No. 2--02--0262

JUSTICE GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Robert S., appeals from an order of the circuit court of KaneCounty granting the State's petition to involuntarily administer psychotropicmedication. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Respondent was charged with a crime not specified in the record. Subsequently, respondent was found unfit to stand trial and admitted to the ElginMental Health Center (EMHC). On November 19, 2001, respondent's psychiatrist,Dr. Romulo Nazareno, filed a petition seeking to involuntarily administerpsychotropic medication to respondent. A hearing on the petition was originallyscheduled for November 26, 2001. However, it was continued four times, and itnot did commence until January 18, 2002. Respondent represented himself at thehearing.

On January 18, 2002, the State indicated it was ready to proceed. However,respondent requested a two-week continuance in order to subpoena his witnesses. The State objected and suggested that the court begin the hearing, noting thatit was unlikely that the hearing could be completed in one day. The trial courtdecided to commence the hearing with the understanding that after the Statepresented its case, the matter would be continued to give respondent time tosubpoena his witnesses.

The State's first witness was Dr. Nazareno. Dr. Nazareno diagnosedrespondent with paranoid schizophrenia. Dr. Nazareno testified that respondent'ssymptoms included hallucinations, delusions, and a deterioration in the abilityto function. For instance, respondent complained of sleep deprivation as aresult of auditory hallucinations. Moreover, respondent believed that thegovernment implanted a microchip in his brain in an effort to read his mind. Respondent claimed that EMHC staff and patients were sending messages to a "mindreader" by actions such as rubbing their chins or adjusting their eyeglasses. In addition, respondent threatened to kill an EMHC patient who respondentbelieved was having a relationship with women intended for respondent.

Dr. Nazareno noted that respondent's symptoms subsided when he wasmedicated on a previous occasion. However, once the medication order expired,defendant began hearing voices, having trouble sleeping, and believing thatfemale celebrities had fallen in love with him. Respondent also threatened tokill a member of the EMHC staff.

Dr. Nazareno recommended administering Risperidone to respondent becausein the past he responded well to the drug, without side effects. Asalternatives, Dr. Nazareno recommended Haldol, Haldol Deconate, and, for sideeffects, Cogentin. Dr. Nazareno opined that the benefits of administering thepsychotropic medication would outweigh the harm. He also stated that respondentlacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about potential side effects andbenefits of the treatment. According to Dr. Nazareno, respondent's psychosis isthe reason he cannot make a knowledgeable decision whether to take themedication. Dr. Nazareno tried less restrictive treatments, such as counselingand group therapy, but they were not effective without medication.

On cross-examination, Dr. Nazareno admitted that respondent neverthreatened him and that he has never personally witnessed respondent threatenothers. Dr. Nazareno also acknowledged that during the court proceeding, he didnot see a deterioration in respondent's functioning and noted that respondent didnot exhibit his ususal symptoms, such as talking to himself. However, Dr.Nazareno stated that respondent's behavior and the way in which he askedquestions showed some paranoia and delusions. For instance, during questioning,respondent insinuated that Dr. Nazareno hears voices. Dr. Nazareno pointed outthat there are times during which an individual can contain delusions by focusingon a task.

Over respondent's objection, the State called Lesley Kane, an intern at theKane County Diagnostic Center (KCDC). Kane conducted a court-ordered independentexamination of respondent. Kane's examination consisted of interviewingrespondent for 60 to 90 minutes, talking to respondent's case worker, andreviewing two to three years of respondent's records. The trial court qualifiedKane as an expert over respondent's objection.

Citing symptoms similar to those identified by Dr. Nazareno, Kane diagnosedrespondent with paranoid schizophrenia. With respect to whether respondentexhibited a deterioration of his ability to function, suffering, or threateningbehavior, Kane stated that respondent has become increasingly tense and agitated,verbally aggressive, and more threatening. In addition, his sexualpreoccupations have increased and EMHC staff noted an increase in the use ofprofanity. Kane further testified that respondent's illness has existed for aperiod marked by the continuing presence of symptoms, noting that respondent hashad a history of delusions since the 1970s. Kane believed that the benefits ofpsychotropic medication would outweigh the harm. Kane noted that respondent'sbehavior poses a risk to himself and to others and that the side effects of themedication can be dealt with effectively. Kane opined that respondent'ssuffering, the deterioration of his ability to function, and his violent andthreatening behavior would decrease with medication.

