JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Vincent Allen Sassano, appeals from the circuitcourt's orders (1) denying his petition to modify his unallocatedchild support and maintenance obligation to petitioner, IlyseSassano, and (2) finding that he failed to pay petitioner pursuantto the parties' marital settlement agreement. We affirm.

FACTS

The parties' marriage was dissolved on June 7, 2000, and thetrial court entered a judgment incorporating a settlement agreementsetting respondent's obligation to pay petitioner $4,632 per month. The monthly obligation included $3,176 for unallocated childsupport and maintenance, $800 for a debit account for the parties'two minor children, and $656 for petitioner's predicted federal andstate tax liability. The agreement did not specify respondent'sincome at the time of the dissolution.

The parties agreed to joint custody, and petitioner wasdesignated as the "residential parent." They also agreed to meetannually to discuss the children's changing needs. The agreementfurther provides in relevant part:

"Although [the parties] have conducted some informaldiscovery, [they] have decided to enter into this MaritalSettlement Agreement without such formal discovery and withoutformal investigation of the assets, liabilities, of theirjoint or mutual assets, of his or her own assets, and of theassets of the other party to enter into this MaritalSettlement Agreement. They each acknowledge that they areentering into this Marital Settlement Agreement despite theknown and unknown assets, income, or liabilities of the other. Each enters this Agreement willingly and waives any right,title, claim, or interest that she or he may have based onlack of disclosure by the other or insufficient knowledge ofthe assets or income of the other.

* * *

The amount that [respondent] pays [petitioner] asunallocated maintenance and support from June 10, 2000, toSeptember 1, 2004, shall not terminate upon either[petitioner's] remarriage or cohabitation on a continuingconjugal basis, although it shall terminate upon either herdeath or [respondent's] death. Neither shall the support bemodifiable for any reason during that period, and, if[petitioner] seeks, before 9/1/04, to modify support or childsupport, then this unallocated maintenance and support shallautomatically terminate as of the date of her filing anypetition for modification or the like, and child support shallbe set at that time at the then statutory amount for thenumber of children then residing primarily with [petitioner]. If not otherwise terminated according to this paragraph,maintenance terminates completely with the final payment ofunallocated maintenance and support on 9/1/04."

At the prove-up hearing, respondent testified that he knew, ifthe matter went to trial, a judge would likely order him to paypetitioner less than he was agreeing to pay under the settlement. Respondent asserted that he was currently self-employed and had"made a full disclosure of all the assets [he] acquired during themarriage," but he did not specify his current salary. The trialcourt then entered the judgment adopting the settlement agreement.

On November 8, 2000, five months after the dissolution,respondent filed a petition to modify support pursuant to section510(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act(Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/510(a) (West 2000)). Respondent allegedthat one of his clients had ended his employment, which created asubstantial change in circumstances. Petitioner then filed twopetitions for rules to show cause, alleging that respondent hadfailed to fund the debit account and pay support.

In April 2001, the court conducted a hearing on the petitions. Respondent testified that, from January to May 2000, he worked onlyas a computer consultant for a company called Christianity Today. However, on May 15, 2000, respondent also began serving as thechief technology officer of OneBlueWorld.com, a computer softwarecompany. Respondent's second job increased his projected annualgross income from approximately $80,000 to $202,000. On June 7,2000, the marriage was dissolved pursuant to the marital settlementagreement in which respondent did not disclose the additionalincome.

Respondent further testified that he remarried on September20, 2000, and that his new wife earned nearly $100,000 per year. On October 15, 2000, OneBlueWorld.com terminated respondent'semployment after retaining another company to perform respondent'sduties. Soon thereafter, respondent began working exclusively forChristianity Today as the director of information technology, andhis salary at the time of the hearing was $70,000. Around the timeof his employment change, respondent learned that he owed anadditional $50,000 in past-due taxes.

