Respondent, Barbara Kirkpatrick, appeals from a judgment ofdissolution of marriage that dissolved the bonds of matrimonybetween respondent and petitioner, Clayton Kirkpatrick. Thejudgment was based on the trial court's finding that respondent wasguilty of extreme and repeated mental cruelty toward petitioner. Respondent contends that the trial court erred in making itsfinding because (1) her conduct in merely leaving petitioner wasnot mental cruelty but at most was desertion for less than one yearwhich, under the specific provisions of the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West2000)), does not constitute a proper ground for the dissolution ofa marriage and (2) the trial court's finding of extreme andrepeated mental cruelty was against the manifest weight of theevidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The parties were married in Illinois on January 8, 2000. OnJune 25, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for the dissolution ofthe marriage. The petition alleged (1) that irreconcilabledifferences had caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriageand (2) that, without cause or provocation by petitioner,respondent had been guilty of extreme and repeated mental crueltytoward petitioner. On November 13, 2000, at the start of anevidentiary hearing on the petition, the trial court grantedrespondent's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect tothe part of the petition based on the allegation of irreconcilabledifferences. The hearing then proceeded only on the allegation ofextreme and repeated mental cruelty. In order to adequatelyaddress respondent's contention that the trial court's finding wasagainst the manifest weight of the evidence, we set out in somedetail the testimony and other evidence presented at the hearing.

At the evidentiary hearing, petitioner testified that his dateof birth was January 8, 1915. Petitioner did not know respondent'sage. January 8, 2000, the date of the wedding, was a Saturday. After the wedding, the parties returned immediately to petitioner'shouse in Glen Ellyn. According to petitioner, on the Wednesdayfollowing the wedding, respondent left his house and went to livein her own house in Barrington. When respondent left, she toldpetitioner that she needed a rest and that she wanted to take avacation. Respondent took virtually all of her possessions withher.

Respondent had been petitioner's caretaker for about sixmonths prior to the marriage. As petitioner's caretaker,respondent lived at petitioner's house and her duties includedshopping, cooking, and cleaning. Petitioner hired respondent tolive at his house "regularly." However, during the time that shewas petitioner's caretaker, respondent was frequently absent frompetitioner's house from Saturday night until Monday morning. Petitioner paid respondent $40,000 per year to be his caretaker.

Petitioner further testified that, prior to the marriage, whenrespondent was his caretaker, he gave respondent a charge card. Petitioner told respondent that she could use the charge card topurchase groceries for his household. After the marriage,respondent asked petitioner if she could continue to use the chargecard. Petitioner told respondent, "yes, but don't abuse it." Petitioner had no knowledge as to whether respondent used thecharge card between the time of the wedding on Saturday and thetime respondent left his house the following Wednesday. Petitionerbelieved that after respondent left she used the charge card topurchase a new furnace, new air conditioning, and a new hot waterheater for her home in Barrington. The charges for these itemstotaled more than $7,000. Petitioner had no interest inrespondent's home in Barrington. Petitioner subsequently canceledrespondent's credit card.

Petitioner further testified that after respondent moved outof his house she never came back. After respondent left,petitioner attempted to telephone respondent at her home inBarrington but got no response from respondent for several weeks. Petitioner first attempted to call respondent shortly after sheleft. Over the next several weeks, petitioner made "four or five"unsuccessful attempts to call respondent. During this period,petitioner did not receive any calls, letters, or notes fromrespondent.

Petitioner further testified that before respondent left sheoffered no explanation as to why she was leaving other than thatshe needed a vacation. In response to petitioner's queries as tohow long respondent was planning to be gone, respondent stated that"she didn't know." When respondent left petitioner's home, shetook her keys to petitioner's house and a garage door opener withher. About a week after respondent left, a neighbor of petitionerfound the keys and the garage door opener in the neighbor'smailbox. There was no note with these items and petitioner did notreceive any communication from respondent regarding the keys andthe garage door opener.

Petitioner further testified that before respondent left shedid not complain to him about anything that he had done. Petitioner could not recall any controversies between him andrespondent that occurred between the time that they were marriedand the time that respondent left. Petitioner acknowledged thatrespondent did not like his adult children from a prior marriage,that respondent did not want to have anything to do with hischildren, and that respondent did not want his children to come topetitioner's house.