Kane also concluded that respondent lacked the capacity to make a reasoneddecision about psychotropic medication. According to Kane, respondent is unawareof the severity of his illness. Regarding less restrictive alternatives, Kanestated that respondent has been offered psychosocial therapy, but, becauserespondent does not have insight into his illness, "it doesn't seem as thoughthat alone is going to be helpful." Kane also noted that in individuals withschizophrenia, therapy is more of an augment to medication. Kane opined "to areasonable degree of psychological certainty" that respondent meets the criteriafor psychotropic medication.

On cross-examination, Kane admitted that during her independent examinationof respondent she did not observe defendant suffering from delusions orhallucinations. She also indicated that respondent did not exhibit such symptomsat the hearing.

The State recalled Dr. Nazareno. He testified that respondent does nothave the capacity to make a reasoned and rational choice regarding whether heneeds medication. Dr. Nazareno noted that respondent does not believe he is ill. Dr. Nazareno added that respondent's judgment is so impaired by his illness thathe sees only the risks, and not the benefits, of the medication.

Kelli Childress, a former assistant State's Attorney, testified that shefirst met respondent in 1999 when she was assigned to a hearing in whichrespondent was involved. On or about October 31, 2001, Childress received atelephone call from respondent. Respondent told Childress that he remembered herfrom the 1999 hearing and he had been thinking about her ever since. Respondentaccused Childress of helping the government with a scheme to read his mind. Respondent believed that he and Childress were supposed to be together and thatthe government indicated to him that Childress felt the same way about him. Respondent asked Childress if she would help him get out of EMHC so that theycould be together. Childress told respondent that she was involved with someoneelse and that the information he had was incorrect. Childress stated she feltthreatened during the conversation.

Respondent called Childress again on December 31, 2001. According toChildress, the tone of this conversation was less accusatory and more romantic. Respondent told Childress that she was beautiful, that he had feelings for her,and that the government informed him that they were supposed to be together. Respondent stated that he thought about marrying Childress, having children, andmoving to California. Respondent told Childress that the government informed himthat she was romantically involved with other patients at EMHC and with a playerfor the Chicago Bears.

Childress testified that she was familiar with respondent's case and whyhe was at EMHC. She was afraid that if respondent believed that she was part ofsome government scheme to read his mind, he could become violent. As a result,after both calls, Childress contacted the State's Attorney's office and the courtliaison at EMHC. In addition, following the first call, she contacted localpolice. Childress has not heard from respondent since the second call. Oncross-examination, Childress admitted that respondent did not specificallythreaten her.

Mark Thomas, a licensed clinical social worker at EMHC, testified that heis respondent's primary therapist. Thomas stated that respondent's psychiatricdiagnosis is paranoid schizophrenia. According to Thomas, respondent's conditionhad been deteriorating over the four- or five-month period prior to the hearing,with increased agitation, verbal outbursts, and verbal aggression.

According to Thomas, respondent believes that the voices he hears arecaused by a chip implanted by the government. Respondent believes that the chipenables the government to read his mind. On two occasions in the three monthsprior to the hearing, respondent became agitated with Thomas because respondentbelieved that Thomas was "signaling the mind readers" by rubbing his limbs. Athird incident occurred when Thomas sided with a technician who had a disputewith respondent. At that time, respondent cursed at Thomas within inches of hisface. Thomas considered respondent's behavior during the third incident toconstitute a threat.

Thomas testified that respondent told him that he suffers fromhallucinations and delusions. The hallucinations and delusions center on femalecelebrities, but have included staff at EMHC. In addition, respondent toldThomas that he wanted to have a relationship with Childress and he hoped to havebabies. Respondent also told Thomas that his conversations with Childress hadgone well and that she had been receptive.