On cross-examination, respondent admitted that he andpetitioner personally negotiated some of the terms of the maritalsettlement agreement in May 2000, but he denied that he statedduring the negotiations that he earned only $80,000 annually. However, he admitted that he did not disclose his full employmentto petitioner, any of her representatives, his attorney, or thecourt before the marriage was dissolved. Respondent's counseltestified that he was unaware of respondent's additional incomebefore the dissolution.

Todd McMeen, the chief executive officer of OneBlueWorld.com,testified that he and respondent negotiated for two to three monthsbefore respondent began his employment on May 15, 2000. McMeenhired respondent on a month-to-month basis with the expectationthat it would be a "long-term" relationship because "there wasplenty of work to go around." However, respondent was terminatedon October 15, 2000, because his services were no longer needed.

Over respondent's objection, the trial court admitted aFebruary 2, 2000, letter from respondent's counsel to petitioner'scounsel, stating that respondent expected to earn only $80,000 inthe year 2000. The court also admitted a May 2, 2000, letter from respondent's counsel to petitioner's counsel, indicating thatrespondent and petitioner had been personally negotiating asettlement during the final two weeks of April 2000. Petitionerthen testified that, during settlement negotiations in May 2000,respondent stated that his annual salary was $80,000.

On April 9, 2001, the trial court denied the petition tomodify support and found respondent to be in contempt forunderfunding the debit account by $5,735 and owing $13,349 in past-due support through April 2001. The court found that respondent'semployment with OneBlueWorld.com was "a fact known only to him" atthe time of the dissolution and that respondent could not use histermination from that job to prove a substantial change incircumstances because it was not in the record or disclosed duringdiscovery. The trial judge also stated, "I fault the lawyers andthe court for not fixing what the income was. *** And I don'tbelieve that [respondent] can sit there and remain silentessentially with a wad of cash in his sock that he doesn't tellanybody about." The court denied the petition because respondent'scurrent salary of $70,000 was not substantially less than the$80,000 portion of his salary that he disclosed during thesettlement negotiations.

Respondent filed a motion to reconsider, and the motion wasdenied on May 14, 2001. On May 31, 2001, petitioner filed apetition for fees and costs pursuant to section 508 of the Act (750ILCS 5/508 (West 2000)). The trial court continued the case so theparties could negotiate a settlement, and, at a subsequent hearing,petitioner insisted that respondent should not be allowed to purgethe contempt finding.

On July 25, 2001, the court vacated the contempt finding butnoted that respondent still owed the arrearage. The court alsofound no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the judgmentunder Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). Respondent filed his notice of appeal on August 21, 2001.

ANALYSIS

Petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal, respondent objected,and we ordered the motion and objections to be taken with the case.Petitioner contends that respondent's notice of appeal is either(1) late because it was filed more than 30 days after the orderdenying the motion to reconsider or (2) premature becausepetitioner's petition for fees and costs was still pending at thetime the notice of appeal was filed. Respondent argues that hisright to appeal accrued on July 25, 2001, when the trial courtentered its written finding pursuant to Rule 304(a). We note thatpetitioner's statement of facts on this issue is inadequate andmisleading because it fails to mention the July 25, 2001, order andthe Rule 304(a) finding therein. See Official Reports AdvanceSheet No. 21 (October 17, 2001), R. 341(e)(6), eff. October 1,2001.

Rule 304(a) provides that "[i]f multiple *** claims for reliefare involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a finaljudgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the *** claimsonly if the trial court has made an express written finding thatthere is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appealor both. *** In the absence of such a finding, any judgment thatadjudicates fewer than all the claims *** is not enforceable orappealable ***." 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). Appellate jurisdictionalissues in dissolution of marriage proceedings are inherentlyproblematic because the proceedings involve many separate issuesthat are not always decided at the same time in the trial court.

