In re Petition to Disconnect Certain Territory From the Village of Campton Hills, Kane County, Illinois

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Illinois » 2nd District Appellate » 2008 » In re Petition to Disconnect Certain Territory From the Village of Campton Hills, Kane County, Illinois

State: Illinois

Court: 2nd District Appellate

Docket No: 2-08-0349, 2-08-0350, 2-08-0356, 2-08-

Case Date: 10/15/2008

Preview:Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. Filed: 10-15-08 ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ In re PETITION TO DISCONNECT ) Appeal from the Circuit Court CERTAIN TERRITORY FROM THE ) of Kane County. VILLAGE OF CAMPTON HILLS, KANE ) COUNTY, ILLINOIS ) No. 07--MC--12 ) (Scott Horton, Michele Horton, Stephanie ) Fahey, Paul Fahey, Donald Krause, Bonnie ) Krause, Dorothy A. White, Robert E. White, ) Harold Broten, Karen Broten, Wayne Lange, ) Robert A. Klock, Denise M. Klock, Jean ) Francissen, Kathleen M. Champion, Patrick ) Francissen, and Vernon W. Francissen, ) Honorable Petitioners-Appellees, v. The Village of ) Michael J. Colwell, Campton Hills, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ In re PETITION TO DISCONNECT CERTAIN TERRITORY LOCATED IN KANE COUNTY, ILLINOIS FROM THE VILLAGE OF CAMPTON HILLS ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Kane County. ) ) No. 07--MC--4 ) (Walter Kold, et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. ) Honorable The Village of Campton Hills, ) Michael J. Colwell, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ In re PETITION TO DISCONNECT CERTAIN TERRITORY COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE CHEVAL DE SELLE SUBDIVISION AND ADJOINING PROPERTIES FROM THE VILLAGE OF CAMPTON HILLS ) ) ) ) ) ) ) (M.R. Sanborn, et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. ) The Village of Campton Hills, Respondent) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. No. 07--MR--474

Honorable Michael J. Colwell,

Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ In re PETITION TO DISCONNECT CERTAIN TERRITORY LOCATED IN KANE COUNTY, ILLINOIS FROM THE VILLAGE OF CAMPTON HILLS ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Kane County. ) ) No. 07--MC--5 ) (Gene Miceika, et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. ) Honorable The Village of Campton Hills, ) Michael J. Colwell, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ In re PETITION TO DISCONNECT CERTAIN TERRITORY LOCATED IN KANE COUNTY, ILLINOIS FROM THE VILLAGE OF CAMPTON HILLS ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Kane County. ) ) No. 07--MC--11 ) (Dawn Chantos, et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. ) Honorable The Village of Campton Hills, ) Michael J. Colwell, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court: The Village of Campton Hills (the Village) was incorporated in 2007. Pursuant to section 7--3--1 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Municipal Code) (65 ILCS 5/7--3--1 (West 2006)), property owners who meet certain criteria may disconnect from a newly formed municipality within one year of incorporation. This consolidated appeal involves five groups of property owners (petitioners) who filed petitions to disconnect from the Village, pursuant to section 7--3--1: (1) case No. 07--MR--12 (Campton Farms); (2) case No. 07-- MC--4 (Prairie Lakes); (3) case No. 07--MR--474 (Cheval de Selle); (4) case No. 07--MC--5 (Hidden Oaks); and (5) case No. 07--MC--11 (Moraines). Except in the Prairie Lakes and Hidden Oaks cases, which were tried together, the circuit court of Kane