Thomas also stated that respondent believes that certain women have been"reserved" for him by the mind readers. Respondent becomes verbally abusive whenhe believes these women have ignored him or when he believes the women have beenhaving relationships with other EMHC patients. Respondent confronted one patientwho he believed was having a sexual relationship with one of his "reserved"women.

Thomas opined that respondent suffers as a result of hearing voices. Thomas believed that respondent's ability to function has deteriorated in thethree months prior to the hearing. Thomas also stated that of the 36 patientshe is in charge of or monitors, respondent poses the highest risk. Thomas statedthat respondent is "in the upper echelon" of patients of who frighten him.

On cross-examination, Thomas testified that respondent has a "remarkableability" to contain his psychosis. Nevertheless, he thought that respondent hadexhibited evidence of mental illness in the courtroom. For instance, Thomasnoted respondent's allusions to government mind readers and his claim that thegovernment implanted a chip in his body.

The State then called respondent as a witness. Respondent objected. Thetrial court sustained respondent's objection on the basis that respondent was atEMHC because he was found unfit to stand trial in an underlying criminalproceeding. The State then rested. Respondent requested two weeks to subpoenahis witnesses, and the court continued the matter until February 1, 2002.

At that time, respondent first called Denise Dojka, Psy.D., a clinicalpsychologist at EMHC and respondent's psychological therapist. She stated thatrespondent suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. Dojka has never seen respondentparticipate in any violent behavior. Nevertheless, based on a risk assessmentshe conducted of respondent, Dojka believed that he was one of the more dangerouspeople in his unit.

On cross-examination, Dojka testified that respondent hears voices thatcall him derogatory names and wake him at night. Respondent believes that thevoices are from the government and that they are transmitted through an implantin his head. The voices inform respondent that women who would like to have asexual relationship with him are being brought to other patients. Respondenttold Dojka that he would have liked to have a relationship with Childress andthat he wanted Childress to have his children. However, he no longer believedthat it was possible to have a relationship with Childress because he believesthat Childress was given large sums of money to have sex with another patient whorespondent believes is inferior to himself.

Dojka testified that she considered respondent dangerous because he hasseveral risk factors. According to Dojka, respondent's history of violence,symptoms of mental illness, refusal of treatment, anger, and the lack offeasibility of future plans all contribute to a finding that respondent has atleast a moderate risk of committing violence in the future, especially since heis not medicated.

Dojka feared that respondent would commit violence against Childress andLynette Krueger, Dojka's diagnostic psychology student. Respondent wanted tohave relationships with these women, but he believed that they were sleeping withothers. This made respondent feel betrayed and resentful.

Dojka believed that respondent needs to be medicated. She noted that ona previous occasion he was medicated for a 90-day period and his sleepingimproved, he was much more relaxed, he participated in activities, and he seemedto be functioning at a higher level. Dojka also believed that respondent issuffering. She noted that he told her he felt "tormented" by the voices.

Becky Mitchell, an activity therapist at EMHC, testified that betweenOctober 2001 and February 2002, she accompanied respondent to two or threeactivities. Mitchell testified that during these activities, respondent did notcause her any problems and he did not have any problems with the other patients. However, Mitchell opined that respondent had the potential to be dangerous toothers. Mitchell's opinion was based on respondent's status as a mental healthpatient, the statements of clinicians, and her past experiences with otherpatients. On cross-examination, Mitchell testified that respondent told her thathe hears voices that "torment" him.

Respondent's last witness was Jose Padilla, an activity staff member atEMHC. Padilla testified that he never had to restrict respondent as a result ofhis behavior. Padilla did not observe respondent express any anger towards otherpatients. On cross-examination, Padilla acknowledged that he sees respondentonly about once a month.

The trial court found respondent subject to the involuntary administrationof medication for a period not to exceed 90 days. In addressing the factorsrelied on in making its determination, the trial court noted, among other things,that respondent lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision about thetreatment. The trial court denied respondent's motion to reconsider, and thistimely appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Before addressing the merits of respondent's appeal, we note that this caseis moot. The trial court order authorizing the administration of psychotropicmedication was limited to a period of 90 days. That period has long sincepassed. Nevertheless, because this case involves "an event of short durationwhich is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' " (In re Barbara H., 183Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998), quoting In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 258 (1989)), wewill address the issues raised by respondent. See In re Cathy M., 326 Ill. App.3d 335, 339 (2001).