Petitioner further testified that at the time of his marriageto respondent he had medical problems. Petitioner's medicalproblems included trouble with his spine and legs, heart problems,and problems related to a prior series of strokes. Petitioner wasunder the care of physicians for these problems. Because of thesemedical problems, petitioner's physicians had recommended that hehave a full-time caretaker. A full-time caretaker was necessarybecause petitioner's physicians had advised him that if he hadanother stroke it could be fatal unless he received immediateattention. Petitioner had discussed this need for full-time carewith respondent. It was petitioner's expectation that if hemarried respondent she would be with him 24 hours a day. Petitioner believed that respondent understood this expectation.

Petitioner further testified that when respondent left she didnot make any arrangements to have someone else take care of him. Immediately after respondent left, one or the other of petitioner'ssons came to petitioner's home from time to time to check onpetitioner. However, petitioner was without full-time care. Petitioner subsequently hired another full-time caretaker.

Petitioner further testified that for years prior to hismarriage to respondent he had been on various medications. Afterrespondent left, petitioner began taking additional medicationsthat he had not previously taken. One of these medications wasZoloft. Petitioner testified that he was taking Zoloft for"depression and a few other things, loss of memory, unconsciousfears of things and things like that where I was not cogitatingvery well." Before respondent left, petitioner had not sufferedfrom such mental difficulties. Petitioner presented a documentthat was described as a document that a pharmacist gave petitionerwhen he obtained the Zoloft. The document was admitted intoevidence. Petitioner also began taking another medication afterrespondent left. This medication, which petitioner could notrecall the name of, was for the relief of tensions. Petitionerdescribed his physical condition since respondent left by stating,"[w]ell, I'm an old man and my health continues to erode and Ithink probably I'm less capable of living well than I was at thattime."

Petitioner further testified that he never received anexplanation from respondent as to why she left his home on theWednesday following their wedding. After respondent left,petitioner first talked to respondent in a telephone conversationwith her about three or four weeks later. Petitioner andrespondent subsequently had several additional telephoneconversations. During one of these conversations, petitioner askedrespondent if she was coming back. Respondent stated that shewanted to come back but did not know when that would be. Duringone of these phone calls, respondent asked petitioner about thepossibility of repairing the marriage. Petitioner testified thathe ducked the question and respondent then hung up. In subsequentcalls and letters, respondent stated that she wanted to return topetitioner's home. However, respondent never returned. Petitionertestified that it was his desire to have his marriage dissolved.

On cross-examination, petitioner acknowledged that during theentire time that he knew respondent, both before and after themarriage, respondent never acted toward him in anything other thana loving, caring manner. After respondent left, petitioner nevertold respondent that he wanted her to come back with him. Petitioner explained that after respondent left he began takingZoloft for the troubles that he was having with his brain, which"wasn't functioning very well." Petitioner considered respondent'sleaving to be a factor in his brain not functioning very wellbecause he was upset by her leaving and her refusal to talk to himfor several weeks. Petitioner testified that he married respondentbecause he thought it would be a good marriage and because he"figured if she was married she would stay with [him], whereasbefore she would spend a lot of time in Barrington." Petitioner'sprincipal concern after respondent left was that respondent was nolonger in his house to take care of him. Petitioner estimated hisnet worth to be about $12 million.

Petitioner acknowledged that he signed an answer to a billof particulars that respondent had filed. At respondent's request,the trial court took judicial notice of one of petitioner's answersto the bill of particulars. (We conclude that the trial courtviewed the answer as a judicial admission.) That answer stated,"petitioner takes several prescription medications for variousphysical ailments; [h]owever, none are directly related to theemotional tension suffered as a result of the petitioner's failedmarriage."

On examination by petitioner's attorney, respondent testifiedthat her date of birth was February 3, 1939. After respondent andpetitioner were married, respondent initially stayed withpetitioner in his house. However, respondent was currentlyresiding in her own house in Barrington. According to respondent,she left petitioner's house on the Thursday following the wedding. Respondent testified that she tried to come back the followingSunday. On that Sunday, respondent went to petitioner's house. However, when respondent arrived at petitioner's house she did notgo in because, based on the cars parked in the driveway, respondentbelieved that all of petitioner's children were in the house. Respondent walked up to the front door but decided not to go inbecause "it would just be nothing but yelling and screaming. Ididn't want any part of it." Respondent has not gone back topetitioner's house since that Sunday. Respondent acknowledged thatshe dropped her keys to petitioner's house and her garage dooropener in the mail box of one of petitioner's neighbors.

