Respondent, A.R., appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Kane Countyfinding her to be an unfit parent and terminating her parental rights to herson, O.R. On appeal, respondent contends that section 1(D)(t) of the AdoptionAct (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(t) (West 1998)), the statutory provision under whichrespondent was adjudicated unfit, is unconstitutional as it violates her rightsto due process and equal protection. We affirm.

The parties do not dispute some basic background facts. O.R. was born withcocaine in his system on December 17, 1997. O.R. is the youngest of sevenchildren born to respondent and is the fifth of respondent's children to testpositive for drugs at birth. On December 23, 1997, the State filed a petitionfor adjudication of wardship with respect to O.R. Because of various actions byO.R.'s foster parents and paternal grandparents seeking to intervene in thewardship proceedings, a dispositional order was not entered until April 23,1999. On that date, O.R. was made a ward of the court and placed in the legalcustody and guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).

On June 7, 1999, the State filed an amended petition to terminaterespondent's parental rights. The petition alleged that respondent is unfit toparent O.R. pursuant to section 1(D)(t) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(t)(West1998)), which identifies the following condition as a ground for unfitness:

"(t) A finding that at birth the child's blood, urine, or meconiumcontained any amount of a controlled substance as defined in subsection (f) ofSection 102 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or a metabolite of acontrolled substance, *** and that the biological mother of this child is thebiological mother of at least one other child who was adjudicated neglectedunder subsection (c) of Section 2--3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, afterwhich the biological mother had the opportunity to enroll in and participate ina clinically appropriate substance abuse counseling, treatment, andrehabilitation program." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(t) (West 1998).

Section 2--3(c) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2--3(c)(West1998)) generally provides that a newborn infant whose blood, urine, or meconiumcontains any amount of a controlled substance is neglected.

The petition also alleged that respondent is unfit to parent pursuant tosection 1 D(k), which lists as another ground for unfitness the "[h]abitualdrunkenness or addiction to drugs *** for at least one year immediately prior tothe commencement of the unfitness proceeding."

Section 1(D)(k) also states:

"There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is unfit under thissubsection with respect to any child to which that parent gives birth wherethere is a confirmed test result that at birth the child's blood, urine, ormeconium contained any amount of a controlled substance as defined *** and thebiological mother of this child is the biological mother of at least one otherchild who was adjudicated a neglected minor under subsection (c) of Section 2--3of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 1998).

Several DCFS caseworkers testified at the hearing. Their testimony revealedthe following. After several years of failing drug tests, failing to completeDCFS-recommended treatment programs successfully, and giving birth to childrenborn with drugs in their systems, respondent began to rehabilitate herself. ByMarch 1998, respondent had successfully completed an inpatient treatment programand had enrolled in a subsequent program. Respondent remains actively involvedin treatment. Between January and September 1999, respondent tested negative fordrugs and had done everything else required of her, including maintaining stableemployment.

Respondent testified that she was a recovering addict and alcoholic andadmitted that, between O.R.'s birth and February 3, 1998, she had used drugsthree times. However, she testified that she had been "clean" for 26months and continued to attend meetings on a regular basis 4 times a week.Respondent was currently living on her own and had been working as a dietaryaide for a nursing home for the past two years.

Following the hearing, the trial court expressed concern as to theconstitutionality of section 1(D)(t). The court stated that, because ofrespondent's "outstanding" rehabilitation efforts, it did not want toterminate respondent's parental rights. In its order, the court noted that theState met the initial burden under section 1(D)(t). However, because section1(D)(k) addresses substantially the same conduct as section 1(D)(t), the courtread the rebuttable presumption in 1(D)(k) into section 1(D)(t) and found thatrespondent overcame the presumption of unfitness. Accordingly, the courtadjudicated respondent fit.

The State filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that there is no rebuttablepresumption and the statute must be applied as written, without any exceptionsregarding a parent's recent recovery efforts. The State suggested that evidenceof respondent's recovery efforts could be considered at the "bestinterests" stage. Following argument, the court reconsidered its ruling andentered an order finding respondent unfit pursuant to section 1(D)(t).

At the close of the best interests hearing, the court found that it was notin O.R.'s best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights. The Stateappealed, and we reversed the court's judgment and remanded the cause for a newbest interests hearing (In re O.R., No. 2--00--0971 (2001)(unpublishedorder under Supreme Court Rule 23)). We concluded that the court incorrectlyrelied too heavily upon respondent's progress in overcoming her drug addictionand that such evidence, standing alone, was not sufficient to warrant a decisionthat a parent's rights should not be terminated.

Following a rehearing on remand, the court found that it was in O.R.'s bestinterest to terminate respondent's parental rights. Respondent timely appeals.

Respondent's sole contention on appeal concerns the constitutionality ofsection 1(D)(t) of the Adoption Act. As this issue was presented neither to thetrial court nor to this court in the first appeal, we must consider whether itis waived.

Generally, constitutional issues not presented to the trial court are deemedwaived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Villareal v.Peebles, 299 Ill. App. 3d 556, 560 (1998).However, because the issue is one of first impression in Illinois and raises aclear question of law that may be resolved without further input from the trialcourt, and because the waiver rule is a limitation on the parties and not thecourt, we will address the merits of respondent's constitutional claim. See AmericanFederation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. County ofCook, 145 Ill. 2d 475, 480 (1991); Ward v. Community Unit School DistrictNo. 220, 243 Ill. App. 3d 968, 974 (1993).

We note that, because respondent does not designatewhether there is a violation of the United States or Illinois Constitution, wewill analyze the claim under the Illinois Constitution. We thus begin ouranalysis with the general rule that all statutes are presumed to beconstitutional. In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 296 (2001). The partychallenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of rebuttingthis presumption and clearly establishing a constitutional violation. ArangoldCorp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 351 (1999). Because the issue is one oflaw, our review is de novo. R.C., 195 Ill. 2d at 296. Wemust construe acts of the legislature so as toaffirm their constitutionality and validity if we can reasonably do so. R.C.,195 Ill. 2d at 296-97.

Respondent first contends that section 1(D)(t)violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection (Ill. Const., art.I,