Initially, respondent claims that the trial court's order should bereversed because it fails to comply with section 2--107.1 of the Mental Healthand Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code or Code) (405 ILCS 5/2--107.1 (West 2000)) in three respects. First, respondent argues that the hearingon the petition to administer psychotropic medication was held outside thestatutorily mandated time frame. Second, respondent contends that the court'sorder does not designate the persons authorized to administer the medication. Third, respondent asserts that the petition listed a criterion for involuntarytreatment that is no longer recognized by statute. These inquiries constitutequestions of law, which we review de novo. In re M.A., 293 Ill. App. 3d 995, 998(1997). We address each contention in turn.

Respondent first argues that the State failed to comply with the timingprovisions for a hearing on a petition to administer psychotropic medication. According to respondent, section 2--107.1(a--5)(2) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a--5)(2) (West 2000)) requires the trial court to hold a hearing on apetition to administer psychotropic medication no later than 42 days after thepetition is filed. Respondent notes that the hearing in this case did notcommence until 60 days after the petition was filed. Accordingly, respondenturges reversal of the trial court's order.

Section 2--107.1(a--5)(2) governs the time frame within which the trialcourt must hold a hearing on a petition to involuntarily administer psychotropicmedication. That provision provides in relevant part:

"The court shall hold a hearing within 7 days of the filing of thepetition. The People, the petitioner, or the respondent shall be entitledto a continuance of up to 7 days as of right. An additional continuance ofnot more than 7 days may be granted to any party (i) upon a showing thatthe continuance is needed in order to adequately prepare for or presentevidence in a hearing under this Section or (ii) under exceptionalcircumstances. The court may grant an additional continuance not to exceed21 days when, in its discretion, the court determines that such acontinuance is necessary in order to provide the recipient with anexamination pursuant to Section 3-803 or 3-804 of this Act, to provide therecipient with a trial by jury as provided in Section 3-802 of this Act,or to arrange for the substitution of counsel as provided for by theIllinois Supreme Court Rules." 405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a--5)(2) (West 2000).

Here, the petition to administer psychotropic medication was filed onNovember 19, 2001. Pursuant to section 2--107.1(a--5)(2), the trial court wasrequired to hold a hearing within seven days. In fact, a hearing on the petitionwas scheduled for November 26, 2001. The record suggests that at the November26 hearing, the trial court denied respondent's motion to proceed pro se. Thecourt then continued the matter on respondent's motion until November 30, 2001.

On November 30, 2001, the trial court denied respondent's motion toreconsider its decision denying respondent's request to represent himself. Respondent then moved for an independent examination to be conducted by F.P.Johnson. See 405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a--5)(2), 3--804 (West 2000). The trial courtgranted respondent's motion for an independent examination and continued thecause to December 21, 2001. See 405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a--5)(2) (West 2000)(granting trial court the discretion to continue matter for a period not toexceed 21 days in order to provide the recipient with an examination pursuant toSection 3--804 of the Code). However, the court appointed the KCDC to conductthe examination.

The record reflects that on December 21, 2001, the trial court entered anorder continuing the matter until January 4, 2002, on respondent's motion. OnJanuary 4, 2002, respondent renewed his motion to represent himself. The trialcourt granted the motion. The court then entered an order continuing the matteruntil January 18, 2002. The record shows that the matter was continued "on theState's motion for cause, Respondent agreeing to such motion, also seekingcont[inuance]." On January 18, 2002, the State indicated it was ready toproceed. However, respondent requested a two-week continuance in order tosubpoena his witnesses. The State objected and suggested that the court beginthe hearing, noting that it was unlikely that the hearing could be completed inone day. The trial court decided to commence the hearing with the understandingthat after the State presented its case, the matter would be continued to giverespondent time to subpoena his witnesses. Consequently, the hearing on thepetition did not commence until 60 days after the petition was originally filed.

