Act)(755 ILCS 5/16--1 (West 2000)) allows a party to file a citation onbehalf of the estate to recover property and discover information. A trial court, in such proceedings, is authorized to determine allquestions of title, claims of adverse title, and right of propertyand may enter such orders and judgments as the case may require. In re Estate of Denler, 80 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1091-92 (1980). Thevalidity of the court orders, and therefore any argumentsrespecting their validity or violation, does not end with closureof the dissolution case in which the orders were entered. See NewYork Life, 311 Ill. App. 3d 156. Courts have allowed suitsconcerning injunctions to lie in this section. See Loftis v.Loftis, 225 Ill. App. 478 (1922) (regarding a transfer of stockpurportedly belonging to an estate).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuitcourt of Du Page County dismissing the cause of action but vacatethe orders calling for an accounting and a division of the maritalproperty.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

BOWMAN and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.