No. 2--04--0236

JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court:

In 1992 and 1995, on behalf of the petitioner, Diane M. Thompson, the intervenor, the IllinoisDepartment of Public Aid, obtained judgments against the respondent, William C. Thompson, forunpaid child support. The judgments were paid via periodic income deductions. In 2004, the trialcourt granted the intervenor's motion to assess interest and entered a judgment for statutory intereston the child support arrearage judgments. The respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court erredby assessing interest because, under section 505(d) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution ofMarriage Act (the Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/505(d) (West 2002)), the arrearage judgments didnot accrue interest. According to the respondent, because the arrearage judgments were supportorders under that section, the installment payments thereon were deemed a series of judgments, uponwhich interest did not accrue until a payment was 30 days late, and that event never occurred. Weaffirm.

The marriage of the petitioner and the respondent was dissolved in 1978, and the petitionerwas granted custody of the couple's two daughters. According to the judgment dissolving themarriage, the respondent was ordered to pay $322.50 per month as child support until 1980, whenthe monthly payment amount increased to $350. Sometime thereafter, the respondent moved toFlorida.

The respondent was subsequently found in contempt of court for failing to pay his childsupport obligations. In 1992, through interstate child support laws, the intervenor obtained a Floridajudgment against the respondent for a $36,940.20 child support arrearage. Pursuant to thatjudgment, the respondent was ordered to pay the arrearage in monthly installments of $170 viaincome deductions. In 1995, the Florida court modified the arrearage judgment to $30,990.20, andthe respondent's monthly payment and income deduction was changed to $325.

In 2003, before an Illinois court, the respondent moved to terminate the installment payments,arguing that he had paid the 1995 judgment in full. In response, the intervenor moved the court toassess interest on the arrearage judgment in the amount of $22,964.99, which included the remainingprincipal plus 9% statutory interest since 1992. In the petition, the intervenor alleged that, after theentry of the 1995 judgment in Florida, the respondent moved to Virginia. The Florida action wasclosed, and the case was transmitted to Virginia for further collections. As alleged in the intervenor'spetition, the Virginia authorities continued to collect arrears from the respondent, and they "begancharging statutory interest, as requested by the State of Illinois and required by law." Relying onsection 505 of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/505 (West 2002)) and section 2--1303 of the Codeof Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--1303 (West 2002)), the intervenor argued that the1995 judgment drew interest at 9% per annum until it was satisfied.

Disagreeing, the respondent contended that the 1995 judgment was satisfied in October 2002but, because the Virginia authorities believed that interest was still owed, money continued to bewithheld. He pointed out that, to support its argument that statutory interest was mandatory, theintervenor relied in part on an amendment to section 505(b), which became effective on January 1,2000. The respondent argued, however, that in Illinois, prior to January 1, 2000, whether a courtshould assess interest on a child support arrearage judgment was discretionary. Therefore, therespondent argued that, by not requesting interest in the 1992 and 1995 judgments setting the childsupport arrearage, the issue of interest was waived or barred by the doctrines of res judicata andmerger.

Following a hearing, the parties submitted written closing arguments. The trial court agreedwith the intervenor and awarded interest, but it reserved ruling on the interest amount. A hearing washeld on the issue of the amount of interest owed. At the hearing, Michelle Metcalf, a public serviceadministrator for the intervenor, testified that she assisted in developing the software program thatis used by the intervenor to calculate the interest owed on unpaid child support judgments. Metcalfexplained how the interest in this case was calculated. Metcalf verified that the interest calculatedwas adjusted in July 1995 when the Florida court modified the arrearage judgment. Furthermore, shetestified that the interest is not compounded. Rather, the interest reflects simple interest charges onthe balance due. Finally, Metcalf testified that she did not believe that the 1992 arrearage judgmentincluded any prejudgment interest. Following the hearing, the trial court entered judgment againstthe respondent for $21,282.43, calculating the interest at 9% per annum since August 1992. Thereafter, the respondent filed a timely notice of appeal.

On appeal, the respondent argues that the trial court erred in granting the intervenor's petitionfor statutory interest on his child support arrearage judgment. Specifically, the respondent argues thatbecause the arrearage judgment was ordered to be paid in monthly installments, and because he nevermissed an installment payment, no interest accrued on the arrearage judgment. The facts are notdisputed and the issue raised in this appeal is one of law. We review questions of law de novo. Inre Estate of Burd, 354 Ill. App. 3d 434, 436 (2004). We note that the issue in this case concerns onlypostjudgment interest on the arrearage judgment. No argument is made that the petitioner shouldhave been awarded prejudgment interest on the late child support payments. For the followingreasons, we disagree with the respondent's contention on appeal and affirm the trial court.

In Finley v. Finley, the supreme court held that whether to impose interest on child supportjudgments lies within the trial court's discretion. Finley v. Finley, 81 Ill. 2d 317, 323 (1980). Sevenyears after Finley, the General Assembly amended section 505 of the Dissolution Act and section 12--109 of the Code by enacting Public Act 85--2 (Pub. Act 85--2,