After leaving petitioner, respondent went to stay at her housein Barrington. Respondent subsequently used the credit card thatshe had received from petitioner to purchase a furnace and airconditioning for her house in Barrington. Respondent used thecredit card because the furnace went out and respondent did nothave any other money. Respondent testified that her purchase ofthe furnace and the air conditioning was a package deal.

Respondent denied any knowledge of petitioner's attempts tocall her after she left him. Respondent acknowledged that she hadcaller ID in her home but testified that it did not always work. After respondent's furnace went out, respondent lived with herdaughter for a while. Respondent testified that she tried to callpetitioner about once a week after she left him but got no answer.

On examination by her own attorney, respondent explained whyshe left the keys and the garage door opener in the mailbox of oneof petitioner's neighbors as follows:

"Because his kids were cruel and mean to me starting thevery next morning after we got married, calling, makingaccusations, demands. They wanted a lie detector test.

I mean they just made life so miserable and unbearablethat I just couldn't handle it, and that's not -- I thoughtCurt would at least stand up for me, but he took their sidesin everything, and they were calling me a thief over a set,dumb set of dishes that couldn't even have been worth ahundred dollars.

And then the pressure got so bad on me that I just left,and I thought it would settle down if I left and he could havea talk with them and get everything under some kind ofcontrol.

He was running to see his attorney, he was running -- Iwasn't allowed to answer the telephone. He wanted me just tosit inside the house, not go anyplace.

So I felt like I was just forced out of there. And I putthe keys in the mailbox. I was going to come back and all hiskids were there and I thought, oh no, it's just more problemsthan its worth."

On additional direct examination by her attorney, respondenttestified that when she left petitioner she did not plan on itbeing a permanent move. Respondent still wanted to come back topetitioner and hoped that it could be worked out. Respondentintroduced a letter into evidence that she asked her attorney towrite to petitioner's attorney about a week after she leftpetitioner. In the letter, respondent requested a reconciliationmeeting.

In rebuttal testimony, petitioner testified that his childrenwere not against his marriage to respondent. Petitioner had talkedto all of his children and they had accepted the marriage. Petitioner denied any knowledge of his children being angry withrespondent the morning after the wedding or being angry with orharassing respondent at any other time after the wedding.

On cross-examination, petitioner acknowledged that he was notalways present in every room of his house with his children whenthey were in the house. On redirect examination, petitionertestified that respondent never indicated to him that his childrenwere harassing her. Respondent told petitioner only that she didnot like his children.

The trial court found that petitioner had proved by good andsufficient evidence the allegation in the petition that respondentwas guilty of extreme and repeated mental cruelty. In making itsfinding, the trial court commented:

"The essence of this case is, in fact, on grounds. Thepetitioner has alleged that the respondent has been guilty ofextreme and repeated mental cruelty without any cause orprovocation on his part.

The essence of mental cruelty is the effect upon thepetitioner and its effect on the mental and physical well-being of the party who is allegedly exposed to mental cruelty.

In this case given Mr. Kirkpatrick's physical conditionand his frailties and Mrs. Kirkpatrick's knowledge of thoseinfirmities, knowledge of his need for constant and continuingcare, it is the Court's finding that leaving with no word asto when she will return, how he is to care for himself,[without] making any alternative arrangements for his care andmaking no arrangements for his needs constitutes mentalcruelty. The fact that it continued constitutes repeatedmental cruelty.

The Court is certainly able to infer that the effect onanyone in the condition of Mr. Kirkpatrick would bedebilitating and would have a deleterious effect on him."

The trial court subsequently entered a judgment dissolving theparties' marriage. Respondent filed a timely notice of appeal.

On appeal, respondent contends that she is entitled to thereversal of the trial court's finding that she was guilty ofextreme and repeated mental cruelty and to the vacation of thejudgment of dissolution. Respondent argues that the trial courterred in making the finding because (1) her conduct in merelyleaving petitioner was not mental cruelty but at most was desertionfor less than one year which, under the specific provisions of theAct, could not constitute a proper ground for the dissolution; and(2) even if merely leaving one's spouse could constitute extremeand repeated mental cruelty, the trial court's finding that herconduct in merely leaving petitioner constituted extreme andrepeated mental cruelty was against the manifest weight of theevidence.

