No. 2--03--0409

JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court:

Pro se petitioner, Dawn L. Loomis, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Du PageCounty denying in part her motion to compel payment of child support from monies and "perks"respondent, Brian R. Loomis, received upon separation from his employer. We hold that respondent'sduty to pay support had already terminated when he received the severance package from hisemployer and affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County on that basis.

FACTS

The parties were divorced on November 16, 1994. The record shows that the parties had twochildren, Heather, born on September 21, 1982, and Brian Travis (Brian), born on May 8, 1984. Inits judgment order entered after trial, the trial court provided for child support, as follows:

"Defendant shall pay to [p]laintiff as and for child support the sum of ONETHOUSAND ONE HUNDRED ($1,100.00) DOLLARS per month representing 25%of what this court finds to be [d]efendant's net monthly income. Additionally,[d]efendant shall pay to [p]laintiff 25% of the net of any bonuses received fromMcDonald's Corporation."

The judgment order did not specify a date or event upon which child support would terminate.Upon Heather's emancipation, the child support figure was modified to 20% of respondent's netincome and 20% of the net of any bonuses. A trial court order entered on March 19, 1998, defined"bonus" as including "perks" in an amount in excess of $500. On May 8, 2002, Brian turned 18 yearsof age, and on June 3, 2002, he graduated from high school.

Respondent was employed as an executive with McDonald's Corporation for approximately29 years when he was terminated on May 31, 2002, due to a workforce reduction. His severancepackage of that date included (1) the opportunity to purchase a company-owned vehicle at a discount;(2) severance pay based on years of service; (3) vested profit sharing and associated savings and stockplans; (4) an "exit bonus"; (5) a "retention bonus"; (6) stock options; (7) earned sabbatical pay; (8)a cash contribution to medical coverage for a 12-month period; and (9) pay for accrued and unusedvacation. The entire value of the package was approximately $700,000. On January 27, 2003,petitioner filed a motion to compel respondent to pay her 20% of the value of each of the abovecomponents of the severance package as child support. She reasoned that Brian did not becomeemancipated until his June 3, 2002, graduation from high school, which occurred three days afterrespondent's receipt of the severance package from McDonald's Corporation, and that each of thecomponents of the severance package constituted a "bonus" because the package was speciallycrafted for respondent. After a hearing, the trial court allowed the motion as to the company-ownedvehicle, the "exit bonus," and the "retention bonus," and denied the remainder of the motion on thebasis that the compensation did not amount to "perks" or bonuses. Petitioner filed this timely appealfrom those portions of the trial court's order which denied the relief she requested.

DISCUSSION

We first note that respondent has not filed an appellee's brief. However, we will decide themerits of this appeal under First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d128, 133 (1976), because the record regarding the issue on appeal is simple and the claimed errorsare such that the court can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee's brief.

Petitioner initially contends that the trial court committed two procedural errors at the hearingon the motion to compel payment of child support. The first involved petitioner's request to strikerespondent's written answer to the motion because it was filed eight days late. The trial court denied petitioner's request on the ground that petitioner had sufficient notice of the answer, even though itwas late, so as not to be surprised. The second claimed error involved a consulting agreement,between respondent and an affiliate of McDonald's Corporation, that petitioner offered into evidenceand that the trial court refused to admit. Because of our disposition of this appeal, it is not necessaryfor us to reach these issues.

We review this matter under an abuse of discretion standard. See In re Marriage of Waller,339 Ill. App. 3d 743, 747 (2003). We may affirm the trial court's ruling for any reason supported bythe record regardless of the basis relied upon by the trial court. Scassifero v. Glaser, 333 Ill. App.3d 846, 860 (2002).

This case turns on the date upon which Brian was emancipated. Unless otherwise agreed bythe parties in writing or expressly provided in the judgment, provisions for child support under theIllinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2002))are terminated by emancipation. 750 ILCS 5/510(d) (West 2002). Attaining the age of majority, 18years, is an emancipating event. Waller, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 748. Although petitioner alleged in hermotion that the judgment of dissolution uses graduation from high school as the emancipating event,and respondent admitted the allegation, the judgment contains no such provision. The judgment issilent with reference to when child support terminates. Further, we have not been advised that thereis any agreement in writing between the parties that extends the obligation of support beyond Brian'seighteenth birthday. Consequently, we hold that Brian was emancipated on May 8, 2002, beforerespondent's receipt of the severance benefits. After Brian's emancipation, the trial court had to relyupon section 513(a)(2) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/513(a)(2) (West 2002)) in deciding whether to awardsupport for a nonminor child. Waller, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 748. That section provides:

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