Ordinarily, " 'issues raised in a dissolution-of-marriage caseare not separate claims and therefore not appealable under Rule304(a).' " In re Marriage of Semonchik, 315 Ill. App. 3d 395, 401(2000), quoting In re Marriage of Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d 114, 120(1983). Here, however, the judgment of dissolution was entered onJune 7, 2000, and that order was final and appealable because itdid not reserve any issues for later determination. Therefore,when respondent filed his motion to modify support on November 8,2000, he initiated a new proceeding. See Semonchik, 315 Ill. App.3d at 401.

In In re Marriage of Piccione, 158 Ill. App. 3d 955 (1987),the parties' marriage was dissolved and no matters were reservedfor later determination. Three years later, the petitioner fileda petition to increase support and for attorney fees, and the trialcourt increased the respondent's support obligation. However, thepetitioner was dissatisfied with the result, and she appealed fromthe orders setting support before the issue of attorney fees wasresolved. Petitioner contended that the child support orders werefinal and appealable because the attorney fees issue was anancillary question. We stated that, because attorney fees areintegrally related to decisions regarding the financial status ofthe parties, the trial court should allocate the fees before areviewing court assesses the trial court's decision regarding theunderlying orders setting child support. Piccione, 158 Ill. App.3d at 963. We then concluded that we lacked jurisdiction to reviewthe child support orders because the record contained no finding offinality pursuant to Rule 304(a). Piccione, 158 Ill. App. 3d at963-64.

The facts of this case and Piccione are very similar. However, this case is distinguishable because the trial courtentered the express written finding as required by Rule 304(a) andrespondent filed his notice of appeal within 30 days of thefinding. Therefore, we conclude that we have jurisdiction toreview the denial of respondent's motion to modify support, and wedeny petitioner's motion to dismiss the appeal.

Turning to the merits of the appeal, we must determine (1)whether the settlement agreement's nonmodification clause is valid,(2) whether petitioner was required to allege fraud and estoppel ina responsive pleading, (3) whether the trial court erroneouslyadmitted evidence of the parties' settlement negotiations, and (4)whether the court abused its discretion in denying respondent'spetition to modify support.

The judgment of dissolution includes a nonmodificationprovision in which the parties agreed that respondent's unallocatedmaintenance and child support obligation could not be modified fromJune 10, 2000, to September 1, 2004. In fact, the settlementagreement provides that petitioner's right to maintenance wouldterminate upon her filing of a petition to modify support. However, where a marital settlement agreement contains anunallocated combination of child support and taxable maintenance,that payment is subject to the statutory right of modificationcontained in the Marriage Act even if the agreement contains anonmodification clause. Semonchik, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 403. Because the parties in this case chose to "lump maintenance in withchild support, creating an 'unallocated' support payment, that'unallocated' support payment is, by statute, modifiable." Semonchik, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 403.

We next address respondent's argument that the trial courtimproperly raised the issues of fraud and estoppel sua sponte. Therecord reveals that petitioner's counsel raised these issues in hisopening statement during the hearing on the petition to modifysupport. The trial court did not raise the issues sua sponte asrespondent suggests.

Respondent nevertheless contends that section 2--613(d) of theCode of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--613(d) (West 2000))required petitioner to allege fraud and estoppel in a pleadingbefore arguing the issues at the hearing. We disagree. Section 2--613(d) of the Code provides that the facts constituting anyaffirmative defense, such as fraud or estoppel, "and any ground ordefense, whether affirmative or not, which if not expressly statedin the pleading, would be likely to take the opposite party bysurprise, must be plainly set forth in the answer or reply." 735ILCS 5/2--613(d) (West 2000).

The Civil Practice Law, Article II of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2--101 et seq. (West 2000)), including section 2--613(d), governsproceedings under the Marriage Act unless the Marriage Act providesotherwise. 750 ILCS 5/105(a) (West 2000). However, we concludethat section 2--613(d) did not require petitioner to set forth herdefense in a responsive pleading because respondent's petitionalready described his prior nondisclosure of income. Respondentwas not prejudiced when petitioner's counsel first raised theissues of fraud and estoppel at the hearing because petitioner'sdefense to the petition to modify did not "take the opposite partyby surprise." 735 ILCS 5/2--613(d) (West 2000); Avery v. Sabbia,301 Ill. App. 3d 839, 848 (1998).