In interpreting the Code's procedural safeguards, this court has advocatedstrict construction in favor of the respondent. In re Janet S., 305 Ill. App.3d 318, 320 (1999). However, it is well established that when a party acquiescesin proceeding in a certain manner, he cannot later complain prejudice on appeal. Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 159 (2002) ("[O]ne cannot complain of error whichhe induced or in which he participated at trial"); see also People v. Villarreal,198 Ill. 2d 209, 228 (2001); People v. Abston, 263 Ill. App. 3d 665, 671 (1994). Under the facts of this case, it is apparent that all but one of the delays incommencing the hearing on the petition were attributable to respondent. Only thecontinuance granted on January 4, 2002, was not solely attributable torespondent. However, the record reveals that the continuance on January 4, 2002,was a mutual request by both parties. The order continuing the matter reflectsthat the continuance was granted on the State's motion, but that respondentagreed to the continuance and asked for a continuance himself. Accordingly,while the hearing on the petition was not held within the statutorily mandatedtime frame, we decline to reverse the trial court's order because respondenteither agreed to the delays or they were attributable to him.

Respondent also complains that the trial court's order violated section 2--107.1 of the Code because it did not designate the persons authorized toadminister medication. Section 2--107.1(a--5)(6) provides that an orderauthorizing the administration of psychotropic medication "shall designate thepersons authorized to administer the authorized involuntary treatment under thestandards and procedures of this subsection." 405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a--5)(6) (West2000). Here, the trial court order authorizing involuntary treatment provides:

"The petition is granted, and ROBERT S[.] shall receive psychotropicmedication to be administered by DR. NAZARENO (or designee whose licenseand credentials permit) at Elgin Mental Health Center for a period not toexceed 90 days."

Relying on two recent cases from this court (In re Richard C., 329 Ill. App. 3d1090 (2002); In re Cynthia S., 326 Ill. App. 3d 65 (2001)), respondent arguesthat the trial court's order is defective because it does not limit treatment tospecific health care professionals who are familiar with his condition. Wedisagree.

In Cynthia S., this court reversed the trial court order authorizing theadministration of psychotropic medication because the court's order failed todesignate the persons authorized to administer the prescribed psychotropicmedication. Cynthia S., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 69. In Cynthia S., the trial courtorder provided " 'The petition is granted, and Cynthia [S.] shall receivepsychotropic medication (including the necessary lab work and medicalexaminations) to be administered by the Illinois Department of Human Services fora period not to exceed 90 days, by those staff whose license allows them toadminister psychotropic medication pursuant to Illinois law.' " Cynthia S., 326Ill. App. 3d at 68. We found that requiring the trial court to list namedindividuals authorized to administer medication ensures involvement by aqualified professional familiar with the recipient's individual situation andhealth status. Cynthia S., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 68-69. See also In re Mary AnnP., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 408 (2002) ("[W]e believe that the specificity requirementfor involuntary treatment orders reflects the legislature's legitimate concernthat only qualified health care professionals, familiar with the respondent'smental and physical status, be permitted to administer the treatment and that therespondent, as well as the treaters, be notified of the exact nature of thetreatment authorized").

Similarly, in Richard C., this court reversed the trial court orderauthorizing the administration of psychotropic medication because the trial courtorder failed to designate the persons authorized to administer the prescribedpsychotropic medication. Richard C., 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1094. In Richard C.,the trial court order provided, " 'It is hereby order [sic] the patient is toreceive haloperidol decanoate IM of 12.5-100 mg/monthly with EKG as needed tomonitor respondent's cardiac state, CBC and differential blood testing yearly andblood chemistries yearly.' " Richard C., 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1094.

The court orders in both Cynthia S. and Richard C. did not specificallylist named individuals authorized to administer psychotropic medication. Incontrast, here the trial court order listed Dr. Nazareno or a designee. At thehearing on the petition, Dr. Nazareno, a staff psychiatrist at EMHC, testifiedthat he is licensed to practice medicine in Illinois and to administerpsychotropic medication in this state. Furthermore, Dr. Nazareno testified thathe has been treating respondent since April 1999. Accordingly, Dr. Nazareno isa qualified professional familiar with the recipient's individual situation andhealth status.