Respondent's first argument based on the provisions of the Actconsists of several subarguments. Respondent initially argues thatthe real basis of the trial court's finding was desertion ratherthan extreme and repeated mental cruelty. In support of thisposition, respondent correctly notes that Illinois courts havedefined extreme and repeated mental cruelty as:

"[a]n unprovoked 'course of abusive and humiliatingtreatment, calculated or obviously of the nature to torture,discommode, or render miserable the life of the oppositespouse, which conduct actually affects the physical or mentalhealth of the spouse.' " Graham v. Graham, 44 Ill. App. 3d519, 527-28 (1976), quoting Gregory v. Gregory, 24 Ill. App.3d 436, 440-41 (1974).

Respondent next asserts that petitioner failed to present anyevidence that she engaged in such conduct toward petitioner. Insupport of this assertion, respondent maintains that the recordshows that she never threatened to harm, never verbally abused, andnever even argued with petitioner. Respondent also points topetitioner's own testimony that she always acted in a caring,loving way toward him. Based on this record, respondent arguesthat it is apparent that her leaving petitioner's home--i.e., her"desertion" rather than any mental cruelty by her towardpetitioner--must have been the sole basis of the trial court'sruling.

Respondent next points to section 401(a)(1) of the Act (750ILCS 5/401(a)(1) (West 2000)) and argues that certain language insection 401(a)(1) shows that the trial court's ruling waserroneous. The language in section 401(a)(1) that respondentrelies on (the subject language) provides:

"(a) The court shall enter a judgment of dissolution ofmarriage if *** one of the following grounds for dissolutionhas been proved:

(1) That, without cause or provocation by thepetitioner: the respondent *** has wilfully deserted orabsented himself or herself from the petitioner for thespace of one year, *** or has been guilty of extreme andrepeated physical or mental cruelty ***." 750 ILCS5/401(a)(1) (West 2000).

Based on the subject language, respondent argues that thetrial court's finding of mental cruelty violates one of thefundamental rules of statutory construction. According torespondent, the rule requires that where a general statutoryprovision and a specific statutory provision both relate to thesame subject, the specific provision controls and should be applied(specificity rule). In respondent's view, in a case such as thiscase, a correct application of the specificity rule to the subjectlanguage would result in the language that explicitly andspecifically addresses desertion controlling over the more generalprovisions that address mental cruelty.

Respondent further argues that when the statute is construedin this way it is clear that the language addressing desertionshould control whether her leaving petitioner, which shecharacterizes as a desertion, constituted a sufficient ground forthe dissolution. Respondent concludes that the trial court erredbecause her desertion of petitioner was for less than one year andsection 401(a)(1) provides that desertion is a sufficient groundfor dissolution only if it was "for the space of one year" (750ILCS 5/401(a)(1) (West 2000)).

Respondent's argument requires us to construe section401(a)(1) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1) (West 2000)). Familiarprinciples guide us when construing a statute.

The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain andgive effect to the true intent of the legislature. In re Marriageof Kates, 198 Ill. 2d 156, 163 (2001). The best evidence oflegislative intent is the language in the statute which should begiven its plain and ordinary meaning. M.A.K. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 198 Ill. 2d 249, 257 (2001). It ispresumed that the legislature did not intend absurdity,inconvenience, or injustice in enacting the statute. Burger v.Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 40 (2001).

Our supreme court has stated the specificity rule as follows:where there are two statutory provisions, one of which is generaland designed to apply to cases generally, and the other isparticular and relates to only one subject, the particularprovision prevails. Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149Ill. 2d 190, 195 (1992). Generally, this specificity rule isapplied when the two provisions are in conflict. See Brown v.Mason, 132 Ill. App. 3d 439, 441 (1985). Statutory construction isa question of law and our review therefore is de novo. Kates, 198Ill. 2d at 163.

In this case, we agree with parts of respondent's argument. However, we disagree with respondent's overall conclusion. Weagree with respondent that the language of section 401(a)(1) thatspecifically addresses desertion plainly applies when desertion byitself, with nothing more, is the alleged statutory ground for adissolution. However, we disagree with respondent's argument thatthe specificity rule therefore applies in this case and requiresher conduct to be evaluated as a desertion under the Act. Respondent does not explain how the language she relies onprecludes the use of conduct such as a spouse's leaving a marriageor a separation as a factor in one of the other grounds fordissolution. We can discern nothing in the language that precludesthe use of a leaving or a separation as a factor when one of theother statutory grounds for dissolution is alleged.