-2-

Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. County conducted separate evidentiary hearings to determine whether petitioners met the statutory criteria for disconnection. On March 20, 2008, the court entered judgments in favor of petitioners and ordered all five territories to be disconnected from the Village. The Village appeals, raising several arguments. In general, it contends that the judgments must be reversed because: (1) section 7--3--1 is not applicable to petitioners' disconnection claims; (2) section 7--3--1 requires that each individual parcel in a disconnecting territory "touch" the municipality's border; (3) petitioners failed to provide adequate notice; (4) disconnection abridged the due process rights of unnamed property owners; (5) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting or refusing to admit certain evidence; (6) the trial court erred in qualifying petitioners' expert witnesses and allowing them to present their opinions, because they lacked adequate foundations; (7) the judgments were against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (8) the trial court failed to account for the cumulative impact of additional pending disconnection suits. For the following reasons, we affirm. BACKGROUND The record is voluminous and the evidence is well known to the parties. Accordingly, we will refer only to evidence that is relevant to our analysis. By way of background, we note the following. The Village filed its first petition to incorporate as the Village of Campton Hills in August 2005. Under Illinois law, the Village could not be incorporated unless the Kane County Board (Board) found that the proposed incorporation was compatible with the official plan for the development of the county and that the Village would have a tax base sufficient to provide all the necessary municipal services to its inhabitants. The incorporators, a committee that included chairperson Patsy Smith, who is now Village president, and

-3-

Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. that was represented by William Braithwaite and the law firm of Arnstein & Lehr, presented their first petition to the Kane County Regional Planning Commission (Planning Commission) and the Board. During those proceedings, the incorporators argued that the proposed Village had a sufficient tax base and that the sufficiency of that tax base should be measured by the Village's equalized assessed value (EAV). Braithwaite informed the Board that, "[a]lthough we enclose as part of this Petition additional information as to the adequacy of budgeting for the new Village without any tax levy, that is not the test. Rather, the test is whether there is a sufficient tax base which, if it becomes necessary to levy a tax, we can provide municipal services at a realistic tax rate." Braithwaite added that the Village could generate significant funds with "a modest levy of $.10 per $100 of equalized assessed valuation." The Kane County Development Department (Department) agreed with that approach. Philip Bus, the Department's executive director, concluded that the proposed Village had a total EAV of $604,179,886 and an EAV per capita of approximately $40,000, which was "among the highest in Kane County." On the basis of those figures, he found that the Village's tax base was sufficient. The Department, however, found that the proposed incorporation was incompatible with Kane County's long-range plans, in part because the Village would include significant amounts of agricultural land that were within Lily Lake's planning jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Board declined to make the requisite findings. The incorporators filed a second petition for incorporation on November 6, 2006, contemplating a smaller land area, which did not include the agricultural land surrounding Lily Lake. The incorporators argued again that the Village's tax base was sufficient because of the high EAV and EAV per capita. On November 6, 2006, Smith informed the Board that the new proposed

-4-

Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. Village would have "an estimated Equalized Assessed Value of approximately $50,000 per capita." The Department agreed with that approach and found that the new proposed Village had a sufficient tax base and that incorporation was compatible with Kane County's long-range plans. Accordingly, the trial court authorized a referendum on the question of whether to incorporate the Village. On April 17, 2007, the voters approved the ballot initiative and on May 14, 2007, the trial court authorized the incorporation. The newly incorporated Village is very large. It encompasses 20.3 square miles and includes 102 miles of road. Based on figures from the 2000 census, the Village has certified 10,504 residents. However, the Village estimates that its population has increased by approximately 2,500 persons since 2000, and the Village has commissioned a special census to determine the actual population. In May 2007, petitioners began filing petitions to disconnect from the Village pursuant to section 7--3--1, which provides: "Within one year of the organization of any municipality *** any territory which has been included therein may be disconnected from such municipality if the territory sought to be disconnected is (1) upon the border, but within the boundary of the municipality, (2) contains 20 or more acres, (3) if disconnected will not result in the isolation of any part of the municipality from the remainder of the municipality, and (4) if disconnected will not be a territory wholly bounded by one or more municipalities or wholly bounded by one or more municipalities and a river or lake, (5) if disconnected, the growth prospects and plan and zoning ordinances, if any, of such municipality will not be unreasonably disrupted, (6) if disconnected, no substantial disruption will result to existing municipal service facilities such as, but not limited to, sewer systems, street lighting, water mains, garbage collection and fire