Respondent argues, however, that allowing a "designee" to administer themedications runs contrary to established case law. See In re Jennifer H., 333Ill. App. 3d 427, 431 (2002) (holding trial court's involuntary treatment orderinvalid for failure to list persons authorized to administer treatment); CynthiaS., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 68-69. According to respondent, the trial court's orderauthorizes anyone with a license and permitting credentials to administer themedications. We disagree.

As noted above, the trial court order authorizes the administration ofpsychotropic medication by Dr. Nazareno "or designee whose license andcredentials permit." A "designee" is defined as "[a] person who has beendesignated to perform some duty or carry out some specific role." Black's LawDictionary 457 (7th ed. 1999). We read the trial court order as allowing Dr.Nazareno to name, in his absence, an individual whose license and credentialspermit him or her to administer the medication to respondent. Thisinterpretation recognizes the reality that Dr. Nazareno may not always beavailable to personally administer the prescribed treatment. It also reinforcesthe concern of the legislature by ensuring that respondent's treatment isadministered under the guidance of Dr. Nazareno, a qualified health careprofessional who is familiar with respondent's situation and health status. Thus, we find that the trial court's order complied with section 2--107.1(a--5)(6) of the Code.

Respondent next contends that the petition did not comply with section 2--107.1 of the Code because it listed "disruptive behavior," which is no longer astatutory prerequisite for involuntary treatment. According to respondent, theinclusion of this factor in the petition resulted in an invalid pleading, whichprejudiced him. We disagree.

Prior to June 2, 2000, section 2--107.1 of the Code authorized theinvoluntary administration of psychotropic medication if, among other things, theState proved by clear and convincing evidence that the recipient had a seriousmental illness or developmental disability and that because of said condition,"the recipient exhibits any one of the following: (i) deterioration of hisability to function, (ii) suffering, (iii) threatening behavior, or (iv)disruptive behavior." 405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a)(4)(B) (West 1998). Effective June2, 2000, the legislature amended section 2--107.1 to delete the reference to"disruptive behavior." Pub. Act 91--726, eff. June 2, 2000 (amending 405 ILCS5/2--107.1 (West 1998)). See Jennifer H., 333 Ill. App. 3d at 431.

In the present case, the petition to administer involuntary medicationconsisted of a preprinted form completed and signed by Dr. Nazareno. Among otherthings, the petition stated that respondent refuses to submit to treatment bypsychotropic medication, that he lacks capacity to give informed consent, andthat because of his mental illness, respondent "exhibits any one of thefollowing; [sic] deterioration of ability to function, suffering, threateningbehavior, or disruptive behavior." (Emphasis in original.) In examining thepetition, it is apparent that Dr. Nazareno underscored the terms "deteriorationof ability to function," "suffering," and "threatening behavior." By preparingthe form in this manner, we believe that it was Dr. Nazareno's intention toproceed on the petition by demonstrating that respondent suffered from a seriousmental illness and that he exhibited a deterioration of his ability to function,suffering, or threatening behavior. It would have been better practice to excisethe term "disruptive behavior" from the petition. Nevertheless, we cannot saythat the presence of the term in the petition rendered the pleading invalid.

Moreover, as respondent concedes, the trial court did not mention the"disruptive behavior" factor in making its decision. Instead, the court foundthat the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent hadexperienced a deterioration in his ability to function, was suffering, and haddisplayed threatening behavior. Thus, we fail to see how respondent wasprejudiced.

Next, respondent argues that the trial court's order must be reversedbecause the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence thatrespondent lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the proposedtreatment. More specifically, respondent asserts that the State failed topresent sufficient evidence that he was informed in writing about the risks andbenefits of the proposed course of medication.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, a court of appeals willreverse the fact finder's determination only if it is against the manifest weightof the evidence. In re Edward S., 298 Ill. App. 3d 162, 165 (1998). A trialcourt's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if theopposite conclusion is clearly evident. Edward S., 298 Ill. App. 3d at 165.

