December 21, 2001

JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Nicholas K., appeals the circuit court's orderthat required him to register as a juvenile sex offender. Hecontends that the sex offender registration statute does notrequire juveniles to register as sex offenders. We reverse.

On November 19, 1998, respondent stipulated to a charge thathe committed criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12--15(a)(2) (West1998)). Respondent was 13 years old. The charge arose from anincident that occurred when respondent was 10, when he and anotherboy attempted to vaginally penetrate the other boy's seven-year-oldsister. The court released respondent to his parents' custody,placing him on reporting supervision for 24 months. The court alsoordered him to complete any recommended counseling. Because courtsupervision is not an adjudication of delinquency, respondent wouldnot have had to register as a sex offender even under the State'sexpansive reading of the statute at the time of the initialdisposition.

On March 29, 1999, the State petitioned to revoke respondent'ssupervision because he missed several scheduled court servicesmeetings. Julie Schuelke, respondent's probation officer,testified that he missed or was late for appointments on January 7,January 15, February 3, February 19, February 25, March 10, andMarch 17. On cross-examination, she admitted that respondent'sfather, N.K., Sr., had told her that respondent would only be ableto attend appointments scheduled on Mondays because Monday wasN.K., Sr.'s day off and he could not miss work on other days. Respondent had no other way to get to the appointments. Nonetheless, Schuelke's schedule was "set in stone" and "shecouldn't deviate from it." The record reflects that, despite therelative difficulty of complying with such regimented scheduling,the respondent-minor was adjudicated delinquent and placed onprobation. The State moved to compel respondent to registerpursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (the Act) (730 ILCS150/1 et seq. (West 2000)). The State alleged that the Act hadbeen amended on July 1, 1999, to require juveniles to register. Defense counsel asked the court to declare the amended actunconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion and orderedrespondent to register as a sex offender. The court stayed itsorder pending appeal and respondent filed a timely notice ofappeal.

Respondent contends that the trial court erred in requiringhim to register as a sex offender. He argues that, although thestatute now contains a definition of "juvenile sex offender," itdoes not explicitly require juvenile sex offenders to register. Applying rules of statutory construction, respondent concludes thatthe court erred by reading into the statute a requirement that heregister. The State responds that, by including a definition of"juvenile sex offender," the legislature was merely attempting toclarify that juvenile sex offenders are a subset of sex offendersgenerally and, therefore, sex offenders who are juveniles arerequired to register just like other sex offenders. We agree withrespondent.

In construing a statute, our primary function is to ascertainand give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting thestatute. Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity &Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 110 (1993). The statutory languageis usually the best indication of the drafters' intent and shouldbe given its plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meaning. Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at 111. Statutes in derogation of the commonlaw must be strictly construed, and nothing should be read intothem by implication. In re Illinois Bell Switching StationLitigation, 161 Ill. 2d 233, 240 (1994). Statutory constructionissues are questions of law that we review de novo. In re Marriageof Kates, No. 90732, slip op. at 6 (November 21, 2001).

The court required respondent to register as a sex offenderpursuant to the Act. "Sex offender" is defined, as relevant here,as any person convicted of one of a specified group of sexoffenses. 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(1) (West 2000). A sex offender mustregister with the chief of police of the municipality where he orshe resides or with the county sheriff if the offender lives in anunincorporated area. 730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2000).

Prior to 1999, the Act did not explicitly refer to "juvenilesex offenders." Effective July 1, 1999, the legislature amendedthe Act to add the following definition:

"(A-5) 'Juvenile sex offender' means any person who isadjudicated a juvenile delinquent as the result of thecommission of or attempt to commit a violation set forth initem (B), (C), or (C-5) of this Section or a violation of anysubstantially similar federal, sister state, or foreigncountry law. For purposes of this Section, 'convicted' shallhave the same meaning as 'adjudicated.' " 730 ILCS 150/2(A-5)(West 2000).

Section 3, governing who is required to register, was not amended.

Respondent contends that the way the Act is now structured,"sex offenders" and "juvenile sex offenders" are defined asseparate classes, but only "sex offenders" are required toregister. He cites the familiar rule of statutory constructionthat, where the legislature uses certain words in one context anddifferent words in another, it must intend a different meaning. See In re Marriage of Walters, 238 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1092 (1992). The State contends, however, that the legislature was merelyattempting to clarify that "juvenile sex offenders" is a subset of"sex offenders" and that the same registration requirements applyto both. We cannot agree.