Respondent next contends that the parol evidence ruleprecluded the trial court from admitting evidence of the parties'settlement negotiations, including the February 2, 2000, letter inwhich respondent's counsel stated that respondent expected to earnonly $80,000 in the year 2000. However, it is well settled thatparol evidence is admissible in a marriage case to establish theexistence of fraud and the true intent and understanding of theparties. In re Marriage of Johnson, 237 Ill. App. 3d 381, 391(1992). Therefore, the parol evidence rule did not preclude thetrial court from admitting evidence of respondent's representationsbefore the settlement.

Although he states his final argument several ways, respondentessentially contends that the trial court's denial of his motion toreduce support was impractical, unfair, and an abuse of discretion. We disagree. The modification of a support award will be made onlyon proof of a substantial change in circumstances pursuant tosection 510(a) of the Marriage Act. 750 ILCS 5/510(a) (West 2000). Contrary to respondent's assertion, the party seeking themodification bears the burden of proving this change. In reMarriage of Connors, 303 Ill. App. 3d 219, 224 (1999).

The court must determine the threshold issue of whether asubstantial change in circumstances has occurred before determiningthe amount of the increase or decrease in child support. In reMarriage of Hughes, 322 Ill. App. 3d 815, 818 (2001). A trialcourt's determination that there has been a substantial change incircumstances to warrant the modification lies within itsdiscretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Villanueva v. O'Gara, 282 Ill. App. 3d 147, 149 (1996). A trialcourt abuses its discretion when no reasonable person would agreewith the decision. In re Marriage of Mitteer, 241 Ill. App. 3d217, 224 (1993).

Orders entered in the context of a dissolution of marriagecase may be vacated or modified if procured through fraud, and aconsent decree may be modified where its execution has beenobtained through misrepresentation. To prove fraudulentmisrepresentation, a party must show (1) a false statement of amaterial fact; (2) the party making the statement knew or believedit to be untrue; (3) the recipient of the statement had a right torely on it and did so; (4) the statement was made for the purposeof inducing the recipient to act; and (5) injury from therecipient's reliance on the statement. In re Marriage of Ealy, 269Ill. App. 3d 971, 973 (1995). The related defense of equitableestoppel is available in a marriage dissolution case where aperson's statement or conduct induces another to reasonably rely onthe statement or conduct to his or her detriment. In re Marriageof Duerr, 250 Ill. App. 3d 232, 235 (1993).

In In re Marriage of Gurin, 212 Ill. App. 3d 806 (1991), theparties negotiated a marital settlement agreement. During thenegotiations and at a hearing, the respondent asserted that he wasthen unemployed but would nevertheless pay $75 per week in childsupport. The petitioner then agreed to convey the maritalresidence to respondent. However, the respondent obtainedemployment before the agreement was signed and incorporated intothe judgment of dissolution. The petitioner subsequently filed amotion to modify child support and the property distribution,alleging that the respondent's fraudulent concealment of hisprospects for impending employment induced her to enter into theparties' marital settlement agreement. Gurin, 212 Ill. App. 3d at809. The trial court granted the motion and set aside thejudgment.

The appellate court affirmed the decision that therespondent's nondisclosure was fraudulent. The court held that"based upon the circumstances of this case, [the respondent] had anaffirmative duty to disclose all information regarding his increasein income and change of employment status to [the petitioner] priorto signing and the court's entry of the judgment. As previouslydiscussed, failure to disclose material information under certaincircumstances in which a duty to speak exists, as here, amounts tofraud." Gurin, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 815.

