JUSTICE GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court:

The respondent, Quinella W., appeals from the May 17, 2001,order of the circuit court of Kane County terminating his parentalrights to his minor child, Tinya W. On appeal, the respondentcontends that the State failed to prove his unfitness by clear andconvincing evidence. We affirm.

On April 28, 1999, the State filed a petition alleging thatTinya W. was a neglected minor. As the respondent's location wasnot known at this time, he was served notice of the petition bypublication. The respondent did not appear at the adjudicatoryhearing. After hearing the State's evidence, the trial courtadjudicated Tinya W. a neglected minor.

On July 26, 2000, the State filed a petition seeking toterminate the respondent's parental rights to Tinya W. Thepetition alleged that the respondent was unfit for the followingreasons: (1) he abandoned Tinya W. (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(a) (West2000)); (2) he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,concern, or responsibility as to Tinya W.'s welfare (750 ILCS50/1(D)(b) (West 2000)); (3) he deserted Tinya W. for more than thethree months preceding the commencement of the adoption proceeding(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(c) (West 2000)); (4) he failed to make reasonableprogress towards Tinya W.'s return within the nine months followingthe adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2000)); and(5) he manifested an intent to forego his parental rights byfailing to visit Tinya W. or to communicate with his caseworker(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(n) (West 2000)).

The trial court conducted a hearing on the State's petition onMay 17, 2001. At the hearing, Carrie Mackowiak was the onlywitness to testify. Mackowiak testified that she was the CatholicCharities caseworker who had been assigned to the case in April1999. At this time, Tinya W. was residing with the maternalgrandmother. The respondent's whereabouts were unknown. Mackowiakprepared a client service plan on May 14, 1999. The only task setfor the respondent was that he cooperate in being assessed forservices once he was located.

Mackowiak rated the respondent's compliance with the serviceplan between April 1999 and July 2000 as unsatisfactory. Mackowiaktestified that she conducted four diligent searches for therespondent during this time and that he could not be located. Aspart of her searches, Mackowiak examined the Putative FatherRegistry but found no match for the respondent's name.

While conducting a fifth search for the respondent in August2000, Mackowiak located the respondent after screening the publicaid rolls. After Mackowiak contacted respondent by letter, therespondent telephoned Mackowiak sometime near the end of August2000. Mackowiak did not testify as to the substance of thisconversation. After this conversation, there was no furthercommunication between the respondent and Mackowiak.

The record reveals that the respondent did appear before thetrial court on September 11, 2000, during a status hearing. Atthis hearing, the respondent agreed to undergo paternity tests. The respondent again appeared before the trial court on October 31,2000, at which time the trial court was advised that the paternitytests had revealed that the respondent was Tinya W.'s father. Thetrial court then appointed the public defender to represent therespondent at the proceedings. The respondent never again appearedin court and was not present at the hearing on the State's petitionfor the termination of parental rights.

Following the close of evidence, counsel for the respondentargued that the respondent could not be found unfit because he wasnever told by Tinya W.'s mother that he was the father of thechild. Counsel argued that it was impossible for the respondent toabandon a child who he did not know existed. For this same reason,counsel argued that it would be unreasonable to expect therespondent to show concern, interest, or responsibility for TinyaW.'s welfare.

The trial court rejected these arguments and found that theState had proved the respondent's unfitness by clear and convincingevidence. The trial court found that the respondent should haveknown of the possibility of the minor's conception as a result ofhis act of sexual intercourse. The trial court also found that therespondent was responsible for the consequences of his act ofsexual intercourse and was under an obligation to care, support,and nurture the child. The trial court concluded that thedefendant had not taken any steps to meet his obligations betweenthe time of the adjudication of neglect and the filing of theState's termination petition. The trial court therefore concludedthat the State had proved the allegations contained in itspetition.

In making its ruling, the trial court also noted that therespondent had failed to register his name with the Putative FatherRegistry maintained by the Department of Children and FamilyServices (750 ILCS 50/12.1 (West 2000)). The trial courtcommented:

"I believe that as a result of the act of sexual intercourse,that one must know or should know of the possibility of theconception of a child. And so, as the statute is structured,and as the putative father registry states, it is theobligation of the individual father in Illinois to register;and the reason that is done is so that in the future, if weneed to try to contact them concerning their child, that we*** can make that contact. And in this particular instance,the fact that [the respondent] did not follow through on theconsequences of his act of sexual intercourse with the motherdoes not alleviate him of his parental responsibilities tofollow through, care for and support and nurture the child."

Following a best interests hearing, the trial court found that itwas in Tinya W.'s best interest to terminate the respondent'sparental rights. This court subsequently granted the respondentleave to file a late notice of appeal.

The respondent's sole argument on appeal is that the trialcourt erred in terminating his parental rights. The respondentargues that the trial court erred in invoking the provisions of thePutative Father Registry contained in section 12.1 of the AdoptionAct (750 ILCS 50/12.1 (West 2000)) to terminate his parentalrights. The respondent argues that section 12.1 pertains only to the notification requirements in adoption proceedings and has noapplication in a proceeding to terminate parental rights broughtunder the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1--1 et seq.(West 2000)). Additionally, the respondent argues that hisconstitutional rights were violated when the trial court terminatedhis parental rights based upon conduct that occurred before therespondent was made aware of his paternity.