By creating a separate category of "juvenile sex offenders,"the legislature must have intended those in this category to betreated differently. Section 3 of the Act plainly provides thatonly "sex offenders" are required to register. It says nothingabout "juvenile sex offenders." If the legislature wanted toprovide that juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent for havingcommitted sex crimes had to register as sex offenders on the samebasis as adults convicted of sex crimes, it could simply haveamended the definition of "sex offender" to include juveniles whowere adjudicated delinquent.

It is at least arguable, as the State contends, that the lastsentence of section 2(A-5), stating, "For purposes of this Section,'convicted' shall have the same meaning as 'adjudicated,' " wasintended to bring juveniles within the class of sex offendersgenerally. 730 ILCS 150/2(A-5) (West 2000). However, this is byno means clear. As noted earlier, if this was the legislature'sintention, it could simply have included this sentence in thedefinition of "sex offender" without creating a separate categoryof juvenile sex offenders.

Moreover, requiring a delinquent juvenile to register as a sex offender would be inconsistentwith the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1--1et seq. (West 2000)). The overriding purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to promote the minor'sbest interests. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 320 (1995). Delinquencyproceedings are protective and the purpose of the Juvenile CourtAct is to correct, not to punish. W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 320; In reJ.G., 295 Ill. App. 3d 840, 842 (1998). Adult offenders andjuvenile delinquents are not similarly situated. J.G., 295 Ill.App. 3d at 843. In a clear statement of its policy, section 1--2of the Juvenile Court Act provides in part:

"This Act shall be administered in a spirit of humane concern,not only for the rights of the parties, but also for the fearsand the limits of understanding of all who appear before thecourt." 705 ILCS 405/1--2(2) (West 2000).

One aspect of this "humane concern" is to keep confidentialthe identities of juveniles brought before the court. To that end,the Juvenile Court Act contains strict guidelines to ensure theconfidentiality of proceedings under it. The general public,except for the news media and the victim, is excluded from juvenilecourt proceedings. 705 ILCS 405/1--5(6) (West 2000); In re AMinor, 149 Ill. 2d 247, 251 (1992). The circuit court may preventany party present in court from disclosing the juvenile's name. AMinor, 149 Ill. 2d at 252. Minors' law enforcement records may notbe released to the general public except in very narrowcircumstances. 705 ILCS 405/1--7 (West 2000). Supreme Court Rule660 was recently amended to provide that, in all appeals filed fromproceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, minors shall beidentified by first name and last initial or by initials only. Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21 (October 17, 2001), R. 660,eff. October 1, 2001.

In short, the legislature and the courts have taken greatpains to preserve the confidentiality of minors involved injuvenile court proceedings. The policy of the Juvenile Court Actis to serve minors' best interests, which mandates that they not be subjected to public scorn and ridicule. See G. O'Reilly, IllinoisLifts the Veil on Juvenile Conviction Records, 83 Ill. B.J. 402,403 (1995). It makes little sense to go to such lengths toprohibit the release of information about minors involved injuvenile court proceedings, yet require a minor adjudicateddelinquent for committing a sex crime to register as a sexoffender. The Sex Offender and Child Murderer CommunityNotification Law allows information about registered sex offendersto be released essentially to anyone who asks for it. 730 ILCS152/120(c) (West 2000).

As the State points out, recent amendments to the JuvenileCourt Act do allow for wider dissemination of juvenile courtrecords. See 705 ILCS 405/1--8(C)(1), (C)(2) (West 2000)(permitting in certain circumstances the circuit court to allow thegeneral public to view the name, address, and offense of a minoradjudicated delinquent). However, the overriding policy is stillone of confidentiality. We note that respondent's records wouldnot be subject to public inspection under these sections becauserespondent was not yet 13 years old when he committed the offense. See 705 ILCS 401/1--8(C)(1)(B), (C)(2) (West 2000). In the absenceof a clearer expression of its intention, we will not assume thatthe legislature intended to authorize the release of informationabout the minor and his offense pursuant to the Act when the sameinformation may not be released under the Juvenile Court Act.

The judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed.

Reversed.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and GROMETER, J., concur.