Section 2--107.1(a--5)(4)(E) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a--5)(4)(E)(West 2000)) provides that the State must prove by clear and convincing evidencethat the recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about theproposed course of treatment. Cathy M., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 341. To this end,the Code requires the proposed recipient's physician or the physician's designeeto advise the recipient "in writing[] of the side effects, risks, and benefitsof the treatment, as well as alternatives to the proposed treatment, to theextent such advice is consistent with the recipient's ability to understand theinformation communicated." 405 ILCS 5/2--102(a--5) (West 2000). If the patientis not informed of the side effects, risks, and benefits of the proposedinvoluntary treatment, the trial court order authorizing such treatment must bereversed. Cathy M., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 342; Edward S., 298 Ill. App. 3d at 166.

In both Cathy M. and Edward S., we reversed the trial court ordersauthorizing the administration of psychotropic medication because the Statefailed to present clear and convincing evidence that the respective respondentswere informed of the risks and the benefits of the proposed course of treatment. Cathy M., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 343; Edward S., 298 Ill. App. 3d at 166. In CathyM., the respondent was not given any written information regarding the proposedtreatment. Cathy M., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 342. In Edward S., there was hearsaytestimony regarding the contents of a note given to the respondent by a doctor. However, this court held that this evidence was insufficient to demonstrate thatthe State provided the respondent with the necessary information from which hecould make an informed decision. Edward S., 298 Ill. App. 3d at 166.

In contrast, the record discloses that Dr. Nazareno informed respondent inwriting about the side effects, risks, and benefits of the proposed involuntarytreatment. Dr. Nazareno testified that on several occasions he discussedpsychotropic medication with respondent. According to Dr. Nazareno, when hetried to discuss the drugs he wished to administer, respondent told him he didnot need the medication. Dr. Nazareno also testified that when he attempted togive respondent information regarding each drug, respondent told him that he"knows the medication." Dr. Nazareno testified that the last time he tried togive respondent information about the drugs was two or three weeks before thehearing. At that time, respondent stated that "he [did] not need it." Thus, itappears that each time Dr. Nazareno attempted to present respondent with writteninformation, respondent refused to accept the information. We cannot acceptrespondent's request that we reverse the trial court's order where his ownactions made it impossible for Dr. Nazareno to accomplish his statutory duties. See In re Barry B., 295 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1086 (1998). Based on this evidence,we cannot say that the trial court's order to administer psychotropic medicationwas against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Respondent next challenges the trial court's decision to appointpsychologist Leslie Kane as an independent examiner. Respondent asserts that thetrial court erred in qualifying Kane as an expert because she lacked sufficienteducation and training in the field of psychiatric medicine. Alternatively,respondent argues that the trial court should have limited Kane's testimony to"non-psychiatric subjects."

Whether an individual is an expert is a matter generally reserved to thesound discretion of the trial court. People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 186(1996). An individual will be allowed to testify as an expert where his or herexperience and qualifications provide him or her with knowledge that is notcommon to laypersons and where the testimony will aid the trier of fact inreaching its conclusions. People v. Henney, 334 Ill. App. 3d 175, 184 (2002). There is no precise requirement as to how the expert acquires specializedknowledge or experience. People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 104 (1994). An expertmay develop expertise through research, education, scientific study, training,practical experience, or a combination of each. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d at 186;Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 104. At least one court has concluded that an expert'seducation alone is sufficient to qualify him or her as an expert. In re J.J.,327 Ill. App. 3d 70, 79 (2001) (finding that trial court did not err inqualifying witness as an expert where witness had bachelor's and master's degreesin psychology and was working on his doctorate in the same field). We will notreverse the trial court's determination absent an abuse of discretion. Henney,334 Ill. App. 3d at 184.