Here, petitioner did not base his petition for the dissolutionof the marriage on respondent's alleged desertion. Rather,petitioner based the petition on respondent's alleged mentalcruelty. It is true that respondent's leaving petitioner is asignificant factor in the alleged mental cruelty. However, thealleged mental cruelty is not based on the leaving, per se. Instead, the alleged mental cruelty is based on the effects of theleaving on petitioner. As we read the Act, the specificity ruledoes not preclude such an allegation.

Respondent's reliance on Voss v. Voss, 55 Ill. App. 3d 286(1977), Graham v. Graham, 44 Ill. App. 3d 519 (1976), and Matthewsv. Matthews, 36 Ill. App. 3d 508 (1976), as additional support forher statutory construction argument does not change our conclusion. In each of these cases, the trial court granted a request fordissolution on the ground of mental cruelty and the appellate courtreversed the judgment of dissolution. Respondent cites these casesas examples of the appellate court holding that desertion for lessthan one year does not constitute mental cruelty. Respondent alsourges us to regard these cases as authority for the propositionthat a desertion of less than one year cannot be considered as afactor in a determination of mental cruelty.

We are not persuaded that these cases stand for such aproposition. Voss, Graham, and Matthews each involved an allegeddesertion or separation in the context of a claim of mentalcruelty. It is true that in each of these cases the appellatecourt reversed a finding of mental cruelty. However, none of thereversals was because the appellate court held that the desertionor separation could not be a factor in determining whether mentalcruelty was proved. Rather, in each of these cases the appellatecourt determined that the effect of the desertion or separation inthat particular case had not been proved. See Voss, 55 Ill. App.3d at 289 (record showed complainant encouraged spouse's vacationuntil dispute over payment for it); Graham, 44 Ill. App. 3d at 527(husband did not prove that wife refused to accompany him when hemoved because of his job); Matthews, 36 Ill. App. 3d at 510-11(wife stayed away for health reasons on doctor's advice).

For all these reasons, we conclude that respondent's statutoryconstruction argument does not require the reversal of the trialcourt's finding.

Respondent next argues that the trial court's finding wasagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. In support of thisargument, respondent asserts that there was no evidence that herleaving petitioner (1) was cruel to petitioner or (2) had anyeffect on petitioner's physical or mental health.

Along with several other grounds for dissolution, the Actprovides for dissolution upon proof that, "without cause orprovocation by the petitioner," the respondent "has been guilty ofextreme and repeated *** mental cruelty." 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1)(West 2000). We have set forth above the Illinois courts'definition of mental cruelty.

The determination of the issue of grounds for the dissolutionof a marriage is a matter for the trial court, and the trialcourt's finding will not be disturbed unless it is against themanifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Jerome, 255Ill. App. 3d 374, 390 (1994). Because a determination of whetherthe evidence constitutes sufficient proof of mental cruelty dependson the circumstances of each case, and because the assessment ofthe evidence is best done by the trial court, great deference isgiven to a trial court's finding that the evidence was sufficientto establish the ground of mental cruelty. Hollo v. Hollo, 131Ill. App. 3d 119, 122 (1985).

Whether a respondent's alleged misconduct constituted mentalcruelty is determined primarily by the effect of the allegedmisconduct on the complaining party. In re Marriage of Semmler, 90Ill. App. 3d 649, 653 (1980). Therefore, a trial court'sdetermination is necessarily highly individualized and depends onthe total factual background of each case. Semmler, 90 Ill. App.3d at 653.

In this case, the trial court's comments show that itappropriately focused on the effect of respondent's allegedmisconduct on petitioner's mental and physical well-being. Therecord shows that respondent was well aware of petitioner'sfrailties and petitioner's need for constant care. Nonetheless,respondent left petitioner without indicating whether or when shewould return and without making alternative arrangements forpetitioner's care. The trial court inferred from the evidence thatrespondent's conduct was debilitating to petitioner and had adeleterious effect on him. The trial court therefore concludedthat this conduct constituted mental cruelty and that itscontinuation constituted repeated mental cruelty.

In view of the entire factual background of this case, wecannot say that the trial court's determination that respondent'sconduct constituted extreme and repeated mental cruelty was againstthe manifest weight of the evidence.

The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and BYRNE, JJ., concur.