-5-

Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. protection, (7) if disconnected the municipality will not be unduly harmed through loss of tax revenue in the future." 65 ILCS 5/7--3--1 (West 2006). Prairie Lakes consists of 197.48 acres and 170 platted single-family lots. It is populated by 166 residents who occupy 51 homes. Hidden Oaks consists of 35 single-family lots totaling 59.96 acres. Approximately 98 residents occupy 30 homes. Only five of Hidden Oaks' tracts of land are located directly on the border of the Village. Cheval de Selle includes approximately 351 residents. It consists of 102 parcels, all of which are zoned for single-family homes. The Moraines has 24 parcels ranging from 1 to 2.5 acres and zoned for single-family homes, and all but 2 parcels are developed with single-family homes. The population is estimated at 72 persons. Campton Farms consists of 87.1 acres, which are owned by 17 individuals, and has 21 residents. The Village presented the following common assertions throughout the disconnection cases. The Village argued that it was in its infancy and most formative period with respect to its growth prospects, planning, and zoning and that any change resulting from these disconnections would unreasonably disrupt and negatively impact the newly formed Village. The Village further argued that it levied no real estate property tax and did not plan to and, therefore, its sources of revenue were limited to state-shared funds, a portion of the township road fund tax, and sales tax. It further argued that it did not receive tax revenue based on the average assessed or equalized assessed valuation for all property within the Village. Therefore, the Village maintained, it was likely to suffer great loss of tax revenue if the court granted the disconnections. Based on the evidence, the trial court rejected these and other arguments and granted the disconnections. The Village timely appealed and we granted motions to consolidate. ANALYSIS

-6-

Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. I. Burden In disconnection cases, the petitioners have the burden of proving the statutory requirements. City of DeKalb v. Town of Cortland, 233 Ill. App. 3d 307, 310 (1992). However, the disconnection statute is to be liberally construed in favor of disconnection (Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Barrington Hills, 133 Ill. 2d 146, 154-55 (1989)), regardless of the petitioners' purpose. Indian Valley Golf Club, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 135 Ill. App. 3d 543, 547 (1985). The common theme is to allow disconnection absent a hardship or impairment to the municipality. Indian Valley Golf Club, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 547. II. Applicability of Section 7--3--1 The Village first contends that section 7--3--1 is not applicable to petitioners' disconnection petitions. The Village asserts that section 7--3--1 applies only to single-parcel disconnections whereas section 7--3--6 applies to multiple-parcel disconnections. See 65 ILCS 5/7--3--6 (West 2006). The Village argues that, because the present disconnection petitions involve multiple parcels and were filed under section 7--3--1 instead of section 7--3--6, the cases should have been dismissed. In support of its argument, the Village contrasts the language in section 7--3--1 that permits disconnection of "any territory" (emphasis added) (65 ILCS 5/7--3--1 (West 2006)) with the language in section 7--3--6 that permits disconnection of "any area of land consisting of one or more tracts" (emphasis added) (65 ILCS 5/7--3--6 (West 2006)). The Village maintains that section 7--3-1's omission of the emphasized text in section 7--3--6 should be construed to mean that the legislature wanted to limit section 7--3--1 to single parcels. Because this issue involves statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. In re Marriage of Best, 228 Ill. 2d 107, 116 (2008).