Parental rights and responsibilities, despite their societaland personal importance, may be terminated when a parent isadjudicated unfit pursuant to the statute. In re A.S.B., 293 Ill.App. 3d 836, 843 (1997). However, because each case involvingparental fitness is sui generis, courts generally do not makefactual comparisons to other cases. A.S.B., 293 Ill. App. 3d at843. To effectuate the termination of parental rights, the Stateneed prove only one statutory fact of unfitness by clear andconvincing evidence. A.S.B., 293 Ill. App. 3d at 843. In otherwords, a reviewing court need not consider other findings ofunfitness when there is sufficient evidence to satisfy any onestatutory ground. A.S.B., 293 Ill. App. 3d at 843. A finding ofparental unfitness is entitled to great deference on review andwill not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight ofthe evidence. A.S.B., 293 Ill. App. 3d at 843.

We agree with the respondent that it was improper for thetrial court to consider the respondent's failure to register hisname with the Putative Father Registry in making its fitnessdetermination. The registry was created by the provisions of theAdoption Act, and its purpose is to assist in the identificationand location of a putative father of a minor child who is, or whois expected to be, the subject of an adoption proceeding, in order"to provide notice of such proceeding to the putative father." 750ILCS 50/12.1 (West 2000). By failing to register within 30 daysafter a child's birth, a putative father is subsequently barredfrom bringing or maintaining any action to assert any interest inthe child. 750 ILCS 50/12.1(g) (West 2000). The registry wascreated by the legislature in order to bring finality to adoptionproceedings and to preclude a putative father from laterchallenging the legality of an adoption because he had no knowledgeof the proceeding. See In re Petition to Adopt O.J.M., 293 Ill.App. 3d 49, 67 (1997).

The instant case was not initiated under the Adoption Act, butwas instead brought as a neglect proceeding pursuant to theprovisions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1--1 etseq. (West 2000)). The respondent's identity was known from theonset of the proceeding, and the State subsequently filed apetition to terminate his parental rights. Therefore, the questionbefore the trial court was not whether the respondent had anyrights in an adoption proceeding but, instead, whether therespondent was an unfit parent and whether his parental rightsshould be terminated. See 705 ILCS 405/2--29 (West 2000). Thespecific grounds upon which a parent may be found unfit areprovided by statute. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2000). A putativefather's failure to register his name with the Putative FatherRegistry is not a statutory ground upon which the father may befound unfit. Accordingly, we believe that the trial court erred inconsidering this factor in rendering its fitness determination.

However, despite this error, we nonetheless believe that theevidence presented at the hearing supported the trial court'sfinding of unfitness. Here, the respondent has had no contactwhatsoever with Tinya W. from the date of her birth. Nor was anyevidence introduced demonstrating that the respondent provided anyfinancial support or otherwise expressed any interest in herwelfare. Such evidence certainly supports the trial court'sfindings that the respondent abandoned Tinya W. and failed todemonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern, orresponsibility for her welfare.

The respondent asserts that it was improper for the trialcourt to consider his conduct prior to the time that he wascontacted by Mackowiac, as he was not aware of his paternity duringthis time. Initially, we note that the respondent did not appearat the hearing and did not introduce any evidence demonstratingthat he was unaware of his paternity. However, even assuming thatthe respondent was unaware of his paternity, the case law does notsupport his argument. For example, in In re A.S.B., 293 Ill. App.3d 836, 844 (1997), a putative father argued that it was improperfor the trial court to terminate his parental rights because thenatural mother had misrepresented to him that he was not the fatherof the child. The father argued that he had been "thwarted" fromdemonstrating any interest, concern, or responsibility for hischild because he was not aware of the child's existence. A.S.B.,293 Ill. App. 3d at 844. The court rejected this argument, holdingthat the law imposed an unequivocal and substantial burden uponparents to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern, orresponsibility for their children. A.S.B., 293 Ill. App. 3d at844. The court explained that what a putative father believes inhis own mind is relevant only if he makes some effort to showinterest or concern for the child. A.S.B., 293 Ill. App. 3d at844; see also In re Adoption of A.S.V., 268 Ill. App. 3d 549, 558(1994); In re Adoption of J.R.G., 247 Ill. App. 3d 104, 110 (1993).

In this case, there is no evidence that the respondent evermade any effort to show any degree of interest, concern, orresponsibility for Tinya W.'s welfare. Indeed, there is noevidence appearing in the record indicating that the respondenttook any interest in Tinya W. even after he purportedly firstlearned of her existence. As already noted, the respondent was notpresent at the hearing on the State's petition to terminate hisparental rights. In the absence of any effort on the respondent'spart, we cannot conclude that he has evinced a reasonable degree ofinterest in Tinya W. See A.S.B., 293 Ill. App. 3d at 844. As theevidence supported at least one of the grounds of unfitness allegedby the State, we hold that the juvenile court did not err interminating the respondent's parental rights.

Finally, the respondent briefly maintains that hisconstitutional right to due process was violated when the trialcourt's fitness determination was predicated upon conduct thatoccurred before he was provided any services to correct hisparental shortcomings. However, the respondent has insufficientlyarticulated his argument to facilitate our review of this issue inviolation of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (188 Ill. 2d R.341(e)(7)). Although the respondent cites to Santosky v. Kramer,455 U.S. 745, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982) and variousprovisions of the Juvenile Court Act, he does not explain how theseauthorities establish a constitutional violation in the instantcase. We are therefore unable to respond to this argument and findthat it has been waived. See Vernon Hills III Limited Partnershipv. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 287 Ill. App. 3d 303, 311(1997).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Kane County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and BYRNE, JJ., concur.