Here, the record shows that Kane was not licensed to practice psychology. However, Kane testified that she performed the examination of respondent underthe supervision of a licensed clinical psychologist. Moreover, she testifiedregarding her education and experience. Kane had a bachelor's degree inpsychology and a master's degree in counseling psychology. At the time of thehearing, Kane was completing her eighth and final year in a doctorate program. While Kane was working towards her master's degree, she interned at a counselingagency where she worked with adolescents and their families. After completingher master's degree, Kane spent eight years at a community counseling centerwhere she performed crisis intervention counseling for juvenile delinquents. Kane also worked as an extern at the Kane County Diagnostic Center and the CookCounty jail. In September 2001, Kane started an internship at the Kane CountyDiagnostic Center. According to Kane, she has extensive experience withpsychiatric and psychological patients. In addition, Kane testified that she hadpreviously testified in court as an expert. The trial court qualified Kane asan expert because she had previously testified in court as an expert witness.

Although we do not necessarily agree that the fact that Kane previouslytestified as an expert in court was a sufficient basis to qualify her as anexpert on this occasion, we may affirm the result below on any basis that issupported by the record. Krilich v. American National Bank & Trust Co. ofChicago, 334 Ill. App. 3d 563, 573 (2002). In this case, we find that thecombination of Kane's education, training, and experience provided a valid basisto qualify her as an expert.

Moreover, we do not accept respondent's alternate argument that the trialcourt should have limited Kane's testimony to nonpsychiatric subjects. Asrespondent notes in his brief, the primary difference between a psychiatrist anda psychologist is that the former has the power to prescribe controlledsubstances while the latter does not. See People v. McDonald, 186 Ill. App. 3d1096, 1100 (1989). Here, although Kane testified that she believed that theadministration of psychotropic medications would benefit respondent, she did nottestify regarding the type or dosage of the psychotropic medications Dr. Nazarenowanted authorization to administer to respondent. Accordingly, we find that thetrial court's decision did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Respondent also claims that the admission of Kane's testimony deprived himof due process. According to respondent, the trial court should have appointeda psychiatrist as an independent examiner.

Section 3--804 of the Code governs independent examinations in mentalhealth proceedings. That provision provides in relevant part:

"The respondent is entitled to secure an independent examination bya physician, qualified examiner, clinical psychologist, or other expert ofhis choice. If the respondent is unable to obtain an examination, he mayrequest that the court order an examination to be made by an impartialmedical expert pursuant to Supreme Court Rules or by a qualified examiner,clinical psychologist or other expert." (Emphasis added.) 405 ILCS 5/3--804 (West 2000).

Whether the statute mandates the appointment of a psychiatrist is a question ofstatutory construction, which we review de novo. People v. Roake, 334Ill. App.3d 504, 510 (2002). The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertainand give effect to the legislature's intent. Regency Savings Bank v. Chavis, 333Ill. App. 3d 865, 867 (2002). Generally, the most reliable indicator oflegislative intent is the plain language of the statute. In re Kenneth F., 332Ill. App. 3d 674, 684 (2002). The plain language of section 3--804 of the Codedoes not require the trial court to appoint a psychiatrist as an independentexaminer. Rather, the statute allows the court to appoint an impartial medicalexpert pursuant to supreme court rules or a qualified examiner, clinicalpsychologist, or other expert. As we previously discussed, Kane was properlyqualified as an expert.

Despite the plain language of the statute, respondent insists that he wasdeprived of due process by the trial court's failure to appoint a psychiatristas his independent examiner. According to respondent, the trial court's decisionto appoint a psychologist effectively foreclosed any chance that he could obtaina judgment in his favor. Citing to In re Ashley K., 212 Ill. App. 3d 849 (1991),respondent contends that the trial court was required to accept the testimony ofthe State's psychiatric experts over any testimony by experts in the field ofpsychology that he presented.

In Ashley K., the trial court entered an order precluding the subject minorfrom undergoing any therapy and from visiting her former foster parents. In soacting, the trial court rejected the testimony of two child psychiatrists, Drs.Leventhal and Zinn, in favor of the testimony of two other individuals, theminor's therapist and Anne Brown, a licensed psychologist.

On appeal, the reviewing court noted that Brown was not a medical doctorand that at the time Brown testified, she had been a licensed psychologist foronly 3