-7-

Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. We find that this argument lacks merit. Clearly, section 7--3--1 is not limited to single parcels. Section 7--3--1 requires that the "territory" to be disconnected must be 20 or more acres and must not be wholly bounded by one or more municipalities and a river or lake. It makes no sense to infer that the legislature intended a "single parcel" limitation when it did not simply state such a limitation in section 7--3--1. Regardless, section 7--3--1 allows a petition for disconnection to be signed by a "majority" of property owners, which clearly implies that the legislature intended that this section apply to multiple-parcel disconnections. We agree with petitioners that it is difficult to imagine a scenario where a "majority" of property owners could exist in the absence of multiple parcels. In addition, both section 7--3--1 and section 7--3--6 permit disconnection of a "territory." It is clear that a "territory" may include "multiple parcels," and Illinois courts have consistently permitted the annexation and disconnection of multiple-parcel "territories" under section 7--3--1 and 7--3--6. See, e.g., In re Disconnection of Certain Territory from the Village of Machesney Park, 122 Ill. App. 3d 960, 972 (1984) (wherein we affirmed the disconnection of a multiple-parcel territory under section 7--3--1); see also La Salle National Trust, N.A. v. Village of Mettawa, 249 Ill. App. 3d 550, 578 (1993) (affirming the disconnection of an 11-tract territory under section 7--3--6). III. Bordering Territories The Village next contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the disconnecting territories are located "on the border" of the Village. The Village asserts that section 7--3--1 requires that a disconnecting territory cannot be "on the border" unless each and every individual parcel in the disconnecting territory also lies on the border.

-8-

Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. In Village of Mettawa, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 564-65, and Indian Valley Golf Club, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 135 Ill. App. 3d 543, 552, 554 (1985), we held that, where there is reasonable contiguity among parcels in a territory to be annexed, even extreme irregularity of boundaries does not bar annexation. The Village suggests that these decisions were premised on the commonality of ownership. However, we find nothing in those decisions to suggest that they were premised on the commonality of ownership. Similarly, nothing in the disconnection statute draws a distinction based on common ownership. Section 7--3--1 states only that land to be disconnected must be located on the border of the municipality from which it is being disconnected; it does not state that all parcels in the disconnecting land must be on borders, and it could not reasonably be interpreted in that manner if it were ever to be given any effect. 65 ILCS 5/7--3--1 (West 2006). The principal object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Indian Valley Golf Club, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 552. The plain meaning of the language used by the legislature is the safest guide to follow in construing any act, as the court has no right to read into the statute words that are not found therein either by express inclusion or by fair implication. Indian Valley Golf Club, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 552. Therefore, we also reject this argument. IV. Notice Requirement The Village next contends that petitioners failed to provide adequate notice to all nonpetitioner taxpayers and property owners under the notice provisions set forth in sections 7--3--2 and 7--3--6.1 of Article 7 of the Municipal Code. 65 ILCS 5/7--3--2, 7--3--6.1 (West 2006). The Village contends that petitioners were required to publish the dates of the public hearings and to send certified letters to all nonpetitioner taxpayers and property owners notifying them of the very first

-9-

Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. court appearance, even if the first court appearance was a routine motion presentment call rather than the public hearing. The Village claims that any failure to provide such notice of the very first court appearance was incurable and required immediate dismissal. We note that the Village stipulated that petitioners provided proper notice in the Cheval de Selle case. Similarly, in the Campton Farms case, petitioners obtained waivers of notice from the only two nonpetitioner taxpayers and property owners. Thus, the Village's argument applies only to the remaining three cases. The Village presents a question of statutory interpretation. The principles guiding our analysis are familiar. The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent, with the best indication of that intent being the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute's language. Wisniewski v. Kownacki, 221 Ill. 2d 453, 460 (2006). All other rules of statutory construction are subordinate to this cardinal principle. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 312 (2002). In construing statutes, courts will presume that the legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Alvarez v. Pappas, 229 Ill. 2d 217, 228 (2008). The construction of a statute presents a question of law, which we review de novo. In re Marriage of Best, 228 Ill. 2d 107, 116 (2008). The first notice provision of the disconnection statute is in section 7--3--2, which provides, in relevant part: "Upon the filing of the petition as provided in Section 7--3--1, the court shall set the same for public hearing which date of public hearing shall be within 30 days of the date of the filing of the petition. The court shall give at least 10 days notice of such hearing by publishing notice thereof once in a newspaper published in the municipality from which the territory is sought to be detached, or if there is no such newspaper published in such