Here, respondent also had an affirmative duty to disclose hischange in employment status before the court entered thedissolution judgment. See Gurin, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 815. Respondent stated that he earned only $80,000 from one job, and hisconscious nondisclosure of his additional income amounted to afalse statement of material fact upon which petitioner reasonablyrelied to her detriment. The additional information would havecertainly affected the settlement negotiations. We agree with thetrial court that respondent may not secretly reap adisproportionate share of the economic benefit of his second joband later demand petitioner to shoulder a greater share of the costwhen he loses that employment. The court did not abuse itsdiscretion in denying respondent's motion to modify support.

This case is distinguishable from In re Marriage of Broday,256 Ill. App. 3d 699 (1993). In that case, the husband initiateddivorce proceedings and retained an attorney who was a friend ofboth parties and had represented them in the past. The husband andhis attorney each advised the wife to retain counsel, but shedeclined. The parties met with the husband's attorney andnegotiated a separation agreement. At the prove-up hearing, thewife ignored the court's repeated admonishments to hire an attorneyand insisted that she understood the agreement. The trial courtthen incorporated the signed agreement into the dissolutionjudgment. Broday, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 701-02.

The wife subsequently discovered that the agreement did notfully disclose all of the husband's assets even though it purportedto do so. Broday, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 702. The husband's attorneydid not learn of the nondisclosure until after the agreement wassigned. Broday, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 703. The wife petitioned tomodify or vacate the judgment and alleged, among other things, thatthe separation agreement was procured by fraud. Even though thetrial court concluded that the husband lacked the "genuine intent"to deceive, the court granted the petition. Broday, 256 Ill. App.3d at 703. The appellate court reversed because the element ofscienter was missing. Broday, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 704. Theappellate court further noted that "the fact that [the wife] couldhave discovered information about [her husband's] financial statusthrough her own investigation or by hiring an attorney diminishesher claim of detrimental reliance on [his] misrepresentations." Broday, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 704.

Here, however, the trial court found that respondent intendedto deceive petitioner when he concealed his additional income, andwe defer to the trial court's credibility determination on thatissue. Also, in Broday, the wife's limited knowledge of herhusband's financial status was the result of her failure to retaincounsel. The parties in this case agree that they waived formaldiscovery to expedite the litigation. However, petitioner's waiverwas induced, at least in part, by respondent's assertion that hisannual salary was only $80,000.

Respondent contends that he was unfairly punished for thenondisclosure because the trial court and the attorneys should haveasked for proof of his income at the dissolution proceeding. Inattempting to shift the blame for his concealment, respondent argues that his nondisclosure was less culpable than theaffirmative misrepresentation in Gurin. We disagree.

The record indicates that the trial court and the attorneyshad no reason to inquire about respondent's income at thedissolution proceeding because respondent expressly testified thathe had "made a full disclosure of all the assets [he] acquiredduring the marriage." However, if respondent had undertaken eventhe most basic disclosure, petitioner would have known of hisemployment by OneBlueWorld.com, and this information would haveaffected her decision to acquiesce in the settlement. Furthermore,respondent's affirmation at the prove-up hearing essentiallynegated the settlement agreement provision in which each partywaived his or her right to formal discovery of the other party'sassets. Nevertheless, the provision waiving discovery did notauthorize respondent to perpetrate a fraud on petitioner and thetrial court, as the trial court found.

At trial, respondent argued that his discovery of additionaltax liability for the year 1999 contributed to the substantialchange in circumstances warranting a reduction of his supportobligation. He abandons this argument on appeal, and, in anyevent, such an argument lacks merit because the settlementagreement expressly provides that respondent assumed responsibilityfor the parties' entire marital tax liability accruing during theyear 1999. Finally, we note that, although respondent asserts thathe paid petitioner a "substantial amount of money," he does notchallenge the trial court's calculation of his support arrearage.

For the preceding reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Lake County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and GROMETER, J., concur.