-10-

Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. municipality, then such notice shall be published once in a newspaper having a general circulation within such municipality, the date of such publication to be not less than 10 days prior to the date set for the public hearing." 65 ILCS 5/7--3--2 (West 2006). The trial court complied with the public hearing and notice requirements under section 7--3--2. The other notice provision is in section 7--3--6.1, which follows the disconnection provision of section 7--3--6. Section 7--3--1 applies to a disconnection from a newly formed municipality, whereas a petition seeking disconnection from an established municipality would be filed under section 7--3--6. Section 7--3--6.1 provides, in relevant part: "When territory is proposed to be disconnected by court order under this Article, the corporate authorities or petitioners initiating the action shall notify each person who pays real estate taxes on property within that territory unless the person is a petitioner. The notice shall be served by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, at least 20 days before a court hearing or other court action. If the person who pays real estate taxes on the property is not the owner of record, then the payor shall notify the owner of record of the proposed disconnection." 65 ILCS 5/7--3--6.1 (West 2006). We do not find that the notice requirements of section 7--3--6.1 also apply to disconnection actions brought pursuant to section 7--3--1. Clearly, when the legislature placed section 7--3--6.1 after section 7--3--6, it intended that section 7--3--6.1 apply only to actions for disconnections brought pursuant to section 7--3--6. Although section 7--3--6.1 contains language stating that it applies to all petitions for disconnection "under this Article," the scheme of Article 7 clearly identifies separate notice requirements for each method of disconnection, and the notice requirements for a section 7--3--1 petition are expressly provided for in section 7--3--2.

-11-

Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. Moreover, section 7--3--6.1's 20-day requirement makes it incompatible with actions brought under section 7--3--1. As the trial court noted, section 7--3--6 and section 7--3--6.1 contemplate court proceedings with no time limitations. See 65 ILCS 5/7--3--6 (West 2006). By contrast, section 7--3--2 requires a "public hearing" within 30 days. Complying with the 30-day public hearing requirement would be difficult if petitioners were required to provide 20 days' notice of the public hearing via certified mail. We further note that it would be impossible to comply with the 30-day requirement if section 7--3--6.1 required 20 days' notice of the very first court appearance at which the public hearing was scheduled. Regardless, as the trial court held, petitioners provided proper notice of the relevant "public hearings" and "court actions" by timely publishing notices in the newspapers and by sending certified letters to all nonpetitioner taxpayers and owners within the disconnecting territories. The Village contends that such efforts were useless in any event because section 7--3--6.1 required petitioners to provide notice of the very first court appearance in each case, and it contends that the failure to do so was incurable. First, we do not find that section 7--3--6.1 controls. Even if it were controlling, we find nothing in the statute that requires notice of the first court appearance. Section 7--3--6.1 simply states that notice must be given 20 days before "a court hearing or other court action." 65 ILCS 5/7--3--6.1 (West 2006). We construe such language to mean that notice is required before a substantive "court hearing" or "court action," not a routine motion call of no consequence to a nonpetitioner taxpayer or owner. Finally, the time limitations in section 7--3--6.1 are directory only, because the statute does not provide a penalty for noncompliance. Therefore, any failure to strictly comply with such notice does not invalidate the petition to disconnect. See Village of Machesney Park, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 966. In sum, we find the Village's arguments unavailing.

-12-

Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. V. Due Process The Village next argues that disconnection abridged the due process rights of unnamed property owners. The Village claims that petitioners were permitted to directly and materially affect the status of literally hundreds of nonpetitioners by seeking disconnection of their property. The Village ignores the purpose of the notice requirements of section 7--3--2, which is to protect nonpetitioners' rights to be heard. Accordingly, we also reject this argument. VI. Evidentiary Rulings The Village next takes issue with several of the trial court's evidentiary rulings. Evidence is relevant where it tends to prove a matter in controversy or has a legitimate bearing on a disputed matter. Northern Illinois Medical Center v. Home State Bank of Crystal Lake, 136 Ill. App. 3d 129, 152 (1985). The determination of whether particular evidence is relevant is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d 402, 420 (1993). The Village first asserts that the trial court erred in including evidence regarding EAV, property taxes, and other potential revenue sources. Petitioners pointed out that the Village had the ability to generate revenue through property taxes. In all of the cases, except Cheval de Selle, petitioners also noted that the Village had other untapped sources of revenue, such as utility taxes and franchise taxes. The Village claims that such evidence was irrelevant and argues that the trial court's analysis of the Village's future tax revenues should be limited to those sources that the Village is currently utilizing. We disagree. We first find that any error by the trial court regarding this issue was harmless, as in each case the trial court specifically found that disconnection would not "unduly harm" the Village, even

-13-

Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. if the Village continued to operate on only its current revenue sources. For example, the trial court found in the Moraines case that the Village's disclosed 2008 revenues were at least $1,955,755, and its anticipated 2008 expenses were only $1,484,770. Therefore, the Village was projecting a surplus of nearly $500,000, which was more than enough to accommodate all five disconnections. The trial court found that the Village could have a cumulative surplus through 2017. The trial court made similar findings in the other four cases. Furthermore, section 7--3--1 allows an analysis of the impact on a municipality's "future" tax revenue, not its "current" tax revenue. Thus, a trial court may consider revenue sources that may be available in future years even if they are not currently being utilized. See, e.g., Village of Mettawa, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 571 (court "may take into account the availability of other sources of revenue to replace the revenue lost to the municipality"). The Village also asserts that the trial court improperly considered statements and analyses regarding the Village's EAV and EAV per capita that were made before it became incorporated. As stated, during preincorporation hearings, the Village's current president, Smith, and its counsel, Braithwaite, mentioned the Village's EAV and EAV per capita as evidence that the Village had a sufficient tax base. During each case, evidence of preincorporation conduct and statements were admitted in several contexts: (1) through Philip Bus's testimony (in the Cheval de Selle and Campton Farms cases); (2) through various documents; and (3) through Steven Hovany's testimony. The Village asserts that such evidence should have been excluded as irrelevant. We observe first that the Village forfeited many of its objections by failing to raise them before the trial court. Regardless of forfeiture, the evidence was relevant because it tended to prove a matter in controversy. One of the Village's primary arguments was that EAV and property taxes

-14-

Nos. 2--08--0349, 2--08--0350, 2--08--0356, 2--08--0357, 2--08--0358 cons. could not be used to evaluate the Village's tax base. In response to that argument, petitioners were entitled to show that Smith, Bus, and Braithwaite all previously advocated the consideration of that revenue source. Such evidence bolstered Hovany's and Steven Lenet's analyses and called Smith's credibility into question by demonstrating that she took a contrary position when it was in her interest to do so. VII. Qualifications and Opinions of Expert Witnesses The Village next contends that the trial court erred by qualifying petitioners' expert witnesses and, even if the trial court did not err in qualifying them, by allowing them to present their opinions, because the witnesses failed to present adequate foundations. Expert testimony is admissible if it assists the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or deciding a fact in issue and if the witness is qualified by reason of knowledge, skill, experience, education, or training to give said testimony. Village of Plainfield v. American Cedar Designs, Inc., 316 Ill. App. 3d 130, 139 (2000). If the expert's opinion is without proper foundation, particularly where he or she fails to take into consideration an essential factor, that opinion " 'is of no weight and must be disregarded.' " People v. Wilhoite, 228 Ill. App. 3d 12, 21 (1991), quoting 32 C.J.S. Evidence

Download In re Petition to Disconnect Certain Territory From the Village of Campton Hills